and although not absolutely universal (for we have seen that there are anomalies in the case of judgment creditors and the case of dower),1 yet it is generally true, and applies to cases of every sort where an equity is sought to be enforced against a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate without notice, or even against a bona fide purchaser not having the legal estate, where he has a better right or title to call for the legal estate than the other party. It applies therefore to cases of accident and mistake as well as to cases of fraud, which, however remediable between the original parties, are not relievable as against such purchasers under such circumstances.3 437. We have thus gone over the principal grounds upon which Courts of Equity grant relief in matters of accident, mistake, and fraud. In all these cases (to recur to a train of remark already suggested) it may be truly asserted that the remedy and relief administered in Courts of Equity are in general more complete, adequate, and perfect than they can be at common law. The remedy is more complete, adequate, and perfect, because equity uses instruments and proofs not accessible at law, such as an injunction operating to prevent future injustice, and a bill of discovery addressing itself to the conscience of the party in matters of proof. The relief also is more complete, adequate, and perfect, inasmuch as it adapts itself to the special circumstances of each particular case, adjusting all cross equities, and bringing all the parties in interest before the court so as to prevent multiplicity of suits and interminable litigation. Courts of Law on the other hand cannot do more than pronounce a positive judgment in a set formulary for the plaintiff or for the 1 See ante, §§ 57 a, 108, 381, 410, note; post, §§ 630, 631; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note, p. 22; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 2, notes (h) and (i); Id. B. 3, ch. 3, § 1, note (a); Id. B. 6, ch. 3, § 3, note (i); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 7, note (u); Id. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (ƒ), p. 22; Id. B. 1, ch. 5, § 4; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 2, ch. 3, p. 283; Mitford, Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 274, note (d). 2 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 2, ch. 6, § 2, and note (1⁄2); 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 4, § 25, and note (e); Id. B. 1, ch. 1, § 7; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 16; 2 Chance on Powers, ch. 23, § 1, art. 2859 to 2863; Pomfret v. Windsor, 2 Ves. 472, 486; Medlicott v. O'Donel, 1 B. & Beatt. 171; Ex parte Knott, 11 Ves. 618; Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Will. 495; ante, §§ 64 c, 108, 139, 381, 409, 411. 8 Ante, §§ 64 c, 108, 381, 409, 410, 434; post, §§ 630, 631. See Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, pp. 111, 112, 113. defendant, without professing or attempting to qualify that judgment according to the relative equities of the parties. Thus if a deed is fraudulently obtained without consideration, or for an inadequate consideration, or if by fraud, accident, or mistake a deed is framed contrary to the intention of the parties in their contract on the subject, the forms of proceeding in the Courts of Common Law will not admit of such an investigation of the matter in those courts as will enable them to do justice. The parties claiming under the deed have therefore an advantage in proceeding in a Court of Common Law which it is against conscience they should use. Courts of Equity will (as we have seen) on this very ground interfere to restrain proceedings at law until the matter has been properly investigated. And if it finally appears that the deed has been improperly obtained, or that it is contrary to the intention of the parties in their contract, these courts will in the first case compel a delivery and cancellation of the deed, or order it to be deposited with an officer of the court, and will further direct a reconveyance of the property if it has been so conveyed that a reconveyance may be necessary. In the second case they will either rectify the deed according to the intention of the parties, or they will restrain the use of it in the points in which it has been framed contrary to, or it has gone beyond, their intention in the original contract.1 438. In like manner Courts of Equity will (as we have seen) aid defective securities under like circumstances. They will also interfere not only to relieve against instruments which create rights, but against those which destroy rights, such as a release fraudulently or improperly obtained.2 (a) And finally they will not only prevent the unfair use of any advantage in proceeding in a court of ordinary jurisdiction gained by fraud, accident, or mistake, but they will also, if the consequences of the advantage have been actually obtained, restore the injured party to his rights.3 439. The flexibility of Courts of Equity too in adapting their 1 Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 128, 129; Id. 112, 113. 2 Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 129, 130. 