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of its organism, will still always be mainly conclusive with regard to this matter. For every society, according to its different nature, may extend to a different sphere, and the relations of the dominant society to its own subordinate societies as well as to the surrounding dominant societies, that is, states, and their acknowledging the same vital principle, or one of a different character, are, ultimately, the real causes that determine the limits of the sphere embracing those who belong to the particular society, and restrict their mass.

§ 118. The fact that human existence is impossible in the absence of natural economical agencies, leads us to distinguish further component elements amongst the materials of the state.

Of these factors, the territory is one of the first importance: permanent settlement, that is to say, absolute rule over the territory, being a necessary condition of any advanced social life. Societies of the lowest order could no doubt exist for a time without fixed dwellingplaces, and we even find in history records of such primitive, transitionary, and quite imperfect state-formations, which lacked the intimate tie of territorial permanency. Yet amongst populations living by the precarious pursuits of hunting and fishing, and even amongst nomadic populations, there arises, at a very early period, a religious as well as a political notion of intimate relationship with the places of their abode, and, amidst their very wanderings, we find them keeping steadily before their eyes as a paramount aim the acquisition of some country, and their final settlement in it. With the introduction of agriculture and of tribal life, and at the first dawning of the interest of local contiguity, the importance of a home affording sustenance and security was recognized, and gave rise to an inseparable connection. between the notion of rule over a certain territory and that of the state; notions which, becoming almost identical, created the idea of country as being co-extensive with the state, and as palpably presenting to the mind the sphere of life of the society as well as its actual conditions.

From this time forward this connection never ceases, although we find that, with certain state - structures, especially the feudal ones-which owed their formation to the fact that the Church was only partially dominant -the connection between the state proper and the territory was not immediate, but established through the agency of inferior circles, which, however, owing to this very function, assumed to themselves some of the characteristics appertaining to the state. Thus, in the communal, the conquering and the national state alike, the character of the relation of the sovereign power to the individuals is admitted to apply incontestably to the territory also, which in this way figures as one of the invariable elements of the state.

§ 119. The constituent elements of the spirit or soul of the state are, again, the conditions of the establishment and assertion of its sovereign power, which find their outward embodiment in the structure of the state, that is in the connection of its component parts and in the sum of those institutions through which the consciousness and the will of the state are declared and applied. And, just as, in the case of natural organic beings, the manifestation of the spiritual qualities takes place mainly through the intermediary of one organ, namely, the brain-the action of which, however, demands the co-ordination of the activity of the remaining organs of the body, and generally fails for want of nourishment without the co-operation of the external senses-even so, the realization of the spirit of the state is chiefly accomplished by that conspicuous organ in which the sovereign power is centered. This latter, again, when alone and isolated, can neither take form nor stand, but requires the combined action of the organs ramifying through the whole body of the state, each organ having its distinct function in conformity with the circumstances of the life of the state. Those rules which set forth the order of these institutions and that structure, and which point out the mutual relations of the elements of the state, and the extent to which, and in

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what manner, each of these contribute to the creation of the sovereign power, and to the formation of the self-consciousness and the will of the state, or which, in a word, determine who have a share in the sovereign power and in what manner they have it, are comprised under the name of Constitution: whilst the notion of Government is indicative of the modes of action of the organs, and of the rules governing the activity of the state. Hence, the structure, the constitution, and the government, are severally manifestations of the spiritual formation of the state, and express the correlative and different points of view from which the concrete phenomena of the sovereign power may be observed.

Besides examining the external requisites for the establishment and working of the sovereign power, it is necessary to determine the essential nature of the spiritual life of the state.

The state itself being a dominant society matured into full individuality, the essence of its spirit is furnished by the consciousness of the vital interest forming the common tie of that society, and the acceptance of that interest as the aim of the community. Hence, some concrete fundamental principle underlies the life of every state, the actual quality of which depends upon the character of the interest of the particular dominant society, towards the realization of which the permanent endeavours of its sovereign power are directed, and which determines the rank to be occupied by any particular state in the order of the development of mankind. This principle, therefore, in its final results, defines the possible sphere of the society of the state, and to it are gradually adapted the structure, the constitution, and the government of the state resulting from, and shaped in conformity with, the requirements of its assertion; and it is this principle from which the institutions of the community borrow their proper moral value.

As many kinds of states may therefore be distinguished, as there are actual vital interests of society, or

combinations of these capable of figuring as dominant interests. Thus the consanguineous, the tribal, the communal, the conquering, the ecclesiastical, and the national states become successively crystallized from social formations in the process of known historical development, and they can be followed in the changes arising from their mutual action upon each other. In proportion, however, as these states advance and correspond to societies of a progressively higher order, they become step by step more completely qualified to develop the attributes of their condition as states, although none of them are able to accomplish this entirely at the beginning of their rule. All are, in organization, at first behind the antecedent state, which has been longer and perfectly established, and only in course of time attain their utmost fulness of stature and strength of frame.

§ 120. If, however-leaving now out of the question the degree of perfection of the states now actually existing and of those that have actually existed—we do not endeavour to analyze exhaustively all the elements of the state, but merely to point out those common to all states, and characteristic of the proper notion of the state, distinguished as such from the society, the fundamental principle of the dominant society-which is inevitably found in every state, although varying in its nature-is, owing particularly to this variety, lost sight of, and the notion of the state becomes confined to those characteristics, which are of a merely formal character, and which bring into view the individuality and the capacity for action of the state, and its external independence and limits, as well as its internal absoluteness and order. These charateristics are the sovereignty, the constitution, the structure, and the government of the state, constituting the features of the state, as such, exclusively, and attaching in no wise to any other form of society. The state, therefore, according to such an abstract notion, becomes independent of all its peculiar social contents, and can be conceived as distinct from the society filling up

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its framework and furnishing its materials, and as an independent organism.

(The state may thus be characterized also as distinct from its society from the point of view of its functions, not indeed with regard to the whole sum of its activity and aims, which embrace also those of the society, but with reference to its efforts in the conception, creation, maintenance, and assertion of the general conditions of social co-existence. Every dominant society, indeed, as far as it is dominant, is bound to watch over the conditions of the community itself, in order to secure the interests of the community. If, therefore, amongst these conditions, there are special ones which vary according to the particular sphere of interest and connections of the dominant society, there are others again, both formal and general, which include the materials furnished by the whole community, and are identical in every dominant society. These may be ranged under the points of view of the co-existence and co-operation of the members of the community, of the order of their relations, of their proper contribution in the matter of the interests of that community, of their discipline, and of their capacity of being of service in the affairs of the state. The state, by virtue of its dominant character, is bound to establish and to maintain the conditions having reference to the foregoing circumstances, but the nature of these conditions is always dependent upon the society which supplies the materials of the state. The state, thus regarded as the personification of the society, is that structure which creates and maintains the law of the society in every case, leaving on one side the question of its contents and nature. For, since the creation and maintenance of law is an absolute duty, the dominant society, in its capacity as a state, must always perform it, whatever may be the nature of the social principle it subserves. The question we now examine is not one referring to the kind of aim which may be paramount with regard to a certain society and its law, but turns mainly upon the point whether, admitting any kind of aim, coercive activity in general is