Dorking" style, a battle between an English and a French fleet, Captain Eardley-Wilmot of the English Navy forms the English fleet in double echelon, "the flagship leading, the other vessels ranged on her quarters, making an isosceles triangle. Thus the squadron had the shape of a wedge, in which each ship's ram and bow fire were clear of the next ahead." This was the formation of the Roman fleet under Marcus Atilius Regulus, minus the triarii. [An account of the principal battle formations of the galley period will be found in Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute, Vol. III., No. 1, April 20th, 1876.] The French fleet were "in two divisions, line ahead,* a formation that meets with the unqualified approval of the metaphorical Paul Brachet," and, by implication, that of the ingenious author.

I have traced these successive steps in the history of naval tactics with a view to calling attention to, and emphasizing the fact that the essayist has touched the root of the matter when, to the question, page 20, “In what formation should we approach to the attack?" he answers: that in which the maximum number of heavy guns can be brought to bear at long range." This sound principle had already been enunciated on page 17, where it is stated, as the summing up of the 31 tactical propositions, that "the most practical method of arriving at sound conclusions is to analyze the gun fire and the tactical qualities of the ships we have, and deduce tactics to fit them."

As the line of battle, which forms the basis of every system of tactics, must be made up of ships of sufficiently high military value, I cannot help wishing the author had been a little more explicit in the statement first quoted, and had recommended, as no doubt he intended to do, the deducing of a system of tactics best adapted to the gun fire and tactical qualities of our line-of-battle ships. A system of tactics based on the offensive and manoeuvring powers of a ship of the line of the Massachusetts type might not be suitable for a light cruiser of the Montgomery class. The rôle of each class is essentially different. It will be the duty of the tactician to classify our ships and indicate those that are to be admitted to the line of battle and those that are to perform functions in connection with the line of battle, and from those elements to deduce his system.

In the passages first quoted lies the gist of the whole question. It was that very principle, as laid down by the author, that determined, as we have seen, the battle formation in the oar and in the sail period. Reasoning from that fundamental principle, the true solution of the problem cannot be very far off. The English Naval Prize Essayist of 1879 said of naval tactics, "We are groping in the dark," a fact we may reaffirm with the qualification, thanks to the author and those working on the same lines, that dawn is breaking.

I find myself compelled to dissent somewhat from the author on one point. He recommends, on page 27, that a complete scheme of tactics "should be worked out by one or more drill squadrons, or a fleet of steam launches. . . ." If we can keep up one squadron of evolutions we

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will do well, but the flotilla of launches is a poor substitute for it. The views on this subject of the distinguished French Admiral Jurien de la Gravière may well be quoted on this point. It was proposed some years ago in France to reduce naval expenditure to such an extent that the Minister of Marine would be no longer able to keep up the Mediterranean squadron of evolutions. 'That squadron," the admiral observes, in opposing its abolition, “is the school where the young officers apply the knowledge acquired in all others." "It is the source," he continues, "whence our officers and crews derive their true naval spirit. For this reason alone the squadron of evolutions should be maintained at any cost. But a more important consideration yet urges its continuance. It is our only school of tactics. The fleet most thoroughly drilled in naval tactics will have the greatest advantage in war."

"When opposing fleets join battle the lines will be broken through, and immediately every ship will have to reverse her course to resume the fight. This manœuvre must almost inevitably result in collisions among ships of the same fleet. If these ships are all homogeneous, and describe equal arcs of evolution, the risks of collisions will be small; and if to this there be added a constant habit of manoeuvring together, those risks will disappear altogether. It is not simply in practising regular evolutions and following geometrical lines that gives the self-possession so essential in battle. Neither single cruisers nor the semblance of a squadron composed of steam launches or gunboats constitute an adequate school for this difficult art."

