27th. Column should always be taken to mean indented column, in which ships do not follow exactly in the wake of the next ahead, but a little on the port and starboard quarter, alternately, of each ship.

This minimizes the danger of collision, enables a more compact formation to be maintained, permits signals to be seen to better advantage, places the ram of the mate to better advantage in case of need, and best gives to column all the advantages claimed for it, viz.:

(a) Column is easiest to keep or to reassemble in.

(b) It is perfectly flexible, and can, in a few minutes, change to any direction and into other formations.

(c) Each ship is flanked by the two next astern, which can come up on either side in case of need.

(d) Ships in column can maintain the same speed.

(e) By a slight sheer out of line, any or all the weapons-the gun, ram, or torpedo-can be called into play.

(f) In this formation guns practically are in line.

(g) The indented column is more adhesive and concentrated than direct line ahead (column).

28th. The changes of direction of head of all ships simultaneously, or of head of column in action, should be four points, or multiples of that number.

This enables us to reduce the number of battle signals; it simplifies movements; it adds to the effectiveness of gun fire by not changing direction so often; and it prevents a wavering policy as to converging on the enemy. In rounding the flank or rear of an enemy's formation, an exception to the above will be made in that each will circle and draw in without regard to four points and without the necessity for signals, as hereafter described.

29th. Chase should always be given where opportunity offers, viz., when the enemy offers a stern presentation. Unless he is superior in speed he cannot get room to turn and front you when you are once close in his wake, and you can pick up all stragglers.

30th. A greatly inferior fleet in point of numbers, but possessing a decided advantage in speed, may attack a column with some show of success by the retreat formation in double échelon.

of ships, should seek to bring on an engagement, if at all, in narrow waters well known to its officers.

The preceding propositions may all be summed up in the following phrases: 1. Massed 1. Massed formations. 2. Concentration in attack. 3. Reserve speed. 4. Knowledge of plans. 5. Ability to execute them. Further arguments in support of several of the more important propositions will appear in the discussion of the fleet in action.

Until we know a little more about tactics, the most practical method of arriving at sound conclusions is to analyze the gun fire and tactical qualities of the ships we have, and deduce tactics to fit them. We do not know the tactical qualities of many of the newer ships, and it is not good policy to publish the tactical data of those now in commission. Fortunately, gun fire alone gives very conclusive results from its study.

Prof. Alger, U. S. Navy, in a recent lecture at the War College, gave an illustration of the broadside fire of battle-ship No. 5 (Kearsarge), in which it was assumed that a 13-inch gun can be fired once every 5 minutes, an 8-inch once every 2 minutes, a 5-inch R. F. three times in 1 minute, and 4-inch and smaller calibers four times in 1 minute: "We find that of the whole number of projectiles fired in any period of time on one broadside, only six-tenths of 1 per cent. will be 13-inch, 1.6 per cent. of 8-inch, 16.5 per cent. of 5-inch, and 81.3 per cent. of the smaller calibers. In other words, 3-inch armor will keep out at least 81.3 per cent. of all projectiles fired by one battle-ship against another, 6-inch armor will keep out at least 98 per cent., and 12-inch armor at least 99.4 per cent. When we consider the fact that most impacts will not be normal, and that the range will usually be considerable, we may safely say that under any probable future conditions armor of 7-inch thickness will keep out 98 per cent. of the whole number of projectiles fired against it."

This view of gun fire does not of course deal directly with the chances of hitting or with the variation in striking energy at different distances. It is an important phase, but there are others.

At the War College, in the tactical games, the unit of gun fire is the broadside fire of a ship, for a certain period of time, at 2000 yards range. The right ahead or right astern fire of a ship under the same conditions is one-half unit; and the bow and quarter

fourth the above; at 3000 yards, one-half; and at 1000 yards and less, double. Some re-adjustments of the values assigned to right ahead and bow and quarter fire would seem desirable in the light of the accompanying diagrams, which illustrate the values assigned to the different arcs of fire of various well-known ships in our navy, computed on the basis of the percentage of projectiles thrown in any given time, multiplied by the striking energy, Ist, at 2500 yards, and 2d, at 1000 yards. These distances are chosen because the former is just beyond the effective range of all of the secondary battery, and for the further reason that at this range (2500 yards) the "remaining velocity" of a 6-pdr. is just that of a 1-pdr. at 1000 yards. The dotted line represents the value of a single volley from all the guns bearing in the different arcs. It will be noted that the lengths of the radii, and not the areas of the sectors, are the measures of the striking energy on any line of bearing. This comparison of the volleys is a good method in considering all the ships, for it ignores any question of rate of fire, which may vary. The full lines are computed on the basis of the number of smaller projectiles thrown in the interval between the fires of the largest caliber gun carried by each ship. The right-ahead and right-astern fire is represented as a sector, it being assumed that a variation in the course of one or two degrees will be permissible in formations to bring the guns to bear.

