17. Interested Party.-Under the settled law of North Carolina, that a notary public in taking acknowledgment of a deed and making privy examination of the maker's wife, is performing a judicial function, and that if he is an interested party he is disqualified and the probate a nullity, a trust deed executed by bankrupt and his wife in favor of a bank and probated before a notary, who was a stockholder and assistant cashier of the bank, held invalid as against bankrupt's trustee.-Boone v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, U. S. D. C., 285 Fed.

183.

18. Knowledge of Insolvency.—A contract whereby a wholesale dealer sold flour and lard to his customers in excess of their storage facilities, to protect them against an expected increase in price, and agreed to deliver the goods in the future, if the buyers would sign trade acceptances payable at the time of delivery, was an agreement for sale, and not a lending of the buyers' credit to the wholesaler, so that the buyers were entitled to the goods after the bankruptcy of the wholesaler. if there had been a delivery thereof to the buyers at a time when they had no knowledge of the wholesaler's insolvency.-Willen v. Schillicci, U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 12.

19.- -Name.-The Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. §§ 9585-9656), does not require a bankrupt corporation to list its corporate name as a part of its assets, nor does such name pass to creditors subject to the payment of debts, and the rule is not affected by Ky. St. § 562, allowing the purchaser of a corporation's franchise and property to organize a new corporation, with the rights, privileges and franchises of the corporation.-TheobaldJansen Electric Co. v. Harry I. Wood E. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 29

20. Preferences.-That a creditor took back goods sold to bankrupt at the sale price, though at the time they were worth but half such price in the market, held sufficient to warrant a finding that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that bankrupt was insolvent and that the transfer would effect a preference.-Bossak & Co. v. Coxe, U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 147.

21. Preference.-Where the evidence before the court when it disallowed a claim, except on surrender of a payment received within four months, was sufficient to support a finding that the payment constituted voidable preference. whether or not the findings of the referee established every element of a preference is immaterial. -Blair & Hughes Co. v. Bransford, U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 34.

a

22. -Priority.-Under Bankruptcy Act, § 64a (Comp. St. § 9648), taxes legally due and owing by bankrupt are entitled to priority of payment over all contract debts, including claims for wages given priority over other debts by subdivision b(4).-In Re Kittenplan, U. S. D. C., 285 Fed. 62.

23. Railroad Claim.-At the time of its bankruptcy a corporation had certain lumber in course of transportation by the Railroad Administration. which unloaded the lumber on its own ground and several months later sold it. Held that, while demurrage until unloading, and the cost of unloading were proper claims against the estate, a charge for storage as demurrage and at the demurrage rate after bankruptcy was not allowable as a prior or preferential claim or debt due the United States, under Rev. St. § 3466 (Comp. St. § 6372); also that the Director General was chargeable with the fair value of the lumber at the time of bankruptcy.In Re Stork Contractors' Export Corporation, U. S. D. C., 285 Fed. 438.

24. Bills and Notes-Indorser.-Under Rev. St. art. 1843, where the maker of a note was insolvent and his residence unknown, the failure of a holder to promptly bring suit does not release indorser.Blucher v. Meuly, Tex., 247 S. W., 391.

25. Negotiability.-A certificate of deposit certifying that the named person has deposited a certain sum payable to the order of the named person in current funds in six months from date on return of the certificate properly indorsed is a negotiable instrument, and transferable by indorsement in the same manner and with the same legal result as other negotiable paper.-Clark v. Holder, Tex., 247 S. W. 699.

26. Notice.-Where a check was given for the purchase of a note not due on February 26, after notice on March 16 of seller's alleged defect in title to the note, buyer held not guilty of bad faith in not stopping payment on the check, where there was no evidence that he knew it had not been paid.-Reitherman v. Wheeler, Mo., 247 S. W. 222.

27. Carriers of Goods-Penalties.-Crawford & Moses' Dig. § 937, providing for a continuing daily penalty of $2 against an express company for fail ure to pay the value of goods lost in transit with 20 days after notice of their loss, is unconstitutional, the penalty being exorbitant and unreasonable for the reason the statute leaves it to the discretion of the owner of the lost goods to bring suit at any time within the period of the statute of limitations.-American Ry. Express Co. v. Bratton Ark., 247 S. W. 379.

