"These provisions were adopted to prevent the legislature from passing what are commonly known as omnibus bills.'" Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 299.

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"The object of this provision was that neither the members of the legislature nor the people should be misled by the title." Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 8 N. Y. 241.

"The intent of this provision of the constitution was to prevent the union in the same act of incongruous matters, and of objects having no connection or relation. And with this it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation by having matters of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another." State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280.

"The object of this constitutional provision was to require so clear an expression of the subject of the bill in the title that it would at once apprise legislators and others interested of the precise subject of the proposed legislation." City of Kansas v. Payne, 71 Mo. 159.

Mr. Cooley, after an examination of all the authorities, sums up the object and purpose of such provision thus: "It may, therefore, be assumed as settled that the purpose of these provisions was-First, to prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked, and very carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard therein by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.' Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 173.

The provisions of our organic act now under consideration was adopted by congress in view of all these provisions of the state constitutions, with which, and with the construction of which, senators and members were entirely familiar, and undoubtedly the purpose to be accomplished was the same as that accomplished by the state constitutions. An attempt has been made by some to draw a distinction because the act of congress used the word "object" while most of the state constitutions use the word "subject." We have seen that the constitutions of Michigan and New Jersey use the word "object," and, as the former state is the home of Mr. Cooley, that eminent jurist, in stating the purpose of all these provisions, would most likely have seen and stated the distinction, if one in fact exists. Moreover, if any distinction is to be made, it seems to me that the word "object," in the connection in which it is used, is obviously of broader significance than the word "subject." "Object" may be used as having the sense of "effect,”—the thing intended to be accomplished, not the means by which it is to be accomplished, which is properly the "subject." For instance, the object of the act in question was to confer the elective franchise on females; its subject was the subjectmatter on which, in accomplishing that object, the legislative will operated, namely, the section of the Code defining the qualifications of electors. I do not, however, lay particular stress on the use of the word "object" instead of "subject" in our organic act. For all practical purposes, the words are synonymous, as indicated by Mr. Cooley.

In applying the provisions in state constitutions, the courts have uniformly held that a very general statement in the title of the purposes of the law will be sufficient. Still, it is held that the titles must afford some indication, at least, of the object of the laws, or the effects of their provisions. The object or subject which the title shall express must be set forth with sufficient fullness to give the members who are to vote on the law, and the people for whom they vote, some idea of the change which the new law proposes to make. A very meager expression will be sufficient, but some expression there must be. The expression of a purpose to amend a particular section of the Code gives it to be understood that the law is to be changed; but what the law is that is

to be changed, and in what respect it is to be changed, is a matter left entirely in the dark. As every law makes some change in previously existing law, by adding to or subtracting therefrom, the title "An act" would appear to convey fully as much actual, present information. It is true that the title under consideration gives a reference to a source from whence information may be derived as to the law proposed to be changed, but it gives no idea whatever indicative of the change that is to be made. When the seeker after information gleans all the reference indicates, he is driven back to the body of the new law to find what the change is to be,- -a source from which he never would have strayed if the object of the new law had been accurately expressed in the title. But I think a mere reference insufficient, however full the information to which it may lead. The makers of our fundamental law were dealing with conditions as they knew them to exist. In theory legislators inform themselves carefully and laboriously of the effect of the laws upon which they vote. In practice they do not. Laws are often passed by their titles alone. They are very rarely referred to in publications, official or otherwise, prior to their passage, except by their titles. Knowing this fact, and accepting it, and with the design of making the best of it, our constitution makers gave their mandate, intending to obviate as far as possible the evils resulting from this lax way of doing business. If legislators are too busy or too negligent to have read in full or to read laws upon which they are to vote, how vain to expect them to read laws which the laws they are to vote are to effect, with the sole purpose of determining therefrom whether it is worth while to read the laws upon which they are to vote. Congress had no such absurdity in mind, but it intended that the titles to laws should be in themselves an index to their purpose, so that, on hearing them read or on reading them, the attention of members, and of citizens as well, would be excited, and their energies stimulated to an examination of the proposed laws.

It seems to me that it is paltering with the act of congress to say that the object of a particular law is to amend a section of the Code, and that the title is sufficient if it express that much. It would be equally accurate to say the object of all penal laws is to secure the peace and good order of society, and that laws denouncing robbery, burglary, or larceny would have their object adequately expressed by the title "An act to secure the peace and good order of society." The latter title goes as far beyond, as the former stops short of, expressing the true object. The object of an amendatory act is not to amend. Such a construction is too narrow. It sticks in the bark. Legislatures do not amend simply with the object of amending. The object in every case is to introduce some new, substantive rule of action by the new law, or to abrogate some such rule in the old law. It is attached to the old law because its provisions are supposed to be germane to that law. It might be enacted without reference to it, in which case its title would be required to give intimation of the new rule. What magic is there in the name "amendment" which exempts a law to which it is tacked from the salutary provisions applicable to every other law?

