officers, however, there are, in these navies, 2890 officers employed on shore at naval schools, naval stations, and in hydrographic, coast survey and other work which is performed by the line officers of the United States Navy. Taking these into account, there are ten officers per ship-as many as in our Navy-employed in doing line officer's work in foreign navies.

Now, even if we regard the line officers employed in naval work on shore as a reserve, it may be shown that such a reserve, of all others, is vitally necessary in our case. With the addition of the proper number of torpedo-boats to our Navy-which is sure to come in the near futureand the assignment of one line officer to each of them, we would not have in time of war, when auxiliary cruisers are commissioned, more than five line officers per ship to meet an enemy! This will be too few, when we consider the work involved in quickly training a large number of recruits and in preparing to defend an extensive coast with scant . material. With fewer ships, more raw recruits, and a more extensive coast than our probable enemy, we must not be caught with fewer trained officers. Economy, and every consideration based upon an intelligent study of the necessities of war, demand that the United States Navy should have at all times a surplus of line officers. A competent "general staff" assigned to the duty of preparing this country for the emergency of war would be sure to arrive at such a conclusion. At present the surplus, if such it may be called, is very small. If all the ships of the regular Navy were now commissioned, 75 per cent. of the line would be at sea. In time of war the officers of the retired list could do most of the shore duty; but, making all allowance for them and for available graduates of the Naval Academy now in civil life, the Navy would be hard up for line officers in the event of war.

England has fewer line officers than most other navies-too few in the opinion of many of the best authorities in England, one of whom speaks as follows:

"The want of fully trained lieutenants and sub-lieutenants is a fatal one. The whole greatness of a navy, all probability of success in war depends on a sufficiency of young officers of the highest class, and yet we have allowed ourselves to look forward with complacency to picking up a sufficiency anyhow. The thing has grown on us so gradually that we are unable to realize the condition. We cannot see the absurdity of the very high and expensive training we give to a small number of lieutenants, when, if war breaks out, we must place them side by side with officers of no training at all! Even for peace manœuvres we are seen to run immediately short, and we are placing warrant officers who may be fathers of families in charge of torpedo-boats. Without any disparagement, it must still be said that torpedo-boat service is not for warrant officers. If this weapon is to do what is expected of it, it can only be when it is in the hands of the young and the daring. There are a great number of ships which ought for the sake of efficiency to carry considerable numbers of sub-lieutenants, and which do not carry one."

This picture of the conditions existing in the British navy, where the

I think Mr. Worthington is wrong in arguing that we should reduce the number of line officers in order to develop the petty officer, and I cannot admit that he and others have found an inconsistency in the essay regarding its treatment of this subject. The petty officer can be developed by giving him, without reservation, the exact status of a noncommissioned officer-" only this and nothing more." To deprive him of this status, and then seek his improvement by reducing the number of line officers, would be as absurd as to give a corporal the duty of a commissioned officer in the Army while denying his ability to act as sergeant of the guard. Instead, therefore, of withdrawing line officers from ships and depriving the Navy of those officers who would be most vitally necessary in time of war, we should withdraw other individuals who are not needed, and remove other obstacles that prevent the development of the petty officer in his own legitimate field.

Line officers will not complain of watch duty if they are freed from the duties that are usually assigned to the non-commissioned officers in an army.

Executive and watch officers, who have the best opportunities for observation, will not agree with Mr. Worthington that steam winches, steam cutters, and the abolition of sails and spars have lessened the burden of ship-work. The following comparison of the complements of the Wabash and Philadelphia will serve to illustrate this point:

From this it will be seen that the deck force of the Wabash was greater than the total complement of the Philadelphia. The deck force of the Philadelphia is considerably less than one-half that of the Wabash. Line officers who compare the new ships with the old, and who remember their experience in directing ship-work, know that, regardless of steam winches, etc., the burden of drudgery and coaling ship is far heavier upon the individual man than in former days. There are many more drills and exercises, and the line officer and bluejacket are kept far busier now than in the days of the "old Navy."

