III ZONNEBEKE AND PASSCHENDAELE RIDGES July 31, 1917–October 12, 1917 N July 31 an Allied assault, for which big guns had been preparing for three weeks, was begun along a front of about twenty miles, from the region of Dixmude south of Ypres and around Warneton on the Menin road toward Lille. Starting with the first peep of day the attack, which was carried out jointly by French and British troops-the French holding the line north of Boesinghe and the British, the one between that town and Warneton-at the end of the day's fighting had been well carried out. The French had two lines of captured German trenches, and Haig's men three lines, in addition to ten or more towns and villages and over 3,500 German prisoners. Could the British get to Menin and seize the bridgehead, the road to Lille would now be open, but the Teutons had massed great numbers of guns and numerous divisions of fresh men to hold back the onslaught. At some points so determined were the attacking forces that frequently the British passed the objectives which had been assigned for their capture, pushed on beyond and took terrain that had not been counted on. The casualties of both British and French were relatively slight, considering the intensity of the fighting, but the Germans, in addition to men lost as prisoners, suffered heavily in killed and wounded. A majority of the positions taken by the Allies had been in possession of the Germans ever since they had invaded Belgium in 1914. The French attack, which resulted in the capture of Steenstraete, was pushed on beyond that town and penetrated the German lines to a depth of nearly two and a half miles. The British carried their deepest wedge to a depth of two miles. A torrential rainfall, and the resultant turning of the battlefield into a veritable quagmire, almost halted the great offensive the next day. For the most part the day was spent by the British and French in consolidating positions won, or in beating strong German counter-attacks. At two points near Ypres the Germans, using masses of men, were successful against the British, but this advantage was offset in the Zillebeke and Yser Canal sectors, where the British and French acting together advanced their lines. The losses of the Teutons had thus far been heavy, the ground at various points being covered with their dead. Some of the killed were schoolboys and seemingly unfitted physically for the arduous trials soldiers had to undergo. In addition the British alone had taken more than 5,000 prisoners-4,000 of them on the Yser salient. While the rain and the morass thus served to hold the Allied forces in leash, they were not effective in keeping the Germans from throwing counter-attacks with large forces of men against several newly won sectors of the front held by the British and French, nor in bringing about a cessation of the violent artillery-duel along the entire line. Crown Prince Rupprecht concentrated the strongest of his counter-offensive operations on an attempt to regain lost ground, but his efforts went for naught, British artillery- and infantry-fire raking advancing forces, putting an end to attacks and adding materially to the already heavy casualties the Germans had suffered. The commander of the German Fourth Army was no despicable antagonist for the British. He had suffered a sharp defeat at Messines; but he had the type of mind which reacts against failure, and, as he had done a year before on the Somme, so now he adapted his defense to the British mode of attack. In Flanders the nature of the ground did not permit of a second Siegfried line. Deep dugouts and concrete-lined trenches were impossible because of a waterlogged soil, and he was compelled to find new tacties. Von Arnim's solution was what were known as "pillboxes," already used at Messines. These were small concrete forts, sited among the ruins of a farm or in some derelict piece of woodland, often raised only a yard or two above the ground, and bristling with machine-guns, with entrance at |