It is assumed in the diagrams that a 13-inch gun can fire once every 6 minutes, a 12-inch once every 5, a 10-inch every 3, an 8-inch every 2, a 6-inch every 1, a 5-inch R. F. 5 times a minute, and a 4-inch R. F. and smaller calibers 7 times a minute. The rates of fire of the 5-inch R. F. and smaller calibers may be considered excessive, but are based on actual trial. The 13-inch and 12-inch guns in the British Navy are said to fire once every 2 minutes, and even less is claimed. Why our guns should be so much slower remains to be explained.

In comparing the battery power of different ships, as shown by the heavy lines, it will be noted that, for instance, the period shown for the Indiana is 6 minutes, for the Iowa 5 minutes, for the Maine 3 minutes, for the Minneapolis 2 minutes. A comparison of the Minneapolis with the Brooklyn, in which the interval is 2 minutes in both cases, shows clearly where it is advisable to invest money in the future. The assigning of such

emphasizes, probably unduly, in the Kearsarge, the great importance of rapid-fire guns, but it is doubtful after all if we can emphasize this too much. The Puritan is the most powerful of our monitor type. All other monitors would plot the same way as to arcs of gun fire, but with smaller radii. The Monterey would present one slight variation, in that her after turret guns are 10-inch and her forward 12-inch. The Maine shows the effect of the échelon arrangement of her turrets in the strong port bow and starboard quarter fire. The Iowa's stern fire fits her admirably for the rear vessel in a column. The Kearsarge illustrates that, as usual, in departing boldly from European models, we have achieved a notable success. It is to be hoped that some ship of this type will be named the Alabama, to demonstrate that, while the war is over, we should not fail to remember one of its most important lessons.

This analysis of the gun fire of different types emphasizes clearly the fact that each unit vessel of a class should possess the same tactical qualities and the same distribution of gun fire, and that a continuous programme of ship-building should be at once entered upon in conjunction with a thoroughly renovated system of battle tactics, in which the ships should conform to said tactics. The building now of homogeneous ships of a few definite types, and plenty of them, combined with a clear recognition of our future in this hemisphere, is, as even a purely commercial investment, a sound and wise policy, aside from the manifest duty we owe to the coming generations of Americans in perpetuating our free institutions on this side of the Atlantic.

THE FLEET IN ACTION ON THE OPEN SEA.

Having a fleet composed of a certain number of armored ships and a greater number of scouts, protected, and partially protected cruisers, the process by which an action would be brought about with practically an equal force of a worthy enemy would seem to be about as follows:

Ist. Scouting. The highest development of the scout would be the improved St. Louis merchant type of high speed, great coal capacity, and armored and coal protection to boilers and engines. Her fighting value would be small, possibly, but her capacity for

of ship, with an enormous radius of action, would be able to cable or bring in news of the whereabouts of the enemy.

Proceeding in force to look for him, the scouts accompanying the fleet, deployed in extended order, would bring in and transmit by signal the sighting of the enemy in force on a certain bearing, giving such details of his strength and formation as it had been practicable to ascertain. What formation should our fleet at once assume?

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2d. The approach to the attack.-There is a period of time between the sighting of the enemy and the arrival of the two fleets in the zone of each other's fire which we must carefully study, for on it depends the securing of the first advantage, which often implies that a second will follow if properly managed. During this period the formation to be assumed should be one in which tentatively each ship is in such a position towards the enemy, relatively to her consorts, that her weapons may do effective work at the earliest instant, thereby securing the first advantage. The weapon of great range is the gun. We have seen that armor of 7-inch thickness will keep out 98 per cent. of the whole number of projectiles fired against it," at long range, owing to the fact that impact will not be normal; but we have also seen that a plunging fire of heavy projectiles, striking inboard on the protective deck in the bows-on position at long range, possesses the maximum destructive effect which gun fire can produce in reducing a ship's tactical efficiency. Therefore, when we ask ourselves in what formation we should approach to the attack, the answer is that in which the maximum number of heavy guns can be brought to bear at long range, viz., some compound form of line, preferably double line, each line being indented, the heavy ships in the first indented line and the lighter ships in the second indented line, six cables in rear. This formation is the armed reconnaissance in force preliminary to battle strategy or battle tactics, and in no way commits the fleet to remaining in that formation, because line can at once be changed into column, if desired, as soon as the measure is taken accurately of the enemy's formation and disposition.

In support of indented line formation for the approach to the attack, we may summarize:

(a) It brings all the heavy ships of the first line into the zone