It is true that the "working of a modern gun is quite within the comprehension of a warrant officer "-or even of a petty officer, if we consider the mechanical question simply-and we may grant that these subordinate officers are equally patriotic also. But there are other than mechanical questions involved in the control of guns and in deciding whether commissioned, warrant, or petty officers shall be in sole charge in battle. If the commissioned officer can be dispensed with in some of the turrets and in some divisions without loss of fighting efficiency. he can, for similar reasons, be dispensed with in all. As stated by the English authority, it is absurd to have officers of a very “high and expensive training" working side by side with officers of no scientific

the battery. Let us consider two exactly similar ships going into action, one in which highly trained line officers have charge of the gun divisions and torpedoes, and the other in which warrant or petty officers have charge. Which would have the best chance of success? If the latter, then the Naval Academy may be abolished with little loss to the Navy.

If the control and direction of guns and torpedoes against an enemy were purely a mechanical question, like the control of an engine for instance, it is admitted that practical men like warrant or petty officers could do the work as well as commissioned officers and graduates of the Naval Academy. But there are tactical and military principles involved which require the presence of commissioned, highly trained officers in each turret and gun division, for the same reason that such officers are required in a company and platoon of infantry. The presence of such officers does not prevent the development of their non-commissioned subordinates. With the utmost good nature it is submitted that, to use his own expression, Mr. Worthington "appears to confound two problems "one to work a ship and develop efficient petty officers by withdrawing line officers from ships, and the other to work a ship and develop efficient petty officers without depriving the ship and the Navy of the officers who are most necessary to fighting efficiency in time of

war.

Mr. Worthington criticises the proposition to reduce the number of staff officers and replace them by line officers when practicable, and advocates instead an extension of the duties of staff officers. It would appear that the former proposition simply takes account of ship efficiency -naval efficiency-and that the latter takes account,. primarily, of the individual. Now which is wisest and most economical from a naval point of view-to employ on board ship officers of no naval training and restricted usefulness, or officers of naval training and general usefulness? Which system would give the best results in time of war? All this did occur to the essayist when he proposed to replace officers and men of little or no naval training by others who are carefully trained. No offense was intended, no individual was to be injured—the “change of organization" was to be gradual, but it is absolutely necessary to the efficiency of the ship in time of war.

It is not easy to see that the plan of trusting petty officers on deck and withdrawing line officers would be more successful than to trust petty officers in the engine-room and reduce the number of scientific engineers, though Mr. Worthington seems to think so. It is submitted that the presence of so many commissioned engineers has prevented the petty officers in the engine-room from getting warrant rank. If petty officers and machinists in the engine-room have less service in the Navy than petty officers in the line, may it not be for the reason that they have less prospect for a warrant? Taking the five principal navies of Europe, we find that the average is 1.8 engineers per ship, while in our Navy the present number is 2.7 per ship, or as 2 to 3. We have, therefore, as large a surplus of engineers in our Navy as of line officers, in comparison

as in the case of line officers? Cannot the former be recruited from men in civil life more easily than the latter? Is it as difficult to find men who are acquainted with steam machinery as it is to find men who are acquainted with guns, torpedoes, naval tactics, etc.? There is nothing offensive in these questions, nor in the statement that the care and management of steam machinery does not require a distinctively naval training. It is only fair to say that the officers who run the engines of Atlantic liners and merchant steamers generally can run the engines of a man-of-war. Is it fair to say that the deck officers of a merchant steamer are competent to handle and direct guns, torpedoes and ships in a naval battle? Does not this duty require strictly naval training?

