be already conceived in inseparable union with it. Therefore, when we say that the object is the cause of our perception, we merely say that that which, when thought, becomes one with our perception, is the cause of our perception. In other words, we are guilty of the glaring petitio principii of maintaining, that our perceptions of objects are the causes of our perceptions of objects.

Another important result of the new philosophy, is the finishing stroke which it gives to the old systems of 2 dogmatic Realism and dogmatic Idealism. The former of these maintains, that an outward world exists, independent of our perceptions of it. The latter maintains, that no such world exists, and that we are cognizant merely of our own perceptions. But this new doctrine shows, that these systems are investigating a problem which cannot possibly be answered, either in the affirmative or the negative; not on account of the limited nature of the human faculties, but because the question itself is an irrational and unintelligible one. For if we say, with dogmatic Realism, that an outward world does exist independent of our perception of it, this implies that we are able to separate, in thought, external objects and our perceptions of them. But such a separation we have shown to be impossible and inconceivable. And if, on the other hand, we say with dogmatic Idealism, that an outward world does not exist independent of our perceptions of it, and that we are conscious only of these perceptions-this in

volves us in exactly the same perplexity. Because, to think that there is no outward independent world, is nothing more than to think an outward independent world away—but to think an independent world away, we must first of all think it—but to think an outward independent world at all, is to be able to make the distinction which we have shown it is impossible for us to make the distinction, namely, between objects and our perceptions of them. Therefore, this question touching the reality or non-reality of an external world cannot be answered; not because it is unanswerable, but because it is unaskable.

We now take leave of a subject which we not only have not exhausted, but into the body and soul of which we do not pretend to have entered. We have confined our discussion to the settlement of the preliminaries of one great question. We think, how. ever, that we have indicated the true foundations upon which modern philosophy must build-that we have described the vital crisis in which speculative thought is at present labouring, while old things are passing away, and all things are becoming new. This form of the truth is frail and perishable, and will quickly be forgotten; but the truth itself which it embodies, is permanent as the soul of man, and will endure for ever. We hope, in conclusion, that some allowance will be made for this sincere, though perhaps feeble, endeavour to catch the dawning rays which are now heralding the sunrise of a new era of science-the era of genuine speculation.

THE period is still distant at which the history of the Reform Bill can be properly written: when its causes can be fully traced, and its consequences calculated when the motives and merits of the conflicting parties that supported and opposed it can be finally tested and determined: when it can be seen on a calm review of events whether, at some particular crisis, a different move on the part of its opponents could have saved the constitution from so great a change; or whether, at any turn of the game, another result was possible, or would have been desirable.

Whatever may be the ultimate issue of its operation, we see no likelihood that we shall ever repent the course that the Conservative party generally pursued as the opponents of reform. That measure, whether right or wrong, came upon us in so questionable a shape, that we were bound to cross its path and arrest its progress. Unless convinced of its necessity and salutary tendency, we were called upon by our allegiance to the constitution not merely to withhold our approbation from it, but to offer it the most resolute resistance. If it was the determined and deliberate will of the nation that it should be carried, the opposition of any political party, how ever powerful, would not avert it. But such opposition, proceeding from the active Conservative influences of the community, was sure to be eminently beneficial, though unattended with success, and even though actuated by undue suspicions and over-anxious fears. No country can possess a sound or solid constitutional structure, in which great organic changes can be brought about without strenuous resistance and a violent convulsion. By such formidable and doubtful conflicts the minds of men are deeply and extensively impressed with the serious and solemn nature of all revolutionary movements: they are deterred from attempting them without an adequate inducement and a reasonable prospect of success; they are induced to desist from them whenever the substantial objects are attained for which they have been resorted to; and they are warned against reviving the struggle

when once it has terminated, whether in favour of the one party or of the other. In this way the permanent stability of government is secured, and those alike who promoted and deprecated the change, subside into a mutual and not unfriendly acquiescence in the final issue and adjustment of the strife.

