Слике страница
PDF
ePub

Court Decisions

In this department of THE AMERICAN EMPLOYER will be found decisions of courts in the United States and the Dominion of Canada on issues of law of interest to employers of labor.

FLOW OF LABOR Court Holds it Cannot be Hampered by Strikers

A New Jersey court decision clearly upholds the right of an employer to conditions that will not hamper the free flow of labor to his plant.

The George Jonas Glass Co. had procured an injunction against the Glass Bottle Blowers' Association, following a boycott of its business, followed by a strike. From the decree following this injunction the defendants appealed, the appeal resulting in the decree being affirmed. The injunction awarded restrained the defendants:

From knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause by threats, offers of money, payments of money, offering to pay expenses or by inducement or persuasion, any employe of the complainant under contract to render service to it to break such contract by quitting such service.

From personal molestation of persons willing to be employed by complainant with intent to coerce such person to refrain from entering such employment.

From addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant against their will and thereby causing them personal annoyance, with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment.

From loitering or picketing in the streets or on the highways or public places near the premises of the complainant with intent to procure the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant and with a view to cause persons so employed to refrain from such employment.

From entering the premises of the complainant against its will with intent to interfere with its business.

From violence, threats of violence, insult, indecent talk, indecent, abusive epithets, annoying language, acts or conduct practiced upon any person without their consent with intent to coerce them to refrain from entering the employment of complainant or to leave its employment.

From attempting to cause any person employed by complainant to leave. such employment by intimidating or annoying such employes by annoying language, acts or conduct.

From causing persons willing to be employed by complainant to refrain from so doing by annoying language, acts or conduct.

From inducing, persuading or causing or attempting to induce, persuade or cause the employes of complainant to break their contracts of service with complainant or to quit its em-ployment.

From threatening to injure the business of any corporation, customer or person dealing with or transacting business and willing to deal and transact business with the complainant by making threats in writing or by words for the purpose of coercing such corporation, customer or person against his will, so as not to deal with or transact business with the complainant. The court said:

Each portion of the injunctive relief thus granted is directed to some manifestation of the strife that was carried on by the combined defendants against the complainants. in each respect the injunction is justified by the evidence in the case.

And

The employes of the complainant referred to by the decree are those

who either refused to join the strike or who entered the complainant's employ after the strike. With respect to these it will be observed that the defendants are restrained from using coercion, inducements or persuasion to bring about the termination of that employment, whether the employe be under contract of service or not. With respect to other persons not as yet employed, but willing to take employment under the complainant, the defendants are restrained from interfering to prevent this by coercion or personal molestation and annoyance; but are not restrained from using mere persuasion in such a case. There is a restraint against picketing designed to molest and annoy persons employed or willing to be employed, and there is a restraint against the continuance of the boycott. It is clear beyond dispute that the complainant has suffered grievously in its property and business through the acts of defendants, whose continuance is thus prohibited. That the injury to the complainant is irreparable by action of law is likewise clear. If, therefore, the acts themselves are unlawful and violative of the property rights of the complainants, the injunction is proper. The conduct of defendants in using coercion in some cases and persuasion in others in order to bring about breaches of the contracts of personal service existing between complainant and some of its employes-defendants having, of course, full notice of the existing employment was unlawful and actionable upon well settled principles. And the same is true of conduct whose object and purpose were to bring about a termination of the relations of master and servants between the complainant and its ployes in cases where there was no binding contract of service, but a mere service at will. In Frank & Dugan vs. Herold (63 N. J. Eq. 443, 450, 52 Atl. 152) Pitney, V. C., said that to create the relation of master and servant it is not necessary that there should be any contract in writing or even verbal between them to work for any particular length of time, that the relation exists when one person is willing from day to day to work

for another and that other person desires the labor and makes his business arrangements accordingly. Whether an action will lie for interference in the relations existing between employ-er and employe where there is mere service at will and where the interference is the result of fair competition in the labor market is a question mooted but not necessary to be decided in the present case. The defendants were not competitors in the labor market. Their interference had for its immediate object the crippling of the complainant's business. only semblance of excuse alleged is that defendants desired to bring about. improved labor conditions in complainant's works; but this object did not warrant resort to unlawful meas

ures.