28. Carriers of Passengers-Sleeping Passenger -There is no duty upon the part of a railroad company to awaken a passenger who has fallen asleep in a chair car in order to advise him that his destination has been reached, and to enable him to alight there.-Newton v. Okmulgee Wholesale Grocery Co., Okla., 212 Pac. 422.

29.

Commerce-Garnishment and AttachmentThe effect on interstate commerce of garnishment and attachment proceedings, authorized by a state statute, is too remote to be objectionable.-Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, U. S. C. C. A. 285 Fed. 369.

30.-Interstate.-Sale of goods through traveling salesman of a manufacturer whose principal place of business was in another state, where it was engaged in the manufacture, such solicitors receiving the orders and sending them to the other states when the goods so ordered were shipped. constituted "Interstate commerce."-Chariton Säk Co. v. Jones, Calif., 212 Pac. 203.

31.

Conspiracy-Labor Union.-Where an employer's business was operated in a normal and usual manner and to a normal extent, and the places of all union men who had left had been filled, and strike benefits had not been paid for some time, a strike was ended, within G. Le 150, § 4; but, even if it was still pending, the members of a labor union had no right to interfere with the employer's business, for the illegal purpose of forcing it to abandon the making of individual contracts with its employees.-Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, Mass., 137 N. E. 919.

32. Constitutional Law-Contracts.-Though the remedy for enforcement of a contract may be se far a part of the contract as to be within the protection of Const. art. 1, § 10, prohibiting a state from impairing the obligation of a contract, it not necessarily so, and the Legislature may modify or change existing remedies, or prescribe new modes of procedure, if a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is given.-Conley v. Barton U. S. S. C., 43 Sup. Ct. 238.

33. Contracts-Labor.-A contract between landlord and tenant that labor in the neighborhood should not be employed by the landlord at all, bat

to be employed by the tenant in harvesting his crops held against public policy, as it forced the labor to be employed by the tenant at his own priceWinthrop v. Allen, S. C., 115 S. E. 745.

34.

ized under the laws of South Carolina has a right Corporations-Books.-A corporation organto transact business and to use certain of its books outside the state, and the law does not, either expressly or impliedly, require performance of the impossible condition that all books of a domestic foreign corporation doing business In a foreign state or county shall be kept at all times within the state.-Self v. Langley Mills, S. C., 115 SE

754.

35. Claims

Against Receivers.-Subscriptions by a business corporation to educational institutions, authorized by the directors, where there was a reasonable probability of direct benefit to the corporation from the activities of the institutions by other corporations, held within the corporate aided and where similar subscriptions were made powers and valid, and receivers of the corpora

tion, in the absence of objection by creditors or stockholders, authorized to allow the claims of the beneficiaries as general creditors.-Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., U. S. D. C., 285 Fed. 58.

36. Charter.-The user by a corporation of the charter and by-laws procured for it by an attorney under contract with its promoters is not per se an adoption of the ratification of the promoters' contract, since the corporation had no option to accept or refuse the benefits of the contract.Kridelbaugh v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., Iowa, 191 N. W. 803.

37.- -Directors.-Under Gen. Corp. Law, § 9, requiring that the business of corporations be managed by a board of not less than three directors, a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum, four directors of a corporation having a board of nine did not constitute a quorum, and hence could not elect a director to fill one of two vacancies, though a by-law provided that, if the office of one or more directors became vacant, the remaining directors should elect a successor, whether or not section 30, providing that any vacancy in the board shall be filled by it, unless otherwise provided in the by-laws, conveys authority to place such power, when taken away from the board, in others than the stockholders; there being still a full statutory quorum of the board in office.Mecleary v. John S. Mecleary, Inc., Dela., 119 Atl.

557.

