cree as a divorce a vinculo matrimonii would have. Va. Code, 1887, § 2264; Marshall v. Baynes, 88 Va. 1040, 14 S. E. 978.

A divorce a vinculo matrimonii, although for a supervenient cause, or for a cause which, while it existed at the date of the marriage, is yet by statute specially declared to dissolve the marriage only from the time of the sentence, operates as a bar to dower or curtesy. Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. Gratt. 13; 599; Harris v. Harris, 31 Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182; Cleek v. McGuffin, 89 Va. 324, 15 S. E. 896. See 2 Minor's Inst. (4th Ed.) 137.

Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court may make such further decree as it may deem expedient in regard to Va. the estate, etc., of the parties. Code, 1887, § 2263. See Cralle v. Cralle, 84 Va. 198, 6 S. E. 12; Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182; Francis v. Francis, 31 Gratt. 283; Harris v. Harris, 31 Gratt. 13; Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599; Carr v. Carr, 22 Gratt. 168; Bailey v. Bailey,

21 Gratt. 43.

Curtesy and dower are barred by a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii; and the same principle applies to maintenance, in the absence of any provision in the decree as to the property rights of the parties. Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va.

182.

But the divorce which breaks the bonds of matrimony perpetually, dissolves the marital relation between them, so that the man ceases forever to be the husband and the woman to be the wife, must necessarily defeat the consummation of curtesy. Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 606.

Deeds of Separation.-As to the validity of deeds for the voluntary separation of husband and wife and their effect upon the marital rights of the parties, see Dooley v. Baynes, 86 Va. 650, 10 S. E. 974; Switzer v. Switzer, 26 Gratt. 574.

D.

ANTENUPTIAL CON

Where a husband by an express contract before and in contemplation of marriage agrees to surrender his right to the enjoyment of the property during coverture and his right to take as survivor, there remains nothing to which his marital right can attach during the coverture, or after the death of the wife. Charles v. Charles, 8 Gratt. 486.

The only power the wife has to deprive the husband of his right of curtesy is that she may, by his consent, deliver to him an estate in lieu of his curtesy. If she does not do this in her lifetime she can not effect it by any provision in her will, which can not take effect until her death, and therefore can not operate as an agreement, such as is required by the statute, to bar curtesy. The husband may, as we have seen, by the provisions of his will, bar the dower of his wife, or, at least, compel her to elect whether she will take the provision made for her in lieu of dower, or whether she wil renounce the will, and take under the

A deed of marriage settlement will not divest the marital rights of the husband to a greater extent than the terms of the instrument clearly require. Mitchell v. Moore, 16 Gratt. 275; 2 Minor's Inst. (4th Ed.) 126.

E. BY HUSBAND'S JOINING IN WIFE'S CONVEYANCE.

A husband's right to curtesy in the statutory separate estate of his wife is defeated by the execution of a deed by her in which he united. Bankers' Loan, etc., Co. v. Blair, 99 Va. 606, 7 Va. Law Reg. 253, 39 S. E. 231; Campbell v. McBee, 92 Va. 68, 22 S. E. 807; Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639.

L. is insolvent, and there are liens on his real estate. P., father of L.'s wife, devised to her one undivided sixth part of "Mansfieid" farm. L. and wife convey said sixth to W., for $3,886, payable in certain stocks and bonds, and W. simultaneously conveyed said stocks, etc., and said sixth interest, to trustees, for the purpose of paying out of the proceeds of said stock, etc., the liens of judgments against L., on said sixth interest and to hold the residue "subject to any appointment which the wife of L. may make in writing addressed to said trustees." It was held, this is not a settlement of the husband's life estate, as tenant by the curtesy, on his wife, but a sale by L. and wife to W. of her own land and of her husband's marital interest therein. Tebbs v. Lee, 76 Va. 744.

joining in such deed. It was held, said pretended deed was wholly ineffectual to divest the grantor of her ownership of such land, and did not pass any interest therein, legal or equitable, to the said grantees. The said grantor having died intestate, her other heirs at law and the surviving husband, as tenant by the curtesy, have a right to have such a deed set aside and removed as a cloud upon their title; the former as remaindermen in fee, according to their interests, subject to the life estate of the Austin v. Brown, surviving husband.

37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E. 207. H. BY WIFE'S DEVISE.

