BILLS OF REVIEW.

1. If there has been an erroneous application of facts found by a decree, a
court of equity may revise or reverse the decree by a bill of review.
Jackson v. Jackson, 427.

2. BILLS OF REVIEW MUST BE PROSECUTED WITHIN THE TIME FOR PROSECUT-
ING WRITS OF ERROR where there is no statute specifying the time
within which such bills may be prosecuted. Jackson v. Jackson, 427.
8. FINAL DECREE-TIME FOR PROSECUTING.—If a decree of partition deter-
mines the interests of the respective parties and directs partition to be
made accordingly, the time within which a bill of review may be prose-
cuted must be computed from the date of such decree and not from
the date of a subsequent order or decree dismissing the action. Jack-
son v. Jackson, 427.

BONDS.

See PLEADING, 2, 3; SHERIFFS, 3.

BOUNDARIES.

See DEEDS, 2.

BRIDGES.

See RAILROADS, 8, 9.

BROKERS.

1. CONTRACT FOR COMMISSIONS EARNED IN VIOLATION OF LAW.-When a city
ordinance duly enacted prohibits unlicensed real estate brokers from
transacting business within the city limits, a real estate agent negotiat-
ing a sale or exchange of city real estate without procuring a license
cannot recover commissions for his services. Buckley v. Humason, 637.
2. AGENCY-VOID AGREEMENT AS TO COMMISSIONS.-An agreement between
real estate agents by which each is to share in commissions paid by their
principals, contingent upon the sale or exchange of the latter's property,
is opposed to public policy and void, even though a price is fixed by the
principals upon their respective properties. Levy v. Spencer, 303.
8. AGENCY-DUTY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL.-Upon an exchange of property,
each principal is entitled to the benefit of the unbiased judgment of his
agent as to the value to be placed upon the other's property, and to a
reasonable effort on the part of such agent to obtain a reduction of the
value to be allowed therefor in the exchange. The agents cannot act
in each other's interest and antagonistic to the interests of their princi
pals by sharing commissions received upon the completion of the ex-
change. Levy v. Spencer, 303.

See AGENCY, 9.

BUILDING CONTRACTS.

1. ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATE.-If, by the terms of a building contract, it is
provided that payment shall be only upon the certificate of the archi
tect, such certificate is a condition precedent to payment, and no action
can be sustained upon the contract in the absence of such certificate,
unless it has been demanded from the architect and fraudulently with
held. Arnold v. Bournique, 419.

2 PRESENTATION OF ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATE, WHEN EXCUSED.-If, by
the terms of a contract, the builders were to be paid on the presenta

tion of a certificate signed by the architect, and such architect adjusts
the account between the parties and gives the builders a certificate
showing the amount found due them, which by them is handed back to
the architect because not satisfactory, after which he refuses either to
return the certificate or to make any other, the builders may recover
the amount specified in such certificate, though they have not presented
and cannot present it to the defendant. Presentation of the certificate
is not one of the substantial requirements of the contract. Arnold v.
Bournique, 419.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

Bee ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 13; JUDGMENTS, 8; SEDUCTION, 1; WILLS, 3, 6, 11.

BY-LAWS.

See ASSOCIATIONS, 1, 4; CORPORATIONS, 18.

CARRIERS,

1. RAILROAD CORPORATIONS-DISCRIMINATION, WHEN A QUESTION Of Law.
If the facts of an alleged unlawful discrimination are conceded, or are
established by undisputed testimony, whether an unreasonable dis
crimination was made, such as is forbidden by statute, is a question of
law for the court. Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. R., 43.

2. RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.-A DISCRIMINATION MADE BETWEEN MANU.
FACTURERS and dealers in coal in charges made for the transportation of
such coal is not forbidden by a statute prohibiting discrimination be
tween persons in like conditions and under similar circumstances, if, by
reason of the coal so transported for the manufacturers, they produce a
larger amount of freight for the carrier, while such a result does not
follow the coal carried for the dealers. Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. R., 43.
See NEGLIGENCE, 5–8.