38. -Expenditures.-A corporation, which majority stockholder in another corporation. through a reorganization plan, has acquired all the stock of the reorganized company, but has been required by the court to make a pro rata distribution of the new stock among the minority stockholders of the old corporation, on payment by them of their proportionate share of unsecured debts of the old corporation which it has paid to effect the reorganization, is entitled to charge only its actual expenditures in that behalf, and not the face value of the claims discharged, and has the burden of proof to show the amount of such actual expenditures.-Bogert v. Southern Pac. Co., U. S. D. C., 285 Fed. 46.

39-Fraud.-The failure of stockholders to examine the corporate records and books and thus acquire knowledge of the wrongful acts of the corporate officers and directors is not to be attributed to their negligence, for they have a right to assume that the officers and directors will be faithful to their trust, and hence, where the fact that the directors in September, 1911, fraudulently voted themselves stock of the corporation contrary to Const. art. 9, § 3, did not become known to the stockholders until a receiver was appointed on February 17, 1919, laches could not antedate the appointment of the receiver.-Cahall v. Burbage, Dela., 119 Atl. 574.

40. Interstate Commerce.-A foreign corporation having no stock of goods in Missouri was not doing business in that state, in violation of Rev. St. 1919, § 9792, in selling goods, manufactured and kept in other states. through solicitors who took orders in Missouri, but sent them in to the company's home office; its business being interstate commerce.-J. B. Colt Co. v. Watson, Mo., 247 S. W. 493.

41. Customs and Usages-Sugar.-Where, in the exportation of sugar from the port of New York, "sugar in bags" was understood by shippers to mean granulated sugar in bags, a contract for the shipment of "sugar in bags" must be interpreted in the light of this understanding, and did not cover cube sugar in bags, which was customarily carried at ship's option weight or measurement.-Minford v. Moore & McCormack Co., U. S. D. C., 285 Fed. 207.

42. Easements Necessary.-Where lane used by landowner in going to the different tracts into which his heirs partitioned the land was absolutely necessary to the use of one of such tracts, and reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of others, the owners of such tracts had a right to use a way thereover as an appurtenance to their tracts.-Kaiser v. Somers, Ind., 138 N. E. 20.

43. Electricity-Ordinary Care.-Assuming that a boy was a trespasser as to the owner of land on which he was gathering walnuts and over which

47. Insurance-Amount Recoverable.-In a policy insuring an automobile against damage by collision or loss or damage by fire, a provision that the liability of the insurer shall be reduced by the amount of any property loss or damage until repairs have been completed or parts replaced, when it shall attach for the amounts originally written, does not reduce the amount of insurance against loss by fire after a collision by the total amount paid as loss resulting from the collision until all repairs have been completed and all parts replaced but, in the event of a fire occurring after some of the repairs had been completed and liability incurred therefor, insured can recover the full loss less the cost of completing the repairs.-Honey v. Pacific Automobile Indemnity Exch., Calif., 212 Pac. 199.

48.- -Authority.-Payments entered in receipt book in apparent due course of business, and by the same officer who acknowledged the beneficiary's first payment, were exercise or continuation of initial authority, and the acceptance of the benefits by the society was sufficient to induce the member reasonably to believe that the authority continued to receive subsequent premiums.-Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Reed, Ala., 94 So. 910.

49.-Rider.-Heim V. American Alliance Insurance Co.. 147 Minn. 283, 180 N. W. 225, 1022. to the effect that a fire insurance company may not use a rider upon the standard form of insurance policy prescribed by statute which provides for any method of determining liability that results in limiting the same at less than the actual loss and less than the amount insured, followed and applied.-Brecher Furniture Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., Minn., 191 N. W. 912.

50. Time of Suit.-A condition in a policy of insurance providing that no recovery shall be had thereon unless suit is brought within a given time is valid unless the time prescribed can be said to be unreasonable. or the limitation is rendered inoperative by statute.-Schlitz v. Lowell Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Vt., 119 Atl. 516.

51. Intoxicating Liquors-Aboard Ship.-A ship of American registry at sea or within a foreign port is within the scope of the Eighteenth Amendment and of National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, § 3, as supplemented by Act Nov. 23, 1921, § 3.-International Mercantile Marine v. Stuart, U. S. D. C., 285 Fed.

79.

