French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation.” The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state of blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together present a proposed course of action previously unknown to international law. As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to measure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical situation thus created should be changed and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when no blockade exists. The declaration presents other perplexities. The last sentence quoted indicates that the rules of contraband are to be applied to cargoes detained. The rule covering noncontraband articles carried in neutral bottoms is that the cargoes shall be released and the ships allowed to proceed. This rule can not, under the first sentence quoted, be applied as to destination. What then is to be done with a cargo of noncontraband goods detained under the declaration? The same question may be asked as to conditional contraband cargoes. The foregoing comments apply to cargoes destined for Germany. Cargoes coming out of German ports present another problem under the terms of the declaration. Under the rules governing enemy exports only goods owned by enemy subjects in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure and condemnation. Yet by the declaration it is purposed to seize and take into port all goods of enemy "ownership and origin." The word "origin" is particularly significant. The origin of goods destined to neutral territory on neutral ships is not and never has been a ground for forfeiture except in case a blockade is declared and maintained. What then would the seizure amount to in the present case except to delay the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what disposition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if owned by an enemy subject. Would a different rule be applied according to ownership? If so, upon what principles of international law would it rest? And upon what rule if no blockade is declared and maintained could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be condemned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but to release it? While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of the submarine for both defensive and offensive operations, may make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility, it feels that it can be urged with great force that there should be also some limit to "the radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the belligerents can be construed to be a blockade. It would certainly create a serious state of affairs if, for example, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into Halifax. BRYAN. WILSON'S COMMUNICATIONS TO GREAT BRITAIN ABOUT RE- [Four and one-half months after the beginning of the European war, Wilson sent the note of December 26, 1914, to Great Britain reciting the grievances of American merchants and declaring that the United States "is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes exceeds the manifest necessity of a belligerent and constitutes restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation." The British replies were long and complicated, citing American trade statistics and alleging precedents established by Federal maritime operations in the Civil War. March 30, 1915, a second American note answered many of these subtly-argued points and declared that a recent “Order in Council" constituted "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace." A correspondence followed, marked by British communications still more complex than the early ones and extremely voluminous. President Wilson finally summed up the American contention in the following comprehensive note, answering British notes of January 7, February 10, June 22, July 23, July 31, August 2 and August 6, 1915.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, October 21, 1915. To Ambassador W. H. Page (London): I desire that you present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the following: This Government has delayed answering the earlier of these notes in the hope that the announced purpose of His Majesty's Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the interest of neutrals" and their intention of "removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American cargoes" and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurances to the United States Government that they would make it their first aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken by the Allied Governments," would in practice not unjustifiably infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in trade and commerce. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that this hope has not been realized, but that, on the contrary, interferences with American ships and cargoes destined in good faith to neutral ports and lawfully entitled to proceed have become increasingly vexatious, causing Ameri can shipowners and American merchants to complain to this Government of the failure to take steps to prevent an exercise of belligerent power in contravention of their just rights. As the measures complained of proceed directly from orders issued by the British Government, are executed by British authorities, and arouse a reasonable apprehension that, if not resisted, they may be carried to an extent even more injurious to American interests, this Government directs the attention of His Majesty's Government to the following considerations: [Here followed a denial of the correctness of deductions drawn from trade statistics as to the injury to American foreign trade, and (1) objection to the seizure of cargoes on suspicion, and their detention while the British government looked for evidence to support the suspicion (2) insistence that international usage permitted only a search at sea and not a deviation of vessels from their course in order to carry them into a port for search (3) a denial that American practice in this respect during the Civil War justified the British proceedings (4) denial of the British claim that modern conditions made search at sea impracticable, and a statement from American naval experts that the "facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in fact greater than in former times" (5) objections to a demand for evidence of innocent voyage beyond the papers of the ship and the goods found on board, and a repetition of the American objection to the practice of seizing and detaining ships "on mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the detention." (6) Repudiation of the British claim that the American seizure of the Bermuda in the Civil War (a famous case cited frequently by Great Britain) was in any sense similar to the British practices. The British contention that greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great Britain's enemies raised a presumption that they were intended for sale to the belligerents, was characterized as not laying down a "just or legal rule of evidence. Such a presumption is too far from the facts and offers too great opportunity for abuse by a belligerent, who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with impunity on neutral commerce." On this subject the note continued:] Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired. When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country, it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his rights of trade. Moreover, even if goods listed as conditional contraband are destined to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in itself sufficient to justify their seizure. Relying upon the regard of the British Government for the principles of justice so frequently and uniformly manifested prior to the present war, this Government anticipates that the British Government will instruct their officers to refrain from these vexatious and illegal practices. The British note of July 23, 1915, appears to confirm the intention indicated in the note of March 15, 1915, to establish a blockade so extensive as to prohibit trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain, however, admits that it should not, and gives assurances that it will not, interfere with trade with the countries contiguous to the territories of the enemies of Great Britain. Nevertheless, after over six months' application of the "blockade" order, the experience of American citizens has convinced the Government of the United States that Great Britain has been unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish |