The only sign of organic life visible consisted in a few small ctenophores, swimming about in a lively manner among the floating masses of ice. The air was saturated with moisture, the rigging was covered with ice, and a dense layer of hoar-frost coated the bulwarks and the masts. During the afternoon it snowed for about three hours, but when it cleared at a quarter-past seven we noticed that the snowfall had not extended over a great area. The southern mountains and hills appeared dark and naked, while the land to the east and west was in its full winter attire. The vessel was unmoored and we steamed slowly ahead. To our right the lofty cliffs of the newly-discovered land came into view, and before us opened a wide bay, subsequently named Newman's Bay, the head of which could not be discerned from the crow's-nest. Never before had the keel of a vessel ploughed the sea which was now being traversed by the Polaris. Towards eight o'clock the ice increased in quantity, but as far as we could judge it consisted only of broken floes and hummocks; not a single berg was to be seen. Some of the fields were discolored by mud. The ice was setting south with increasing rapidity. At 8h. 56m. Hall attempted to land in a small bay. He used one of the whale-boats, but owing to the swiftness of the current he found it impossible to make the shore. Afterwards he tried it again, but with the same result. therefore named the bight Repulse Harbor.

He

Following the open leads in various directions, we steamed ahead till half-past eleven, when we were again overtaken by a dense fog, which forced us to make fast to an ice-field. Toward midnight the current reached its maximum velocity of about four knots. The moon was almost full (29d. 18h. 20.8m.); it was probably the time of spring tide, and the velocity of the constant current was evidently increased by the influence of the tidal current. The set was towards the south, but it was impossible then to decide whether the acceleration was due to the flood or to the ebb. As we did not have any fixed point to which to refer the water-level, we attempted in vain to find out whether the tide was rising or falling; moreover, the sounding-gear, stowed in the hold, was not accessible.

At half-past six in the morning of the 31st of August we made a new start, but owing to dense fog the vessel had to be moored again to an ice-field at 7h. 50m. When it cleared, at ten minutes past nine, we continued our northerly course. We noticed more old floes than before; the hummocks increased in number and the open lanes grew narrower.

Budington, the sailing and ice master, whose courage and enthusiasm were not in proportion to his thirty years' experience, declared it impossible to penetrate any farther. He had sung the same song when we first met the ice in Smith Sound, but now he harped somewhat louder and in a higher key, and wished to turn back in search of a harbor. Hall, whose whole ambition was to attain the highest possible latitude, opposed Budington's views, as did every member of the expedition who took an interest in the enterprise.

It is always a disagreeable and thankless task to be compelled to discuss the qualities of a shipmate, and to criticize his actions, but at the same time it is the foremost duty of the historian to be accurate and impartial, even at the risk of touching an exposed nerve. In order to secure the highest degree of impartiality I shall now refer to the published testimony, as given before the Polaris Board, and, furthermore, I shall quote my own opinion expressed at the time, during a consultation held on the bridge of the Polaris, as repeated by Budington himself before the said Board. Budington's statement is as follows:

"Hall held a council with the officers, Dr. Bessels and myself, and the others, which I have here, that was written down as it occurred, I believe, word for word. It reads as follows: 'Consultation held on board the Polaris in regard to getting further north with the vessel, the vessel being on the east side, looking for a harbor. Dr. Bessels, Mr. Meyers, Captain Tyson, Captain Budington, Mr. Morton, and Mr. Chester. Doctor wanted to cross the straits to look for a harbor, as being better for sledge journeys, while the east side was better for navigation, if we could not get further north. Mr. Morton coincided with Dr. Bessels. Mr. Meyer had the same opinion. Mr. Chester to get as far north as possible. Captain Tyson to get into harbor as soon as possible. Captain Budington to keep on east side as being better for navigation, and certainly better for sledge journeys. It was impossible to get further north on account of the pack. Go along the coast on the east side of the straits northward until a harbor is reached, which could be done in a short time. There had been seen one a few miles south of the present position of the vessel. It was decided by the commander to cross the straits. In doing so we got beset by the pack and drifted back about fifty miles.'"

Budington continues: "That paper was written down at the time, and it was the same in Captain Hall's journal, which unfortunately has been lost. It was left on the ice." When asked by the Secretary of the Navy whether the paper was in his own handwriting,

Budington answered: "No, sir; it was written by my instructions. It is a record of the consultation and opinions given at the time, written down by my instructions by Captain Hall's clerk, perhaps a week after it occurred. The same thing was written down by Mr. Meyers in Captain Hall's journal. Captain Hall once read it to me from his journal and I got the clerk to write down a copy of it, which is this copy."*

Mr. Budington was not an expert in the art of writing; so he had the "copy written down" by Hall's clerk about a week after the consultation had taken place. Why he had our respective statements committed to paper I will leave an open question. The solution of the problem, however, is by no means a difficult one.

