Ball et al. vs. Fulton County. Magher v. Morgan, 3 Kan., 372; Clark v. Tinsley, id., 389; Carroll v. Powell's ex'rs., 16 Mo., 226; Brown v. Perry, 14 Ind., 32; 10 id., 199; 17 N. Y., 232; 28 id., 438; 39 id., 377; 21 Wis., 395; 19 Barb., 416; 52 Mo., 342; 48 Cal., 364; 32 id., 172; 39 id., 559, with many other decisions to the same effect. In the case of Allen v. Patterson, above cited, the action was for the price of goods, the complaint was in form of indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. Jewitt, judge, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The Code requires that the complaint should contain a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. Every fact which the plaintiff must prove to enable him to sustain his suit, and which the defendant has a right to controvert in his answer, must be distinctly averred or stated. The rule of pleading in an action for a legal remedy is the same as formerly, in this, that facts and and not the evidence of facts must be pleaded," and, after an analysis of the complaint, reaches the conclusion that its averments are in conformity with the general principles. In Granis v. Hooker, 29 Wis., 65, the complaint was like the one before us, in form a common count for money had and received. When considering the legal sufficiency of the count, Cole, justice, said: "It is contended by defendant that all the facts in respect to the fraud should have been stated in the complaint, otherwise, the plaintiff is not entitled to prove them; on the other hand, it is claimed that all it is necessary that the complaint should contain, is substantially an allegation that the defendant has received a certain amount of money to the use of the plaintiff, as in the old form of declaring in indebitatus assumpsit. We are inclined to sustain the latter view, and to hold that the facts which, in the judgment of the law, create the indebtedness or liability need not be set out in the complaint. Vol. XXXI.-25. Ball et al. vs. Fulton County. In yielding our assent to this great weight of authority, and in holding the complaint in this case sufficient, we do but affirm the principles settled in the case of Lincoln & Maupin v. Benedict, and Williams v. Rivercomb et al., delivered at the present term of this court, in the first of which we held a complaint in trespass for taking property, in the common law form, sufficient, and in the second, the sufficiency of a pleading in replevin, in like form. Conceding the merits of the Code Practice for its enlarged privileges of amendment from the inception of the action to final judgment, and of its provisions in dispensing with the mere forms and fictions in pleading, and the advantages of adapting the pleadings to the evidence in the case, as well as in several other respects, it has not escaped our observation that the effort made to abandon the common law forms of pleadings, and to substitute a simpler statement of the facts necessary to sustain the action, has fallen so far short of realizing the benefits anticipated, as strongly to incline the courts in several of the States in which the Code Practice has been adopted, to hold many of the common law forms a substantial compliance with requirements of the Code Practice. The disadvantage of having no established form of pleading, and no settled adjudications upon the construction to be placed upon them, is made manifest in most of the courts where the form of pleadings have been changed, in the increased litigation consequent upon such change, in which every pleader is left to determine for himself what facts should be stated to sustain an action. Finding no error in the judgment and proceedings of the court below, the same is, in all things, affirmed, with costs. Boone County vs. Keck. BOONE COUNTY VS. KECK. 1. Exuitable proceeding to enforce satisfaction of judgment, etc. In a bill filed under the provisions of sec. 2713, Gantt's Digest, by an execution creditor, for the purpose of subjecting the property of a defendant in execution, the latter must be made a party, to entitle the plaintiff to discovery and relief. 2. GARNISHMENT: A county is not subject to the process of garnishment. APPEAL from Boone Circuit Court. Hon. J. H. HUCKELBERY, Circuit Judge. J. M. Moore, for appellee. WALKER, J.: Minerva A. Keck filed what is stated to be a complaint in equity, in which she alleges that, at the October term, 1874, of the Boone Circuit Court, she obtained judgment against Jacob R. Keck for $2,050, upon which execution was issued, and returned unsatisfied for want of property upon which to levy. That she is informed, and believes, that Boone County is indebted to Jacob R. Keck, in the sum of $1,500, in public buildings scrip of said county; that a suit of garnishment has been served upon N. B. Crump, clerk of the court of said county, requiring him to appear and disclose the indebtedness of Boone County to Jacob R. Keck, with a prayer that if, upon investigation of the relation between Boone County and Keck, it should appear that the county is indebted to him, the clerk of Boone County be ordered to issue scrip for the same, and place it in the hands of the sheriff, to be subjected to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment, and for other equitable relief. A demurrer was filed by Boone County to the complaint, which was overruled. The county also filed an answer; evidence was heard, and judgment rendered against the county for $2,000, and an order Boone County vs. Keck. made that the clerk issue scrip to that amount, and deliver it to the sheriff. The county appealed. The sufficiency of the complaint, and the liability of the county (a public corporation) to the process of garnishment, are the material questions to be considered. The Code of Practice provides for a proceeding by a writ of garnishment at law, under the provisions of sec. 2991 Gantt's Digest, and sec. 2713 provides for an equitable proceeding by bill for a discovery of property, money or debts due to the defendant, or in his possession, and in such action against the defendants for a discovery, "persons indebted to the defendant in execution, or holding money or property in which he is interested, or holding the evidences or securities for the same, may be also made defendants." We may suppose that it was under the latter statute the plaintiffs seek relief. But no discovery is sought against the defendant in execution, no relief is sought against him, nor is he made a party to the action; nor is Boone County made a party. There were no parties defendant. It is true, that Boone County did appear, and filed both a demurrer and answer; concede that thereby she did make herself a party; still, as no complaint was filed against the defendant in execution for a discovery, a proceeding to which he was not made a party, and did not appear, no foundation was laid for calling upon "persons indebted to the defendant in execution to answer." It is a mere waste of time to detail the numerous errors in this proceeding; the complaint is so defective that, if no answer had been filed, and all of the facts thereby taken as confessed, no valid decree could have been rendered. The demurrer should have been sustained. The remaining question is, was Boone County, a public and political corporation, liable to garnishment for debts contracted by her. It is true, that she may sue and be sued, plead and be Boone County vs. Keck. impleaded, but, because this may be done in ordinary proceedings, it does not necessarily follow that she may be garnisheed for the debts which she has contracted as a corporation and for corporate purposes; that her means for payment shall be diverted from their legitimate purpose, and taken to pay liabilities not contracted by her. The Code has made no provision for garnisheeing public corporations, nor does the provision for taking the rights and shares in the stock of banks and of insurance companies, and other corporations, when properly construed, extend to other than private corporations. Such was expressly held to be the proper construction to be given to the statute which authorized "an attachment or judgment, to be levied on the lands of any person or persons whatever, corporate or sole." The court held that these terms do not include municipal corporations; that they are exempt for reasons of necessity. Mayor of Baltimore v. Root, 8 Maryland, 95. The language of our statute is, that "persons indebted to the defendant may be required to answer," and our statute also provides (sec. 5625 Gantt's Digest) that the word persons includes a corporation, as well as a natural person. In this respect, the Alabama statute is like ours. But in the Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v. Roland & Co., 26 Ala., 498, it was held, that it did not so control the sections giving the process of garnishment against "any person" indebted, etc., as to authorize a garnishment against a public municipal corporation. Chilton, Ch. J., when considering this statute, said: "The statute, it is true, authorizes any person to be summoned as a garnishee, and sec. 1 of the Code declares that the word person, when used in it, includes a corporation as well as a natural person; but this must be understood only of such provisions as will allow this signification to be given without violating its evident sense and meaning. When, by the context, it is clear no such meaning was intended, and when, by thus construing the word persons, it would render the Code, |