The references are to the marginal sections of the Text. Figures enclosed in
brackets refer to passages opposed in sense to the preceding entry.
abilities, dist. virtues, 125.-not necessary even for heroic virtue, 132. an
acute moral sense the chief of all abilities, 473.
absolute, dist. relative virtue, 685 n, 699, 730.
abstract,-ideas, belong to the understanding and are already possessed
by the mind when it is supposed to be forming them, 600.-terms,
influence of on affections, 939.
[S. Clarke.]-of immorality, like that of denying mathematical truths,
490, 513, 516. iniquity in action the same as contradiction or absurdity
in theory, 500.-practical and speculative, 491.
[Wollaston.]-of treating things as what they are not, 1034, 1054.
[Hobbes.] injustice like absurdity in disputation, i. e. contradicting
what one maintained in the beginning, 903.
[Brown.]-dist. vice, 738-740.
accidental, dist. direct goodness of an affection, 8-9, cf. 747 n.-com.
petition of benevolence and self-love, 238.
activity,—of mind implied in knowledge, 592 f.—and self-determination
essential to spirit, 597.
acts, moral, imply affection, 5.-three elements in our judgment of, 466.—
imply will and design, 245. dist. events, imply principles and character,
245. incongruous,' 'unfit,' &c., as epithets of actions, 247.-imply free
choice, 544.-moral, must be knowingly directed to some object, in-
telligible or sensible, 544.—moral, imply intelligent and free agent,
1024.determination of a reasonable being,' 622.-dist. motion,
704-5.-attributes of, dist. essence, 747 n.-truth of, 1026. merit
belongs to agents rather than actions, 654.
Adams,-cited by Price, 685 n, 694 n.
Addison,-cited by Bentham, 413 n.
admiration, dist. approbation, 269, 279, 330.
affection, v. desire, benevolence, virtue.
[Shaftesbury.] man alone capable of affections towards his affections
by reflected sense, 11.-moral beauty of, perceived by man, 12.-right
application of, secured by reason, 17.-dependence of, on opinions,
14-16, cf. 23, 986.—sensible and rational, 18, cf. 442, 557.—just=‘uni-
form and steady will and resolution' constituted by sound reason, 20.—
proportionable, towards the moral objects of right and wrong, 21.-
natural and original, cannot be displaced by opinions, but only by habit
or contrary affections excited by opinions, 23.-opposition of, to natural
sense of right and wrong, 25.-balance of, determines action, 32.-
classification of, 32. love of life, 57. anger, and love of wealth, 58.
-for good or evil of its system, makes a creature good or bad, 5, 31.
for private good may be good or bad, 6-7.-good, must be immediately
and directly good, 9, 13. when all affections are suited to the good of
a species, the natural temper is entirely good, 10.-kind, may be vicious
if immoderate, 10, cf. 33.—public, are natural, 26.—conflict between
public and private, 27-8. no happiness without some social affection,
29.-for good of public, may be too strong, 33.-private, may be too
weak, 34.—proper strength or weakness of, relative to economy of
a species or creature, and a good balance, 35. strong kindly affections
the chief means of self-enjoyment, 37-55.-natural, are either the same
as mental pleasures or produce them, 40.-charm of kind, superior to
all other pleasure in opinion of experienced judges, 41, cf. 478.-for
learning, disinterested, 42.-social, an element in sensual pleasure, 42-3,
53, cf. 105.-social, yield pleasures of sympathy and esteem, 43.-partial,
yield short and slender enjoyment, 44. superior pleasure of 'intire
affection,' to have which is to live according to nature, 45, cf. 108,
124, (741).-social, produce easy temper and good conscience and so
happiness, 46-52.-social, necessary even to bodily pleasures, 53-
social, produces balance of passions and healthy inward constitution,
54, 65. self-passions, if too strong produce misery, 56-9.—unnatural,
60-62 (cf. 760).
[Hutcheson.] v. benevolence-for rational agents, is virtue or the source
of virtue, 89, 110 f. no virtuous affections spring from self-love (q. v.),
90, cf. 198-9. all passions and affections justify themselves, 104, cf. 311
(560), but all are not pleasant; we do not choose affections for the
sake of the concomitant pleasure, 104, cf. 168 (cf. 751-2, 811). love of
moral excellence, a peculiar order of affection, 474. many affections
approved by moral sense without reference to the good of a system, 480.
[Balguy.]-useful, but not essential to virtue: reason (q. v.) not given
us to regulate affection, but affection to reinforce reason, 554.—an inferior
principle to reason though antecedent in time, 554.-rational, for virtue
itself, or love of complacency, 556, cf. 474.-rational, dist. instinctive,
555.-for virtue, as a good in itself, 560. if affections justify themselves
why ask for a reason of our choice of virtue? 560, cf. 104, 311.-for
particular objects may be instinctive, but not for natural or moral good
in general, 573.—dist. instinct, 573.