It would be an injustice on my part to doubt the correctness of the copy" unless sustained by the facts; but I feel compelled to state that we did not hug "the east side, looking for a harbor," but that it was the intention of the commander, and in accordance with his instructions, and his peremptory duty, to attempt reaching as high a latitude as possible.

As a matter of justice to myself I will also quote a paragraph from the official narrative, published by Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis, U. S. N., which reads as follows: "Dr. Bessels was of the opinion that it would be much better to reach the western coast, where a passage might be found to the north along the land, and where sledge-travelling in the spring would be more practicable." That I was not very much. mistaken in this opinion may be seen by consulting the results of a passage made by a subsequent expedition, which we shall presently have to consider; and that my statement could not have been influenced by any one on board can easily be inferred from the fact that I was the first person asked by the commander to express an opinion.‡ Mr. H. C. Chester was the first mate on board the Polaris. Let us now turn to those passages of his testimony relative to the movements of the vessel and the condition of the ice. He says: "On the thirtyfirst day of August, 1871, we got to the highest point we made. The steamer was stopped. We could see through the channel, and there was a water-cloud-a dense water-cloud-to the north. I mean a cloud that denotes open water. I think that we could have gone farther north from that point. It has always been my impression that we might have gone on. It was my watch below at the time. I heard

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the year 1873, P. 447.
Loc. cit., p. 92.

† Narrative, p. 92.

them sing out to the man at the mast-head, and heard the man at the mast-head sing out there was a lead close to the land on the east shore, and some one called me. I do not recollect who it was,* but some one called me and said that Captain Hall wanted to see me in the house. I went up, and when I got there the officers were all there and the scientific corps."+

...

The man at the mast-head, at the time mentioned by Mr. Chester, was Henry Hobby, from whose testimony I shall quote the following passages: "I was on the lookout at that time in the crow's-nest. From what I heard, all the officers wanted to go north. Captain Budington and Captain Tyson said it was necessary to make winter quarters as fast as possible. I could hear every word that was uttered. Captain Budington wanted to go into Newman's Bay; Captain Hall and all the rest wanted to go north, with the exception of Captain Tyson. . . . When I was up there in the crow's-nest, and they were talking about it, I could see a way for going north on the eastern shore, from north to about northeast. So far as I could observe there was open water. . . . There was no ice between us and the open water that I saw. I sung out from the crow's-nest, inquiring where they wanted to go. I told them there was plenty of open water to the northeast, Captain Budington said that we must make winter-quarters. These were just the very words he said. I asked him where he wanted me to go, and he said: 'Right over there, to Newman's Bay.' The ship was lying still at the time, under steam, and not fast; she was just lying there. There was no ice to stop us from going north, as far as I could see. We steamed across towards the west side."§

*It was William Nindemann, subsequently a member of the Jeannette Expedition.

+ Report, pp. 480, 481.

If the editor of the "Narrative" had studied the various documents of the expedition he would probably not have published the following sentence: "The belief appears to have been unanimous that it was impossible to advance to the north along the eastern side." (Narrative, p. 93.)

When I proposed to the Commander to cross the strait and to follow the west coast, I did so because I considered it then, as I do now, a lack of good judgment and an act of utter folly to shove a vessel blindly into the ice without a coast to fall back upon. In closely following the Siberian shore, Nordenskiold, with comparative ease, accomplished the Northeast Passage, while Weyprecht and Payer actually sacrificed the Tegethoff in consequence of attempting to push through the ice. As another warning example the fate of the Jeannette can fairly be mentioned.

§ Loc. cit., p. 556.

Although these statements do not agree in every respect, they still tend to prove that Budington felt reluctant to proceed northward. That those witnesses who testified to having seen a water-sky, frostsmoke, or open water to the northward were correct, may perhaps be proved by the following table, containing some meteorological observations made on board the Polaris during the 30th and 31st of August.

Unfortunately, ten observations out of the sixteen made during this period were lost, but the above table speaks for itself. It shows clearly that during six hours of fog the wind was in five instances northerly, and that the air was almost saturated with moisture. That these moist northerly winds, accompanied by fog, which the Polaris experienced while steaming through Smith Sound, must have passed over a sea not entirely covered by ice, can scarcely be doubted.

I am unable to say whether Mr. Budington took these conditions into account, but I state here without any hesitancy that he could not have had more than the most superficial knowledge of the condition and character of the ice at the time. A satisfactory survey of the surroundings can be obtained only from the crow's-nest, but Budington never considered it worth while to ascend the Jacob's ladder. To this, every impartial survivor of the Polaris expedition will testify. According to Budington's judgment it was quite impossible to attain a higher latitude. And Hall, not being a sailor himself, was weak enough to yield to Budington's views. He did this, however, with much reluctance.

About two o'clock on the afternoon of the 31st of August the vessel was headed to the westward to cross the channel, subsequently named by Hall Robeson Channel. The dreary old fog set in anew, and at half-past five we were compelled once more to make fast to a