but where, as in the case discussed, there was no issue which affected a woman, the ladies who insisted on retaining their places in the jury box seem to have shown rather an excess of zeal in the performance of public duty. In point of fact no woman should be required to serve on a jury against her will. In other words, female jury service should be perfectly voluntary. Solicitors' Journal (Eng.).

SUICIDE COMPACTS

Mr. Justice Lush has recently performed a very real public service in boldly counseling juries to disregard the archaic technicalities of our law and refuse to convict of murder the survivor of two would-be suicides who have entered into a joint compact to take their lives. That such a survivor is guilty of murder, according to the strict rule of our Common Law, there is no possibility of doubt; but the ground on which it rests is a little uncertain. Where two persons, A and B, take part in the murder of C, A handing an axe and B felling the victim with it, they are obviously principals in the first degree, for each takes an essential part in the actual homicide. Where A bars a door to prevent assistance arriving, while B does the deed, they are equally principals, but B is now a principal in the first degree and A in the second-for A was only present as an aiding party on the scene of the crime, he did not take a direct part in it. Again, where A counsels or incites B to commit the crime and B does it, A is an accessory before the fact. Also, when A and B conspire to murder C, and A carries out the conspiracy by committing the murder, the better opinion is that B, as well as A, is guilty of murder. In all these cases both A and B are equally guilty of murder; an elaborate discussion of the origin of this rule will be found in Chapter 22 of Stephen's "History of the Criminal Law". Again, when B commits suicide he is in law guilty of self-murder. Hence when A and B conspire together to commit a joint suicide, A and B are jointly guilty of the murder of B, if in fact B succeeds in killing himself. All this is unanswerable logic, but one may reasonably doubt whether it is also common sense. For, after all, in murder the victim does not assent to his killing, and although the law may refuse to treat consent to a crime by the victim as a justification of the crime, yet it does affect the moral category of the act. Indeed, our whole law of murder requires revision in the light of modern ideas.-Solitors' Journal (Eng.), Nov. 25, '22.

BOOK REVIEW

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INHERITANCE TAXATION

A copy of the third edition of this book, by Messrs, Gleason and Otis, has been received from the publishers, Mathew Bender & Co., of Albany and New York City. No doubt many are already familiar with this comprehensive work on this interesting subject to the profession. Certainly those engaged in this field of the law should have this volume for reference, since it deals completely with all phases of the subject, with particular attention devoted to New York State procedure.

The text, after the customary Introduction and Table of Cases, is divided into six major parts, dealing at length with the nature of the inheritance tax, transfers subject to the tax, the parties affected thereby, as well as the property, the procedure followed in general in New York in the inventory of estates, their valuation and fixation of the tax and, finally, a review (a) of the various State satutes on the subject, (b) the Federal statutes, viz., the Act of 1916, with amendments, followed by the new Treasury Department regulations relating the estate tax (Regulations No. 63), and (c) the New York statutes down to the present law effective July, 1921.

The Appendix includes a list of State inheritance tax officials, with addresses; list of the several Federal Internal Revenue Divisions, with statement of territory embraced and Division offices; list of corporations affected by transfer tax laws of state of incorporation; New York State inheritance tax forms; brief survey of transfer tax legislation by the several States and subject index to the volume.

IN BAD COMPANY

When a vote is to be taken on some important measure, a Congressman who cannot be present "pairs" himself with some Representative who would vote "aye" to the Congressman's "nay," or vice versa. Once a Democratic member of the House received a letter from an active politician of that party in his district, calling attention to the fact that he was reported in the Congressional Record almost every day as being "paired" with a Republican. "I don't doubt your loyalty to the party," read the letter; "but I think the boys would like it a good deal better if you paired with Democrats instead of Republicans."-Harper's Magazine.

DIGEST.

Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this Digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Alabama California

Delaware

.70 .7, 19 .28 ..39 .20

..44, 57, 58, 59, 66 .6, 60 ....13, 55, 56, 61 ..15 .30 .9, 52 ..36, 37, 51 53 .3 .41, 68 .27, 50 ...2, 8, 23, 26 .....10, 14, 33, 69 .54 ..22, 45, 46, 48 ......11, 29

.67 ..5, 12, 16, 24, 25, 31, 32, 42, 47, 49 ....1, 18, 21, 34, 40, 43, 64, 71 ..4, 17, 35, 38, 63

.....62, 65

Agriculture-Laborer's Lien. Under Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 1188, 1190, a laborer was entitled to a laborer's lien on a crop, though he did his work during one calendar year and the crop was harvested the succeeding calendar year.-Myers Tuval, Wash., 209 Pac. 1087.

V.

2. Ambassadors and Consuls-Immunity -A consul duly appointed to the United States by a foreign country, but whose exequatur has been revoked, is not within Judicial Code U. S. § 256 (U. S. Comp. St. § 1233) subd. 8, granting immunity against state court proceedings to ambassadors and consuls.-Savic v. City of New York, N. Y., 196 N. Y. S. 442.

3. Assignments - Negotiable Instrument.-In view of Negotiable Instruments Act (Rev. Codes 1921, §§ 8534, 8596), a check is not an assignment pro tanto of the drawer's deposit so as to give the holder a right of action against the bank if payment is refused, unless the bank has certified or accepted the check.-Stankey V. Citizens' Nat. Bank, Mont., 209 Pac. 1054.

4. Automobiles-Agency -Where one owns and maintains an automobile for the comfort, convenience, pleasure, entertainment and recreation of his family and entrusts its management to any member thereof, such member will be regarded as the agent or servant of the owner, and he will be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by a third person from the negligent management of such machine on the public roads by such agent or servant.-Aggleson v. Kendall, W. Va., 114 S. E.

454.

5. Damages.-Evidence of a witness of automobile's value before accident, and of owner showing market value afterwards, justifies finding damages in difference between these amounts.-St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Price, Texas, 244 S. W. 642.

6. -Insurable Interest.-In action on automobile theft policy requiring the insured to have "the unconditional and sole ownership of the automobile," the plaintiff was required to establish his insurable interest in the property by proof that he had the unconditional and sole ownership of the automobile.-Hessen v. Iowa Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., Iowa, 190 N. W. 150.

7. Negligence Per Se.-Driving an automobile on left side of highway when approaching another vehicle coming in the opposite direction is negligence per se (Stats. 1917, pp. 382, 401).-Blackwell v. American Film Co., Calif., 209 Pac. 999.

8- -Registration.-Highway Law, § 282, subd. 6-a, as amended by Laws 1920, c. 687, to require payment of a specified registration fee for motor vehicles constructed or specifically equipped for the transportation of goods, etc., does not require payment of such fee, irrespective of the actual or intended use of the vehicle, in view of other provisions of such subdivision, and also subdivisions 1-c and 6.-Zabriskie v. Law, N. Y., 196 N. Y. S. 423.

9. Bank's and Banking-Bank Book.-A savings bank book, like a bill of exchange or note, is for many purposes a chattel, and not merely an evidence of debt, but representative of it.-Stebbins v. North Adams Trust Co., Mass., 136 N. E. 880.

10. Ultra Vires.-A company, incorporated under the laws of this state for the purpose of "contracting for and buying and selling securities and bonds, also borrowing and loaning on same and making loans on real estate security," is not authorized to engage in the banking business, and where such company solicits and receives government bonds, on deposit at its established place of business in this state, agreeing to return same or like bonds upon call, or at a time agreed upon, paying therefore a stipulated rate of interest in addition to that called for by the coupons attached thereto, its announced purpose being to use same as collateral to borrow money which shall constitute its working capital, such transactions are beyond its authority, and will be enjoined.-Security & Bond Deposit Co. v. State, Ohio, 136 N. E. 891.

11. Bills and Notes-Consideration.-Under Negotiable Instruments Act, §§ 24, 25, where a note was given to secure a debt due on an open account, it was supported by the valuable consideration of a pre-existing debt.-Stalnaker v. Tolbert, S. C., 114 S. E. 412.

