the naval militia is distinguished may have the effect to ennoble the man-of-war's man's calling in the eyes of the people. The men of the militia seem to be proud of the blue shirt of the sailor, and their influence should be exerted toward securing for the bluejacket of the Navy full recognition for his manliness and respectability.

The following is a recapitulation of the methods advocated in this paper to secure the highest degree of fighting efficiency for our ships:

1. Make the organization as homogeneous as possible, both as regards officers and men.

2. Assign to the duties on board ships the commissioned officers who will plainly be most useful in battle; the same will inevitably be the most useful in time of peace.

3. Make warrant officers as numerous as possible, in order to provide promotion for enlisted men.

4. Give the petty officer the exact status of a non-commissioned officer in the army.

5. Trust the bluejackets, and give them the responsibility of sentry duty, that they may be the better fitted to become petty officers.

6. Bring every possible muscle in the ship to aid in bearing the burden of ship-work.

7. Seek a higher standard than in any other navy in the development of the enlisted men, because of the unusual strain that a state of war would bring upon our service.

8. Give continuous-service men desirable positions in navyyards as an inducement for good men to remain for a term of years afloat.

9. Encourage officers to study the art of training and developing men, in order that the United States Navy may profit by the established principle that-" Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships; over and over again the French Revolution taught this lesson, which our own age with its rage for the last new thing in material improvement has largely dropped out of memory." [Mahan.]

In conclusion, the writer begs leave to state that there is nothing new in this paper except possibly the proposition to instruct officers systematically and carefully in piloting and in all the

tion with officers of all grades leads to the belief that the recommendations in this paper voice the sentiments of a large majority of the line officers of the Navy-sentiments that are heard every day on board ship. If perfect freedom is permitted in discussing and advocating measures that are deemed injurious to the service, the same freedom must be permitted in condemning them. In no other way will evils be discovered until they have grown to enormous proportions. The chances of victory largely depend upon the number and kind of men who are assigned to a ship. If it is forbidden to suggest changes in time of peace, it may not be discovered until too late that defeat could have been averted by placing on board ship the officers and men who are logically best fitted to contribute to the fighting efficiency of a man-of-war. An apology is hardly necessary in presenting this subject before an Institute that is supposed to encourage the discussion of matters affecting the efficiency of the Navy. It may be sufficient to say that this step is taken with all due respect for the feelings of individuals in the service, but with a firm conviction that a frank, fearless, and searching examination of the personnel afloat is necessary at a time when "naval reorganization" is being considered and when the possibility, at least, of future war may be admitted.

DISCUSSION.

Captain R. D. EVANS, U. S. N.-Mr. Chairman: I find myself in accord with Lieutenant Fullam on "The Organization, Training, and Discipline of the Navy Personnel," as viewed from the ship, and I am sure all sea officers must thank him for his plain-spoken and timely words. I believe that the proper organization of the line of the Navy will be found in increasing the numbers in the several grades to meet the demand that will be made upon them as the Navy is increased to the proportions it must, in the near future, assume. At the same time incompetent officers must be weeded out by some process, and I can see nothing better than promotion by selection in the junior grades up to and including commander.

The reasons for seniority promotion above the grade of commander, and the objections to selection, are too obvious and well known to need mentioning.

I, for one, am opposed to all the schemes for reducing the number

enough officers afloat to secure the highest efficiency. If officers are too old for the duties they are called on to perform, the efficiency of the service and that must be the first question considered and the one to which all others should give way-requires that they must be removed from the active list and their places filled by younger men. When we have a fleet of torpedo-catchers and torpedo-boats, and fifteen or twenty gunboats-and this number is now in sight-the question of "command rank while young" will soon be settled, for undoubtedly the authorities will see the advantages of giving all these commands to lieutenants, while the commanders and lieutenant-commanders will absorb many of those now held by captains.

I certainly agree absolutely with Lieutenant Fullam in all he says regarding the necessity for more officers afloat. Unfortunately we cannot discuss the question in all its bearings without being accused of opposing one corps or another of the Navy. In what I may say I wish to disclaim any idea of opposing anybody. I am only trying to give my ideas in a crude way on an abstract but very important question to the country. As an outsider looking at the question of paymasters on board ship, I cannot for the life of me understand why a graduate of Annapolis should not perform the duties of pay officer as well as a graduate of Princeton or Yale; and when I discover that graduates of Annapolis are actually, as executive and navigators, keeping accounts of, and making balance-sheets for, more property than the paymaster, my astonishment is increased.

As regards engineer officers on board ship, I do not think any are required, or, rather, none would be in a very short time if we had warrant machinists and the younger engineer officers taken into the line. All the watch officers of the ship would then belong to one corps, call them what you please, preferably line officers, as their titles seem to be so popular just now. The older engineer officers, who are being disabled at such a furious rate, could then perform their proper duties on shore, where they should, when consolidated with the Construction Corps, make ships and the things that go into them fit each other better than they do now. They could also be employed as instructors at colleges of which we hear so much.

The younger constructors should follow the course now wisely laid out for them by the Secretary of the Navy, and so find out some of the practical discomforts imposed upon sea-going men by their lack of practical knowledge.