Fortunately we are not without authority to guide us on the precise point under consideration. It has been held in New York several times that reference in the title of a law to a particular section of the law to be amended is not a sufficient compliance with the constitution. The title itself must give information, and not simply a reference to sources of information. People v. Hills, 35 N. Y. 449; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Tingue v. Village of Pt. Chester, 4 N. E. Rep. 625. The last case was decided January 19, 1886. The same thing, in effect, has been held in Minnesota. The title of an amendatory act not indicating its object further than was done by the incorporation therein of the title of the act amended, it was held that provisions in the amendatory act not fairly within the object described by the title of the original act were invalid. People v. Gadway, 28 N. W. Rep. 101.

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The logic of this case is clearly that a reference to the title of the old law is sufficient only when that title is broad enough to cover the things provided for by the new law; a fortiori, if the old law have no title indicating its contents, a reference to it would be entirely insufficient.

The same court, in another case, cites the New York cases, but guards against their adoption to the full extent, because not necessary for the decision of the case then before it. State v. Smith, 28 N. W. Rep. 241.

The decisions in Indiana are much to the same effect as those in Minnesota. State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195.

The Michigan decisions are to the same effect. In a case in that state an amendatory act was sustained, the title of which referred to particular sections of a certain act, the title of which was included in the title of the amendatory act, and a section of the old act not described in the title of the new act was held properly amended. The case, which is not very clear, evidently proceeded on the ground that the reference to the title of the old act was in itself a sufficient indication of the things which the amendment might accomplish. The following expression is in point on the matter here involved: “The practice of amending by reference to sections, instead of by reference to the subject or to the entire statute, is one which creates a great deal of mischief, and in no way carries out the real design of the constitution, and is of no practical value, in most cases, in indicating what changes are to be made or what precise object is in view." Comstock v. Judge Superior Court, 39 Mich. 195.

California appears to maintain the same doctrine. The following is the latest decision in full of the supreme court of that state: "We are of opinion that the act of the legislature entitled 'An act to amend sections 4000, 4003, 4004, 4006, 4022, 4023, 4024, 4025, 4026, 4028, 4029, 4046, 4087, 4103, 4104, 4109, 4115, 4116, 4119, 4165, 4192, 4204, 4221, 4256, 4314, 4328, 4329, 4344, and add two new sections to be known as sections 4292 and 4348, and repeal sections 4005, 4105, 4106, 4110, 4111, 4134, 4304, and to establish a system of county governments,' approved April 27, 1880, is in conflict with the constitution of the state and void." Leonard v. January, 56 Cal. 3. As there is nothing in the opinion to lead to the conclusion that the different things proposed were incongruous, the only objection which is indicated is the obscurity of the title of the act. Such appears from the brief to have been the objection urged by counsel.

It appears, on the contrary, to have been held in Georgia that the title of the act is sufficient if it refers to the section of the statute amended, (Wheeler v. State, 23 Ga. 9;) also in Arkansas, (Norman v. Curry, 27 Ark. 440). It appears also that the title of a repealing statute is sufficient in Louisiana if it designates the section repealed. State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637. The last cases are taken from a digest. How accurately the points decided are digested I have no means of knowing. An Alabama case, found in the same work, does not, however, bear high testimony to its accuracy. Concerning the Louisiana case, if it be correctly reported, distinction is to be drawn between a repealing act and an amendatory act. A reference in the title of the former to the section repealed manifestly gives reference to a source of information leading to a perfect knowledge of all that is proposed to be done. Scattered throughout the reports and text-books are many cases holding that the incorporation in the title of the amendatory or repealing act of the title of the act to be amended or repealed is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. This is undoubtedly true, and it is true because the subject of an amendatory act is required in all cases to be germane and congruous to the general object of the original act which it affects, and to recite the title of the original act in the title of the amendatory act is to express the subject of the amendment in the amendatory act. This view explains many cases which are quoted as authority for the proposition that a

reference to the amended law is sufficient. Of this class are State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195; Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 216; State v. Bank ers', etc., Ass'n, 23 Kan. 500; State v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 367; Gatling v. Lane, 17 Neb. 81, 22 N. W. Rep. 453; State v. Lancaster Co., 17 Neb. 85, 22 N. W. Rep. 228; Miller v. Hurford, 13 Neb. 18, 12 N. W. Rep. 832; People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507; State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 268.

It must be confessed that in the Missouri case, and in the Kansas cases last referred to, the courts use some unguarded expressions not required by the cases before them. On the whole, I think the clear weight of authority and certainly sound reason is against the position that a reference to a section in the title of an amendatory act, without more, is in any case sufficient. For a valuable collection of cases on this subject, see Mr. Freeman's notes to Davis v. State, 61 Amer. Dec. 331.

By reference to the cases there cited, it will be seen that provisions such as that in our organic act are mandatory, and must be obeyed. I give full assent to the doctrine that courts should hesitate before declaring an act of the legislature invalid, but the statement is equally binding that courts must give effect to views of law clearly entertained, and necessary to the determination of causes, even to the extent of declaring laws that are so unconstitutional. My conclusions concerning the validity of this law have not been hastily arrived at. Arguments concerning a law similarly circumstanced was had before me in my district several months ago, and I deferred a decision of the question until after the holding of this term, partly in the hope that the question might be presented here and authoritatively determined. My associates have also had the benefit of argument in their districts, and have expressed opinions thereon before coming here; so that we are all as well equipped to arrive at a correct opinion as we can well hope to be, and as this question arises in this case, and meets us squarely, it ought to be decided.

