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Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will not ask any questions now.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, do you want to ask some questions?
LIMITATION ON U.N. PEACEKEEPING ABILITY
Senator BAKER. One or two general questions, if I may. I apologize to the witnesses for not being here at the beginning of their testimony. But even so I can't resist the temptation to ask you questions, even though general, that may already have been put.
I recall that when the Charter was first published, it was loudly proclaimed as an instrument for preserving the peace. It was clear to me, however, that the institutional arrangement was not calculated to preserve the peace, because there was no authority, there were no armed forces, there was not the might with which the peace could be kept. Rather it was a consortium authority to keep the peace.
I wonder if either or both of you can tell me whether you agree with that concept or not, and what effect, if any, America's unfolding new foreign policy, referred to today as detente, has had on that concept?
Mr. DALLIN. Yes; I think I would agree that that is generally correct. The U.N. can act in defense of peace or to secure peace when the major powers are in agreement. Even then, of course, there has been considerable difficulty in agreeing, as in the case of the Congo or Middle East, who should control peacekeeping forces, and the Soviet Union has been most adamant that the Security Council should have operational control-in other words, that the Soviet Union should be in a position to interpose a veto at any time it doesn't like the use of such forces-not the Secretary General as had previously been tried.
That of course limits the possible activity of such peacekeeping forces, and, when it comes to conflict among the major powers, the U.N. is powerless other than as intermediary or broker. Of course it was not intended to resolve that kind of conflict to begin with; it began with the assumption of agreement among the permanent members.
Senator BAKER. That is not quite the question.
What I am trying to say is that in the absence of a peacekeeping force on a permanent basis, the only authority for peacekeeping that the U.N. has, is the agreement of the major powers of the world. Today our effort at détente involves primarily the Soviet Union and infrequently at least the People's Republic of China. To what extent has that short-circuited the original U.N. peacekeeping concept and put something else in its place?
Mr. DALLIN. I believe it has not fundamentally changed the situation in which the U.N. has not had any permanent peacekeeping forces except in those special occasions where the powers have agreed on it. Détente may have facilitated that it has the present Middle Eastern arrangement in October-November 1973: at least that is the Soviet claim. They claim that it would have been harder to have arrived at that solution in the days of the cold war. Perhaps so. It does make a slight Soviet departure with regard to peacekeeping forces, but, fundamentally, I think, you are entirely correct, sir.
EFFECT OF DÉTENTE ON THE U.N.
Senator BAKER. Incidentally I think you should know I fully support the effort and concept and I think former President Nixon's initiative in this respect will be observed and studied by historians for a long time. But haven't we, in effect, acknowledged that there must be further elaboration of the right to reach bilateral agreements under the Charter at the same time that we pursue our growing aspirations for general worldwide détente.
Mr. DALLIN. Yes, indeed.
Senator BAKER. Mr. Buckley, do you have any observations in that respect?
Mr. BUCKLEY. Only this. I think that on the whole it is safe to generalize that touchy issues become touchier the moment they are proposed through the United Nations. The reason for this is that there is a linkage within the U.N. between countries and blocs of countries that is electrified as a result of a polemical statement of the case. For instance, there is no reason in the world for Chad, let's say, to be opposed to an antihijacking covenant, but the moment it is asked to endorse that covenant in the U.N. it consults the Organization of African Unity which in turn consults the Arab bloc which is dominated at this moment by its anti-Israel compulsions and under the circumstances Chad proceeds to vote against really its own best interests.
What I am saying, therefore, is that by running a problem through the United Nations you tend to polarize it and encourage a vote that is cast without reference to the intrinsic merits of the proposal before the House, whether it is a cease-fire or antiterrorist convention.
Senator BAKER. Do you think we have enhanced the prospect of the U.N. by our growing policy of détente, do you think we have diminished the prospect, or do you think it has any prospect at all?
Mr. BUCKLEY. I think you have to distinguish between two major functions of the U.N. and throw one away every term. That is the idealistic function.
Senator BAKER. What is that?
Mr. BUCKLEY. The idea of spreading human freedom. There is no question that the emphasis we have put on détente, and this is what we did in fact devote the first few minutes to, there is no question or emphasis on détente has committed us to a kind of verbal and ethical course necessary which has left the U.N. bloodied in respect of any potential to being an idealistic influence.
On the other hand, there is no question that the U.N. provides good mechanical facilities for the exchange of threats, inducements, bribes, collaborations, and the rest of it.
Senator BAKER. It is a good institution for those purposes.
To answer my own question, which I find sometimes irresistable, I think that on occassion the policy of détente of the United States, as it extends to other nations, to the People's Republic, and still others, is de facto parallelism to the creation of the original U.N. Charter concept; namely, that Russia, China, the United States, Great Britain, and France would get together and maintain the peace. Outside the U.N., it seems to me that we have begun to do that although not quite so rigidly structured.
My time has expired and I thank you for the opportunity.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Buckley, we would be very glad for you to
Senator BUCKLEY. No questions. The CHAIRMAX. Senator Case. Senator CASE. I am ready but I have no questions. I think the points of view are very well expressed. I think they respond to yearnings and understandings that a lot of us have.
Thank you very much.
"GETTING THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE U.N. AND THE U.N. OUT OF
THE UNITED STATES"
The CHAIRMAN. We sometimes hear people say, “Get the United States out of the United Nations and the United Nations out of the United States.” You wouldn't subscribe to that idea, would you, either one of you.
Mr. BUCKLEY. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to peacekeeping. Of course the Charter provides for a peacekeeping program, doesn't it?
Mr. BUCKLEY. It provides a procedure, that is right.
The CHAIRMAN. For setting up a peacekeeping force and utilizing that force?
