fair hearing and proper deliberation. Our laws so far as possible should be general and not special. The charters of our cities should establish local responsibility for the details of administration, thus making each municipality a training school for the development of civic spirit. Our electoral machinery should be carefully safeguarded to assure uncorrupted expression of the popular will. And the supremacy of public right and the just exercise of public privilege should ever be enforced to the end that individual liberty should have its proper scope and that the common interest upon which the liberties of all ultimately depend should be secure against exploitation. We may congratulate ourselves upon the gains which have been made and we may devote ourselves to these important tasks inspired by the work of the long line of faithful servants who through the generations have striven for the public good and have made possible our present attainments. Within the limits of the Federal Constitution, the people of the State may have the government they desire. These limits leave the people free to administer their State affairs, the care of which has not been committed to the Federal government, so long as they maintain republican institutions and the common privileges of citizenship and act in accordance with the essential principles of justice embraced in the concept of due process of law. They are not subject to Federal restraint in perfecting State administration. But they must act in accordance with their own fundamental rules. The people of the State have established their own Constitution which defines the sphere within which all public officers must act. Unhesitating obedience to its mandates and loyal recognition of its restrictions is the first law of our political being. Constitutional rule is the rule of the people, for the Constitution is the fundamental and direct expression of the people's will. It is not only a check upon representatives, but is an act of self renunciation, the voluntary pledge of a salutary conservatism. If they desire, the people may change it; but the change must be made in the prescribed manner, and until so changed the Constitution binds the people themselves and their official representatives, as expressive of the deliberate policy which they have deemed it wise to protect from hasty alteration even at their own hands. The powers of government are classified as executive, legislative, and judicial. While the propriety of avoiding their confusion so far as may be practicable is generally recognized, the people have a wide range of choice in the distribution of these powers and they are not and cannot well be separated with logical exactness with regard to the officers who exercise them. Perhaps the judicial branch of the government is most closely confined to a single class of powers though in certain cases (and more conspicuously in other States than in our own) it is permitted administrative functions. We cannot too strongly emphasize the importance of proper respect for the authority of the courts as the arbiters of our judicial controversies. All rational progress must be based upon the maintenance of the fundamental principles of law and order and upon the support of the institutions for the peaceful settlement of conflicts over rights. And it is precisely for this reason that we may deprecate any attempt to involve the courts in questions which are essentially legislative or administrative, and where, in the absence of the invasion of constitutional guarantecs, the matter is one of policy and the judicial function properly speaking is not concerned. The executive power is vested in the Governor, but he is also an important part of the lawmaking power of the State. This is through his power of veto. After the final adjournment of the Legislature he has absolute control of the bills left in his hands and none may become a law without his approval. During the legislative session he has a qualified veto, and despite it bills may become laws if two-thirds of the members of each House so vote in the face of his objections. The plain intent of the Constitution is that the Governor shall express his judgment upon legislative measures before him and that his judgment shall control unless the measure is so strongly supported that it counts in its favor two-thirds of the members of the legislative houses after his objections have formally been stated. The Governor is also to recommend to the Legislature such matters" as he shall judge expedient." It is not his constitutional function to attempt by use of patronage or by bargaining with respect to bills to secure the passage of measures he approves. It is his prerogative to recommend and to state the reasons for his recommendation and, in common with all representative officers, it his privilege to justify his position to the people to whom he is accountable. And the more closely he confines himself to his province and discharges his responsibility within the limits assigned to him, the less confusion will there be in the working of our system and the more potent will be the sway of intelligent public opinion over those charged in their various offices with the duties of representation. While the Governor represents the highest executive power in the State, there is frequently observed a popular misapprehension as to its scope. There is a wide domain of executive or administrative action over which he has no control, or slight control. There are several elected State officers, not accountable to the Governor, who exercise within their prescribed spheres most important executive powers. To the Comptroller and State Treasurer are confided administrative powers with respect to financial matters. The Attorney-General is charged with duties appropriate to the enforcement of public rights through legal machinery. The State Engineer and Surveyor has important powers with regard to the canal improvement and the only member of the Canal Board accountable to the Governor is the Superintendent of Public Works who has a limited authority. The Commissioners of the Land Office are independent of the Governor. The multiplication of executive duties incident to the vast and necessary increase in State activities has resulted in the creation of a large number of departments exercising administrative powers of first consequence to the people. The Governor has the power of appointment, but in most cases the concurrence of the Senate is necessary. The terms of these officers are generally longer than the Governor's term. And in their creation the Legislature with few exceptions has reserved final administrative control to the Senate in making the heads of departments, to whose appointment the Senate's consent is necessary, removable only by it. Our system is therefore widely different from that of the Federal government. The President, through his Cabinet, has direct control of the great executive departments, and administrative officers though appointed with the concurrence of the Senate are responsible to the President and are removable by him. Yet it can hardly be said that there is more reason to fear centralization in the State than in the Nation. The practice of withdrawing appointive administrative officers from direct responsibility to the executive head of the State, who is directly accountable to the people, is of doubtful wisdom. A division of accountability which practically results in no real accountability to any one lessens the proper stimulus to efficiency. Responsibility to the people is the essential safeguard of free institutions. This does not mean the election of all or even of a great number of administrative officers, for undue burdens upon the electoral machinery would defeat its purpose. But it would seem to imply that distribution of administrative powers should have as its correlative the proper centralization of responsibility. It may fairly be said to require that the executive authority, exercising the appointing power under whatever check, should be responsible for administration and should have the control upon which such responsibility must rest. 66 The Governor is to take care that the laws are faithfully executed." But with respect to this duty there are further limitations than those involved in his relation to appointive officers. It is part of our system of government that the laws in large measure are enforced through officers locally chosen. To the Governor in certain cases is given the right to remove local officers, but this is only upon charges properly made and sustained after hearing. While the Governor's exercise of this jurisdiction is not subject to review, he in his province, like the highest court of the State in its province, must not act capriciously or arbitrarily, but in accordance with the rules and principles governing his authority. The Governor is as much bound to support our constitutional system of local government so far as it provides for the local choice of officers, as he is to remove officers clearly proved to be guilty of serious neglect or misconduct. The Governor has no right to use his power of removal to assert his preferences or to attempt even temporarily to impose his will upon the community which has chosen its officer. The appeal to him is the necessary check to secure responsible government and must be justified by proof of such dereliction as may be sufficient to make removal of the elected officer consistent with our fundamental principles of local self-government. It is therefore obvious that to secure efficient administration requires the co-operation of many forces. We must mainly rely upon the constant work of the educational and moral agencies which develop the public spirit that is needed to support democratic government. And we may make our governmental activities more responsive to the sentiments thus inculcated by such improvement of our nominating and electoral machinery as will facilitate the expression of the popular will, encourage the more active participation of the people in their political affairs, and thus make less easy the domination of selfish interests or the protection of those who find profit in law breaking. There must also be emphasized the importance of the wise use of the appointing power, a counsel particularly needed in view of the enormous increase in administrative offices. The Constitution provides that appointments and promotions in the civil service shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained so far as practicable by competitive examinations. While officers appointed by the Governor or by the Legislature are outside the Civil Service rules, it is obvious that merit and fitness should be the first consideration in these appointments. The area of choice in appointments is limited in no slight degree by relations and obligations apparently incompatible with primary allegiance to the State, which are too frequently incident to the success of able men in private business; and |