"It is absolutely necessary to accustom oneself to handling, within contracted spaces, masses of from eight to ten thousand tons, which cannot collide without mutual destruction. One must become accustomed to the imminence of such dangers; to become habituated to the close order of steaming by night as well as by day, in fair weather and in foul; to know how to form groups; to extend the lines, to mass the ships or to throw them out in echelon. Above all, one must be possessed of the faculty of placing himself in full sympathy with the commander-in-chief, to have an intuitive perception of his designs, and to anticipate his movements without the use of signals. Herein lies the whole secret of naval tactics. There is but one definition for this species of tactics: it is the art of manœuvring in battle, and while rendering support to your consorts, to avoid fouling them. The most skillful are those who can execute fleet evolutions when the transmission of orders has become impossible. The very last measure of economy France should resort to, then, is, in my judgment, the dispensing with the squadron of evolutions.”

Did these views need confirmation it would be found in the work accomplished by the French squadron of evolutions. It has produced two of the best works on naval tactics. The Tactique Navale and Tactique Supplémentaire à l'usage d'une Flotte Cuirassée, par Vice-Amiral Cte. Bouët-Willaumez, was the direct result of that officer's term of service as its commander-in-chief; and this was followed by Escadre d'Evolutions, 1868-1870, Considerations Generales sur la Tactique Navale, par

In the course of a few introductory remarks in the later work occurs the following: Chargés par le Ministre d'entreprendre la révision du livre des signaux et de la tactique officielle, nous n'avons pas perdu de vue les conditions dans lesquelles cette révision allait s'accomplir," etc. It will be seen from this passage that the French Government took sufficient interest in such matters to direct the commander-in-chief to utilize his squadron as a School of Application and to do exactly the work proposed by the essayist. That is one picture, and here is another. It is within the memory of men still living that attempts to utilize an American squadron for similar purposes were repeatedly and determinedly frustrated by the American Government; and when, with the remains of a depleted squadron, a final effort was made in that direction it was seriously proposed to make the officers concerned pay for the coal expended! Is it to be wondered at, then, that the author should tell us "our books on tactics are primers, our signal books a monument to those who do not go to sea"?

The essayist has very properly devoted one chapter to definitions. Naval tactics is entitled to a terminology of its own. But I think the author is slightly in error when he says, page 9, §6, that our books on tactics are based on foreign works. He then tells us that column is here taken to mean "line ahead," etc., etc.

Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. N., prepared his Fleet Tactics under Steam in 1869. It was published by authority of the Navy Department. Six years previously he had been drilling seamen with a field battery of naval howitzers, and conceived the idea of adapting the movements of an assemblage of fieldpieces to the flotilla he subsequently commanded. In the preparation of his work he was no doubt indebted to the treatise of Vice-Admiral Bouët-Willaumez. However that may be, Commodore Parker discarded the terms that had been used in the old naval tactics under sail and stated that there are but three formations for a fleet . . . any one of which may constitute an order of battle, viz., line, column, echelon."

Captain Hoff, in his last work on tactics, adopted the same terms. It seems hardly necessary, therefore, to use "foreign terms to express formations," or even "to state their equivalents." Captain Hoff also uses the term line-of-battle ship, a name by which our first-rates should be designated. Under the head of Tactical Propositions, page 10, the expression "steam fleet battle tactics" is unnecessarily cumulative. The word "blank," in "to blank some of the enemy's gun fire," sounds (or reads) like the euphemistic form of the not wholly unfamiliar damn. Thus in one account of the battle of Mobile we read that Farragut cried out: "Blank the torpedoes! Go ahead!" The verb "to blank" is used here, presumably, in the sense of to mask. The latter word has the sanction of good military usage. But these are very small matters. The essay is an able one, and a welcome indication of the progressive spirit of the

Lieutenant A. A. ACKERMAN, U. S. N.-Lieutenant Niblack is to be congratulated upon having so clearly and briefly brought the fundamental principles of a modern naval tactics into one's mental grasp. The essay is all the more admirable that in spite of its brevity it is so full of suggestion. No one can read it without beholding in every direction vistas of possibilities and being impelled to investigate for himself this old subject revived through changed conditions to a new and fascinating youth.

While thus recognizing the great value of the essay, there are certain considerations to which I ascribe a different weight than the author, and accordingly carry my conclusions not so far or farther than he does. Possibly my lack of experience in fleet manœuvres, or their systematic study as pursued at the Naval War College, has permitted me to err, in which case a speedy correction is most desirable.