12. -Time Check.-Where plaintiff, who financed a railway subcontractor and took an assignment in the name of his brother for moneys coming due the subcontractor, had drafts or checks for wages guaranteed by him drawn on a mercantile company with whom he had deposited money for their payment, such drafts or checks were not properly time checks, but in effect drafts or bills of exchange, as a "time check" is a certificate, signed by a master mechanic or other person in charge of laborers, reciting the amount due the laborer for labor for a specified time (quoting Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Time Check).-Gerlach v. North Texas & S. F. Ry. Co., Texas, 244 S. W. 662.

13. Chattel Mortgages-Conversion.-Where buyer of piano, who had given seller a purchase-money mortgage, shipped piano back to seller's factory for repairs without cost and return the piano to buyer, the seller could not retain the piano because of buyer's default in payment of purchasemoney installments when due, but was required to foreclose the mortgage in the regular way, and such retention amounted to a conversion.-Cable Co. v. Greenfield, Ky., 244 S. W. 692.

14. Commerce-Rates.-The state has no power to fix ferriage rates over a navigable river from a landing place in a sister state back to its own shore.-City of Bellaire v. Bellaire, Benwood & Wheeling F. Co., Ohio, 136 N. E. 899.

15. Steamship Agent.-A license tax imposed by a municipal ordinance on a company acting as steamship agent for certain steamship companies in soliciting cargo, arranging for its acceptance, and performing other duties, for a commission on the gross freight charges, is not a direct hindrance or regulation of interstate or foreign commerce, but affects such commerce only remotely, and does not violate Const. U. S. art 1, § 8, cl. 2, reserving to Congress exclusive authority to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.-City of New Orleans v. Texas Transport & Terminal Co., La., 93 So. 751. 16. Conspiracy-Representations.-If defendants conspired to induce plaintiffs to purchase interest in oil and gas lease by means of fraudulent representations, and the plaintiffs in reliance on representations purchased interest in lease, they were entitled to recover in an action for conspiracy, though by exercise of ordinary diligence they might have found out the truth, and that such representa

tions were false. Oliver v. Huckins, Texas, 244 S. W. 625.

17. Contracts-Intention -Where the parties to an agreement make its reduction to writing and signing a condition precedent to its completion, it will not be a contract until this is done, although all of the terms of the contract have been agreed upon. But where the parties have assented to all the terms of the contract, which are fully understood in the same way by each of them, the mere reference in conjunction therewith to a future contract in writing will not negative the existence of a present contract.-Brown v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., W. Va., 114 S. E. 457.

18. Mutuality.-A contract by a bank to advance money to a corporation being organized to conduct a fish-canning business was not void for lack of mutuality where it was agreed that the company's business should be transacted with such bank exclusively, and the organizers, relying on the contract, subscribed for stock and advanced money to the corporation.-Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Sims, Wash., 209 Pac. 1113. 19. Corporations-Notice.-Though, under Civ. Code, § 19, relating to constructive notice, where a purchaser of stock had no actual knowledge of circumstances which would lead her to examine the corporation's books, or of matters which appeared therein, and as there was no duty imposed upon her by law to examine them, she cannot be charged with constructive knowledge of the facts which an examination might have led her to discover.Prewitt v. Sunnymead Orchard Co., Calif., 209 Pac. 995.

20.- -State Statute.-C. S. § 4775, has no applicability to an action by a foreign corporation to protect its property lawfully acquired, and such corporation, which has not complied with the provisions of sections 4772 and 4773, may sue in the courts of this state to recover possession of personal property, where the suit is not based upon a breach or violation of a contract made in its name or for its use or benefit.-D. M. Ferry & Co. v. Smith, Idaho, 209 Pac. 1066.

22. Executors and Administrators Creditors.The personalty of intestate is the primary fund for payment of debts, including those secured by bond and mortgage, and a creditor, because secured in this manner, is not precluded from sharing in the personal estate, nor the proceeds from the sale of real estate when so sold, as to divest his lien.In re Jones' Estate, Pa., 118 Atl. 647.

