pressed in Sanscrit by rita, and in Latin by ratio, and which were, subsequently, also applied to the inevitable. relations of human activity, such as the union of the sexes and the begetting and education of children. Later, this order-in opposition to the casual acts and enunciations of will of the gods, occasionally proclaimed and lacking internal coherence—is imagined as standing above the Deity itself, and as holding supreme sway, and finds its embodiment in the Greek expression μoípa, and the Latin fatum. The agencies answering these terms also figured as the remnants of a more immediate religion of nature, supposed to have formed a most ancient stratum underlying the systems of more modern mythological polytheism. At a still further developed stage of thought, this Divine order is identified with the order of moral nature, and the fundamental principle of law and right was derived as following out of this, as is shown in some cases by the expressions used by Plato, and as modern writers, especially Stahl and Walter, have attempted to prove in detail.

Connected, but not identical, with this theory is that purely metaphysical view, which deems the order of the independent nature of things to be the fundamental principle of justice, that is, of law and right.

According to Plato, this doctrine follows from the hypothesis of the exclusive essential reality of the ideas; according to Aristotle, from the theory of causes, and from the conception that the nature of things is rational and that the qualities and differences of ideas answer the different features of natural existence. We find also the same current of thought in our century in Schelling's objective rationalism, according to which the functions of the spirit. are entirely identical with those of nature, except that the former is, in addition, self-conscious, and that, as a consequence, the essence of the laws of nature may be discovered from those of the spirit,

§ 201. Whilst the order of things is, on the one hand, thus conceived as running parallel with rational conception, it may, on the other, be also conceived as that

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blind law of nature, disconnected from insight, the rule of which extends over man also, and, as reflected in the feeling of power or of advantage, likewise serves as the motive of activity and as the principle of law and right. This conception forms essentially the foundation of the epicurean theory, but, as is indicated by its particularized inferences, it points at the same time the transition of thought from the metaphysical views to the theory of practical utility. A similar fundamental thought pervades Montesquieu's views in determining the spirit of the laws.

But this order and law of nature presents itself to man not merely as unconscious only, but also reversely, as the manifestation or emanation of the universal spirit, coextensive with all nature. Hence arise the pantheistic systems, which naturally at the same time figure as susceptible of being exchanged for monotheistic conceptions. The stoic philosophy of classic antiquity represents this view, which conceives the λóyos, the "word," as corresponding with the universe, and as its animating spirit, which creates at the same time its universal order and law, and finds its expression in the material series of causes and effects as well as in the ideal necessity of the good. Hence, obedience to nature is its fundamental principle of practical life; the moral aim is harmony with the order of nature, for which man becomes qualified by wisdom, and which, again, is practically embodied in virtue. The rule of virtue, again, is the order of nature, every man, as a citizen of the world, without regard to his individual situation, being its subject, and it is thus universal, immutable, and eternal.

We find pantheism built up with the greatest deliberation and with rigorous consistency, and applied to every group of moral ideas by Spinoza. His system, however, differs from the modern modes of thought founded upon natural science and experience but in this; it presents itself in theological phraseology; thus the law of nature appears as identical with nature in every direction, but also at the same time as the expression of the essence of the Deity, conceived as one, undivided and personal, and

in harmony with the latter and as its manifestation the individual soul also harbours rational love moving to veneration of the Deity, as the common fundamental principle of thirst after knowledge, and of action. Right, in this system, appears also coextensive with the sphere of real, and not merely apparent, strength, agreeing with consciousness, and thus as being essentially the will of the overwhelming majority in the state, which is, therefore, regarded as the proper source and representative of the sovereign power, the body of which is furnished by the state. Accordingly, this theory may be likewise conceived as a theory of practical and definitive power, if due regard be paid to its essence, independently of its form and origin.

