NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

FEBRUARY, 1884.

SUGGESTIONS IN FAVOR OF MORE PRACTICAL AND EFFICIENT SERVICE EXERCISES.

BY LIEUTENANT NATHAN SARGENT, U. S. N.

The signs of the times, as shown by the recommendations of the President's Message, the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, the leading articles of prominent newspapers, and the late resolutions of the Union League Club of New York and Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco, go to prove that the consensus of opinion throughout the country is in favor of a decided increase of the matériel of the Navy, and that we may soon expect to have the service supplied with a fleet of modern and effective vessels.

These vessels, if not formidable, will at least be excellent ones of their type; and being armed with guns of the most approved pattern and highest power, will not be handicapped by either the antiquated smoothbore, or the makeshift converted rifle, to which we have so long been accustomed.

This, of course, is a matter of great congratulation to the naval officer; who, in hailing the dawn of a new era, cannot help remembering how for many years he has been mortified by being obliged to cruise in foreign waters, in vessels of a type some twenty years behind the age, and whose ingenuity has often been put to the test in attempting to answer the questions propounded by foreigners and foreign officials, who could not understand the anomaly of the richest country in the world having the weakest navy, with types of ships and guns long since abandoned by the principal maritime powers.

But, however satisfactory may be our new ships, and however powerful our new guns, their effectiveness will be almost nil, unless we have an efficient, well trained, and intelligent personnel to man them. For this, the responsibility rests directly with the officers of the service.

For many years past, whenever the lamentable state of our navy has been mentioned, a strong contrast has at once been drawn between ships and personnel, and the latter has always been declared equal to that of any other service. So it may be, so far as raw material is concerned; but, if untrained, and unacquainted with the resources, requirements, and methods of modern naval warfare, it will be substantially useless in any conflict, even if opposed to an enemy far inferior in natural qualifications.

Our service has a glorious record in the past, but its record is due largely to the fact that the careful training its men had received rendered them much superior to those with whom they came in conflict. In the French war and in the war of 1812 our successes were owing, not only to the superiority of our ships (as urged by the enemy), but also to the fact that our adversaries paid little attention to gunnery in exercising their crews; our men, on the contrary, had been instructed with the utmost care, and particular consideration had been given to their target practice and manner of firing in a seaway. The good results of this training were shown by the favorable issue of many actions, in which we had to contend, not only with equal force and valor, but with the prestige established by years of maritime supremacy. The most noted of our reverses in the war of 1812 was when the unfortunate Chesapeake, with an untrained crew, was opposed to a vessel commanded by an officer who, in a commission of over four years, had been untiring in his endeavors to improve the gunnery of his men.

With such an experience to look back upon, one might imagine that the present day would find our personnel at the highest point of excellence, with a training far in advance of that of foreign navies, and ready for any emergency of sudden war. That such is not the case is due to the fact that a prevailing characteristic of our service is extreme conservatism. Any proposed change from the existing order of things, in whatever manner, or however sensible and beneficial, raises a storm of objection and disapproval; the more requisite the change, and the more apparent to thinking minds its necessity, the more decided seem its opponents, and the more strenuous their efforts to prevent its accomplishment. This tendency blocks the way to any improvement in the training of our crews, and explains why there has been little or no alteration in the usual drills and exercises for the last twenty years.

But, the ultimate object of a naval force being readiness for WAR,

we cannot afford to stand still while other nations are advancing, and it behooves us, the officers of the Navy, to see that its personnel is kept up to the mark of modern effectiveness, and is made worthy of its traditions and reputation.

How far behind the times we are may be seen by an inspection of any of our fleet or ship routines, showing what drills and exercises are considered necessary. Sail and spar drill, general and fire quarters, and an occasional boat exercise, constitute the major part of all requirements; while at rare intervals a landing party is organized, and the men are sent on shore in their mustering clothes to go through a dress-parade, which, as a military ceremonial is generally a failure, and as a land evolution is of no utility whatever as a preparation for service.