The same principles apply to petty officers-those who are to be efficient with guns and torpedoes must have naval training, while a machinist may be perfectly competent, as such, who has never seen a manof-war. The same rule applies to engineers and machinists as to surgeons and apothecaries-all may be easily recruited from men in civil life. It is to be regretted that Mr. Worthington did not give more space to the discussion of the engine-room personnel. It would be interesting to know if he advocates the increase of the engineer corps to 303, the assignment of engineers to colleges, and the appropriation of money to provide engineering plants for technological schools throughout the country in order that these institutions, probably thirty or more in number, might furnish about seven cadets annually for the Navy! Would it not be better to expend all this money and talent upon the Naval Academy course, where there is already a modern ship and some facilities for practical instruction, instead of attempting to build up thirty or forty schools of naval engineering? The writer believes that there are at least a few naval engineers who object to an increase of the corps which would sentence them to do the duty of a machinist for years, and that they would prefer a system in which the engine-room watch is stood by warrant officers and chief machinists, while the scientific engineers, few in number afloat, superintend the machinery. Line officers do not urge this plan on personal or corps grounds, or by reason of any feeling of jealousy or enmity. They, as the officers who must command the whole ship, believe that with the promise of warrant rank, shore service after a term of service afloat, and the retired list, a corps of most efficient mechanical engineers could be formed, thus relieving the collegebred engineer from the performance of duties that will always be uncongenial to him.

In conclusion, the writer insists that the essay was written with but one idea in view-to advocate what is best for the ship as a man-of-war. So far from being actuated by selfish motives, it is ventured that the watch officers of the Navy would, as a body, prefer to remain such all their lives rather than accept promotion as a result of compromises or measures that sacrifice the Navy as a military organization, and the ship as a fighting machine, in order to promote the interests of corps or individuals. We will continue to "plank the deck" and attend to every

Standing watch is an excellent thing in many ways; it keeps the "young" line officer in good physical trim and prevents his getting soft and flabby! In time of war he must have endurance. In time of peace he must prepare for war. Relieve him from a non-commissioned officer's duty and the line officer will attend to the watch and the legitimate duties of a commissioned officer.

The necessity for naval reorganization is pressing. It is annoying, to say the least, that the admirals commanding our most powerful squadrons, and the captains commanding our modern ships-even those within easy reach on the home coast—should not even be consulted in framing measures affecting naval efficiency! These officers, who study the whole problem of fighting efficiency-the only officers who do study it, the only ones who know about it—and who have kept these ships ready for war for months past, are ignored! The ship and the man who commands it are forgotten while "bills" are being framed in Washington! But the ship and the man who commands it always decide the issue of battle. They are not forgotten then. They should not be forgotten before the battle begins. If the Navy is to be reorganized in a manner to increase, not lessen, the chances of victory, Congress must think of the ship and respect the advice of the man in command, otherwise our Navy will be ruined by legislation.

SPEED CONTROL IN MODERN STEAMERS. (See No. 77.)

R. H. THURSTON, Director Sibley College.-The general idea of Lieutenant Wood, as a matter of engineering, is, I have no doubt, perfectly feasible. I think that there is no serious difficulty in securing control of the speed, and of the operation of the engines, of a ship at any point on the vessel at which it may seem desirable. Difficulties will undoubtedly arise in the practical application of that scheme; but they will be overcome, it may be safely assumed, by a little ingenuity and skill in designing. In fact, the plan has been frequently proposed in the management of steam ferry-boats; where, if anywhere, that promptness of action and celerity of adaptation of the speed to the exigencies of the moment, which is important in the case of a naval steamer in battle, is most generally illustrated. There can be no question that the power of handling the ship and of adjusting her speed, as well as her course, from a point directly under the eye, and within reach of the voice, of the officer conning the ship, when in action, can hardly be overvalued. The real question and the fatal difficulties, if such exist, come in the actual employment of the device, which, as matter of engineering construction, may be, as we will assume, a perfect success. I am inclined to think, however, that it will be practicable to overcome all difficulties if the right sort of a designing engineer should take them in hand, and that none will prove fatal.

In the regular working of the engine, once started, and in simple adjustment of speed within ordinary ranges of working, I see no reason