52. Penalties.-While the state, when legislating for the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, has no power to depart from the construction of its meaning adopted by Congress and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, yet it may provide such penalties as it may déem proper for breaches of its own laws, though such penalties

53. Landlord and Tenant-Lease Construed. Where under a lease containing a provision against assignment, but allowing the lessor the "privilege to take in partners to operate a moving picture theater," a partnership is formed, and thereafter the lessor sells his interest in it to another partner without any mention of the lease, which was still in his name, held that his act did not constitute a breach of the covenant; the lease being most strictly construed against the lessor.-Hunter v. Johns, Pa., 119 Atl. 605.

54.

Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk.The Safety Appliance Acts (Comp. St. § 8605 et seq.), which were intended to promote the safety of employees and travelers, and section 8 of which (Comp. St § 8612) eliminated assumption of risk in case of a violation covering any employee of any common carrier who may be injured, was not limited in the case of a defective coupling to an employee who was in the act of coupling or uncoupling the cars, but covers liability for injury to an employee whose duties in carrying water required him to cross numerous tracks on which were strings of freight cars, and who was injured while climbing over the bumpers when other cars collided with the string, because the coupler between them and the rest of the train broke.Keenan v. Director General of Railroads, U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 286.

55.-Employee.-One using his own wagon and team in hauling coal from a coal company's mine and delivering the coal to its customers. held an employee of the mine company.-Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Moore, Ind., 137 N. E. 887.

56. Negligence Per Se.-The employment of a boy under 14 years in violation of the statute (Pa. St. 1920, § 13286 is negligence per se, and the employer is liable for any injury in the course of the employment, regardless of negligence, and this liability exists where the employment is by an agent acting within the scope of his authority, express or implied.-Faiola v. Calderone, Pa., 119 Atl. 539.

57. On Duty.-An employee in the morning brought a helper engine from the roundhouse to the station and turned it over to the crew of a freight train at 8:15. At 2:45 p. m., when the train reached a point 36 miles distant, he was required to again take charge of the engine and return it. In the meantime he had no duties to perform, but rode deadhead in the caboose. Held, that during such time he was not "on duty," within the meaning of Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8678).-United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 285 Fed. 152.

58.- -Relation Broken.-An employee, who unnecessarily leaves his employment and assumes a position of peril for his own pleasure or convenience, ceases to be an employee for the time being, and becomes either a trespasser or at best a mere licensee. This is true where an employee leaves his place of work and goes to another part of employer's premises which is not intended for his use.-Gypsy Oil Co. v. Ginn., Okla., 212 Pac. 314.

59. Time of Claim.-That an employee, who claimed that the employer owed him for overtime. which was not included in periodical pay checks issued, waited for six months. after his last pay check before communicating with the employer as to his claim for overtime, did not bar his recovery. although it affected the weight and credibility of his testimony.-Yardley v. Iowa Electric Co., Iowa, 191 N. W. 791.

60. Municipal Corporations-Breach of Contract. -Within a contract with a city extending the time for completion of the work in case the contractor shall be actually and necessarily delayed by any strike not caused, instituted, or provoked by him or his agents, a strike due to the failure of the

contractor to pay the wages essential to keep the work going is not one resulting in necessary delay. but one caused or provoked by the contractor if such wages are reasonable in amount and cheaper labor cannot be obtained at the prevailing market rates.-McGovern v. City of New York, N. Y., 138 N. E. 26.

61. Railroads-Authority of Servant.-A railroad company is liable for the tort of its servant committed within the general scope of the latter's employment, even though the servant in committing the tort exceed his authority; and it is immaterial whether he exceed his authority knowingly or ignorantly.-Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Cornelius, Miss., 95 So. 90.

62. Fair Doubt.-When contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense to an action for damages for personal injuries sustained on a highway at a crossing where there were two main line railroad tracks, and it was shown that a passing freight train on one of the tracks obstructed plaintiff's view of the other track and of an approaching passenger train, by which he was struck. plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury if there is a fair doubt as to the inferences to be drawn from the admitted facts with respect to his alleged negligence.-McCarty v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., Minn., 191 N. W. 819.