23. Frauds, Statute of-Contract.-In case of a written contract for the sale of realty, there must be a formal contract signed by both parties.Polucek v. Jahoda, N. Y., 196 N. Y. S. 445.

24. Removal.-Though a parol contract rescinding a land sale contract be within the statute, if the purchaser, in reliance thereon has so acted on it that a failure to complete it according to its terms will work irreparable injury to him, equity will regard the case as removed from the statute, and grant relief.-McDonald V. Whaley, Texas,

244 S. W. 596.

25. Husband and Wife-Wills.-The surviving widow has the right, and it is her duty, to control and manage the community property, and, where the community estate consisted of the family homestead, in which the widow had a life estate, and she was prudent and diligent in the preservation of the property, and frugal and provident in the use and application of the fruits and revenues derived therefrom, a daughter was not entitled to more than one-half of the property as against a son of the widow by a former marriage, to whom the widow bequeathed all her property.-Dreyfuss v. Whittle, Texas, 244 S. W. 623.

26. Landlord and Tenant-Lease.-Where a lease contained a provision for an extension of the term, in the absence of testimony of a new lease, lessee's continuance in possession for a year after lessor sold the premises will be presumed to be according to the provision for an extension.-Hartley v. Garnham, N. Y., 196 N. Y. S. 401.

27. Lease.-A tenant, agreeing to make all alterations and repairs at his own expense and to comply with all laws in effect, must bear an expense of fire escapes erected during the lease, as required by Tenement House Act.-Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. De Cozen, N. J., 118 Atl. 625.

28. Marriage Fraud.-Fraud, made a ground by Rev. Code, 1915, § 3004, subd. "d," for annulling a marriage, is a generic term embracing many varying forms of deception, and it may be actively pronounced, or brought about by disingenuous silence; but the fraud must go to the essence of the contract, and misrepresentations concerning wealth or social position will not avoid the marriage.— Williams v. Williams, Dela., 118 Atl. 638.

29. Master and Servant-Ratification -The retention of employee after knowledge of the commission of a tort is only evidence of ratification by employer, and not ratification as a matter of law.-McFadden v. Anderson Motor Co., S. C., 114 S. E. 402.

That an

30. Municipal Corporations-Evidence. aged person two years after accident creates confusion in using a blackboard at the trial to indicate streets and corners where defendant's automobile struck him is not very material where the situation is otherwise clearly evidenced.-Brown v. Patterson, Md.. 118 Atl. 653.

31. Principal and Agent-Evidence.-Where principal denied his agent's authority to draw checks in his name paid by defendant drawee bank, and showed he had instructed the bank not to pay the checks, it was error to permit principal's daughter to relate conversation concerning the agency between principal and the agent, had when the bank owner was not present.-Norwood v. Ferguson, Texas, 244 S. W. 619.

32. Railroads License.-That one has no license to operate an automobile struck by a car pushed over a crossing without signal does not make him a trespasser to whom the railroad was not liable unless his peril was discovered in time to have prevented the collision, as the want of license did not contribute to the injury.-St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co., v. Price, Texas, 244 S. W. 462.

33. Sales-Delivery.-Where buyer of lath had given two orders, one for 50 carloads at $3.30 per thousand, and a later one for 25 carloads at $5.10 per thousand, and the first order required the seller to "complete order at the earliest day possible," the seller was bound to fill the first order before applying the increased price of the second contract to his shipments; the notation on second order to "rush shipments" not authorizing seller to ignore the first contract's requirement for shipment at "earliest day possible."-Bishopric Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, Ohio, 136 N. E. 902.

34. -Title.-Seller, who accepted check in payment for cattle, and did not present check until after delivery of cattle and until four days after he had received the check, was not entitled to the cattle after seizure thereof while in hands of buyer's agent, under an execution upon a judgment held against buyer, though buyer stopped payment on check, in view of evidence that the parties intended a completed sale, and in the absence of evidence that the check was not drawn against sufficient funds.-Goodwin v. Bear, Wash., 209 Pac. 1080.