CASHIER.

See AGENCY, 7.

CEMETERY.

See EMINENT DOMAIN.

CERTIFICATE

See ASSOCIATIONS, 1, 2; BUILDING CONTRACTS, 2

CHANCERY.
See EQUITY.

CHARACTER.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 7.

CHARITIES.

1. CHARITABLE USES ARE FAVORED IN EQUITY and will be supported when
a trust would fail for uncertainty were it not for the charity. Johnson
v. Johnson, 104.

2 A CHARITABLE DEVISE OR BEQUEST WILL BE UPHELD where it is created
in favor of a person having sufficient capacity to take as donee, or if it

be not direct to such person, where it is definite in its object, lawful in
Its creation, and to be executed by trustees. Johnson v. Johnson, 104
CHARITABLE BEQUEST.-DESIGATION OF A TRUSTEE OF A CHARITABLE
TRUST is sufficient if the will devises property to the wife and daughter
in trust with power to nominate their successors and other associates in
trust from the testator's descendants or their Protestant husbands or
wives, not exceeding five, who may in turn elect their successors from his
descendants, and if there should at any time be not as many as two of
his descendants able and willing to take charge of the trust, then it
shall revert to a board consisting of the elders of the several Presby.
terian churches of the city of M., who shall, with the assistance of the
Presbyterian pastors, nominate from the bankers and business men of
their body an executive committee, who shall have full power and con-
trol to manage the trust. Johnson v. Johnson, 104.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS. -THE DOCTRINES OF CY PRES AND PARENS PATRIA,
as recognized in the English law, have never obtained in Tennessee.
Only those powers which in England were exercised by the chancellor
by virtue of his extraordinary, as distinguished from his specially del-
egated, jurisdiction exist in the chancery courts of that state. Johnson
▼. Johnson, 104.

5. CHARITABLE TRUSTS-VOID for Want of BENEFICIARY. —A devise and be-
quest of property to trustees with power to control and manage the
trust so that it shall be productive of the most good to the greatest
number, in a will in which the testator expressed his desire that the
proceeds of the trust should be devoted to a free female college, but in
case the way is not clear to that end, that they should be used for some
charitable purpose, preference always being given to something of an
educational nature, is void, because under the provisions of the trust
there can be no one who can demand of the trustees the benefit of the
trust on the ground that he is one of a class for whose benefit it was in-
tended. Johnson v. Johnson, 104.

CHASTITY.

See SEDUCTION.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

1. Fraudulent IN PART.-A lease which is in legal effect a chattel mort-
gage, if presumptively fraudulent as to part of the goods therein de-
scribed, is presumptively fraudulent as to all. Greeley v. Winsor, 720.
2. MORTGAGE OR CONDITIONAL SALE—An agreement for the conditional sale
of chattels whereby the vendor reserves the right, on default in the
payment of a note given for the purchase price, to retake the property
and to regard all money paid as being paid for its use, and stipulates
that, on his doing so, the note shall be canceled, is not a mortgage, and
does not invest the vendor with the rights of a mortgagee. Crompton v.
Beach, 323.

& CHATTEL MORTGAGE IN LEASE-VALIDITY OF.—A lease executed and re-
corded as required by the law relating to chattel mortgages, providing
that the "rents, whether due or to become due, shall be a perpetual lien
on any and all goods, merchandise, furniture, and fixtures now con-
tained, or which may at any time during the continuance of the lease
be contained in the building, except such goods as are sold in the usual
course of retail trade," must be treated as a chattel mortgage, and be-

cause it gives permission to the mortgagor to sell part of the mortgaged
property for his own benefit, is presumptively fraudulent as to his other
creditors. Greeley ▼. Winsor, 720.

CHECKS.