Modern naval tactics seems to be a tactics of gun fire alone. When it is considered what great sacrifices are made in order to clothe battleships in armor, or to give them a knot more speed, it is natural to desire to get some return; yet battle-ships, when in fleet formation, are to be handled almost as gingerly as cruisers, and their extra speed, if they have any, is thrown away.

Now it would seem that that admiral whose tactics required the armor to do its share in the fight as well as the guns, and which made the knot more speed compensate in some way for the consequent lighter battery, would be more worthy of success than the one who treated his ships like so many units.

The fact is, the effect of gun fire under battle conditions is as much overrated as the defensive power of armor is underrated. The battleships are built to stand punishment, and if any of them are disabled by gun fire alone, it will be because of a lack of armor rather than in spite of it.

Thus far the characteristics of individual ships seem to have been assigned neither credit nor debit values in naval tactics. In fact, two of the most important of all, namely, ammunition supply and marksmanship, have not been mentioned at all; yet both of these are deeply involved, and merit early consideration in the design of the ship.

One agrees with Lieutenant Niblack that we must deduce tactics to fit the ships we have. But then our ships should be designed to fit the grand tactics best adapted to the exigencies of the national defense; so that actually the best minor tactics are derived ultimately from the best grand tactics. Thus grand tactics will fix the size of the fleet, its disposition, and the duties and responsibilities of its various subdivisions. And the duties of the individuals should determine their draught, coal supply, speed, offensive and defensive powers, and finally, the minor tactics.

For example, it is possible for a nimble opponent with numerous ships to establish a flexible blockade, which would recede without breaking before a sortie of coast-defense vessels, only to flow back when the pressure was relieved. And this might continue indefinitely before one

capable of crushing the defenders of each port in succession. This seems to indicate the advisability of adding to our purely defensive fleet of battle-ships a number of powerful armored cruisers carrying 10 or 12-inch guns. In these vessels the offensive should predominate. It is asked, however, that the supply of ammunition to their guns should at least be no more precarious than the service of the guns themselves. They should have speed and a great radius of action; in fact, they should be the stormy petrels of the Navy; and living and fighting at sea, the question of draught should not be permitted to impair their efficiency.

With regard, however, to the defending fleet. Our coast and harbordefense vessels cannot choose their opponents. They must take issue with any and all who come. Reliability and endurance are, therefore, qualities which in these vessels should overshadow all others. At the same time their offensive powers must be great, or they will fail in their purpose of intimidating or destroying the enemy, while perhaps not suffering destruction themselves. It must be admitted that when the individual organizations lack the quality of endurance, to say nothing of permanence, the most brilliantly conceived evolution may result in confusion, if not demoralization. Failure to consider this fact must condemn any tactics. Yet theorists regard a ship as more or less formidable, if we take the diagrams, according to the energies of its gun fires and the arcs over which these energies may be delivered. Nothing is said of the vulnerability of the ship, and yet upon that more than the dependent gun fire, speed, or any other quality, rests its ability to carry out its part of the evolution and maintain the fight. It seems no more than common-sense and good military practice to take full account of the effect of more than probable disasters. It is the weak points in a ship's design, and its interior organization as affected and dependent upon that design, which will determine its value and reliability in war, quite as much, if not more than, the arcs and energies of its gun fire.

The less vulnerable the battle-ships are, the more independent they will be; the greater the power to extend a line of battle without rendering it fatally weak, or to undertake isolated movements without fear of being destroyed in detail. With an extended formation every gun may be brought to bear, while concentration is certain to mask some of them.

The time interval mentioned by Lieut. Niblack is most important as affecting concentration of fire when the fleets are moving past each other. If, for example, it is intended to concentrate the fire upon a certain squadron or division of the enemy, and the opportunity or necessity for a "charge through" presents itself, the formation of columns of sections in three lines as proposed by Lieut. Niblack is undoubtedly most powerful. I prefer, however, on account of the time interval, to go farther and close up the lines for the charge, forming from each column of sections an indented column. For the enemy has a time interval as well as ourselves, so that if we can place a new Hartford at the head of the column to take the first shock without faltering, the