At number 361, the writer says: "Admitting, then, the necessity that the jurisdiction shall be founded on domicile, etc." The courts in England, in their recent decisions have acted on the rule that actual domicile gives jurisdiction, irrespective of the matrimonial domicile, and this is unmistakably shewn by the rulings in Foster v. Foster and Berridge (g), Brodie v. Brodie (h), Wilson v. Wilson (i), Gillis v. Gillis (j), Lesneur v. Lesneur (k), Firebrace v. Firebrace (1), and Harvey v. Farnie (m). This somewhat indicates what would be the decision in a case exactly similar to the present one. In France the courts have gone much further than it is necessary for the purposes of this case, and much further than we perhaps would be disposed to go. They have refused in several cases to recognize the validity of divorces pronounced in a foreign country between persons domiciled in such foreign country. The arrêts are mentioned by Demolombe (n), but the more recent jurisprudence seems to have recognized the validity of such divorces. The present case must, however, be decided by the rules to be found in our own code, and we believe that these rules are express and to the point. Art. 6 C.C. provides "that the laws of Lower Canada relative to persons apply to all persons being therein, even to those not domiciled there; subject as to the latter, to the exception mentioned at the end of the present article.” "An inhabitant of Lower Canada" (which by section 21 of the schedule to Art. 17 of the code, means a person having his domicile in that part of the province, now the Province of Quebec), “so long as he retains his domicile therein, is governed, even when absent, by its laws respecting the status and capacity of persons; but these laws do not apply to persons domiciled out of Lower Canada who, as to their status and capacity, remain subject to the laws of their country. The exception here mentioned does not apply to the parties in this cause who have their domicile in this country. Their status and capacity must, therefore, be governed by the laws of this province. They came here as a lawfully married couple, as man and wife, and they cannot change that personal status, except according to the laws in force in this province; and as there is no law authorizing a divorce they must be held to be married as long as they retain their domicile in this province. There is no plainer provision of law than the one just cited-and to shew that it is not susceptible of any other interpretation than the one given, we have only to quote a short passage from the report of the commissioners. At (g) 10 Jur. N.S. 254. (i) 27 L.T. 351. (j) 8 Ir. Rep. Eq. 597. 26-SUP. Ct. cas. (k) 34 L.T. 511. (m) 42 L.T. 482. (n) Vol. 1, No. 101. 1884 STEVENS บ. FISK. 1884 STEVENS v. FISK. p. 144 of their second report (o) the commissioners say, on art. 7— which is now the 6th article of the code: "This article is intended to replace article 3 of the Code Napoléon, which determines what persons and property are governed by the French law." "This article, which is of the utmost importance, has been prepared with care, and is founded on the numerous authorities cited after each of its paragraphs." One of the authors cited is Felix, which we have already quoted at length. Boullenois is another, and at p. 157 of the first of his Traité des Statuts Personnels, etc., he says: "L'on sent que c'est la nature même des choses et la nécessité qui exigent que lorsqu-il s'agit de déterminer l'état et la condition des personnes, il n'y ait qu'un juge qui doit être celui du domicile, à qui ce droit puisse appartenir." "C'est donc avee beaucoup de sagesse que l'on a réglé que la personne recevait son état et sa condition du lieu de son domicile." * The effect of this rule is that, in case of a change of domicile, the status obtained under the laws of the first domicile is retained until another status is acquired, according to the laws of the new domicile. In the present instance the parties when they came from the State of New York were legally married according to the laws of that state, and they were recognized as such by the laws of this country. If they had been mere transient travellers they might have returned to their domicile, obtained a decree of divorce under the laws in force there, and on coming back here they would, on principle (although this has been the subject of much controversy in France: Demolombe, vol. 1, No. 101), have been held to be freed from the bonds of wedlock and treated as single persons are. The moment, however, they acquired a domicile here their status could not be changed, except according to the laws in force in this pro vince, that is the laws of their new domicile. This is what Felix clearly expresses in the passage of his work already cited:"Après le changement de domicile, la loi du nouveau domicile exerce sur l'indivu les mêmes effets que celle du domicile d'origine avait exercé jusqu'alors." Bourjon, tit. xi., ch. 4, sec. 2, No. 11, p. 114, of the edition of 1770, shews so clearly, by the examples which he gives, the effect, on a change of domicile, of the laws of the new domicile on the status of an individual, that I may be permitted to quote his obser vations on this subject: XI. "Si un homme" (says this author) "originaire du pays de droit écrit, vient s'établir à Paris, avant d'avoir acquis l'âge que la Coutume de Paris requiert pour tester, il ne pourra tester aussitôt que le droit écrit le permet, mais seulement lorsqu'il aura acquis l'âge requis par cette coutume; il est venu à Paris incapable, il y reste tel jusqu'à ce que la loi qui régit sa personne lève l'incapacité." (0) Vol. I., pp. 144, 145, 146, 147. XII. “La raison est, que c'est elle, alors, qui régit sa personne et non le droit écrit, et, par conséquent, sa capacité qu'il ne peut avoir que par sa disposition, puisqu'il ne l'a jamais eu par la loi même de son premium domicile; mais si cet homme n'avait quitté le pays de droit écrit qu'après avoir acquis l'âge pour tester, et qu'il fut constaté que son testament est antérieur à son changement de domicile, en ce cas le testament serait bon, quoique le estateur mourût à Paris avant l'âge que la coutume requiert pour tester, c'est droit acquis et consommé." XIII. "Cela