If the law conferring the elective franchise on females was not a fruit of disobedience to the wise and salutary restraint of the organic act, as has been charged, and if there is a public sentiment in the territory which favors such a measure, the next legislature will probably re-enact it. It will be done then, if done at all, openly, and in a guise which is not objectionable, and after a full opportunity has been given the people to express their views. A measure of such a character, involving changes in our social and political structures so momentous, and, as many men and women believe, so disastrous, unless the measure lapse into disuse, ought never to be urged or passed under any other conditions.

For the reasons herein before stated I believe the act amending section 3050 to be in conflict with our organic act, and void. For the same reasons the act of the legislature approved January 29, 1886, (St. 1885-86, p. 113,) is void. For the same reasons the act approved February 3, 1886, (Sess. Laws 1885-86, p. 128,) is void, except in so far as it purports to amend sections 3079 and 3084 of the Code. These sections, relating as they do to the mere minutiæ of conducting elections, could not, under the title affixed to that act, be amended so as to confer the elective franchise on any one, nor has any amendment of them been attempted which would have that effect, if valid. Females, then, are not voters in this territory, and, not being voters, they are not competent to sit on juries.

I do not agree that there is error in the record other than that committed in the ruling on the question which I have been considering. For that error, however, concerning which a majority of us are agreed, the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

NOTE. Since writing and delivering the above opinion, I have found the case in 27 Ark. mentioned. That case relates entirely to a declaration of the code of the state to the effect that none of its provisions shall be repealed unless such intention is expressly stated, etc. No constitutional question was involved.

LANGFORD, J., (concurring.) The record in this case presents for our discussion the following propositions of law: First, can a prisoner be extradited upon a charge of felony, which is the carrying on a swindling game of bunco and twenty-one, and be tried and convicted upon the charge of carrying on the game of twenty-one or top and bottom dice, and swindling a man thereat? Second, can a man be convicted of a felony under an indictment which charges that defendant and another conducted the swindling game of twenty-one, or top and bottom dice, without description of the offense by any words other than those naming 'a game, stating no acts which constitute the offense? Third, can a prisoner be convicted of any felony under such a charge in the indictment? Fourth, if the jury in such a case bring in a verdict of guilty as charged, can the court enter judgment for carrying on the swindling game of top and bottom dice, omitting the words "twenty-one?" Fifth, can a prisoner be convicted on any indictment where he has duly challenged the grand jurors upon the admitted fact that four of them who found the bill were married women, living and keeping house with their husbands?

As to the first point, we think that each of the states are sovereign as to each other in all respects, as one foreign nation is to another, save and except in those particulars which each state has surrendered to the United States. Each state has surrendered its right to make treaties and war to the government of the United States. If a prisoner is extradited from one state to another, it is done, not through the terms of treaty, the breach of which is to be punished by war or revolution, but through the comity and pleasure of each state. There can be no power of one state brought against another to force extradition. This comity of states is exercised with great liberality and without the jealousy which controls foreign nations as to each other. This comity, by long custom, has become a quasi international law as between the states. The courts of a state will not discharge a prisoner thus extradited except upon the ground of fraud or imposition. A false pretense that a man is required for one thing, when in truth and in fact he is wanted for quite another thing, is a fraud; and in such a case the court would presume that the executive had been imposed upon, and, upon an advantage being attempted as the fruit of such fraud, would discharge the prisoner. In this case the offense mentioned in the requisition and the indictment are so similar that no presumption of fraud can arise. I conclude, therefore, that the prisoner ought not to have been discharged upon this ground.

As to the second point, the statute under which the prisoner was convicted divides illegal games into two classes,-the first class being misdemeanors; the second, felonies. Among the class of games which are mentioned by name as misdemeanors is the game of twenty-one. The game of twenty-one is not mentioned among those games which are declared felonies. Top and bottom dice is not mentioned as a game which is either a misdemeanor or a felony. If the game of twenty-one is to be punishable at all, it being specially mentioned as a misdemeanor, and not a felony, can only be punished as a misdemeanor, and a conviction of felony is illegal. The offense is not defined by the statute except by the name of the game. What acts constitute the offense are not stated in the statute. I am of the opinion that, when a word has an accepted, unambiguous meaning, as fixed by the law, or by the English language, it is sufficiently definitive of itself, without further statutory definition, such as the word "adultery," or the like; but a word which does not convey a fixed or ascertainable meaning in law, or in English, is not sufficiently definitive to create a crime. A law is a rule of action prescribed. A word which has no fixed meaning cannot constitute a rule of action, for the connotation is not definite, nor does it prescribe either to the public or the courts, what acts, are or are not criminal. The words "top and bottom dice" signify no class of actions which can be known by the public or the courts; besides that game is not denominated an offense. What