[Butler.]-particular, presupposed by self-love (q. v.), 198-9.
[A. Smith.-propriety of, lies in a certain mediocrity, 282.
[Price.]—dist. passions and appetites, 650.
[Brown.] all affections equally disinterested, because an affection is
only a mode of pleasure or pain; a passion and a pleasure are neither
cause nor consequence but the same thing under different names, 751-2
(cf. 811).
[Gay.]-arises from the pleasure or pain which accompanies the con-
templation of a future pleasure or pain, 869.
agent, v. acts.-may be object of his own good actions, 544.-rather than
actions the subject of merit, 654.
agreement, v. reason, fitness.
[Balguy.]—or disagreement of ideas natural or moral perceived by
reason, 548,714.-between gratitude of A and kindness of B, 548,714,718,
723. special sense not required for perception of moral or mathematical
agreement, 549.-of one idea with another and of one thing with another =
ideal truth, and truth of things, 550.-of things depends neither on percep-
tion of man nor on will of creator, 550.-between actions, agents, and
objects, 350.-between moral ideas and between arithmetical ideas,
different, but both equally necessary, 715.-perception of moral, yields
a proposition and an obligation, 716-17.-between gratitude and bounty
self-evident, real, and objective, 718, 723.-moral, as evident to under-
standing as differences of colour to our eyes, 719. 'fit' actions reason-
able, conformable to truth and obligatory, 719-22, 730.-with truth,
constitutes perfection in art and moral rectitude, 730. reasonableness
of an act its agreement with the real relations of things or the under-
standing of the agent, 735.
amiable, dist. respectable virtues, 276, 310.
animals,—have no virtue, 11.-have no conscience, 192-3.-have no reflex
sense of actions, II, 244-5.-can a. have virtue? 531.-might have such
a moral sense as Hutcheson describes, 538. to treat men as brutes, or
brutes as stones, contrary to truth, 550.-possess true liberty, 703.-
have no reflection and so no virtue, 711.
antecedent,-obligatoriness of laws of nature, 514, 516, 587 (v. compact).
'anticipations,'-of morality, 835.
appetite, dist. self-love (q. v.), 205. man endowed with appetites for
means as well as for ends, 304. dist. passions and affections, 650.
'appetitus sensitivus' and 'rationalis,' 442, 450.
approbation, v. virtue, moral sense.
[Hutcheson.]—disinterested, 76-7.-always of benevolence (q. v.),
134 f.-a simple indefinable idea, 447.-and election excited by
different qualities, 447.-is it excited by conformity to truth or
reasonableness? 454. we do not choose to approve because appro-
bation is pleasant, 460. pleasure and self-approbation as motives of
action, 460 (cf. 806).-corrected by reasoning, but not therefore
a function of reason (q. v.), 458.—of moral sense as superior to all
other abilities, 473.
[Butler.] v. conscience.-immediate, of actions and dispositions apart
from tendency to happiness, 242 n, cf. 293, 318-333.-or disapprobation
of actions is perception of their good or ill-desert, i. e. of reward or
punishment, 246.
[A. Smith.] v. sympathy.—of passions as proper, is same as sympathy
with them, 262, and the same as adopting them, 263.-may proceed
from consciousness of conditional sympathy under influence of general
rules, 264, cf. 305.-of affections as proper, i. e. proportionate to their
causes, dist. their approbation as meritorious, i. e. beneficial in tendency,
205-6.-of affection as proper, regulated by correspondent affection in
ourselves as a standard, 267.-of taste and good judgment, where the
cause of the passion is indifferent to us, 268.-heightened into admiration,
e. g. of intellectual virtues, 267-270, cf. 329. where the object closely
concerns us or the agent, correspondence of feeling difficult to preserve,
272, and the agent to obtain approbation must lower his passion to
the level of the spectator's, 273. nature teaches the spectators to assume
the circumstances of the agent, and the agent to assume those of the
spectators and look at his passion with their eyes, 274-5. only un-
common degrees of sensibility and self-command approved as virtue,
276-8, which thus differs from mere propriety, 279.-two standards of,
perfection and ordinary degree of proximity to perfection, 280-1.-of so-
cial passions, rests on redoubled sympathy, 283.—of actions, as meritorious
or the reverse, which are the proper objects of gratitude or resentment,
285. proper gratitude and resentment are those which the impartial
spectator approves of, i. e. sympathies with, 290.—of retaliation, im-
mediate and antecedent to all reflections on utility, 293, cf. 270, 326 f.
