track was designed, consisting of short sections of rail bolted to steel cross ties. Most of this track was in five meter lengths, though shorter sections were used. All were in multiples of one and one-fourth meters, and were accurately sawed so as to insure absolute fit of intermediate sections, when shell fire made replacement necessary. Quantities of curved track, as well as switches and turn-outs, were also built. About 605 miles of fabricated narrow-gauge steel track were purchased, and 460 miles of it shipped to France. These narrow-gauge railroads were operated under extreme conditions of grade and curvature, and were the lines of communication between the rail heads of the broad-gauge system and the dumps and depots in the front sectors. In periods of activity and during advance they not only transported troops, munitions, materials and subsistence stores, but they were used to bring up railway artillery rapidly. When the track was destroyed by shell fire, as often happened, it was easy for the engineers to replace broken sections by new material. In order to use the motor trucks it was necessary to maintain the roads immediately behind the front in good condition, and this was done by road-building units recruited from among men accustomed in civil life to road building. These regiments frequently worked under the direct fire of the enemy.

In the construction of these roads many quarries were opened to obtain the necessary material. In quarries operated by the American engineers about forty-two thousand cubic meters of rock were obtained, while in quarries jointly operated with French forces seventy-five thousand cubic meters were obtained. The problem of transportation then, which at the beginning appeared to be extremely difficult, was most effectually solved, and, indeed, as the war went on there was a constant increase in the number of men and the amount of supplies carried across the ocean.

For many weeks during the summer of 1918 the number of men carried was more than ten thousand a day. No such troop movement as this had ever been contemplated, and no movement of any such number of persons for such a distance and such a time had ever previously occurred.

The record of the United States in bringing these same men back to the shores of the United States excels even the record made in transferring them to Europe.

The troops sailing from the United States left America from ten ports. Eleven thousand sailed from Quebec, 34,000 from Montreal, 1,000 from St. Johns, 5,000 from Halifax, 6,000 from Portland, 46,000 from Boston, 1,656,000 from New York, 35,000 from Philadelphia, 4,000 from Baltimore and 288,000 from Norfolk, a total of 2,086,000. Some of these went directly to France, and others to England. In England 45,000 went to Glasgow, 4,000 to Manchester, 844,000 to Liverpool, 11,000 to Bristol ports, 1,000 to Falmouth, 1,000 to Plymouth, 57,000 to Southampton and 62,000 to London, a total of 1,025,000 men. In France, 13,000 went to Le Havre, 791,000 went to Brest, 198,000 to St. Lizere, 4,000 to La Pallice, 50,000 to Bordeaux and 1,000 to Marseille. Among every hundred men who went over, forty-nine went in British ships, forty-five in American ships, three in those of Italy, two in French, and one in Russian shipping under English control.

As time went on, the turn-around, by which is meant the movement of a ship across to Europe and back again, became shorter and shorter. When operations began, the turn-around for troop ships averaged about fifty-two days, and for cargo ships sixty-six days. During the summer of 1918, the turnaround for cargo ships became standardized at about seventy days, and for troop ships at about thirty-five days. During winter the time taken was much longer. The fastest ships averaged under thirty days. The Leviathan landed the equivalent of a German division in France each month. The shipment of cargo was done almost entirely by American ships.

During the whole period of active hostilities the army lost at sea only 200,000 deadweight tons of transports. Of this 142,000 tons were sunk by torpedo. No American troop transport was lost on its eastward voyage. After the armistice, the American troops at once began to return to the United States. In the movement to Europe, the British had carried about one-half of all these troops. On their return to America

the British ships were not used, but our large cargo ships were converted into troop-carrying vessels, and great aid was rendered by the navy which put at the army's disposal cruisers and battleships, so that the army was brought back home even more rapidly than it was taken to France.

From the files of the United States Navy the table included in Chapter XXI has been taken showing the total number of United States troops carried overseas and the nationality of the ships which transported them.

CHAPTER XXVI

COAL AND GASOLENE HELP TO WIN THE WAR

Oduring

NE of the most important questions before the country during the progress of the war was the question of fuel. The great dependence of almost all forms of industry upon the supply of coal made it absolutely essential that the coal production in our country should be increased during the war, and that so far as possible there should be economy in its use. Before the war the Bureau of Mines had studied the problem, and issued many reports tending to solve many of the difficulties met with in the burning of coal. One of its conclusions was that in many localities the substitution of coke for anthracite coal was desirable on the score of economy and cleanliness. The Council of Defense appointed a committee on coal production during the war, and the following statement as to its work was issued in the middle of June:

"The primary purpose of the Committee on Coal Production as outlined when it was created is to increase coal production so that an adequate supply will be available. How well it has accomplished this purpose is shown by the following figures. Bituminous coal loaded at the mines in the United States for rail movement amounted in May to nearly 40,000,000 tons, or over seven million tons more than was loaded in May a year ago, and four million tons more than in April of this year. Anthracite shipments in May were over 1,300,000 tons more than for May a year ago. This mine activity probably makes a record month for rail shipments to the consumers, and figures already reported for the first half of June show that a still further increase is going on, which is expected to make June exceed May by a substantial tonnage. So far, this year, therefore, the mines have been surpassing previous records." The chief coal-producing states in the United States are Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois and Ohio.

FIXING THE PRICE OF COAL

On June 27th a special committee of coal operators established in Washington a permanent Bureau in co-operation with the government. It approved a proposition that coal prices during the war should be fixed by a joint governmental commission composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Defense Council's Coal Production Committee and the Federal Trade Commission. The price of coal had been steadily rising until it had reached $5.50 or $6.00 per ton. The Coal Operators Committee suggested a price at the mine of $3.00 a ton east of Pittsburgh, and $2.75 to the west. On July 1st Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, refused to accept this proposition despite the approval of other members of the government, on the ground that the price was exorbitant, and for nearly two months there was no fixed price, until on August 21st when President Wilson at the suggestion of Federal Trade Commissioner W. B. Colver fixed the price at $2.50 a ton. During this period orders for many millions of tons throughout the country were cancelled, and there was no movement of coal on the railroads. It was this delay which largely helped to cause the crisis in the following winter.

The Food and Fuel Control Law passed on August 10, 1917, authorized the creation of a Fuel Administration, and on August 23d President H. A. Garfield, of Williams College, was appointed Fuel Administrator. He was given authority to fix fuel prices, to license dealers and to punish by revocation of licenses for violation of the terms of the law, or regulations made pursuant thereto. Late in September Dr. Garfield fixed the price of coal at $2.00 a ton, which was the basic price when the coal crisis came. He also promulgated a series of regulations in connection with contracts for the sale of coal and coke. As the year went on, shortage of coal developed.

It seems to be evident that plenty of coal had been mined, and that the difficulty was caused by the shortage of cars and the general condition of congestion at terminals. Federal Trade Commissioner Colver declared the railroads alone were to blame, and John P. White, labor advisor to the National Fuel Administration, declared that there were miles and miles of loaded coal cars that were not moving.