is important enough, however, to be referred to a joint committee of naval and marine officers, who, accepting the great principle of cementing and drawing closer the connection between two bodies which long serIvice in the British Navy has linked together, shall find the means of making still more useful that corps which has ever been proud of the connection. "In making these suggestions, I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not seek to destroy the individuality of the force as marines. Their traditions are too marked, and their services so much appreciated, that few would desire to see these obliterated by simple absorption into the Navy. They themselves would not welcome any such radical change. But if the higher grades are retained as now, there must be more to look forward to than at present, and these should be found in home ports as well as stations abroad. There are many important commands in places dependent on the Navy which might well be filled by colonels and generals of marines. It can hardly be said that the Navy has its fair share of positions of responsibility in outlying parts of the empire. The fitness of the marine officer, with his dual training and knowledge of fleets, for such positions can hardly be questioned. Practical recognition of this in the future, with adoption of my suggestions for the earlier portion of his career, would remove all discontent, in addition to proving beneficial to the State." U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. Gentlemen: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. CLOSING ADDRESS, SESSION OF 1895. By CAPTAIN H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. Navy, We are now about to close the session of 1895 at the Naval War College. The College has not been long established, and during these, its early years, our sessions have been avowedly tentative in their nature. It has been our wish to discover, through actual experiment, whether the Navy desired these methods, whether it felt in itself any disposition toward the study of war. I have never doubted that the Navy would know, better than any one could tell it, what its professional needs were in any special case, if its attention could once be seriously drawn in that direction. An ancient maxim says that when a man has reached the age of forty he is either his own best doctor or a fool. Similarly it may be announced as probable that an organized system, such as the Navy, with a century of growth and experience to form its opinions and generate its intuitions, will have a clearer knowledge of what is good for it than can any individual suggestor, whether he be himself within or without the ranks of the naval profession. To insure this clear knowledge and intuitive perception on the part of the naval organization, it is of course a prime necessity that its attention, attracted in turn as it is to the many new and strange things of modern times, should be concentrated for a time at least upon this somewhat neglected art of war. Once thus concentrated, we may count upon a worthy decision, represent faithful in judging; lending its weight to that maxim of the politicians that "Every one knows more than any one.” The attitude of the College toward this matter is therefore that of one who, having submitted certain questions to a court and produced varied evidence for both sides, awaits with patience the decision of the judge. In this case the Navy is the judge, and will in time render a just verdict; but the College, though it will await the decision with patience, does not profess indifference as to the result, but on the contrary announces itself as an earnest believer in the study of warfare as immediately and critically necessary to ensure the credit of the Navy and the reputation of the Republic in the wars that are to come. We refer to the history of nations and of their armies and navies for absolute proof that this critical need exists. Their records show convincingly that the neglect of the art of war renders useless or destroys the bravest troops, the best equipped fleets. No one claims that the Germans who conquered France in 1870 were a different race from those Germans who were swept from the map of Europe as a military factor in the early years of the century, and by those same Frenchmen or their fathers. Clausewitz, and after him, Moltke, perceived that earnest study of warfare, laborious preparation for war, were the natural solutions of this problem, the main factors of success in this trade of war, as in all trades. They undertook the task bravely and patiently. Much patience was needed, we know. The remnants of a feudal system with the ghost of an old-time chivalry were banded together against them. It was rank heresy, their opponents claimed, to say that there was anything in war but bravery and loyalty, especially anything so lowering as work and study-study of their own hills and rivers, of the territory of possible enemies, of their war resources, and finally of the history of former campaigns. War was represented in their minds by their good swords, their steeds, their own valor and fidelity. This was all-there was nothing more. So away with pedants and their dusty histories and laborious preparation! The new school of officers could, however, point to the then recent annihilation of the Prussian armies by the brilliant Corsican, and to this there was no answer ready; and so the new ideas prevailed, and were consummated after a half-century at We of the present day, looking back as from a height upon the century now closing, so full of impressive military lessons, possess an advantage that cannot be overestimated, and that should not, and I believe will not, be neglected by our nation. We cannot fail to recognize in the great example set by Prussia the overwhelming weight of study and thought in war; though that country delayed until it was driven into this system by the menace of speedy effacement from the map of Europe. The question for us is whether we shall also wait until war having come, some national humiliation teaches us the bitter lesson that Prussia learned in loss and sorrow. It is not a question now of a large or small Navy, but how we will some day use whatever force may be placed in our hands. Eight of our ships well handled and bravely fought, but beaten by twelve of an enemy-this will bring no shame to our people; but should the day come when twelve of ours, through lack of officers trained for war, are defeated by eight of an enemy, then will a blow have been struck at our national pride, and the bonds of sentiment which alone hold together the different portions of our country will be that much weakened and more likely to break under pressure when the disrupting forces, to which all nations are at times liable, shall be exerted to divide the continent into several distinct nations. We can endure defeat if discreditable no better than other races. What they may dread in loss of territory given up to their conquerors, we have to fear in the shape of a weakening national sentiment tending some day to disintegration of the body politic. As to the material and men provided, no thinking man among naval officers would advocate great armies and navies for our Republic. The force provided, the ships, the weapons, and the personnel should undoubtedly be of small though reasonable size, but there is an eternal fitness of things which must be considered. There goes to the making of a great nation, or a complete one even if not great, certain elements which enter in due proportion into its composition, and no one of them can be omitted or slighted without marring the appearance and the strength of the whole. There must be so much commerce and money-getting, so much of governmental protection, so much of legislation, of judiciary, of revenue, of expen |