for fraudulent representations made at the time of the sale as to the value of the stock. The court held that the defendants transferred the stock to the cattle company, and the right of action, if any existed, belonged to the cattle company, and further stated: "The right to an action for the recovery of damages having thus vested in that company it would not pass to any third person, to whom the company might sell or assign the stocks in question, as a mere incident thereto." It can be said of the complaint in the instant case as was said of the complaint in that case, that "There are no facts averred which show a transfer or assignment of the right to claim damages from the defendants by reason of the alleged false statements in regard to the value of the stock." The right of action growing out of fraud is usually a personal right to the extent that it does not pass with an assignment of the thing to which the right relates. Worsham v. Brown, 4 Ga. 284; Mullinax v. Lowry, 140 Mo. App. 42, 124 S. W. 572; Steele v. Brazier, 139 Mo. App. 319, 123 S. W. 477; Fox v. Hirschfeld, 157 App. Div. 364, 142 N. Y. Supp. 261; 5 Corpus Juris, 952, note 22 (e). In accord with the foregoing rule is the case of Norris v. Colo. Turkey Honestone Co., 22 Colo. 162, 43 Pac. 1024. The demurrer was properly sustained upon the ground that it does not appear that there was any assignment of the cause of action to the plaintiff. It is not necessary, therefore, to pass upon the question of the assignability of the cause of action, either under the laws of Ohio or of Colorado. The plaintiff also attempts to state a cause of action, independent of that which might have accrued to Martha D. Huston or her legal representatives, upon the ground that he elected to take the stock in lieu of the cash bequeathed to him under the will, because he believed in the alleged false representations of the defendant. But these alleged false representations were made, if at all, long prior to the time plaintiff made his election, and were made, as he says, to induce him and his wife to purchase addi tional shares. They were not made with the purpose or intention of influencing plaintiff to accept an assignment of the shares in the manner pleaded, and plaintiff cannot base an independent cause of action upon such alleged misrepresentations. In Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 Pac. 21, 7 Am. St. 202, and Wheeler v. Dunn, 13 Colo. 428, 437, 22 Pac. 827, this court, quoting from Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, thus states the rule: "A misrepresentation goes for nothing unless it is a proximate and immediate cause of the transaction. It is not enough that it may have remotely or indirectly contributed to the transaction, or may have supplied a motive to the other party to enter into it. The representation must be the very ground on which the transaction has taken place." We think our conclusion is also borne out by 2 Cooley on Torts (3rd ed.) 940. It appears from the record that the parties below stipulated that the motion to strike interposed to the first complaint should be treated as a demurrer. Thereupon the court sustained the demurrer, and plaintiff by leave of court filed an amended complaint. This was further amended by filing a supplemental complaint. Plaintiff having twice exercised the privilege of amending, and apparently pleading fully the facts relied on, there was no error or abuse of the court's discretion in refusing plaintiff the right to amend further. The right to amend further was discretionary with the court. King v. Mecklenburg, 17 Colo. App. 312, 315, 68 Pac. 984. Unless it appears that such discretion is abused, a court of review will not interfere. Anthony v. Slayden, 27 Colo. 144, 60 Pac. 826. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Bailey concur. Decided April 2, A. D. 1917. Rehearing denied June 4, A. D. 1917. No. 8842. BOYD v. BOYD. Decree in the Under Rev. Stat. The case not DIVORCE County Court-Appeal to District Court. Error to Arapahoe District Court, Hon. H. P. Burke, Judge. Mr. GEORGE ALLEN SMITH and Mr. E. L. REGNNITTER, for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. G. TEMPLE and Mr. E. M. SABIN, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Bailey delivered the opinion of the court. PLAINTIFF in error, Joseph W. Boyd, was plaintiff in a suit for divorce in the County Court of Arapahoe County, wherein Nelle May Boyd, defendant in error, was defendant, in which a decree was rendered in his favor in September, 1911. In July, 1914, defendant in error filed suit for the annulment of that decree, on the ground that she did not accept service of summons, though the record purports to show that she did; and further, that she had no knowledge of the granting of the decree, or the pendency of the suit, until shortly before filing her complaint herein. Answer was filed, and upon trial judgment was entered setting aside the decree, from which judgment Joseph appealed to the District Court. Mrs. Boyd filed a motion to dismiss that appeal, on the ground that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment, as it was a judgment in divorce proceedings, to which no appeal to the District Court lies. This motion was sustained, and plaintiff in error brings the judgment of dismissal here for review. The appeal from the judgment of the County Court, vacating the divorce decree, was taken to the District Court under sec. 1536, R. S. 1908, providing that appeals may be taken from the County Court to the District Court upon all final judgments of that court, except upon judgments upon confession: "Appeals may be taken to the District Court of the same county, from all final judgments and decrees of the County Court, except judgments by confession, by any person aggrieved by such final judgment or decree; ** * The suit was an independent action in equity, to set aside an alleged void judgment. The fact that the judgment sought to be annulled happens to be a decree of divorce in no way affects the character of the action so as to bring it within the purview of the statute relating to appeals in divorce cases. It appears that plaintiff below moved the dismissal of the appeal upon the theory that sec. 12, chap. 74, Session Laws, 1915, governed the procedure. That section, so far as it might be applicable, is as follows: "No appeal shall be taken or allowed to the District Court from any judgment or decree of a County Court in any action for divorce. * * *"" This provision relates to appeals from decrees or judgments in divorce actions, and applies to such only. This was not a suit or proceeding in divorce, and the foregoing provision has no application to the judgment and decree under consideration. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded to the District Court for a trial on the merits, de novo. Mr. Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Allen concur. Decided April 2, A. D. 1917. Rehearing denied May 7, A. D. 1917. No. 8512. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1, IN YUMA COUNTY, ET AL. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Revenue Bills. An act for establishing a general system of free schools, providing for the levying and collection of taxes as incident to the main purpose, is not within the condemnation of sec. 31 of Art. V of the Constitution. Neither is a supplemental or amendatory act, looking to the same end. Chap. 206, Laws of 1911, is not a bill for raising revenue within the meaning of the Constitution. 2. WORDS AND PHRASES-Government, defined. 3. STATUTES-Duty of Court to Sustain. It is the duty of the courts to uphold a statute, unless clearly opposed to some provision of the fundamental law. Error to Denver District Court, Hon. James H. Teller, Judge. Mr. E. E. WHITTED and Mr. THOS. R. WOODROW, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Jo. A. FOWLER, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Allen delivered the opinion of the court: THIS was an action brought by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company to recover a portion of the "Special School Tax," paid by the company under protest to the treasurer of Yuma County. The school board of the defendant, School District No. 1, certified to the board of county commissioners of Yuma County a twenty mill levy, the board made the same, and the assessor used the levy in extending taxes against the property of the plaintiff railroad company. The levy was certified and made under chapter 206 of the Session Laws of 1911, being an act entitled "An Act to amend Section Five Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-five (5895) of the Revised Statutes of Colorado, 1908." The complaint was drawn upon the theory that this act |