63. Sales-Acceptance.-In an action for the price of goods sold, plea alleging that plaintiff shipped more goods than were ordered, and defendant subsequently agreed to retain the extra goods and pay for them after those ordered had been sold, and when the extra goods were needed. and that those ordered had not all been sold, held to state no defense.-O. B. Andrews Co. v. Dorsett, Ga., 115 S. E. 772.

64. Illegal.-Under Act May 3, 1915 (St. 1915, p. 328), declaring the sale of citrus fruit, 15 per cent or more of which shows a marked drying in 20 per cent or more of the exposed pulp, a misdemeanor a seller delivering fruit, pursuant to an executory contract for the sale of his entire crop, after discovering that it was frosted to such extent, cannot recover the contract price, though the agreement was valid when made; Act May 24, 1917, § 11a (St. 1917. p. 912), prohibiting the sale of citrus fruit, except on trees, if "frozen to the extent of injuring the reputation of the citrus industry of the state," which is unconstitutional for the same reason as Act June 3, 1921 (St. 1921. p. 1234), and Act May 27, 1919, § 9 (St. 1919. p. 1225), only purporting to supplement and not repealing, expressly or impliedly. the Act of 1915MacRae v. Heath, Calif., 212 Pac. 228.

65. -Warranties.-In an action for the balance due on the purchase price of a cotton cleaner, purchased under a contract containing the provision. "twenty days use of cleaner will be conclusive evidence of fulfillment of warranty and accept ance," where it appeared that such cleaner had been used several months before any objection was made to it, held, that a directed verdict for plaintiff was proper.-Coleman v. Williams & Miller. Ark., 247 S. W. 75.

66.

Searches and Seizures-Affidavit.—An affidavit, which merely states that the affiant has information that a certain state of case exists. is not sufficient for issuing a search warrant.-Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 247 S. W. 3.

67.

Waters and Water Courses-Absque Injuria. An upper owner may reasonably drain his surface waters into a natural water course, as required by good husbandry, and may exercise this right without qualification or limit, and if he thereby increases the flow of the stream beyond its capacity resulting in flooding and damaging a lower owner such damage is damnum absque injuria for which no right of action lies, especially where the overflow is due to the fact that other owners also ex ercised their right to drain into the stream.-Board of Drain. Com'rs, Etc., v. Board of Drain. Com'rs Etc., Miss., 95 So. 75.

68.

-Nuisance.-The condition arising from erecting a shed so that the rain drains therefrom against and damages the wall of a building of an adjoining landowner constitutes Harms v. Kuchta, Md., 119 Atl. 454.

a

nuisance.

Central Law Journal

St. Louis, June 5, 1923

PROVISIONS IN AUTOMOBILE POLICIES AGAINST RENTING AND USE FOR HIRE

Under the provisons of a Missouri statute that a warranty in a policy of insurance. which is not material to the risk, shall be considered merely a representation, it was held that a policy insuring an automobile against fire and containing a warranty that the machine would not be used for hire, was not forfeited by the machine being used for hire on one or two occasions, it not being used for hire at the time it was burned. As applied to the loss, the provision referred to was not a warranty and was not material to the risk. This case follows the rule established by other Missouri cases, that, "Temporary non-compliance with provisions of the policy, unless such provision is a warranty, will not work a forfeiture, if there was compliance at the time of the loss (Berryman v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 199 Mo. App. 503, 204 S. W. 738 [1918]).

In North Carolina, the rule is laid down that in construing a policy of automobile fire insurance, with express provision that the automobile "will not be rented or used for passenger service of any kind for hire except by special consent of the company indorsed on the policy," a single act of renting or using the car for hire, by an employee of the owner without his knowledge, will not be held in itself to be such a breach of the owner's warranty as will forfeit the insurance. In this case the owner was suing on a policy of the kind mentioned to recover for the loss of his car, which had been burned. Immediatey before the loss his employee, without his knowledge, had used the car for hire to others, but the loss occurred thereafter, and while the car was being returned, after

some repairs were made on it, to the owner's garage under his directions. There was no evidence that the outward trip had any direct bearing upon the loss, or increased the risk at the time of the loss. It was held that the loss did not fall within the intent and meaning of the prohibitive clause of the policy so as to work a forfeiture. It will be noted that the Court seems to have treated this provision as a warranty, although allowing the insured to recover (Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37, Ann. Cas. 1917 D 50 [1915]).

