CHARLES OF AUSTRIA, HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN

Charles had succeeded Francis Joseph in November, 1916. Count Czernin, his Foreign Minister as early as April 12, 1917, had advised him to seek to bring about peace

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now been overthrown may induce reflection and recall the phrase, Exemple trahunt. It is no use replying that in Germany or AustriaHungary conditions are different; it is no use replying that the firm roots of the monarchical ideas in Berlin or Vienna preclude such an event. This war has opened a new era of world history; it has had no precedents and no prolog. The world is not the same as it was three years ago, and it is useless to seek in history analogies for all those events which are now everyday occurrences.

"Your majesty knows that the burden upon the people has grown to dimensions which are simply unbearable. Your majesty knows that the bow is stretched so taut that a break may be expected any day: . . . I do not believe that the internal condition of Germany is materially different from ours, but I fear that in military circles at Berlin certain illusions are cherished. I have the firm conviction that Germany, like ourselves, is at the end of its strength, as indeed the responsible political elements in Berlin do not deny. I am as firm as a rock in the conviction that if Germany attempts to conduct another winter campaign, there will result convulsions in the interior of the Empire which would seem to me much worse than a bad peace concluded by the monarchs.

"It is beyond doubt that the American declaration of war has materially aggravated the situation. It may be that months will pass before America can throw any forces worth mentioning into the theater of war; but the moral factor, the fact that the Entente now expects new and powerful aid, alters the situation to our disadvantage, because our enemies have considerably more time before them than we, and can wait longer than we, unluckily, can wait.

"In Germany great hope is based upon the submarine war. I consider this hope delusive. I do not deny for a moment the fabulous achievements of the sea-heroes; I concede with admiration that the number of ships sunk monthly is something incredible; but I affirm that the success awaited and predicted by the Germans has not been achieved. . . . But to-day even enthusiastic German advocates of submarine-warfare must begin to realize that this means will not decide the victory; and I hope that the unfortunately mistaken notion that England will be forced to conclude peace within a few months will also lose ground in Berlin. Nothing in politics is more dangerous than believing what you wish; nothing is more fatal in a great crisis than the habit of closing one's eyes to the truth, and giving oneself up to Utopian illusions, from which there must sooner or later be a fearful awakening."

How futile were Czernin's warnings one can now realize by recalling the vigor with which the U-boat work was

prosecuted in the spring, summer, and autumn of 1917. Then, as if in a belief that she had terrorized Great Britain and America to the point of submission to the Teutonic sword, Germany came forward with another peace "kite." On July 19, the Reichstag adopted resolutions which exprest a desire for a peace of lasting conciliation, with "no annexations and no indemnities," a cry which German diplomats contrived to have taken up later by the Bolsheviki of Russia and which Germany,

with astonishing perfidy, several months later repudiated and her army forced the socalled peace treaty of BrestLitovsk upon Russia.

PRESS ILLUSTRATING SERVICE.

On July 29 Michaelis, the new German Chancellor who had succeeded Bethmann-Hollweg, maintained that the refusal of the Entente Allies to accept these resolutions as a basis for peace negotiations proved that they did not renounce conquest as their object in the war. Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, at the same time contended that peace could be reached by negotiation and that any delay in bringing it about was due to England's determination to destroy the Central Powers. On August 15, the Pope sent a peace note to all the belligerents, in which he suggested disarmament, withdrawal from occupied territories, restitution of German colonies, settlement of territorial and political questions in a conciliatory spirit, and a general condonation of the past. A proposal coming from such a quarter proved embarrassing to the European Allies, and the burden of replying was left to President Wilson, whose answer, altho courteous and respectful, left little unsaid as to the stern necessity of destroying the power for evil that

existed in the German military autocracy. Opinion in general supported his calm and forceful statement. It became the final word of the Entente. England officially adopted it as her own reply.

Following closely upon the efforts of Czernin and the Pope there came on August 20 a letter from the Emperor Charles of Austria to the German Crown Prince. In this letter the Emperor declared that Germany was in "a hopeless situation" and urged that Germany make peace before winter, which she could do if willing to "make territorial sacrifices in Alsace-Lorraine." Following are parts of this letter:2

"Bulgaria is on the point of dropping out of the war, and the situation demands that peace should be concluded before winter. I have positive indications that we could win over an opponent, if Germany would be willing to make certain territorial sacrifices in Alsace-Lorraine, but I do not want Germany alone to make sacrifices. I will myself bear the lion's share in this direction.”

Emperor Charles then pointed out how Austria in 1915 had offered Trentino to Italy to avoid Italy's entrance into the war, and added: "Germany is in a similar, but far more hopeless situation, and you, as heir to the throne, have the right to throw a weighty word into the scale." The letter closed with a request to "unite your efforts with mine to end the war quickly and honorably."

Fundamentally the Allied terms of peace were the restoration of Belgium after complete evacuation; the restoration of Northern France, and the retrocession to France of Alsace-Lorraine. Equally certain was it that the Allies would demand the cession by Austria to Italy of Trieste and the Trentino, which were inhabited by Italian-speaking peoples long opprest by Austria and eager to return to the Latin world. In the same way, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia would have to go to Serbia, and Transylvania which was inhabited chiefly by Roumanians, would go to Roumania. All these were applications of principles of selfdetermination as exprest by President Wilson in an address

2 Printed in April, 1919, in The Berliner Zeitung-am-Mittag, in a letter from a Vienna correspondent.

There

made by him before we entered the war. There was no proposal on the part of the Allies to dismember Germany. The only territory to be taken from Germany was territory which she had taken from France forty-six years before, and certain Polish districts which Frederick the Great took as his reward for destroying Polish liberty and independence. The German people were hungry, but they were not yet hungry enough to overthrow the military autocracy which had brought them to a condition of misery. They were dissatisfied, but they were not dissatisfied enough to repudiate either their military leaders or the principles which had made Germany a predatory state-the principles on which Prussia for two centuries had been gradually expanding her territory from a small to a great state. could be no peace in the world so long as the German people held to the doctrine that ambition, or the necessities of their state, was above humanity; in other words, that there was no moral law when a German Imperial appetite had to be appeased. Americans as well as the Entente Europeans had reached a point where they had to face the fact once for all that they must smash the Prussian system or the Prussian system would smash all that they cared for or believed in. Until the German armies were defeated in the field all talk about peace would be a sham, unless Germans were willing to accept peace founded on conditions that conceded their defeat. The end of this war was in sight, but it was not yet at hand. The principles for which Europe had fought, for which we in America were soon to fight in France had been only partially vindicated.

Well supported statements were made at this time that influential Frenchmen had been approached on behalf of the German Government with a view to ascertaining whether proposals for peace, regarded by the latter as honorable and even generous, would be acceptable to France. These proposals included the cession of Metz and perhaps part of Alsace. The purpose was to separate France from her Allies, after which the Imperial Government believed it could defeat Russia and Great Britain or obtain from them terms which would include the cession to Germany of Antwerp and northern Belgium.