est fondé sur ce que le changement de domicile ne peut lui faire perdre un droit et une capacité qu'il avait acquis lors du changement, et qu'il avait consommé avant icelui; mais il faut cette consommation et qu'il soit constaté qu'elle s'est faite avant le .changement." XIV. "La nécessité de cette consommation est fondée sur ce que n'ayant pas consommé dans le temps la faculté que la loi de son ancien domicile lui donnait, cette loi par la suite lui est étrangère, et il ne peut l'invoquer pour un acte fait dans un temps, où la loi de son nouveau domicile, celle par conséquent qui régit sa personne, lui dénie cette faculté." By substituting the word "divorce" for that of "testament" in the above citation, we have the exact position of the parties in this cause defined under the rules of law prevailing before the code, and which the code has preserved in its integrity, in preference to the new rules adopted by the French code, which, however, does not expressly touch the point in issue in this case. On the strict interpretation of the language of the code we are, therefore, also led to the conclusion that the divorce obtained by the respondent in the State of New York can have no effect here. The appellant is, therefore, still a married woman, and could only bring an action against her husband to recover her dot on being thereto authorized in the manner required by law. (Arts. 176 and 178 of the Civil Code.) This authorization is more specially required when the woman under coverture wishes to institute judicial proceedings against her husband. (Guyot Rep. vo. "Autorization," No. 16, p. 844). The want of such authorization constitutes a cause of nullity which nothing can cover, says art. 183 of the Code: Pothier, "Puissance Maritale," No. 74. (ed. Bugnet, Vol. 7. p. 28.) Duranton, vol. 2, No. 509; says: "Dans l'ancienne jurisprudence, le défaut d'autorisation produisait une nullité absolue, qui pouvait être invoquée aussi bien par celui qui avait traité avec la femme, que par elle et son mari; du moins tel était le sentiment commun des auteurs. Adjourd'hui la nullité est suelement relative, etc." Notwithstanding this change in the law it has been repeatedly held under the code that the want of authorization could be invoked at any stage of the procedure, even in appeal. Sirey, Code Annoté, art. 215, Nos. 44, 45 and 46, cites these arrêts. 1884 STEVENS v. FISK. 1884 STEVENS v. FISK. Our code differs somewhat both from art. 224 of the Custom of Paris, and from art. 215 of the French code, with regard to the necessity of the authorization required by the wife to ester en justice; and therefore in deciding the present case particular attention must be given to the stringent terms of our code, and in doing so we have come to the conclusion that the respondent could not bring the present action without a previous authorization from a judge and that the objection was well taken by the appellant. The majority of the members of the court are, therefore, of opinion that the action of the respondent should be dismissed on the two grounds that the pretended divorce cannot be recognized here and that she has not been authorized to bring her action. Laflamme, Q.C., and Lafleur, for the appellant. New York being the actual and also the intended domicile of the parties at the time of the marriage, their proprietary rights must be governed by the laws of that State, Rogers v. Rogers (p), Astill v. Hallée (q), Dalton v. King (r), Wiggins v. Morgan(s); and these laws give the wife the entire control over her fortune without any conjugal partnership just as if she were a feme sole. We rely on the following propositions: I. The appellant, even if she be still the wife of the respondent, can institute the present action without authorization. II. The want of authorization, even if fatal, had been badly pleaded. III. If authorization was necessary, the court should not have dismissed the action, but should have authorized the wife séance tenante, or at least have sent back the record to the court below to enable plaintiff to get the necessary authorization. IV. The divorce alleged in the declaration is good and valid and entitled to recognition in this province; and its pretended invalidity cannot in any event be set up by the respondent. As regards the first point, the appellant submits that, 1884 v. FISK. even if she be still the wife of the respondent, being separate as to property, she can institute an action against him STEVENS to account; and that the demanding of an account of the administration of her moveable property, being a mere act of administration, does not require authorization. Art. 176, C.C. Our Civil Code differs from the Code Napoléon on this point, and is based on the old law. Pothier, Puissance du Mari, Nos. 61 and 62(t): "La Coutume de Paris, en l'article ci-dessus rapporté, fait une second exception à l'égard des femmes, par ces termes, ou séparées par justice et ladite séparation exécutée." "Ce pouvoir que la coutume donne aux femmes séparées d'ester en jugement sans l'assistance de leurs maris, étant une suite du pouvoir que la séparation donne aux femmes d'administrer leurs biebs, sans avoir besoin pour cela de ieurs maris, il est évident que, cette exception pour les femmes séparées, ne droit s'entendre que des actions qui concernant l'administration de leurs biens, qu'elles peuvent intenter, et auxquelles elles peuvent défendre sans leurs maris." Pothier goes on to explain that the words séparées par justice do not restrict this right to cases of judicial separation, but that it exists also a fortiori in cases of contractual separation. Nouveau Denizart, vo. "Autorization," par. 2, No. 4: "Si a l'exclusion de la communauté portée par le contrat de mariage, on a ajouté que la femme souiroit séparément de son bien, et qu'elle y soit expressément autorisée, elle peut alors administrer et disposer de ses revenus, faire des baux, et suivre en justice, tant en demandant qu'en défendant, les actions mobilières et possessoires, qui lui appartiennent." Rousseau de Lacombe, vo. "Autorisation," No. 12: "Femme séparée ne peut s'obliger sans l'autorité de son mari. Peut s'obliger seulement jusqu'à concurrence de ses meubles et revenus. (t) Ed. Bugnet, vol. VII., pp. 23 and 24. |