slice of France through rectification of frontier; will only give back a small part of Serbia, and Bulgaria can do as she likes with Roumania and everybody must pay indemnities to Germany, etc. The Ambassador adds: "If Bernstorff has given President any other terms he is fooling him, but do not quote me to Bernstorff.”] File No. 763.72/3243 The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary (Penfield) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VIENNA, February 5, 1917, midnight. [Received February 7, 10 a. m.] 1683. Following addressed to Secretary of State at the request of Minister for Foreign Affairs: The Imperial and Royal Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, has conveyed to me the kind words which you were good enough to express to him concerning Austria-Hungary and I hasten to transmit to you on that account my very best thanks.1 I need not say I, too, would be very pleased if the diplomatic relations between us and the United States could be maintained intact. But in order to obtain that result I must above all once again ask the Government of the United States to take into consideration the position in which we are placed. We have declared-openly and honestly-that we only wage a war of defense, that is, that we are ready to negotiate honorable conditions of peace, a peace without victory. These proposals we are still determined to maintain. The basis, according to which there should be neither victor nor loser, was suggested by Mr. Wilson himself and it is now up to the Entente to accommodate themselves to that basis as we did. As long as the Entente will not give up the program published in their last note, a program which aims at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, it is impossible for us to talk about peace, and we are forced to defend ourselves with every means at our disposal. A technical modification of the submarine war is impossible. First of all an exchange of views with our allies would be necessary to that purpose. Moreover and this is the chief reason-the numerous submarines which have left their ports can not be reached by any orders. The point of the question is, it seems to me, that Mr. Wilson who proposed a peace without victory should now feel morally obliged to use his influence with the powers of the Entente to make them accept that basis as we accepted it. The President has all the qualities to achieve this on account of his high position, the personal esteem he enjoys all through Europe and on account of the possibility for the 1 See telegram to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary, No. 1526, Feb. 4. post, p. 112. United States, by cutting off the requisites of war, to induce the powers of the Entente to conform themselves to Mr. Wilson's point of view. I trust that the President of the United States will continue the work of peace he began in a spirit of impartiality and I sincerely hope that he will induce the powers of the Entente to accept, like us, the American point of view, that there should be neither victor nor loser and that the peace concluded should be an honorable one for both sides a lasting one for the whole world. Should the President follow this line of conduct not only the terror of the submarine war, but war in general would come to a sudden end and Mr. Wilson's name will shine with everlasting letters in the history of mankind. I beg to request you kindly to bring the above as well as the answer you might send me to the notice of Ambassador Count Tarnowski. Czernin PENFIELD File No. 763.72/3242 The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary (Penfield) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VIENNA, February 6, 1917, 4 p. m. [Received February 7, 10 a. m.] 1688. In connection with my 1683, February 5, 12 noon, transmitting Count Czernin's views to you, beg to submit following facts as illustrating Monarchy's desperate situation and consequent desire for peace: Long period of freezing weather with interruption of traffic is accentuating scarcity of food. Economic life of Austria-Hungary seems paralyzed. Intelligent persons assure me Monarchy has food for but two or three months. Nearly every street in Vienna has bread line and misery and destitution visible everywhere. People all classes praying for peace. PENFIELD File No. 763.72/3253 The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] ATHENS, February 7, 1917, 7 p. m. [Received February 8, 3.55 a. m.] 246. British Minister informs me attitude of reservists still unsatisfactory and while a few cargoes provisions will be imported, no prospect of raising blockade just now. DROPPERS The President's Proposal to the Allied Powers of Assurances to AustriaHungary against Radical Dismemberment, February 8-Proposals of the de facto Mexican Government for Termination of the War, February 12-Intercession of the United States in Behalf of Greece File No. 763.72119/483A The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, February 8, 1917, midnight. 4421. The President directs that you lay the following before the leading members of the British Government in strictest confidence and begs that you will press the points it contains with all the earnestness and directness you would use were they your own personal views. He speaks of the leading members of the Government rather than of the Foreign Office because he does not intend this as in any sense an official but only as a personal message and wishes you to ascertain informally what he might expect should he make the proposals here foreshadowed officially to the Foreign Office. The President knows that peace is intensely desired by the Teutonic powers, and much more by Austria than by any of her allies because the situation is becoming for many reasons much graver for her than for the others. He is trying to avoid breaking with Austria in order to keep the channels of official intercourse with her open so that he may use her for peace. The chief if not the only obstacle is the threat apparently contained in the peace terms recently stated by the Entente Allies