An approbation of our former course, in resisting the Reform Bill to the utmost of our power, is thus not only perfectly consistent, but essentially connected with our present equally firm determination to abide by its principles.

Our resistance to it was partly prompted, and certainly rendered more energetic, by the conviction that such a change once effected was irrevocable; and the change having now taken place, we feel it our duty, equally as good subjects and as honourable men, to render to the constitution of our country, as thus modified, the same submissive and pious reverence that we acknowledge to have been due to it in its previous form, and when its structure was more conformable to our predilections or prejudices.

In like manner, our sentiments as to the duty we had to discharge in resisting the Reform Bill, are nowise at variance with esteem and respect for those who proposed or promoted it. Allowable varieties of constitutional views, a different reading of the signs of the times, a more sanguine estimate of human or national character, a more sensitive appreciation of existing evils, these diversities of feeling or opinion might induce many men to advocate a measure of reform, who, in all the essential elements of constitutional doctrine and principles, agreed and sympathized with those who condemned it. The parties who took different sides on the reform question were each perhaps in some degree composed of heterogeneous ingredients. The reform party was eminently liable to that observation. It included within its limits, as experience has since shown, the most opposite and most discordant divisions of opinion. Its materials only waited the removal of the pressure arising from the immediate struggle, to fly off in diverging directions, or to turn against each other in a fiercer and more protracted conflict

than that in which they were for the time engaged against their common opponents.

The name, then, of Reformer is in itself little or nothing. It may carry praise, or it may import censure. All depends on the motives, views, and ulterior prospects with which Reform was sought. It would seem that in that measure, as in a magic mirror, those who consulted it in a confiding spirit were enabled to see the particular object of their own thoughts and desires. Some beheld in it, with a wild and wicked exultation, a picture of revolution and democracy-the subversion of nobility and primogeniture -the annihilation or humiliation of the throne-and a re-distribution of property and patrimonial rights. Others, perhaps, discovered in the prospect no such violent overthrow of ancient things, but a great and pleasing alteration of them-a silent subjection of the aristocracies of birth and money to the overwhelming influence of learning, or rather of letters-an ascendancy of the pen or the tongue a stylocracy, or a gloss

ocracy when resistless eloquence, whether oral or written, should wield a stronger and a more stable démocratie than ever fulmined over Greece or Latium-when essayists, and novelists, and lecturers, should become legislators and rulers,-when a well-turned period, a glittering image, or a liberal aphorism, were to control the caprice of the populace, and tame the pride of the patrician. Others, again, with a candid and constitutional eye, yet coloured with youthful hopes or long-cherished expectations, beheld in the coming change only an improved and more symmetrical arrangement of existing powers and principles, under which anomalies should be corrected and exclusions removed when the real excellence of the constitution should not be disfigured by glaring inconsistencies, or discredited by galling distinctions-but in which also there should still be provided both a free utterance for the voice of wisdom and virtue, and an ample check on turbulence and disaffection. In a fourth division of the multifarious bands that bore the name of Re formers, a different set of feelings predominated. The crafty and contracted vision of these men, incapable of reaching any large range of effects,

whether for good or for evil, was fixed entirely on selfish and personal objects, and discovered in the Reform Bill only the means of perpetuating or prolonging the political power of the peculiar circle of family alliances whom they called their party.

In now determining to which of these sections of Reformers individuals or classes must have belonged, we have no other criterion than what is furnished by their subsequent conduct. In the page of recent history, however, we can already read much that will enlighten us in the prosecution of this important enquiry.