The

Reliance is placed by the defendants upon the "act relative to persons combining and encouraging other persons to combine" (P. L. 1883, p. 36; Gen. Stats. 1895, p. 2344, pl. 23). The enactment is: "That it shall not be unlawful for any two or more persons to unite, combine or bind themselves by oath, covenant, agreement, alliance or otherwise to persuade, advise or encourage by peaceable means any person or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving or entering into the employment of any person, persons or corporation." poration." In Mayer vs. Journeymen Stonecutters Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 531, 20 Atl., Vice Chancellor Green apparently treated this act as legalizing private injuries. And in Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. vs. Glass Bottle Blowers' Association, 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 53, 46 Atl. 208, Vice Chancellor Reed construed it as permitting the adoption of peaceable measures for inducing workmen to quit or refuse to enter an employment. Whatever may have been the purpose of its framer, there are, as we think, constitutional obstacles in the way of giving the act so extensive a force. The right of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness are declared by our constitution to be inalienable. (Const. N. J. Art 1, pl

1). No act of the legislature is to be construed as infringing upon these rights unless its language plainly and clearly requires such a construction. If the language so reads, it is to the extent indicated unconstitutional and void. The act of 1883 is, as we think, properly to be treated as merely rendering the combination no longer indictable; in effect as repealing the rule laid down by the supreme court of this state in State vs. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law, 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649. It does not legalize an invasion of private rights nor prevent the party injured from having full redress. Its proper scope is indicated in the opinion of Pitney, V. C., in Frank & Dugan vs. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443, 447, 448, 52 Atl., 152.

So much of the decree as awards an injunction to restrain the defendants from using coercive methods to prevent the flow of labor to complainant's works is also likewise proper. In New Jersey Printing Co. vs. Cassidy, 63 N. J. 759, 765, 53 Atl., 230, Stevenson, V. C., recognized and enforced the right of an employer to an injunction to prevent undue interference with those who wish to come to him for employment. It is principally on this ground that injunctions against what is known as picketing have been sustained in this and other jurisdictions.

So much of the decree as is directed against the continuance of the boycott is plainly justified by the evidence and accords with the law. (Barr vs. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq., 101, 30 Atl., 881; Martin vs. McFall, 65 N. J. Eq. 91, 55 Atl., 465.)

The decree under review should be affirmed with costs-George Jones Glass Co. vs. Glass Bottle Blowers' Association. Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 79 Atlantic Reporter, page 262.

Negligence Bars

That even though a person's employment may be illegal, that fact does not give a plaintiff a cause of action for damages in case of injury against an employer, if the plaintiff

has been guilty of contributory negligence, is held by the supreme court of Michigan.

Jessie Woods was in the employ of the Kalamazoo Paper Box Co. and operated a stayer machine in its factory. She was only 15 years old at the time and her employment at such a machine was in violation of Act No. 285, Acts of 1909. Judgment had been in her favor in the circuit court of Kalamazoo county, whereupon the company appealed and procured a reversal of the judgment on the ground that she was guilty of contributory negligence, the court holding that the fact that the employment was in violation of the statute did not bar the defense. Judge Ostrander said:

"Giving to plaintiff's testimony the greatest probative force, it shows no connection between the defendant's alleged negligence and her injury, unless her employment was a violation of the statute. If it was a violation of the statute, her own conduct may nevertheless be considered to determine whether she was herself at fault. Upon this question her testimony is conclusive. She 'tripped' the machine-set it in motion-while her finger was in the machine, over the anvil. She was not ignorant of the danger or of what she did. Unless the machine moved she was in no danger. It could not move unless she set it in motion. She had no occasion to place her finger in a position where it could be injured, and none to start the machine when it was in such a position. The judgment is reversed and no new trial will be granted."Woods vs. Kalamazoo Paper Box Co., Supreme Court of Michigan, 133 Northwestern Reporter, page 482.

Penalizing Picketing

That a city may pass an ordinance penalizing picketing for the purpose of threatening, intimidating and coercing has been decided by the supreme court of California.

J. J. Williams had been arrested for the violation of a municipal ordinance of the city of Los Angeles prohibiting certain acts, among them the

picketing of places of employment for the purpose of intimidating, threatening and coercing employes therein. Williams applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied, as appears from the following opinion of Chief Justice Beatty, who spoke for the

court:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which has been denied by the court.

The prisoner was arrested upon a complaint accusing him of violating a penal ordinance of the city of Los Angeles. The ordinance is quite comprehensive in its enumeration of the acts which it declares to be misdemeanors and the prisoner was charged in the information with two distinct offenses as defined by the ordinance; first, with loitering on a public street in front of the Fulton Engine Works for the purpose of inducing and influencing persons to refrain from doing and performing service and labor at said works; second with picketing in front of said works for the purpose of intimidating, threatening and coercing such persons.

It is argued in support of the petition that the ordinance is invalid. As to the provisions relating to loitering I have very serious doubts. They are so vaguely comprehensive that a person stopping on the street anywhere in the vicinity of a place of business for the purpose of dissuading an employe from continuing in his employment might be convicted of a misdemeanor.

I therefore concur in the order denying the writ only upon the ground that the charge of picketing for the purpose of intimidation, etc., gives the police court jurisdiction to try the charge. Exparte Williams, Supreme Court of California, 111 Pacific Reporter, page 1035.