Some three years ago the writer witnessed the landing of a large naval force at Fortress Monroe. For weeks the papers had been heralding a grand naval review, and the New York dailies and illustrated journals had sent their correspondents and artists to describe and depict the interesting manœuvres that were anticipated. The North Atlantic and Training Squadrons had rendezvoused in Hampton Roads, the Secretary of the Navy and other high officials were present, and there was nothing to prevent a series of exercises of great utility and interest. But what was the result? There were some fleet and ship drills with sails and great guns, but little attention was paid to them, the main object of interest being the proposed landing party of blue-jackets and marines. At last a signal was made for the force to embark, and soon after, for the squadrons of boats to form opposite the beach. There was no attempt to simulate the covering of the party by a fire from either launches or vessels, during the full hour consumed in forming the boats into line; and the presence of the most insignificant number of an enemy on the dunes of the beach would have been sufficient to effectually prevent all chances of landing. The same lack of any resemblance to real service was shown in the landing itself. There was a general race and scramble for the beach, the men jumped out, pulled up their boats, and formed into battalions; no effort being made to throw out skirmishers, nor to guard against surprise by any of the precautions that would necessarily be taken in time of war. The shore organization effected, the party was marched into the fort, and were drilled at forming and changing front in mass, and in having a brigade dress-parade and review.

Now, of what use to any one, officer or man, was such an exercise as this, and what experience could be gained from it, other than the negative one of teaching us to avoid all of its defective details?

All recent naval expeditions and operations have shown the necessity of having an effective landing force, well organized and capable of rendering good service on shore, by being properly equipped and instructed in some system of tactics adapted to the duties likely to be required of it.

Every one will acknowledge that an exercise of this description should be one calculated to make both officers and men fully conversant with the dangers and difficulties likely to be encountered in actual service. The autumn manœuvres of the German and French armies do not consist of reviews and dress-parades, but of operations extending over several days, and embracing all the discomforts and hardships, and calling for all the skill in tactics and strategy, necessary to actual campaigning. Again, men are no longer fought in masses; the best military authorities recognize and announce the fact that open order is the formation of the future, yet the skirmish drill is usually the last thing taught the sailor. If, perchance, a progressive divisional officer desires to drill his men as skirmishers, he is likely to have the greatest difficulty in obtaining the requisite permission from the conservative first lieutenant, and is perhaps looked on by others as a rara avis, holding unusual or ridiculous ideas, or as one who is anxious to pose in the role of a reformer. But the purpose of our drills is not only to give the sailor employment and exercise, but especially to fit him for such service as he may at any time be called upon to perform, whether on board ship, in torpedo boats, or on shore.

The object of each system of instruction should be to impart the knowledge that will earliest bring the seaman to the desired state of proficiency. What has recently been said by Lord Wolseley in reference to the English soldier may apply with equal force to the sailor. He remarks: "As nowadays you have only a limited time to teach him in, you ought to devote it exclusively to instruction in useful things; and in teaching him useful things you will discipline his mind and body quite as well as if you taught him complicated manœuvres, which are very pretty to look at, but utterly impracticable in the field."

The aim of modern instruction is utility, and the best and most expeditious way of acquiring that utility is what is needed afloat as well

as on shore. The man-of-war's-man of to-day is a very different being from the sailor of fifty years ago, and is a person from whom a much greater degree of intelligence is expected and required; more attention should therefore be given to his instruction as necessitated by the great changes and improvements in great guns, machine guns, magazine guns, small arms, and torpedoes. The probability of having to use or to contend with any or all of these new inventions should necessarily be considered, and our drills should be more in conformity with such requirements. Should this change take place we might soon miss the mediaval cry of "boarders away!" and the sight of the picked men of the ship rushing to the most exposed parts of the upper deck, and with a mighty cheer swarming up on the bulwarks and cleaving the air with their cutlasses. How many minutes, nay, seconds, would it require an enemy, with the modern complement of Hotchkiss, Nordenfeldt, Gardner, or Gatling guns, to sweep them away as so much chaff? Boarders may still be needed in cases of ramming, but they must be manœuvred very differently from the manner of the past.

The daily drills might, with propriety, be carried on in a manner more consistent with the increased intelligence of our men, and the divisional officer should act more in the capacity of an instructor, and less in that of a simple drill-master. Great attention should be paid to target practice with great guns, machine guns and small arms; the battery should be frequently laid for concentrated firing, both by hand and by electrical action; movable targets should be improvised, and the vessel should be under way when firing at them; the effect of drift and of wind blowing across the line of fire should be explained, not only to the gun captains, but also to others who may be called upon to take their place; the manipulation of fuses should be familiar to all; the use of machine guns on deck and aloft, and the defence of tops against small-arm fire, are part of the requirements of the future; while readiness for ramming and for launching torpedoes in action are preparations for emergencies likely to occur with even the weakest wooden vessel.

The subject of torpedoes has become a very important one, and likely to be of momentous interest in the naval warfare of the future. The truism of this statement being universally acknowledged, one might imagine that we should find both officers and men fully in

*The English have an effective movable small-arm target, representing a man running from cover to cover.