35.- -Warranty.-in the case of an executed sale of personal property under an express warranty, the buyer may, if the property delivered does not correspond with the terms of the warranty, either keep the property and sue for breach of the warranty, or, in case the purchase price has not been paid, keep the property and recoup the damages sustained by reason of the breach of warranty in a suit brought against him to recover such purchase price, or rescind the contract and return, or offer to return, the goods to the seller, and in case of the seller's refusal to return the purchase price, if it has been paid, maintain an action

therefor, and in case the purchase price has not been paid, such breach of warranty will be a defense to a suit therefor.-Kemble v. Wiltison, W. Va., 114 S. E. 369.

36. Searches and Seizures-Constitutional Right. -Where a sheriff had been informed and had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was transporting liquor in his automobile on a public highway within the county of which he was sheriff, his search of the automobile while on public highway without a search warrant held not violative of defendant's constitutional rights under Const. art. 2, § 10, and Const. U. S. Amend. 4, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.-People v. De Cesare, Mich., 190 N. W. 302.

37. Warrants.-There was no invasion of the constitutional rights of a bootlegger by an employed investigator, on whose affidavit a search warrant for intoxicating liquor was subsequently issued, going to such liquor dealer's place without a search warrant; he going there as a customer, not to search it.-People v. Christiansen, Mich., 190 N. W. 236.

38.- -Warrant.-It is unlawful, under section 6 of article 3 of the Constitution of this state, forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, for an officer, without a warrant authorizing it, to search a person, except that one legally arrested may be searched for property connected with the offense that may be used as evidence against him, or for weapons or things that may assist escape or acts of violence -State v. Wills, W. Va., 114 S. E. 261. 39. Sheriffs and Constables-Trespasser.-The fi. fa. being regular upon its face, and it being the duty of the sheriff to make the money thereon, he would not be a trespasser and liable to the plaintiffs in damages.-Colter v. Livingston, Ga., 114 S. E. 431.

40. Taxation-City Land.-Where land, though within limits of a city, was unplatted, uncleared and, for the most part, was unimproved, unfenced, swamp and tide lands, and where even the upland was frequently covered by tides and was full of swamps and small creeks, and it would cost more to clear the uncleared portion of the land than it would be worth after cleared, and the valuation of the land as water front property was wholly speculative because there was no demand for such property, the assessor, in fixing the market value of the lands, could not consider any use to which the land could be put by way of cutting it up into small tracts and selling it off at a large figure. -Finch v. Grays Harbor County, Wash., 209 Pac. 833.

41 -Valuation.-Sections 6153 and 6163, Comp. St. 1922, being ambiguous as to the basis of valuation of property subject to inheritance tax, held, construing the whole statute, that the proper basis of valuation by the county judge is the "then cash value" of the property at the time of the death of the decedent, which is ascertained by finding the amount of money the property would produce if offered and sold for cash upon the open market at that time.-In re woolsey's Estate, Neb., 190 N. W. 215.

42. Telegraphs and Telephones Damages. Where through error of a telegram plaintiff lost the sale of cotton, which was sold on discovering the error if he was under the duty to dispose of it sooner to mitigate his loss, this was defensive matter, and the burden was on defendant telegraph company to show that by the use of reasonable diligence plaintiff could have sold to a better advantage.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. White, Tex., 244 S. W. 389.

43. Treaties Personal Property.-Laws 1921, p. 156, providing that lands conveyed to, or for the use of, aliens shall be forfeited to the state, and defining lands as every interest therein and right to the control, possession, use, enjoyment, rents, issues, or profits thereof, did not violate articles 1 and 2 of the treaty with Great Britain, providing that citizens of each of these countries shall have power to dispose of their personalty within the territories of the other, and their transferees shall be subject only to the same duties which the citizens of the county where the property lies are subject, for the statute did not arbitrarily convert that which has always been known as per

sonalty into realty.-State v. O'Connell, Wash., 209 Pac. 865.

44. Trusts-Testator.-The testator's desire for the apointment of a trustee will be observed, although the person whom he sees fit to appoint is not one whom the court would appoint if the appointment were to be made by it in the first instance.-Teater v. Salander, Ill., 136 N. E. 873.

45. Waters and Water Courses-Franchise.Where a franchise to a water company has been construed for several years as giving the company the right to supply water "in the village of Bethlehem South and the villages adjoining in Saucon, Salisbury and Hanover townships," the construction cannot be questioned, except by the commonwealth, even as against a municipality which later acquired the franchise -City of Bethlehem v. City of Allentown, Pa., 118 Atl. 643.

46. Rates.-Where part of the consumers from a city waterworks were charged flat rates, based on facilities for service, and the rest charged for service through meters, the fact that, because the customers having flat rates were inclined to waste the water. the rate paid per gallon by such customers was less than the average rate per gallon paid by the customers having meters, does not alone show unjust discrimination against meter customers.-Consolidated Ice Co. v. City of Pittsbugh, Pa., 118 Atl. 544.

47. Riparian Rights.-A river fed by streams and springs, some of which never fail, flowing steadily in a well-defined channel except in very dry summers, when it gets so low that it stands in holes, though is never entirely dry, is such a natural water course as gives rise to riparian rights to the attingent landowners.-Humphreys-Mexia Oil Co. v. Arsenaux, Tex., 244 S. W. 280.

48. Wills Certificates.-A letter inclosing certificates of deposit indorsed to named persons and instructing addressee to deliver the certificates to indorsees, should writer die in the near future, was testamentary in character.-In re Davis' Estate, Pa., 118 Atl. 645.

49.- -Evidence.-In contest of will on the ground of mental incapacity, an excerpt from an instrument written by the deceased purporting to be a will found among his private papers after his death with signature torn off, held not admissible on issue of mental capacity in the absence of a showing as to when the writing was made.Armistead v. Benefield, Tex., 244 S. W. 391.

50 Intention.-This is so when such intention is manifest upon the face of the will, or there is a necessary implication-i. e., a highly probable inference of an intention by the testator-to so include illegitimates.-Lembeck v. Harms, N. J., 118 Atl. 537.

51.- -Perpetuities.-Provisions not creating perpetuities may be enforced, though in other parts the will is invalid because violating the statute against perpetuities.-Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, Mich., 190 N. W. 250.

52 Title.-Where a testator devised and bequeathed land and personal property used in connection with a business to his sons, and directed them to organize a corporation and convey such property to it, and provided that, if they failed to do so, the property was given to all the testator's children equally, a corporation organized by the sons, and to which conveyances were made as directed, acquired a fee, and where it conveyed to another company of the same name, which afterwards conveyed to the sons, they acquired title as tenants in common.-New England Trust Co. V. Morse, Mass.. 136 N. E. 835.

53. Workmen's Compensation Act-Adjudication. One who devotes substantially the whole of his time for a year to supervising the construction of a large building owned by him and another, and in the construction of which the owners hire and pay wages directly to night watchmen at the building, is under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230), so that, if a servant of the contractors erecting the building, in the course of his employment thereon, is injured through the negligence of one of such owners, the servant may not proceed with a common-law action for negligence against the owner, when it ap

pears that he has sought and obtained compensation from his employers' insurer under the said act.-Gibbons v. Gooding, Minn., 190 N. W. 256.

54- -Award of Compensation.-Section 6, art. 2, c. 246, Sess. Laws 1915, as amended by section 9, c. 14, Sess. Laws 1919, construed, and held to authorize the State Industrial Commission to award an injured employee compensation for a permanent disfigurement of the face, although compensation has been allowed for loss of time for temporary disability.-Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. V. State Industrial Com'n, Okla., 209 Pac. 775.

55.--Course of Employment.-The fact that a hotel maid injured while leaving the hotel at the close of the day's work was a passenger on employer's elevator at the time did not change her relation to her employer so as to prevent recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act; for the injury is one arising out of and in the course of her employment.-Barres v. Watterson Hotel Co., Ky., 244 S. W. 308.

56. -Course of Employment.-A maid working at a large hotel is "engaged in industry" and not in "domestic employment" within Workmen's Compensation Act (Ky. St. § 4880), exempting such employment from the operation of the act; the term "domestic" pertaining to one's home or household.-Barres v. Watterson Hotel Co., Ky., 244 S. W. 308.