Mr. BUCKLEY. It authorizes the Security Council if it detects a threat to world peace to recommend a procedure for coping with it, and that has been so-called peacekeeping force as, for instance the Sinai or right now again in the Middle East.
The CHAIRMAN. There has been a peacekeeping force on different occasions and in every instance I feel it has done a very good job and is doing it. The one out now is doing a good job.
Mr. BUCKLEY. It only does a good job, Senator, when the parties involved are predisposed to accept its presence and to abide by its authority. It has absolutely no force at all. For instance, in 1967 when Egypt and Jordan decided to move, or Israel, depending on which version of history you accept, you will remember it was instantaneously withdrawn.
The CHAIRMAN. We had a peacekeeping force and unfortunately it was withdrawn. Very shortly thereafter came the outbreak; isn't that right?
Mr. BUCKLEY. That is right, it was withdrawn at the request of one of the parties. My point is the acquiesence of the parties.
The CHAIRMAN. Is necessary.
Mr. BUCKLEY. We shouldn't think of a peacekeeping force as having powers, it is in fact merely a symbolic presence that betokens the previous acquiesence of the contending powers.
ACTION THROUGH CONSENSUS
The CHAIRMAN. In last Sunday's New York Times Magazine Harlan Cleveland advocated fewer rollcall votes in the General Assembly and more action through consensus.
Does that idea appeal to you; either or both? Mr. DALLIN. It is certainly worth a try, given the results of the rollcall votes. I would not be overly optimistic that consensus can result in the kind of decision that any of us or Mr. Cleveland would wish. I think it is a counsel, if not of despair, at least of frustration.
The CHAIRMAN. I wondered myself just how he was going to develop that consensus.
Senator CASE. After you discover it you tell us in the Senate and we will work it out later.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, first I will try to discover it in this committee. How about that?
Senator PERCY. Professor Dallin, we very much appreciate your being here. Your testimony was exceptionally good and your own work and that of your distinguished father, Prof. David Dallin, are well known to us.
REASON FOR THIRD WORLD BLOC VOTING
You stated that in the midfifties the nations which followed the U.S. lead at the U.N. began to assert a more independent policy and yet many of those countries, as I observed at the U.N., now seem to be veering toward, not an independent judgment, but a bloc vote and participating in the group of 77 so-called, which now numbers in excess of 100.
Would you care to comment on this and what has brought it about? Many will cast a vote they don't believe in at all, but they do it to go along with the boys, so to speak.
Mr. DALLIN. I quite agree with your observations. I am not sure that I am in a good position to explain how it came about. I think it is certainly true that many countries vote out of a mistaken sense of discipline and commitment to a common cause, which in fact doesn't exist, and it seems to me the United States along with some of its friends can perform a very useful role here in privately pointing out genuine differences of interest among some of these 77.
DR. MOYNIHAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITED NATIONS
Senator PERCY. I would like to ask you about the phrase "benign neglect.” You stated that the temptation to pursue a policy of benign neglect toward the United Nations is likely to weaken rather than strengthen the American position.
Dr. Moynihan was the author of the term "benign neglect" but I find it hard to believe that Dr. Moynihan would advocate such a policy at the United Nations. He, after all, was the author of the family assistance plan which indicated an inclination to try to meet a problem head on and to do something about it. He was also a very activist Ambassador in India.
Are you implying that you feel he might bring benign neglect to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations?
Dr. DALLIN. I fear I don't know his inclinations well enough to judge. I certainly borrowed the phrase from him; I do not necessarily mean to identify it with him. I think it is a sentiment that is expressed more widely in this country of late, but I do not mean to imply that he necessarily would himself apply it toward the United Nations.
ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS
Senator PERCY. You mentioned that United Nations has been insignificant in Soviet-American relations, as dramatized by the last three summit meetings. Do you feel that the summit meetings should be brought under the umbrella of the United Nations and not done on a bilateral basis?
Mr. DALLIN. No, I don't believe so, sir. At present I think we are not at a stage where the summit meetings can usefully be handled through the United Nations. In fact, it would complicate things infinitely. The Soviet Union, too, has responded negatively to the demand of some of the third world countries to monitor negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I suspect the State Department would take a similar position. I don't think at present the bilateral relationship can be placed within the United Nations.
Senator PERCY. Ūnder Stalin the Soviet Union's intention was to have as impotent a United Nations as possible because they felt it would be hostile, and it was hostile, to the Soviet Union.
That policy continued to an extent under Khrushchev and the suggestion of a troika was really an organizational means of making it impotent.
I gather that a majority of the members are now less hostile to the Soviet Union. Do you believe that the Soviets are still satisfied to limit U.N. powers?
Mr. DALLIN. I believe that is correct. They have continued to insist on the sovereign prerogatives of the Soviet Union as of all other member states. The U.N. could not function anywhere within the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This has not kept them from condemning conditions in other countries. I believe the Soviet Union prefers to play it safe by maintaining the veto, the right to stop any U.N. action hostile to it, even if it means that it also gives the other permanent members the same right of preventing actions hostile to them.
Senator Percy. Professor Dallin, you said that the Soviet Union goes further than the United States in its determination to take absolutely no chances that the U.N. will be used against itself or against its friends. Can you give us an illustration of what you had in mind ?
Mr. DALLIN. Well, for instance, the Soviet Union has been intent on minimizing the activities of all U.N. agencies within the Soviet Union. It was one of the first to insist that an individual citizen could not even file a complaint with a U.N. agency, say, a mailbox in Moscow, about a violation of human rights or anything of the sort, something which I think the United States might well be prepared to sanction if the question ever came up. The U.N. office in Moscow is hard to find for any Soviet citizen or even a foreigner with a map and driver.
In general, from the Soviet point of view, the U.N. has been something to use outside the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc but not something to permit a presence of inside the U.S.S.R.