BANKING.-ACCEPTANCE BY A BANK OF A CHECK and a promise to pay it
according to its terms should be inferred from the receipt and the re-
tention of the check and charging its amount to the account of the
drawer, who has sufficient funds on deposit to meet it, if he subse-
quently recognizes the check in a settlement with the bank, though it
was presented to the bank by an unauthorized person and paid to him
on his unauthorized indorsement. Jackson v. Bank, 81.

See AGENCY, 3, 5; Banks, 1, 2.

CODICIL

See WILLS, 1.

COLLATERAL ATTACK.

See HIGHWAYS, 7.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.
See ESTOPPEL, 2; JUDGMENTS, 11.

COMITY.

See STATES.

COMMERCE.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMISSIONERS.

See HIGHWAYS, 5–7.

COMMISSIONS.

See BROKERS; PARTNERSHIP, 1-3; POWERS; WAREHOUSEMEN,

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 6, 7.

COMPROMISE.

1. DEATH, COMPROMISE OF CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF.-A statute
creating a cause of action in favor of a widow, and in case there is no
widow, of the children or personal representative of a decedent, for the
benefit of his widow and children, against one through whose negligence
his death resulted, gives the widow the power to compromise her suit
against the objection of the children and without let or hinderance from
any one, and such compromise as she may make, either before or after
the bringing of the suit, binds all parties having any interest in the
cause of action. Holder v. Railroad, 77.

2 WIDOW'S RIGHT TO COMPROMISE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES resulting from the
death of her husband includes authority to receive the sum agreed upon,
and its payment is a full and complete satisfaction of the claim, and is
binding on the children and next of kin of the decedent. Holder v.
Railroad, 77.

CONCEALMENT.

See SURETYSHIP, 13

CONDITIONS.

Bee COVENANTS; DEEDS, 5-7; DEVISE, 2; EMINENT DOMAIN.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See CONTRACTS, 20; INSURANCE, 2

CONGRESS.

See INTERSTATE Commerce, 1, 8.

CONSIDERATION.

See CONTRACTS, 6, 12; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1, 2; JOINT LIABIL
ITY; LOTTERIES, 1, 4; PLEADING, 3, TRUSTS, 9, 10.

CONSPIRACY.

1. WHAT IS. To constitute a criminal conspiracy there must not only be an
agreement to co-operate to do a certain act, but that act must also be
unlawful. Connor v. People, 295.

2 CONSPIRACIES INJURIOUS TO TRADE AND COMMERCE.-An agreement be
tween dealers, made for the purpose of controlling the price and man.
aging the business of the sale of coal, so as to prevent competition in
price between the parties to the agreement, is illegal, and if the price
of coal was raised in pursuance of the agreement and to effect its ob
jects the crime of conspiracy was committed, and is punishable, under
a statute making it a misdemeanor for two or more persons to conspire
to commit any act injurious to trade and commerce; nor can the guilty
parties escape conviction by proving that the object of the agreement
was to prevent ruinous rivalry between dealers in the same commodity,
and that it had not resulted in raising the price beyond its nominal and
reasonable value. People v. Sheldon, 690.

3. OVERT ACT.-If an unlawful agreement to raise the price of coal was
entered into between dealers therein, the raising of the price in pur
suance of such agreement, and to accomplish its purpose, is an over-
act sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. People v. Sheldon,
690.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See CONSTITUTIONS; LEGISLATURE; REFORM SCHOOLS; STATUTES.

CONSTITUTIONS.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A STATUTE DECLARING THAT ANY PERSONS, FIRMS,
OR CORPORATIONS REFUSING TO CASH ANY CHECK OR SCRIP presented
to them within thirty days of its date of issuance shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor is in conflict with the provisions of the constitution
prohibiting the legislature from passing any law authorizing imprison.
ment for debt, and is therefore void. State v. Paint Rock Coal etc. Co.,
68.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. —A
statute making a railroad company unconditionally liable for damages
for any animal killed by it, and fixing a schedule of arbitrary prices for
certain animals killed, without allowing proof of their value, though