A clause in an automobile insurance poliey provided that, "It is warranted by the insured that the automobile hereby insured, during the term of this policy, shall not be used for carrying passengers for compen sation, and that it shall not be rented or leased." It was held that this constituted a promissory, as distinguished from an affirmative, warranty, an unjustified breach of which by the insured prevents recovery, without regard to whether the prohibitive. use increased the risk. The Court defines an affirmative warranty as one that affirms the existence of certain facts at the time of the insurance, and a promissory warranty is one requiring the performance or the omission of certain things after taking out the insurance (Orient Ins. Co. v. Van Zandt-Bruce Drug Co., 50 Okla. 558, 151 Pac. 323 [1915]).

In Texas it has been held that the clause, "that the automobile hereby insured during the term of this policy shall not be used for carrying passengers for compensation," etc., was intended to mean that the automobile should not be continuously used for that purpose for any length of time, or, in other words, the owner should not make a business of using said automobile for carrying passengers for hire, and it was evidently never contemplated that the casual use of it would work a forfeiture of the policy. Accordingly, use of the machine by the owner's son, without

the owner's knowledge, on two or three afternoons during a fair, for carrying passengers for hire to and from the fair grounds, did not work a forfeiture of the policy. This clause in the policy stated that it was a warranty, and contained a provision that violation of any warranty in the policy rendered the policy immediately null and void. However, according to the construction of the clause by the Court, there was no violation of the provision. Consequently, whether or not the provision amounted to a warranty, was a question not necessary to be decided (Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Hill, Tex. Civ. App., 167 S. W. 1095 [1914]).

A provision of this kind in an automobile fire insurance policy, issued to the mortgagor and mortgagee of the machine, as their respective interests might appear, applies to both the mortgagor and mortgagee, and where the car was used mainly, if not entirely, for livery purposes by the mortgagor, there could be no recovery under the policy (Marmon Chicago Co. v. Heath, 205 Ill. App. 605 [1917]).

In an action to recover on a policy insuring an automobile against loss or damage by fire, which policy contained a provision warranting that the automobile would not be used for carrying passengers for hire or be leased and that, if the warranty were violated, the policy would "immediately become null and void," it appeared that six months after the policy was issued the owner permitted his son to use the automobile to carry passengers for hire. It was held that the policy at once ceased to be in force upon such use of the car, and that the owner could not recover upon it for damage to the automobile by fire occurring eleven and a half months after it was issued. It was further held that the owner was not entitled to a return of any premium paid on the policy, as the policy had attached and only by his own act was he deprived of its full benefit

(Elder v. Federal Ins. Co., 213 Mass. 389, 100 N. E. 655 [1913]).

At the time this case was decided, and during all the time in question, there was a statute in force in Massachusetts providing as follows: "No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of a contract or policy of insurance by the assured or in his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive or unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss." The Court held that, "having been inserted in the body of the policy, the warranty was not dependent upon the negotiations embodied in the application and final issuance of the contract of insurance," and that, accordingly, the statute quoted was inapplicable.

MUNICIPALITY CANNOT BE

LIBELED

Mr. Charles J. Dolan, in an article appearing in the Central Law Journal for May 20, 1923 (96 C. L. J. 168), discusssed the case of City of Chicago v. The Tribune Co. (307 Ill. 595). From this case we learn that one may with impunity publish false and malicious statements regarding a municipality with intent to destroy its credit and financial standing. The only limitation to which the press is subjected, is stated by the Court thus: "Where any person, by speech or writing, seeks to persuade others to violate existing law or to overthrow, by force or other unlawful means, the existing government, he may be punished, but all other utterances or publications against the government must be considered absolutely privileged."

In the case mentioned, which was decided on demurrer to the declaration, the criticism was more than mere criticism of the officials in office. It was partly directed at the corporate entity, which the Court