defense, the following tactical rules are offered as suggestive of expansion by inference and by experience into a general scheme. It should be borne in mind that single line and single column, in fact all simple formations, are much more flexible than compound, but that as eight ships are the limit in even compact formations, we are forced to have compound formations if the fleet is large. In selecting the ships to go in the heavy line, the supporting lines, and the reserve, it will be noted that from the nature of things the supporting line or lines should have greater speed than the heavy line, because the latter manœuvres to come between it (or them) and the enemy, and in going from double line into double column and then changing head of double column eight points, the supporting line must use reserve speed. The reserve should be made up of slow ships and ships of special classes, and, protected by torpedo-boats and torpedo-catchers, should shift for itself and manœuvre to give such support as it can. It is better to go into action with fewer homogeneous ships of good speed and tactical qualities than with more ships when one or two are lame ducks. These last would be better off in the reserve. The fighting line should be agile, and should rely on its heels to be able to protect the reserve in a concentrated attack on it by the enemy. By manoeuvring ordinarily at fast speed, the full and reserve speed is kept for emergencies. Ist. When the enemy is sighted, form indented line at right angles to his bearing, with heavy ships in the first line, and advance at fast speed. 2d. If he is in line, seek a charge through in column of sections disposed in line abreast. Torpedoes shall not be used. Gun fire of rear ships shall be reserved for volley firing under control of the captain, so as not to injure friends, until an enemy's ship becomes a target close-to, when general action may be had. 3d. In the charge, to reform after passing through, the first line shall turn with port helm by countermarching in column of sections. The supporting lines shall divide by wings to right and left, eight points, till clear of flank of heavy line, then head towards enemy and slow to half-speed. The heavy line, after countermarching, shall proceed at full speed, the supporting lines coming in in rear and adjusting speed and formation to new requirements. (Another good method is for all columns of sec 4th. If enemy is in single échelon, stand across the line of bearing of enemy's formation at right angles in column, then change course to come by successive changes of direction of head of column in rear of his formation, and give chase. If in double échelon, proceed in same manner around either flank. 5th. Always give chase when opportunity offers, because your bow presentation is stronger than his stern presentation; you thus have the advantage in your fire, and while you are in his wake he dares not turn. 6th. In the attack on the head of a column by double échelon, the rear ships of the formation should open out clear of the wake of the enemy's rear ship in column to avoid torpedoes which may be dropped by him in his wake. 7th. The leading ship in a column should never attempt to ram unless it is unavoidable or to prevent being rammed, as it will throw the column into confusion. 8th. If the enemy's column attempts to cut through your column at nearly right angles, either stand on and trust to the rear ships being able to ram or torpedo the enemy; or else (a) turn simultaneously through the necessary number of points to head on same course as enemy, and gradually form double échelon to concentrate; or (b) turn simultaneously as stated and double on head of enemy's column by flank ships forming column by slowing successively. 9th. Gun fire being of prime importance, frequent changes of direction should be avoided as being disconcerting to gun fire. If a fleet is skilled in volley firing, these changes may be made simultaneously to bring certain heavy guns to bear at intervals. The increasing value of rapid-fire guns has, however, weakened the former value of concentrated volley or broadside firing. 10th. Always use rectangular in preference to direct method, unless to serve a special purpose. As before stated, these rules are founded on the tactical propositions previously enunciated, and do not represent a complete scheme of tactics. One could, and should, be worked out, however, by one or more drill squadrons, or a fleet of steam launches, such as at the Naval Academy, where the practice will undoubtedly develop some flaws in the theories. A set of tactical rules should include both what to do and what not to do. Battle 50 and 75. It may be possible, however, to reduce the number to 35 by formulating rules. The Naval War College, at Newport, R. I., is accomplishing a great work in formulating the theories of naval warfare. The tactical work should be supplemented by practical exercises afloat. Squadron drill in tactics consists more in studying formations in relation to gun fire with actual target practice, than in making dress parade formations according to inaccurate drawings, based on an inconsistent text which nowhere gives an intelligible idea of the why or wherefore of any formation. Our books on tactics are primers; our signal books are a monument to those who do not go to sea; and the Naval War College, like the proverbial prophet without honor in his own country, is really about our only hope of inspiration in case of that form of national trouble for which alone the Navy has any excuse for existing. DISCUSSION. Commander C. F. GOODRICH, U. S. N.-The prize essay of this year is a valuable contribution to the literature of naval tactics, quite as much for what it does not attempt as for its positive suggestions. The form which an action will assume, after once begun, is entirely problematical, although, to my mind at least, it appears highly probable that a general mêlée is an inevitable sequence of the dash through." If an admiral will, following Nelson's example, take his captains into his confidence, explain his views, invite free discussion, and lay down the result of these conferences in a number of clearly-defined general schemes to cover such actual conditions as are likely to arise, he may be sure that, when the battle has passed beyond the preliminary stage of the attack, when its smoke and confusion have put an end to signalling, and when the casualties, which must be expected, have occurred to prevent further concerted action, he will be only less well served than if he were on board each ship directing its individual manœuvres. For the disorganizing reasons hinted at, it appears wise to consider more particularly the approach, and only to take up the succeeding events as contingent upon emerging from the initial brush with tactical powers reasonably unimpaired. I am quite at one with the lecturer in believing that, within certain limits, the fewer and the simpler the evolutions for battle the better. Formations offering theoretical advantages, no matter how great, should be ruthlessly discarded if their maintenance makes too heavy a draft on |