house keeper near by, for consumption upon his table as an article of food.

Now our statute explicitly forbids the sale, the keeping, and the offering of oleomargarine for sale, as an article of food The identical acts forbidden by the law are thus seen to be the acts which he admits he is engaged in, and which he claims the right to do, notwithstanding his residence in, and the statutes of, the state. This right he claims to derive from the interstate commerce clause in two ways. The first of these rests on the nonresidence of the manufacturer. He asserts that the oleomargarine is made in another state. Because the manufacturer can lawfully make and sell under the laws of the state where the manufactory is located, he contends that the manufacturer can sell his own product anywhere; and for this purpose can establish stores for its sale all over this state, if he chooses to do so. As the manufacturer may do this in person, it is contended that he can do it by an agent, so that he could have as many stores, conducted by as many agents, as there are towns in the commonwealth, and conduct the trade in them all regardless of the police laws of the state. The second line along which he claims to derive immunity is the "original package" doctrine. He says he sells in the packages made up at the factory. He does not divide a roll, a pail or tub of his "goods," but requires the purchaser to take the entire roll, pail 210 or tub, made, filled, or shaped at the factory. We think neither of these positions should avail the defendant.

We do not deny that a nonresident manufacturer may sell his goods and ship them to a buyer in the usual trade packages employed in good faith by manufacturers, without being amenable to the police laws of this state therefor. He may bring them here and hold them in bulk without danger. So much is fairly ruled in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. He may sell them to the trade or for shipment to the states in the same unbroken trade packages notwithstanding their unlawful character. This clearly results from the rule in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. We might have held, had the question been one for us, that the object of the interstate commerce clause was quite different from what it seems thought to be. We might have thought it intended to prevent the establishment of state custom-houses and taxation along state lines, and to make for the general purposes of legitimate trade all the states open to the manufacturer and merchants of the

Beveral states. But for this the states might have intercepted all goods reaching their borders, and weighed, valued, and taxed them, before permitting them to proceed to their destination. The destructive effect upon commerce of such restrictions was clearly foreseen and wisely guarded against by our fathers. But the protection of the lives, the health and morals of citizens was the chief of the duties of government left to the states when the Union was formed. The commonlaw rights and remedies are to be sought in the courts of the states. For this reason we would have held that the police regulations of the states stood on impregnable ground and that while no state had the right to tax or to burden interstate commerce, each state had the right to exclude from its territory such articles of food or drink as were injurious in their character and effects upon the health or the morals of the public. But however this may be, it will not be denied that state commerce, that is business conducted within the lines of a state, was left to state control.

It was the intention of the United States to protect the citizens and the productions of one state against unjust discrimination by the other states; but it was, and is, the duty of the state to protect its citizens against each other.

If then the retail of oleomargarine at the defendant's store is 211 to be regarded as in any sense his business, as it would seem to be from the form of the licenses attached to the case stated, and from all the facts, he is clearly liable as an individual to the penalty provided by the law which he had broken. Can the facts that the store is the store of the manufacturer, and that he is their agent, relieve him from liability? The sales are not made from the factory nor under the right which the fact of making confers on the maker. On the contrary the sales are made under a store license, granted, not to an establishment located in another state, but to a store in this state. When a nonresident of Pennsylvania comes into the state to embark in business here, his situation is like that of any other resident, and his business done at his store is state, not interstate. It does not matter where he obtains his goods. Interstate commerce does not necessarily depend on the origin of goods; or rather, all men who buy and sell foreign merchandise are not necessarily engaged in interstate commerce. If it was otherwise, all merchants would be superior to state laws, for all deal to some extent in goods made in other states and in other coun

66

tries. It is not simply or mainly the origin of the goods therefore that is to be considered, but the nature of the business done. One who keeps a stock of goods in store for the inspection of customers, and sells from this stock to actual consumers, is a local dealer. His business is intrastate, not interstate. Our Act of 1885 under which this case arises is not a trade regulation. It is a police law. This court has so held repeatedly, and our view of it was expressly affirmed by the supreme court of the United States in Powell v. Pennsyl vania, 127 U. S. 678, a case which turned upon that single question. It does not undertake to deal with an importer from another country or state, but with manufacturers, and dealers within the state. It prohibits the manufacture of oleomargarine within the limits of the state. It also prohibits the sale, the offer to sell, and the having in possession with intent to sell, the same as an article of food." It lays its prohibition on those who are fairly subject to its jurisdicdiction, and on no others. We have then a valid police law, so declared by the highest tribunal in the land, which prohibits the sale of oleomargarine as an article of food within the state. We have the proprietor of a store located and licensed here making sales of the prohibited 212 article to customers for the prohibited purpose. It does not matter that the merchant makes his home in another state, or that he makes his sales by a clerk or agent rather than in person. He is a local dealer selling in violation of the local law and liable to its penalty. If the residence of the dealer could affect the character of his trade then our police laws intended to protect our own people would operate as a discrimination against our citizens and in favor of citizens of other states; and would commit to those having no interests in common with us a most odious monopoly in every form or kind of traffic which our state should attempt to regulate or to sup press.