Echo of Loewe Case

By a recent federal court decision in California, in a phase of the well known boycotting labor controversy, involving Loewe & Co., hat manufacturers, of Connecticut, the court held that federal tribunals are not bound

by state court opinions, and a point raised that members of labor unions cannot be interfered with if they act within the rules and regulations of their organizations, was declared not well taken. A temporary injunction. granted the plaintiff was made permanent. A report of the case says:

This was a proceeding in equity to secure an order from the court making permanent an injunction secured by the petitioners against the federation and its officers and members to restrain boycotts against the goods of the complainants. The complainants were manufacturers of hats, residing in Connecticut, distributing their products through merchants in the several states of the Union, and on account of the failure of the manufacturers to unionize their establishment dealers purchasing their hats in the state of California and elsewhere had been boycotted and the sale of their hats diminished. The request to make the temporary injunction permanent was granted on this hearing, as appears from the following opinion of the court, as delivered by Judge Van Fleet:

A careful review of the record submitted on final hearing discloses that the facts, as there stated, are in all material respects fully sustained by the evidence taken before that master; and, under those circumstances, it must be held, as contended by complainants, that the principles announced in that opinion as the bases of the order. granting the preliminary injunction become the law of the case in this court, and fix the right of the complainants to have the injunction made perpetual. That ruling was not, as claimed by respondents, a purely tentative one, like an ex-parte order granting a temporary restraining order. It was a ruling made in response to an order to show cause and after a full hearing of the prima facie case made by the sworn bill and the affidavits of both parties; and the showing then made being fully sustained. by the evidence on the final hearing, the ruling becomes conclusive, excepting only on review by an appellate

court.

The proposition, now for the first

time advanced by respondents, that under the facts stated in the bill this court never had jurisdiction to enjoin the respondents, is based upon an erroneous conception of the law. That proposition is, in substance, that while the case was properly brought in this court, by reason of diversity of citizenship of the parties, no federal question is involved or stated, and that the court is, therefore, simply administering the laws of the state; that under the decisions of the supreme court of this state the acts for which respondents are sought to be enjoined are held to be within the legal rights. of labor organizations, and are not subject to be restrained by the courts; and, consequently, that the temporary injunction issued herein was without right and void from the beginning.

Assuming that this objection can be said in any proper sense, to raise a question of jurisdiction, and without. conceding that the decisions of the state court are to the effect stated, the fallacy of respondents' proposition lies in the fact that in the administration of their equitable jurisdiction the federal courts are not, as assumed, excepting so far as affected by local statutes, administering the laws of the state in which they sit, but are administering the law as applicable to all the states. And in applying the general principles of equity, such as alone are involved in this controversy, they determine for themselves what those principles are, untrammeled by differing decisions of the state tribunals. While the reasoning of a state court in determining such a question is always to be regarded with respect, and will be followed, if persuasive of a correct statement of the law, it is in no sense conclusive or binding upon a federal court.

The opinion of Judge Morrow in granting the preliminary injunction in this case will be found to be fully in accord, in so far as pertinent, with the principles announced by the supreme court in the case of Loewe vs. Lawlor (208 U. S. 274; 28 Sup. Ct. 301, Bul. No. 75, p. 622), a case originating out of the same labor controversy which gave rise to the present suit and involving largely the same

essential facts; the bill, in fact, being almost an exact replica of the one filed in this case. While that was an action, in form, to invoke the protection of the anti-trust act of July 3, 1890, chapter 647 (26 Stat. 209 c. 647, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200), known as the Sherman Act, many of the general considerations there stated. have application to the present case; and it is conceded in respondents' brief that if the court has jurisdiction. here the language of that case is broad enough to cover the acts here involved.

Lastly, if the suggestions of counsel at the oral argument were intended to advance the idea that the individual defendants are protected from the consequences of their acts by the fact that they were acting strictly within the rules and regulations of their organization, the obvious answer is that the Constitution and laws of the country are still paramount to the rules of any private aggregation of men, and it is to those laws that we must look in determining whether the rights of one citizen have been violated by the acts of another.

It follows from these considerations that the complainant is entitled to a final decree making the temporary injunction heretofore granted permanent; and a decree to that effect may be prepared granting a perpetual injunction against the defendants included within the preliminary writ.Loewe et al. vs. California State Federation of Labor et al., United States Circuit Court, Northern District of California, 189 Federal Reporter, page 714.

Discharge Justified

A court in Saskatchewan holds that notwithstanding a man has an annual agreement for employment, he can be summarily dismissed by his employer for a single act of disobedience.

In an action for damages, tried by Chief Justice Wetmore, for improper dismissal of the plaintiff from the defendants' employment, it ap peared that the plaintiff was hired by the defendants as "a mechanical ex

« ПретходнаНастави »