Similar in its nature is Hegel's theory, which, in the dialectical process of the development of the spirit, starts from the identification of thought with existence, of the reasonable with the real, and views law and right as the objective spirit in liberty as an idea, that is, in the generality defining itself, in the idea, that an exist ence is the existence of the free will. Its fundamental principle is expressed as follows: Be a person and respect persons; personality being the generality of free will, and thus formal, self-conscious, and simple relativity--devoid in every other sense of any contents-to its own individuality, and consisting in this, that as such it is in every direction perfectly determinate and finite, but, nevertheless, stands in absolutely pure relativity to itself, and thus knows itself in the finite as infinite, general and free.

$202. Amongst the metaphysical theories are classified, in addition, the theory of moral order and of perfection, and the kindred theories founded upon the order of natural reason; which all of them proceed from faith in the indubitable truth of the ideas corresponding with reason.

The general results of human reason and human thought present themselves in this view as unconditionally right, and the problem to be solved is confined to the question alone, how it should be determined whether a thing really corresponds with human reason or not. Grotius and

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Pufendorf still attribute great weight, in this respect, to tradition, as showing that the preponderating majority of men, in all ages and under all circumstances, held the same proposition to be true, as well as to instinct, which, according to their view, works in conformity with the laws of rational nature. Subsequently, in accordance with the doctrines of the Cartesian philosophy, the clearness and definiteness of thoughts furnish the standard whereby Wolf perceives the fundamental principle of morality, law and right in spiritual approximation to the idea of the Divine. essence in perfection, and, therefore, regards morality as the duty to strive after perfection, only internally enforceable, and the law as duty enforceable externally as well. On the other hand, Malebranche sees the fundamental principle of justice, law and right in the love of the universal moral order eternally existing in the Divine reason; Cudworth in the ideas of pure reason; Clarke in the eternal fitness of the relations of things; and the later Scotch School, pursuing a similar chain of thought, in the judgment of common sense.

§ 203. A hardly perceptible transition leads from the theory of natural and right reason to the theories founded on sentiment; which were partly brought into view by Grotius and Pufendorf in their hypotheses of the social instinct and sentiment, and, having become popular during the latter half of the seventeenth century, especially in opposition to the apparently matter-of-fact and dry utilitarian theory of Hobbes, were associated with theological theories, representing, as they do, moral sense as having been implanted in man by the hand of God. Of such a character is the theory of Cumberland, who, in opposition to the quality of selfishness, which Hobbes accepted as fundamental, looks upon the greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all others as the fundamental. principle of law and right, especially since, through Divine love, human happiness is indissolubly connected with the cultivation of benevolence. Edwards, too, accepts this benevolence felt towards a particular being, in pro

portion to his degree of existence, and in proportion to the degree in which that particular being feels benevolence to others, as the foundation of moral and legal order. The Scotch philosopher, Hutcheson, replaces this good-will by the general expression "Moral Sense," an expression which, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, became all the more popular, as it coincided with the general disposition of that age to look upon the attributes of reason and sentiment as parallel to, and corresponding with, each other, as may be found instanced in Spinoza's "rational love." Through its instrumentality it became, at the same time, possible to bring thus the doctrine of common sense as well as that of moral sentiment into harmony with that conception of the fundamental goodness of human nature, which swayed the public convictions of the last century, and was even generally adopted by the encyclopædists who, in other respects, were scientific in their efforts and discriminating in their criticism.

Adam Smith attempted, in his work on "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," to establish the doctrine of moral sense, by a more thorough and exhaustive psychological analysis, which was designed to be supplemental to the explanations of social phenomena contained in his great book concerning the wealth of nations. His fundamental proposition is, that men are so constituted as to naturally sympathize with each other's feelings; when the sentiments of another are such as would be excited in us by the same objects, we approve them as morally proper. To obtain this accordance, it is necessary that he who enjoys and suffers, should lower the expression of his feeling to the point to which the bystander can raise his fellow-feeling. On this attempt are founded the virtues of self-denial and self-command, and it is equally necessary for the bystander to raise his sympathy as near as he can to the level of the original feeling. In all unsocial passions, such as resentment, we have a divided sympathy between him who feels them and those who are the objects of them; hence the propriety of moderating them, whilst pure malice is always to be con