Prior to the statute, Va. Code, 1849, ch. 122, § 3; Va. Code, 1887, § 2513, a married woman having an equitable separate estate in fee could not dispose of it by will, unless the power to make such disposition was expressly conferred by the instrument creating the estate, such power not being an incident of the estate. West v. West, 3 Rand. 373.

"But, at the general revision of the laws in 1849, the rule of West v. West was changed, so as to allow a married woman to dispose of her equitable separate fee by will. Code of 1849, ch. 122, § 3, which provision was carried, without change, into the present Code. Section 2513. The effect of this was to enlarge the powers of the woman and to give her the right to dispose of her equitable separate fee by will, though the power was not expressly

See ante, "Wife's Equitable Separate Estate," IV, C; "Wife's Statutory or Legal Separate Estate," IV, D. G. DEED OF WIFE.

A married woman, not living separate and apart, but with her husband, undertook, by deed dated April 20, 1878, to sell and convey a certain tract of land, part of her real estate, to two

instrument creating the estate. Such was the construction placed on the statute in the summary of the law, in Justis v. English, 30 Gratt. 571, and such seems to have been the construction of Judge Lomax also. See 3 Lomax's Dig. (2d Ed.) p. 11, note 1." Note to Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 2 Va. Law Reg. 530.

Under Va. Code, 1887, § 2513, a married woman owning an equitable sep

arate estate in fee may, unless prohibited by the instrument creating it, devise the same, and thereby deprive her husband of curtesy therein. The power to make such devise is given by statute and has the same effect as if incorporated into the instrument creating the estate, unless such instrument restrains the power. Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 93 Va. 591, 25 S. E. 601, 2 Va. Law Reg. 527; Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 20 S. E. 950; Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392, 11 S. E. 879. See articles by Professor R. C. Minor, of the University of Virginia, in 1 Va. Law Reg. 651, et seq., criticising the decisions of the court in Chapman v. Price and Hutchings v. Commercial Bank.

In grant by parents of an estate of inheritance in lands to married daughter occurs the following habendum: "To have and to hold in her own right, free from any claims or demands from her husband, or any person claiming under, through or against him in any way, now or at any time hereafter." Afterwards, the wife by her will devised the land to her children, and died leaving her husband. surviving. His creditors brought their bill to subject his supposed curtesy in the land to his debts. It was held, the terms of the devise created a separate estate in the wife with power of alienation, which she exercised, and thereby excluded her husband and all claiming under him from all claim on the land. Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392, 11 S. E. 879.

Although it is provided by W. Va. Code, 1887, ch. 78, § 11, that unless the husband shall renounce any provision made for him by the wife's will he shall have no other interest in her estate than is given him by the will, a failure on his part to renounce such provision will not deprive him of cur

tesy, unless he has agreed to accept the provision in lieu thereof, such agreement being the only mode by which curtesy can be barred under W. Va. Code, 1887, ch. 65, § 16. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 30 W. Va. 599, 5 S. E. 139; Beirne v. Von Ahlefeldt, 33 W. Va. 663, 11 S. E. 46.

Under this statute, curtesy can not be barred by a provision of the will of the wife, even when it is expressed to be for that purpose; but such bar can be made effectual only by agreement between husband and wife inter vivos; that is, by the wife delivering to the husband as estate which he agrees to accept in lieu of his curtesy. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 30 W. Va. 599, 5 S. E. 142.

A husband, although failing to renounce the provisions of a will made in his favor by his wife, who had no children at the date of the will, will not be deprived of his curtesy by an afterborn child that survived his wife. Beirne v. Von Ahlefeldt, 33 W. Va. 663, 11 S. E. 46.

I. CONVEYANCE OF HUSBAND.

It was formerly held, that the husband's interest in the real property of his wife even if curtesy initiate was subject to his disposal by deed without the concurrence of his wife. Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. 305.

Where a wife is seized in fee of land not separate estate, and her husband makes a deed purporting to convey the fee, but void as to the wife, such deed vests in the grantee as life estate, either for the joint lives of the husband and wife, or by the curtesy, according to the facts, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the wife's reversion until the termination of said life estate. Arnold v. Bunnell, 42 W. Va. 473, 26 S. E. 359; Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356, 15 S. E. 56.