I approach the question of marines with great hesitation for many reasons. That I am opposed to marines on board ship is pretty well known, but the reasons for my opposition are either not known or, if known, misrepresented. I find myself not in accord with Lieutenant Fullam as to the importance of landing parties, or more properly, landing drills. The business of officers and sailors is primarily on board ship, and in the new ships, if they attend to their business, they will find they have little time for shore work. Of course, enough of it must

`landed in case of riot, etc. Beyond this it is better to put the time on the turrets, rapid-fire guns and boats.

Coming back once more to the question of marines on board ship, their presence seems to me to be a question for each officer to settle for himself. Do you want marines, and, if so, why? I answer, without hesitation, No; I do not want them because I think sailors are better men for ship work. If we may rate developed intelligence in the enlisted force by dollars and cents-and I think we may fairly do so-then the more marines we have the lower the intelligence of the crew. One can scarcely call this desirable in the vessels we now have to go to sea in. It cannot reasonably be claimed that you can make a landsman any better by dressing him in a buttoned-up coat and putting a red stripe down his trousers. There must be something beyond that. What then is it that makes the greener man more valuable than the more seasoned one on board ship? If you want them to discipline your crew you must admit that they are better disciplined than those who have grown up from apprentice-boys under what I consider the best discipline in the world. As an old training-ship commander I deny absolutely any such proposition. Do you want marines to man your secondary battery. If so, you must admit that they are better for the purpose-better gunners and better shots. Few officers will admit this, I imagine, and those who do will not find the target reports with them. Do you want marines for turret guns' crews? If you do, you want the men of least experience to do the highest class of work on board your ship. If you want marines afloat it must be because you think two separate organizations are better on board ship than one, and, reasoning on this basis, three would be better still, therefore you should have a company of cavalry to further increase your efficiency. The effect upon the entire ship's company is bad, and you are placed in the remarkable position of claiming that one officer who graduates from Annapolis, and develops only one way, and can only do one class of duty on board ship, is better than, or as good as his classmate who is developed in many ways. It may be so, but after a considerable experience I am unwilling to admit it.

If the marines were formed into an expeditionary brigade of say five thousand men, with a brigadier-general to command it, and officered by the valuable corps of officers now in service, and used to garrison the posts near the different navy-yards, I believe it would be the finest body of soldiers in this country, ready at all times to suppress riots and guard Government property. When it became necessary to make a serious demonstration on shore, the proper number of men and officers, properly equipped and outfitted, could be embarked for the purpose, and when the job was done returned to their barracks.

I find myself in accord with Lieutenant Fullam on the subject of "The Bluejacket." The improvement in him, particularly in the petty officer class, during the past ten years, has been most marked, but there still remains much to be desired-better pay, better messing, better clothing. and better care from his officers all around. "Never trust a man in a

known saying, "Spare the rod and spoil the child." I do not believe in beating children, and I do believe in trusting a man in a blue shirt. The more you trust the sailor, and the more responsibility you put upon him, especially when he is young, the more valuable he will be, and the more you can trust him as years go by. Let each officer make it his personal affair to see that the comfort of the men is looked after and I am sure the response will be prompt and manly, and let them encourage the notion that seamanship is not a lost art but the most important part of naval education, more important now than ever before.

What we want most of all in our new machines is the seaman, one whose seamanship includes most of what past conditions demanded, and, in addition, the finer seamanship demanded by the new conditions under which we serve. The "habit of the sea," and the art of "sea housekeeping," were qualities which marked their possessor in the old days, and they are of vastly greater importance in these new days of mastless battleships.

Finally, I am sure from my experience in the ships of the new Navy that warrant officers, and plenty of them, are most necessary to efficiency; their number should be increased and the warrants given to apprentices as a reward for professional attainments.

Commander J. B. COGHLAN, U. S. N.-The subject of the essay under discussion-" The Organization, Training, and Discipline of the Navy Personnel as Viewed from the Ship "—has never, in my opinion, been touched upon, or its various needs enumerated and reviewed, in so able a manner as by the present essayist. The statements are lucid and the arguments unanswerable. In many minor points differences of opinion may exist, but as a whole every naval officer should be its champion. Discussion of it might imply a disagreement. What I submit is meant to be wholly, entirely and heartily in its favor. In some respects I wish it had gone further.

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"Vested rights" have had many and powerful defenders, vested duties" have had few or none.

The statutes creating the marine corps certainly create no vested right of service afloat on board our vessels. The same laws provide for their service in forts and garrisons on shore.

If serving on shore, the same pay and rations would be earned. As no manner of hardship to the corps itself would follow their removal from service afloat, there should be no feeling of bitterness engendered by a calm discussion of the question of their retention on board under the new conditions which have lately arisen.

The experience of every one shows that our modern vessels cannot accommodate the people actually required for proper service.

Even with the reduced crews of peace times the conditions have almost reached the limit of human endurance. What will it be in times of war? The man-of-war's man of to-day is of very different material from the one of a few years ago; is vastly superior in every way. The mode of