Intrenched behind the interstate commerce clause so construed, citizens of other states could prey upon our people, trample upon our laws, and make gain out of a traffic forbidden to our citizens, only to be delivered up absolutely and unconditionally to them. It would require only that such citizen of another state should establish a local store in some of our towns or cities, or in all of them, conduct a local business, to meet a local demand, and, when called upon by the officers of the law, make reply that he made the goods in

some other state, and, as a manufacturer, supplied himself, as a local dealer, with wares of a foreign origin. Neither the foreign origin of the goods sold, nor of the seller nor both together, will convert a business that is local and intrastate into one that is general and interstate within the meaning of the constitution of the United States.

But the defendant's second position is that, admitting the views now stated be correct, he is nevertheless beyond the reach of the state law for another reason, viz., that his sales are made in original packages, and are therefore interstate commerce. We have examined the decisions of the supreme court of the United States for a definition of the term "original package." It does not seem, however, to have received, and perhaps at this time is not capable of, a precise definition that may be applied to it in all cases. The idea for which it stands is, however, not difficult of apprehension or statement. The methods adopted by manufacturers and importers for packing and preparing goods for transportation by sea or land differ with the differences in the character, bulk, and material of the merchandise itself. The general purpose is to adopt that form 213 and size of package best adapted to the safe and convenient transportation and delivery of the particular class of goods to be moved, because the convenience of the trade will be best subserved thereby. Such packages put up with a view to the convenience and security of transportation and handling, in the regular course of trade, are the original packages of commerce. If we look at the meauing of the words employed we are brought to the same conclusion. Original means pertaining to the beginning or origin, the first or primitive form of a thing. Package means a bundle or parcel made up of several smaller parcels combined or bound together in one bale, box, crate, or other form of package. An "original package" is such form and size of package as is used by producers or shippers for the purpose of securing both convenience in handling, and security in transportation, of merchandise between dealers in the ordinary course of actual commerce. Such packages are not always made up by putting smaller packages or bundles together, but may include any form of receptacle that shall hold a fixed quantity; as a barrel of sugar or salt, a bag of coffee, a chest of tea, and the like. The package must not be divided or its unity destroyed. When it is received unbroken from the importer through the custom house, or from the

manufacturer by the ordinary channels of transportation, it is within the protection of the interstate commerce doctrine, and the state may not subject it to vexatious delays, appraise ment, taxation, or trade restriction. But it has never been held that the importer might subdivide his package, and dispose of its several parts in detail. On the contrary in many cases the United States courts have held that upon such subdivision or breaking of bulk the original package ceased to be such, and the goods became mixed with and indistinguishable from the merchandise already within the state, and therefore subject to state laws. This assigns to each jurisdiction its proper powers. The general government protects the citizens of the several states in the movement of their commodities across state lines for the purpose of commerce. The state regulates the retail trade conducted within its own borders, and forbids the sale of such articles to its citizens as it finds to be injurious to them. We are asked in this case to go a step farther, and hold that any package which a manufacturer may choose to put up and send 214 to himself as a merchant or to a customer is necessarily an "original package," because it was put up by a manufacturer outside of the state. We cannot so hold. This question was brought to our attention recently by the case of the Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. St. 615. In that case a distiller living, or at least making whisky, just over the state line, established a store or an agency within the state. He put up his "goods" in bottles ranging in capacity from one quart down to one-half pint, and packing them in unsealed barrels sent them to the Pennsylvania store. When they reached the agent the bottles were taken from the barrels and arranged upon the shelves and in the windows of the store in the manner usual in that trade, and sold to customers. The seller was prosecuted for the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license, such as the laws of the state require. His defense was the now common one that he was engaged in interstate commerce. His position was that the bottles sold by him singly to customers had been filled and corked at the distillery, which was in another state, and that they were the "original packages" put up by the maker and transported across the line to his store for sale. The contention was seriously and earnestly made that any size or shape of jug or bottle which the distiller might desire to meet the needs of the retail sale of drink became, when filled and shipped by