Thus the science of psychology in explaining, on the one hand, the perceptive and retentive qualities of the soul, and defining, on the other, its reflex and active elements, leads us by the discussion of the mutual interaction of the components of the human spirit, of thought, and of action, to the threshold of ethics, whilst affording, at the same time, a basis for the propositions of political

economy.

$ 34. Both these sciences are thus of a deductive character, but only to the extent of the possibility of inferring their doctrines from the attributes of man and from the properties of his surroundings. As far, however, as these attributes undergo a change in consequence of social coexistence, they contain inductive components. For there is no doubt that, under the conditions of social coexistence, the interaction of the different faculties of man produces also such changes in the individual soul as render it altogether different from its original constituent elements, even as the chemical combination of simple elements form bodies possessing entirely new properties. Still in political economy the deductive character predominates. In matters of labour, production, and the securing of their results, man is guided by the instinct of self-preservation, and of the assertion of individuality or selfishness springing from it. The consequences of this sentiment of selfishness are tempered and modified by habit-which in itself is nothing else but the readiness to follow the part made easy by practice by shiftlessness or by self-denial, arising from fear of prejudices or from a disposition to shirk trouble, and, in cases of higher development, even by consideration for the welfare of fellow-creatures. It is only by means of psychological analysis that these motives, their power and mutual relations can be recognized, and that the notions of conduct suggested by these motives, as well as the conditions resulting from such conduct, can be rendered clear. The ulterior problems, particularly important in political economy, concerning the comparative value of human wants and human endeavours with regard to the

INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 67

aims of human life, can again be only solved by the aid of ethics. On the other hand, every economical development, every grade of recognition and satisfaction of wants, is productive of corresponding changes in the world of consciousness and desires, and the sphere of morals continually expands parallel with economical progress. With the widening of human rule over nature, man's inner world thus assumes more extensive proportions, and the establishment of the laws regulating his free motion within it requires higher and larger conceptions. Thus, unless the transformations taking place parallel with the mutual interaction of these sciences are continually taken into account, their theory can never completely cover their entirety.

§ 35. The philosophy of law and civil society, as well as political science-in so far as they are sciences, and not merely collections of practical rules drawn from descriptive knowledge, nor yet only systems of metaphysical or religious dogmas-are, in like manner, both based upon the method and truths of psychology. Their antecedent notions are not simple, for, being historical developments, their meaning and tenour are, in truth, the objects of psychological investigation and proof. Furthermore, the analysis of consciousness and of freedom of action, the separation of their material components from their subjective moments and their definition, the formation of the notions of accountability and responsibility, the elucidation of the ideas of society, state, and law, the rise of duty and public sentiment, and their assimilation with all the former, as well as their combined development in the consciousness of community and into the self-consciousness of the community-all these are matters resting on a psychological foundation. The solution of the questions involved in them requires, however, the additional aid of ethics. Indeed, the determination of the notion and of the theory of historical progress itself-as to whether it be real and essential, or only transient and formal, whether it be the manifestation of a universal law continually ex

panding, or only a glimpse of a few sections of a vast permanent cycle comprehending periods of ages-depends upon the answer to be obtained from psychology as to this question are the faculties of the human mind and the constituent elements of human nature liable to change in their proportions, force, and quality under any and what influences, it matters not how slowly and gradually; or do they eternally remain under all circumstances the same, although subject within certain limits to incessant fluctuations?

§ 36. But just as the self-consciousness of the community develops in parallel lines with the consciousness of the single individuals belonging to it, and just as we are enabled to obtain a clearer insight into the conditions and interests of the community, the more they are reflected in the precise perception single individuals have of their own circumstances, so, too, are the economical and moral agencies and laws connected with the legal and political factors.

The more independent of external nature man grows, and the greater his mastery over it, the more perfect may his social coexistence with his fellows become, and the less will his actions spring from motives of such a character as might bring them into collision with the interests of others. Thus the striving for the attainment of the good, the lawful, and the expedient begins where an emancipation from the blind forces of nature has already taken place, and man has recognized the useful. Yet the highest degree of utility is attainable in such a society only where its members are capable of the largest amount of co-operation, and are therefore individually good, and observe in their conduct the limits of law, and where their social organization is, besides, perfectly expedient. Ethics, again, comprehend the laws of internal freedom, those laws which determine the consequences of resolves-i.e., of the truly individual and strictly spiritual element of actions with regard to the will itself—that is, with regard to the mind in which the will has originated; for the law of causality

THE USEFUL, THE GOOD, THE LAWFUL, ETC. 69

being as universal and absolute in the spiritual world as in the material, every changing spiritual movement affects the whole soul and all its future complexions, and thus either brings us nearer to the ideal condition we strive for, or removes us further from the perfection of complete mastery over self. Every action, therefore, whilst, from the standpoint of its material advantages, the object of economical inquiry, at the same time falls under the sway of morality, not with regard to its outward result, but solely with respect to the intention hidden in it, only so far, namely, as it arises from an internal source, that is, from the activity of the will or lack of it, and thus serves as a source to new currents of formation of will. Accordingly, whilst economical rules are onesided, and allow the widest field to individuality, moral rules are again the severest and most restrictive, but at the same time the most universal ones in their application.

Activity, again, can be brought under the legal standard only when and as far as its external results come into collision with the activity of others, and thus affect the conditions of coexistence and social freedom; political laws can be applied only to those proceedings which tend to the maintenance or change of social institutions, and to the preservation or re-establishment of the social balance, and may be thus subjected to the criterion of social expediency. The rules of law and political rules take, therefore, a midway position between economical and moral rules. The former circumscribe human activity more rigidly than do the rules of morality, but they are less restrictive and confined to a narrower space. Many acts there are which exceed the limits laid down by moral legislation, or affront the absolute sense of duty springing from inner conviction, without offending against the inhibitions of law or the interdicts of politics. Yet, as man learns only by experience to distinguish the boundaries of his freedom of will, and adapts himself but slowly and gradually to them, he is able to form, at first within a small circle, nothing but an estimate of his own

interests; he needs protracted observation to be enabled to trace the ramifications of these interests to a community of a higher order. What is lawless may often seem to him expedient, and what is immoral, lawful. This may all the more readily happen, seeing that man is apt to be much more vividly impressed by the expediency or want of expediency of the direct results of his conduct, than by the influence exerted upon his fate by their remoter consequences. Man requires a larger amount of trained foresight -which can only be subsequently acquired-in order to submit to indirect social or, rather, moral coercion than to physical force; nay, a still larger amount of discipline is essential to enable him to replace the rule of external agencies over himself by the self-restraining rule of his own mind. On the other hand, again, as soon as moral principles are thoroughly understood, the explanation of their consequences is, within the sphere of individual life, a much simpler matter than is the work of picking out from the network of the complicated organization and manifold interests of communities innumerable threads of laws, and following each of them out to their final consequences. Thus, although the development of legal and political instinct as well as of habit is antecedent to that of the moral sense, yet the formation of ethical science rapidly outstrips the growth of the science of law and of political science; its method becomes a model for theirs, and its achievements serve as a basis for their theories. And since any undue preponderance of egotistical considerations over such as are due to others is a moral defect, and public sentiment a moral necessity, and the mutuality of individual and social interests as well as the universal harmony of interests as between communities form a postulate of ethics for the fruits of behaviour in accord with the highest morality can only ripen and be adequately enjoyed by those who contributed to their production, where perfect public order, whilst answering public interest, affords also the possibility of satisfying the entire sum of all private interests and since the more perfect the individual