Among the earnest supporters of the Reform Bill, two individuals now stand conspicuous as having supplied us, in the past events of several momentous years, with a full assurance that in their minds that measure was seen and desired, as one of safe amelioration merely, and not as a movement of revolution, or a means of personal aggrandizement. Sir James Graham and Lord Stanley proclaimed at an early period the constitutional principles that actuated them; and their whole career, up to the present hour, has tended to prove their sincerity, and to reward their fortitude. Within two years after the passing of that measure, to the success of which they had so greatly contributed, they quitted office, on the first indication of a principle affecting the maintenance of a religious establishment, and endangering the continuance of British influence in Ireland. They took this step at a time when their leader, Lord Grey, was still in power, and when the Reform party were yet in possession of a decided preponderance in Parliament. But the disruption of party connexions which thus took place did not throw them headlong into a rash alliance with former opponents. The accession of Sir Robert Peel to ministerial power, in 1834, afforded a proof of their caution and independence, which at the time operated painfully and injuriously on the Conservative cause, but which will now, we doubt not, exhibit a tenfold increase of personal cordiality and public confidence. The refusal of office on that occasion by those distinguished persons was probably as necessary for the general good as it was natural in their individual position. No high-minded nation is easily

reconciled to hasty coalitions. It knows the strength and importance of party ties, and it does not love to see them rashly severed and trodden under foot. Still less is it pleased with such a sight, when there is room for suspecting that the motive is in any degree a selfish or a sordid one. It was proper that Peel, on his first appointment as Minister, should offer to Graham and Stanley a place in his cabinet, in order to show that he respected their character, and had no disagreement with their opinions. It was perhaps equally necessary that they should decline his offer, in order to show that office was not their object, and that they were only willing to repose confidence in a new associate after a full trial and thorough approval of his principles.

These men, and such as these, are now well entitled to claim credit before the most Conservative tribunal, for the constitutional spirit in which they promoted the Reform Bill. They are well entitled to adduce their own views and character, not only as a moral vindication of the integrity of their conduct, but as a rational argument in favour of its prudence. They knew, what no one else could then know so thoroughly, the purposes they contemplated, the point where they were resolved to stop, the exertions and the sacrifices which they were prepared to make in order to guide the new constitution in a safe path, and guard it against further innovation. It cannot be doubted that the innocuous or beneficial operation of the Reform Bill, depends greatly on influences which Reformers alone could fully estimate, and in particular, upon the extent to which many who desired reform detested revolution, and were prepared, when the change was effected, to do every thing in their power to confine it within its due li mits, and even to feel a peculiar and personal responsibility in discouraging all further attempts to tamper with the constitution.

This, we take it, is in reality, the history of the Reform Bill, so far as it has hitherto gone. Many of its supporters are now the most strenuous opponents of further change-many' of the constituencies, for example those of counties, which in their unreformed state were its loudest advocates, are now, after it has passed, the

VOL. L. NO, CCCXII,

least revolutionary in the empire. All this is most creditable to the good sense and moderation of the English character, to the strong and kindly intertexture of different interests and influences in her social condition; and to the equity and mildness with which the older ascendencies must have exercised their sway. The result is, that in the ninth year of a reformed representation, we see the leading opponent of reform placed by the popular choice at the head of public affairs. We see him further supported in office by those, who, on that great constitutional question, achieved so signal a victory over the very man to whose superior fitness as a statesman they now yield an easy and undoubted precedence.

Very different has been the conduct and career of that portion of the Whig party who have pursued an opposite path from Graham and Stanley. If we could identify the Whigs of 1841 with the Whigs of 1832, the change would present a more striking picture of the instability of human greatness than any that the modern history of this country has yet exhibited, and would infer a graver imputation on the constancy of the national character than we could wish to see justified. But the assumption that is necessary for these views, is wholly unfounded. Not even in its personal composition can the Melbourne Cabinet be considered the same with that of Earl Grey; and in all that regards either power or principle, it affords a startling contrast to it. The respect which the nation paid to the Grey Ministry, could never be claimed by their successors, any more than the terror which we feel for the living lion, is fit to be transferred to his skin and tail, when assumed by an unworthy wearer; or than the reverence inspired by a great man is due to his lackey when dressed in his cast clothes.

On the passing of the Reform Bill, it ought to have been regarded by the Whigs as a plain point, both of policy and principle, to discountenance the advocates of further reform. The hazard of the experiment which the constitution had undergone; the suspicion to which they were already subjected by the revolutionary character of some of their reforming associates, the danger that the measure which they had passed would be destroyed or discredited by a misdirection of its influ

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