SECT. I. "gefted into general claffes, or ranged under "the meaning which the word principally "expreffes and fufficient care is not taken "to distinguish the words apparently fyno66 nymous." To illuftrate this criticifm, he copies from Dr. Johnson the articles BUT and HUMOUR, and oppofes to them the fame articles digested agreeably to his own idea. The various fignifications of the word BUT are very nicely and happily difcriminated. The other articles does not feem to have been executed with equal care. The obfervations on the state of learning in Europe are written with ingenuity and elegance; but are chiefly interefting, as they fhew the attention which the Author had given to the philofophy and literature of the Continent, at a period when they were not much ftudied in this island. In the fame volume with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr. Smith published a Differtation" on the Origin of Languages, and on the different Genius of thofe which "are original and compounded." The remarks I have to offer on thefe two dif courfes, I fhall, for the fake of distinctness, make the fubject of a separate section. SEC. SECT. II. Of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the TH II. HE fcience of Ethics has been divided S E C T. by modern writers into two parts; the one comprehending the theory of Morals, and the other its practical doctrines. The queftions about which the former is employed, are chiefly the two following. First, By what principle of our conftitution are we led to form the notion of moral diftinctions ;-whether by that faculty which, in the other branches of human knowledge, perceives the diftinction between truth and falfehood; or by a peculiar power of perception (called by fome the Moral Senfe) which is pleafed with one fet of qualities, and difpleafed with another? Secondly, What is the proper object of moral approbation? or, in other words, What is the common quality or qualities belonging to all the different modes of virtue? Is it benevolence; or a rational felf-love; or a difpofition (refulting from the afcendant of Reafon over Paffion) to act fuitably to the different relations in which we are placed? Thefe two questions feem to exhaust the whole theory of Morals. The fcope of the one is to afcertain the origin of our moral ideas; that SECT. II. of the other, to refer the phenomena of moral perception to their moft fimple and general laws. The practical doctrines of morality comprehend all those rules of conduct which profess to point out the proper ends of human purfuit, and the most effectual means of attaining them; to which we may add all thofe literary compofitions, whatever be their particular form, which have for their aim to fortify and animate our good difpofitions, by delineations of the beauty, of the dignity, or of the utility of Virtue. I fhall not inquire at present into the juftnefs of this divifion. I fhall only obferve, that the words Theory and Practice are not, in this inftance, employed in their ufual acceptations. The theory of Morals does not bear, for example, the fame relation to the practice of Morals, that the theory of Geometry bears to practical Geometry. In this last science, all the practical rules are founded on theoretical principles previously established: but in the former fcience, the practical rules are obvious to the capacities of all mankind; the theoretical principles form one of the most difficult fubjects of difcuffion that have exercifed the ingenuity of metaphyficians. In illuftrating the doctrines of practical morality, (if we make allowance for fome unfortunate prejudices produced or encouraged by violent and oppreffive fyftems of policy), the ancients II. ancients feem to have availed themfelves of s E c T. every light furnished by nature to human reafon; and indeed thofe writers who, in later times, have treated the subject with the greatest fuccefs, are they who have followed moft clofely the foot-fteps of the Greek and the Roman philofophers. The theoretical queftion, too, concerning the effence of virtue, or the proper object of moral approbation, was a favourite topic of difcuffion in the ancient fchools. The question concerning the principle of moral approbation, though not entirely of modern origin, has been chiefly agitated fince the writings of Dr. Cudworth, in oppofition to thofe of Mr. Hobbes; and it is this question accordingly (recommended at once by its novelty and difficulty to the curiofity of fpeculative men), that has produced moft of the theories which characterize and distinguish from each other the later fyf tems of moral philofophy. It was the opinion of Dr. Cudworth, and alfo of Dr. Clarke, that moral distinctions are perceived by that power of the mind, which diftinguishes truth from falfehood. This fyftem it was one great object of Dr. Hutchefon's philofophy to refute, and in oppofition to it, to fhow that the words Right and Wrong exprefs certain agreeable and difagreeable qualities in actions, which it is not the province of reafon but of feeling to perceive; and to that power of perception which renders us fufceptible EE 3 II. SE C T. fufceptible of pleasure or of pain from the view of virtue or of vice, he gave the name of the Moral Senfe. His reafonings upon this fubject are in the main acquiefced in, both by Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith; but they differ from him in one important particular,-Dr. Hutchefon plainly fuppofing, that the moral fenfe is a fimple principle of our constitution, of which no account can be given; whereas the other two philofophers have both attempted to analyze it into other principles more general. Their fyftems, however, with respect to it are very different from each other. According to Mr. Hume, all the qualities which are denominated virtuous, are useful either to ourselves or to others, and the pleafure which we derive from the view of them is the pleasure of utility. Mr. Smith, without rejecting entirely Mr. Hume's doctrine, propofes another of his own, far more comprehenfive; a doctrine with which he thinks all the most celebrated theories of morality invented by his predeceffors coincide in part, and from fome partial view of which he apprehends that they have all proceeded. Of this very ingenious and original theory, I fhall endeavour to give a fhort abftract. To those who are familiarly acquainted with it as it is ftated by its author, I am aware that the attempt may appear fuperfluous; but I flatter myself that it will not be wholly useless to such as have not been much converfant in thefe abstract |