remember Mr. Horne Tooke's saying of intellectual philosophy, that he had become better acquainted with the country through having had the good luck, sometimes, to lose his way-"Si non errâsset fecerat "ille minùs"

Το you, it is altogether needless to add one word as to the probable advantages of such a laborious pursuit of first principles, being so well aware, as you are, that to begin at the beginning in the sciences, as well as in matters of fact, is the nearest and safest road to the end. Even sensible men are too commonly satisfied with tracing their thoughts a little way backwards, and they are, of course, soon perplexed by a profounder adversary. In this respect, most people's minds are too like a child's garden, where the flowers are planted without their roots. It may be said of morals and of literature, as truly as of sculpture and painting, that to understand the outside of human nature, we should be well acquainted with the inside, and you can handle the anatomist's knife, as well as the artist's pencil.

TO SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH.

January 30, 1831.

As your Dissertation must, undoubtedly, be published separately, I hope it will be done without

delay, and I am anxious that you should render it complete. This will cost you but little trouble and will require but a short addition.

I have now read it attentively for the second time, and I feel it to be merely justice to say, that I think it by far the most profound and convincing work on Ethics that I have ever met with. In saying so much, I am aware that I am giving it no less than the praise of being the best book on the best subject in all philosophy. Are you content?

At the same time, let me own, that I think its value would be greatly increased by a short statement of your own view of MORAL OBLIGATION. This will be little more than an abridgement of scattered passages in your Dissertation. Were it

otherwise, I should be disinclined to withdraw your attention from more pressing and, I fear, more engaging pursuits.

So much of our happiness inevitably depends on the conduct of others, that it has been a serious inquiry, in all times, by what rules we should be guided in our mutual intercourse. Indeed, to man only it belongs to know what should be as well as what is.

Few differences of opinion have existed respecting these rules, and none but such as can easily be reconciled, or accounted for; but, far otherwise is the case when it has been asked, "What is a good action ? " "Why ought we to seek the well-being "of others as well as of ourselves?"

The answers given you are well acquainted with, and they have been enumerated by writers of great learning and of much acuteness. To you, therefore, I shall only say, that it appears to me indisputable that benevolent intention and beneficial tendency must combine to constitute the moral goodness of an action. To do as much good, and as little evil as we

can, is the brief and intelligible principle that comprehends all subordinate maxims. Both good tendency and good will are indispensable; for conscience may be erroneous as well as callous, may blunder as well as sleep. Perhaps, a man cannot be thoroughly mischievous unless he is honest.

In truth, practice is also necessary, since it is one thing to see that a line is crooked, and another thing to be able to draw a straight one. It is not quite so easy to do good as those may imagine who never try.

Neither can it be disputed, I think, that our understanding, our reason (call it which you will) must be judge, in the last resort, of every moral quality, be that whatever it may be, which urges us to act, to approve, or to condemn. Yet, fortunately, we have not been left entirely, nor chiefly, to the cold decisions of our intellect. Far readier and stronger motives push us on, than the tardy results of rational calculation. Yes! feelings have ever blended with convictions in forming our habitshabits, beside which, nothing is a sufficiently prompt and effectual cause of action in human nature.

Virtue thus soon becomes perfectly disinterestedsoon so much a feeling as scarcely to seem also a principle: nor is the hypothesis of what is called the moral sense necessary; if, by that term, be meant any faculty innate and instinctive. Once formed, the composition is indissoluble; the current is one, though fed by a thousand springs.

I am fully sensible, too, that the end sought for is seldom or never the immediate stimulus to action. Now, in what manner habits spring up and

grow is no secret to you, nor to any person acquainted with that law of our nature which is called Association by Hartley, Suggestion by Brown, and Sequence by Mill. The first has traced them to their sources.

With you, I regret that no term, yet employed, indicates the singleness of the compound, when once the ingredients have been blended.

Thus far, probably, no real difficulty occurs; but where is to be found a short, clear, and satisfactory explanation of the obligatoriness of moral conduct? Certainly not in Paley. Yet it must ever have been unspeakably desirable to ascertain what is meant by