we do not approve of gratitude unless motives of benefactor are proper,
294-7.-of resentment, when lowered to the level of the sympathetic
spectator, 303. the inquiry is about a matter of fact not a matter of
right-i. e. about the principles upon which a man actually does approve,
304.-of proper punishment, immediate, 304.—of propriety requires
actual concord of sentiments, of merit does not require this, 305,
cf. 264.-of our own conduct based on sympathy with approbation of
a supposed impartial spectator, 306.-of ourselves, can only arise in
society and in relation to the opinion of others, 307-8, our first moral
criticisms being passed on others, 309. virtue not approved because it
is the object of its own love or gratitude, but because it excites those
sentiments in others, 310.-partiality of, shows that it does not proceed
from a peculiar faculty or moral sense, 311-313. self-deceit remedied
by general rules founded on experience of what in particular instances we
approve or disapprove, 314.-originally exercised antecedently to moral
rules, but appeals to them when formed as standards, 315-316.-how far
based on utility (q. v.)? 325 f.-enlivened but not originated by percep-
tion of utility, 326, cf. 270, 293.—of virtue cannot be same kind of feeling
as approbation of a building, 327, cf. 561.—of intellectual virtues, not
based on their utility, 329, so with self-command, 330, generosity, 331,
heroism, 333.-what is the faculty of? self-love, reason, or immediate
sentiment? 334 f. this question has only speculative no practical im-
portance, 335.-ascribed to political advantage of virtue because it is so
striking, 337.-based on sympathy by writers of selfish school, but
sympathy is not a selfish principle, 338-9.-not based on positive law,
340 f. do we approve acts for conformity to reason? 344 f.-regulated
by reason, so far as rules of morals are formed by induction, 344, but
the first perceptions of right and wrong are objects of immediate sense
and feeling, 345.-does not proceed from a special moral sense (q. v.)
analogous to external senses, 348 f., because we approve our moral
faculty itself as good, 349-50 (cf. 457, 473). is it an ultimate peculiar
sentiment, not analogous to external senses, but like gratitude or resent-
ment? 352 f.-but feelings of, not all of same kind, 353, and on this
theory we could not approve of approbation itself, 354.-if a peculiar
sentiment would have been recognized and named long ago, 355.-
proceeds from four sources, sympathy with motives of agent, sympathy
with gratitude of persons benefited, perception that the act conforms to
the general rules regulating our sympathies, perception of utility, 356.
-reduced to level of approbation of a machine by theory which
bases it on sympathy with the happiness of the person benefited, 357
(Hume, Treatise, p. 576 f.).-name of, only recently confined to moral
qualities, 355.
[Bentham.] to treat approbation as a sufficient reason for itself is
the negation of all principle in morals, which require an external
standard, 369-371.
[Balguy.]-does not constitute merit but is produced by it, 536,
cf. 685.-commanded by the reasons of things, as assent by evidence,
though the will can rebel and the understanding cannot, 547.—of virtue,
necessary, 559. the same necessity which compels men to assent to
what is true, forces them to approve what is right and fit, 559.
[Price.]-- of certain acts, irresistible, 585, 608.-of some acts, must
be ultimate, 605.-of making the virtuous happy, immediate and
regardless of public utility, 655.-of an act, is discerning it to be right,
as assenting to a proposition is discerning it to be true, 670.-dist.
obligation, 685.
[Gay.]-often can give no reason for, 852, 880. to explain it not
necessary to assume moral sense or public sense, 854, as the fact can be
explained by association of ideas, Hutcheson's theory being based on an
argument ad ignorantiam,' 855.-may properly be called a habit, 855.
-deduction of, from self-love, 871-9.—not innate but acquired, 879.—
immediate, without regard to private happiness, 880. this comes from
treating means as ends and using them as resting-places, relying on
habitual knowledge, 881-3, and on association of acts with pleasure,
which remain after the connexion has ceased, 884-7.
[Kames.]-not bestowed on material objects unless designed for an
end, 916.-increased when the end is good, 918.-of voluntary action,
peculiar, 920-1.-moral, dist. approbation of works of art, 922, and
proceeds from a peculiar sense, 923.-sense of, dist. sense of duty, 930.-
mere, does not yield the authority of a law, 934, cf. 922.
Aristotle,-cited by Hutcheson, 454, 478.
art,-two standards of judgment in, 281.-perfection of, conformity to truth,
730. taste in art and taste in morals compared, 768.
asceticism, v. pleasure, utility.-principle of, incapable of consistent
pursuit, 368.-influence of, on moral vocabulary, 425 n.
[Butler.]-of ideas of natural and moral evil, fundamental, 246.
[Gay.]-of ideas, explains our approval of certain acts without being
able to give a reason, 855.-of ideas, causes us to treat means as ends,
after they have ceased to promote the real end, viz. pleasure, 884; e. g.
money, 884; fame and knowledge, 885; envy, 886.—arises from educa-
tion or imitation, 887.
atheism, absolute, impossible, 20.
authority, v. conscience, obligation, will, law.—of moral sense immediately
perceived, 472. dist. power, of superior, 219, 481, 816-821.—of con-
science, 190 f.-of the reflective principle, 194, 196, 223, 657, 931.—of
the greatest happiness principle, 746.-of reason, 677.-compounded
of natural obligation of sanctions and moral obligation of laws, 721.
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