that in case they succeeded they would insist upon a virtual dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria needs only to be reassured on that point, and that chiefly with regard to the older units of the Empire. It is the President's view that the large measure of autonomy already secured to those older units is a sufficient guaranty of peace and stability in that part of Europe so far as national and racial influences are concerned and that what Austria regards as the necessities of her development, opportunity, and security to the south of her can be adequately and satisfactorily secured to her by rights of way to the sea given by the common guaranty of the concert which must in any case be arranged if the future peace of the world is to be assured. He does not doubt that Austria can be satisfied without depriving the several Balkan states of their political autonomy and territorial integrity. The effort of this Government will be constantly for peace even. should it become itself involved, although those efforts would not in the least weaken or slacken its vigorous action in such a case. The President still believes and has reason to believe that, were it possible for him to give the necessary assurances to the Government of Austria, which fears radical dismemberment and which thinks that it is now fighting for its very existence, he could in a very short time force the acceptance of peace upon terms which would follow the general lines of his recent address to the Senate regarding the sort of peace the United States would be willing to join in guaranteeing. He is urgently desirous that the Entente Governments should make it possible for him to present such terms and press them for acceptance. The present enthusiastic support which the people of the United States are giving his foreign policy is being given, it is very evident, because they expect him to use the force and influence of the United States, if he must use force, not to prolong the war, but to insist upon those rights of his own and other peoples which he regards and they regard as the bases and the only bases of peace. LANSING File No. 763.72/3290 The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary (Penfield) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] VIENNA, February 10, 1917, 5 p. m. [Received February 11, 3.30 p. m.] 1700. German Kaiser expected to come to Vienna to-night for two days' conference with Emperor. Newspapers forbidden to announce visit. PENFIELD File No. 763.72119/488 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] LONDON, February 11, 1917, noon. [Received February 12, 12.10 a. m.] 5665. Your 4421, February 8, midnight. I immediately sought the Prime Minister with whom I had an interview yesterday afternoon. I reminded him of the purely personal and private nature of our conferences and told him that I now had a most important subject to put before him at the President's command in this personal and private way. I first told him the general substance of your telegram. He welcomed it and before I could mention details he answered every question I had prepared to ask him. The following is the substance of and in part the phraseology of his talk. He knew that Austria was very eager for peace. She really never wanted war and surely there is no animosity between the British and the Austrians. The new Emperor was especially weary of a war that he had not made but had inherited. Besides Austria was obliged to stop in any event. If the Teutonic powers won she would be a vassal of Germany which would be worse for her than an Entente victory. Austria is now generalshipped and managed by Germany. Her very armies are commanded by Germans. She suffers most from economic pressure. "I know she wants to quit." Lord Grey said to me months ago when I first asked for the safeconduct of the new Austrian Ambassador: "We no longer consider that Austria exists except as a convenient German fiction, for Germany dictates her policies, changes her Cabinet and commands her armies." Mr. George continued: "Of course the Austrian Emperor wishes as far as possible to save his Empire. We have no objection to his retaining Hungary and Bohemia. We have no policy of sheer dismemberment but we must stand by the nationals of our allies, such as the Roumanians, the Slavs, the Serbians, and the Italians. Their just demands must be met by the principle of nationality." But neither the British Government nor its allies could under straitened [present?] circumstances lose Italy as an ally. The blockade of Germany might be broken on the Austrian side. German troops and German officers who now hold the Austrian armies together could be released to strengthen the German line in more important places. Present military, submarine, and economic conditions [make it undesirable that we should?] even receive a formal offer of peace from Austria. The time for that has passed and has not yet come again. Present conditions must first change. The premeditated [premature?] retirement of Austria from the war might bring especial disadvantages to the Entente. Austrians released from the army would go to Germany and be added to German productive power. Austria is now an increasing military and economic burden to Germany and Germany will probably give in sooner with the load of Austria on her back than if Austria were out of the war. The Prime Minister repeated that the British had not the slightest animosity to the Austrians whose future freedom in fact they wished to safeguard. The present question is purely a question of military expediency regarding the war as a whole and the removal from Germany of the burden of Austria now would add to the strength of Germany. "For these and other reasons," the Prime Minister continued, " we cannot now even receive formally any peace offer from Austria nor authorize any discussion of peace with her on our behalf. We must look at the war as a whole, but if the President should see fit, acting for himself, to receive specific and concrete proposals from Austria, and should be able and willing to transmit |