8 Id. 131. (a) For a statement of the princi- 4 DeG. J. & S. 579; 1 Perry, Trusts, ples upon which equity takes jurisdic- § 166. tion in such cases see Rolfe v. Gregory, decrees to the actual relief required by the parties, in which their proceedings form so marked a contrast to the proceedings at the common law, is illustrated in a striking manner in cases of accident, mistake, and fraud. If a decree were in all cases required to be given in a prescribed form, the remedial justice would necessarily be very imperfect, and often wholly beside the real merits of the case. Accident, mistake, and fraud are of an infinite variety in form, character, and circumstances, and are incapable of being adjusted by any single and uniform rule. Of each of them one might say, 'Mille trahit varios adverso sole colores.' The beautiful character or pervading excellence, if one may so say, of Equity Jurisprudence is, that it varies its adjustments and proportions so as to meet the very form and pressure of each particular case in all its complex habitudes. Thus (to present a summary of what has been already stated) if conveyances or other instruments are fraudulently or improperly obtained, they are decreed to be given up and cancelled.1 If they are money securities on which the money has been paid, the money is decreed to be paid back. If they are deeds or other muniments of title detained from the rightful party, they are decreed to be delivered up.2 If they are deeds suppressed or spoliated, the party is decreed to hold the same rights as if they were in his possession and power. If there has been any undue concealment or misrepresentation or specific promise collusively broken, the injured party is placed in the same situation, and the other party is compelled to do the same acts as if all had been transacted with the utmost good faith. If the party says nothing, but by his expressive silence misleads another to his injury, he is compellable to make good the loss; and his own title, if the case requires it, is made subservient to that of the confiding purchaser.5 If the party by fraud or misrepresentation induces another to do an act injurious to a third person 1 See 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 208, 211, 212, 261; Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 127, 128, 132. 2 Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 124. 8 Mitf. Pl. Eq. 117, 118; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, Pt. 2, ch. 3, §§ 1, 385, &c.; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 211, 258. 4 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 209, 210; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 4, and notes. 5 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 211; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, § 4, and notes (m) and (n). he is made responsible for it. If by fraud or misrepresentation he prevents acts from being done, equity treats the case as to him as if it were done, and makes him a trustee for the other.2 If a will is revoked by a fraudulent deed, the revocation is treated as a nullity. If a devisee obtains a devise by fraud, he is treated as a trustee of the injured parties. In all these and many other cases which might be mentioned Courts of Equity undo what has been done if wrong, and do what has been left undone if right. 440. We may conclude this head by calling the attention of the reader to the remark (which has been necessarily introduced in another place) that Courts of Equity will exercise a concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of Law in all matters of fraud, excepting only of fraud in obtaining a will, which if of real estate is constantly referred to a Court of Law to decide it, in the shape of an issue of devisavit, vel non, (a) and which if of personal estate is in England cognizable in the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Courts.5 (b) But even in this case the bill may be retained to abide the decision in the proper court, and relief be decreed according to the event. No other excepted case is known to exist; and it is not easy to discern the grounds upon which this exception stands in point of reason or principle, although it is clearly settled by authority. But where the fraud 13 P. Will. 131, note; Jeremy on Eq. Jurisd. B. 3, ch. 2, § 1, pp. 388, 389. 2 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 552; 1 Jac. & Walk. 96; 11 Ves. 638. 81 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (ƒ), p. 13; Id. B. 1, ch. 2, § 13, note (q). But see Ambler, R. 215; 3 Bro. Ch. R. 156, note; 7 Ves. 373, 374. 4 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (ƒ), p. 13; 2 Fonbl. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 3, and note (g); Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 257. Ante, §§ 184, 238; Allen v. Macpherson, 5 Beav. R. 469; s. c. on appeal, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 133. 6 See ante, § 184, note; and Gaines & Wife v. Chew, 2 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 619, 645. 7 Ante, §§ 184, 238, 252, 254; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 1, § 3, note (ƒ), p. 13; 2 Fonbl. Eq. B. 4, Pt. 1, ch. 1, § 3, and note (e); Kerrick v. Bransby, 3 Brown, Parl. Cas. 358; 7 Bro. Parl. Cas. by Tomlins, p. 437. See Wild v. Hobson, 2 Ves. & B. 108; Mitf. Pl. Eq. by Jeremy, 257; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. 284; Id. 119; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 206; Jones v. Jones, 7 Price, R. 663; Allen v. Macpherson, 1 Phill. Ch. R. 133. (a) See Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 494; Gould v. Gould, 3 Story, 516, 537; Archer v. Meadows, 33 Wis. 167; does not go to the whole will, but only to some particular clause, or where the fraud is in unduly obtaining the consent of the next of kin to the probate, Courts of Equity will lay hold of these circumstances to declare the executor a trustee for the next of kin.1 1 Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 257; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. 284; Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. R. 360; Allen v. Macpherson, 1 Phill. Ch. R. 133. In this last case many of the former decisions are collected in which Courts of Equity have granted relief in cases of fraud in wills. See the opinion cited at large, ante, § 184, note; and also the other authorities cited in the same note. |