57.- -Course of Employment.-If compensation claimant knowingly violated the employer's rule forbidding miners to ride empty cars when coming from work, it would only amount to a showing of negligence on his part, and would not take him out of the course of his employment.-New Stauton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, Ill., 136 N. E. 782.

58. Where a pressman had lost one eye previous to his employment, and sustained injury to his left hand, necessitating amputation below the wrist joint, and neither his previous loss of an eye nor the injury to his hand impaired his ability to do his work, he could not recover compensation, under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8, par. (e), subsec. 18, providing that the loss of any two members of the body shall constitute total and permanent disability, but could only recover for the loss of a hand under subsection 12, subject to credit for payments made by the employer under such section.-Chicago Journal Co. v. Industrial Commission, Ill., 136 N. E. 697.

an

defined by section 9, c. 15p, Code 1918 (Code 1913, c. 15p, § 9 [sec. 665]; Workmen's Compensation Act), and both are subject to the provisions of that chapter.-Sole v. Kindelberger, W. Va., 114 S. E. 151.

64.-Injury.-Where a shingle sawyer transferring heavy blocks from a platform to a carrier sustained a rupture of a previously diseased appendix due to the pressure of the blocks when lifted, the occurrence constituted an "injury," defined by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6604-3, as amended by Laws 1921, p. 720, § 2, declaring that the word refers only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event.-Shadbolt v. Department of Labor and Industries, Wash., 209 Pac. 683.

65 No Award.-Compensation for death from sunstroke can be awarded only where the injury is one resulting from a hazard inseparably connected with the industry or substantially increased by reason of the nature of the employment; and, where exposure to the hazard was not different substantially from that of ordinary out-of-door work, no award of compensation can be made.Lewis v. Industrial Commission, Wis., 190 N. W. 101.

66.- Notice.-A posted rule forbidding miners to ride in empty cars to and from work is not binding on one unable to read English and given no information concerning it.-New Stauton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, Ill., 136 N. E. 782.

67. Personal Acts -Where employer, as a part of the contract of employment, permitted employees going to and from their work to ride free on logging trains running between a town and employer's logging camp, and an employee, who left his home at the camp Saturday afternoon, after working hours, for purpose of visiting his father in town, was injured by the lurching of the train while returning to camp Sunday afternoon, his injury did not arise "out of and in the course of employment," within the Workmen's Compensation Act, the trip being personal, and therefore the statute could not be invoked to defeat recovery in a common-law action.-Norwood v. Tellico River Lumber Co., Tenn., 244 S. W. 490.

68.- -Question of Fact.-The unreasonableness of the 'refusal of an injured employee, who is seeking to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, to permit an operation to be performed, is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.-Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Neb., 190 N. W. 208.

69.-State Code -Gen. Code, § 1027, requiring employer to make suitable provisions to prevent injury to persons who use or come in contact with machinery," does not prescribe a "lawful requirement" within constitutional and statutory provisions that the Workmen's Compensation Act shall not take right of action from employee injured because of empolyer's failure to comply with lawful requirement for protection of lives, health and safety of employees.-Toledo Cooker Co. v. Sniegowski, Ohio, 136 N. E. 904.

70. Within Scope.-Where a miner had never been ordered not to pull down loose rock before his injury in removing rock with the aid of the employer's agent, who initiated such removal, and, on the contrary, it had been customary for employees to do such work, and they had been paid therefor, and plaintiff's attention had been called to the dangerous condition, and he was attempting to remove the danger that threatened the miners there engaged and the instrumentalities there employed in the master's business, the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, within Workmen's Compensation Act, § 1.-Ex Parte Majestic Coal Co., Ala., 93 So. 728.

71. Within Course of Employment.-Where a bucker in a logging camp gave notice one morning of his desire to quit work that evening, and after the evening meal went to the office to ascertain the amount of his scale, and to receive his compensation, and was there assaulted by the foreman, the relation of employer and employee was not terminated, and he was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.— Perry v. Beverage, Wash., 209 Pac. 1102.