The references are to the marginal sections of the Text. Figures enclosed in brackets refer to passages opposed in sense to the preceding entry.
abilities, dist. virtues, 125.-not necessary even for heroic virtue, 132. an acute moral sense the chief of all abilities, 473.
absolute, dist. relative virtue, 685 n, 699, 730.
abstract,-ideas, belong to the understanding and are already possessed by the mind when it is supposed to be forming them, 600.-terms, influence of on affections, 939.
[S. Clarke.]-of immorality, like that of denying mathematical truths, 490, 513, 516. iniquity in action the same as contradiction or absurdity in theory, 500.-practical and speculative, 491.
[Wollaston.]-of treating things as what they are not, 1034, 1054. [Hobbes.] injustice like absurdity in disputation, i. e. contradicting what one maintained in the beginning, 903.
[Brown.]-dist. vice, 738-740.
accidental, dist. direct goodness of an affection, 8-9, cf. 747 n.-com. petition of benevolence and self-love, 238.
activity,—of mind implied in knowledge, 592 f.—and self-determination essential to spirit, 597.
acts, moral, imply affection, 5.-three elements in our judgment of, 466.— imply will and design, 245. dist. events, imply principles and character, 245. incongruous,' 'unfit,' &c., as epithets of actions, 247.-imply free choice, 544.-moral, must be knowingly directed to some object, in- telligible or sensible, 544.—moral, imply intelligent and free agent, 1024.determination of a reasonable being,' 622.-dist. motion, 704-5.-attributes of, dist. essence, 747 n.-truth of, 1026. merit belongs to agents rather than actions, 654.
Adams,-cited by Price, 685 n, 694 n. Addison,-cited by Bentham, 413 n. admiration, dist. approbation, 269, 279, 330. affection, v. desire, benevolence, virtue.
[Shaftesbury.] man alone capable of affections towards his affections by reflected sense, 11.-moral beauty of, perceived by man, 12.-right
application of, secured by reason, 17.-dependence of, on opinions, 14-16, cf. 23, 986.—sensible and rational, 18, cf. 442, 557.—just=‘uni- form and steady will and resolution' constituted by sound reason, 20.— proportionable, towards the moral objects of right and wrong, 21.- natural and original, cannot be displaced by opinions, but only by habit or contrary affections excited by opinions, 23.-opposition of, to natural sense of right and wrong, 25.-balance of, determines action, 32.- classification of, 32. love of life, 57. anger, and love of wealth, 58. -for good or evil of its system, makes a creature good or bad, 5, 31. for private good may be good or bad, 6-7.-good, must be immediately and directly good, 9, 13. when all affections are suited to the good of a species, the natural temper is entirely good, 10.-kind, may be vicious if immoderate, 10, cf. 33.—public, are natural, 26.—conflict between public and private, 27-8. no happiness without some social affection, 29.-for good of public, may be too strong, 33.-private, may be too weak, 34.—proper strength or weakness of, relative to economy of a species or creature, and a good balance, 35. strong kindly affections the chief means of self-enjoyment, 37-55.-natural, are either the same as mental pleasures or produce them, 40.-charm of kind, superior to all other pleasure in opinion of experienced judges, 41, cf. 478.-for learning, disinterested, 42.-social, an element in sensual pleasure, 42-3, 53, cf. 105.-social, yield pleasures of sympathy and esteem, 43.-partial, yield short and slender enjoyment, 44. superior pleasure of 'intire affection,' to have which is to live according to nature, 45, cf. 108, 124, (741).-social, produce easy temper and good conscience and so happiness, 46-52.-social, necessary even to bodily pleasures, 53- social, produces balance of passions and healthy inward constitution, 54, 65. self-passions, if too strong produce misery, 56-9.—unnatural, 60-62 (cf. 760).
[Hutcheson.] v. benevolence-for rational agents, is virtue or the source of virtue, 89, 110 f. no virtuous affections spring from self-love (q. v.), 90, cf. 198-9. all passions and affections justify themselves, 104, cf. 311 (560), but all are not pleasant; we do not choose affections for the sake of the concomitant pleasure, 104, cf. 168 (cf. 751-2, 811). love of moral excellence, a peculiar order of affection, 474. many affections approved by moral sense without reference to the good of a system, 480. [Balguy.]-useful, but not essential to virtue: reason (q. v.) not given us to regulate affection, but affection to reinforce reason, 554.—an inferior principle to reason though antecedent in time, 554.-rational, for virtue itself, or love of complacency, 556, cf. 474.-rational, dist. instinctive, 555.-for virtue, as a good in itself, 560. if affections justify themselves why ask for a reason of our choice of virtue? 560, cf. 104, 311.-for particular objects may be instinctive, but not for natural or moral good in general, 573.—dist. instinct, 573.
[Butler.]-particular, presupposed by self-love (q. v.), 198-9.
[A. Smith.-propriety of, lies in a certain mediocrity, 282. [Price.]—dist. passions and appetites, 650.
[Brown.] all affections equally disinterested, because an affection is only a mode of pleasure or pain; a passion and a pleasure are neither cause nor consequence but the same thing under different names, 751-2 (cf. 811).
[Gay.]-arises from the pleasure or pain which accompanies the con- templation of a future pleasure or pain, 869.
agent, v. acts.-may be object of his own good actions, 544.-rather than actions the subject of merit, 654.
agreement, v. reason, fitness.
[Balguy.]—or disagreement of ideas natural or moral perceived by reason, 548,714.-between gratitude of A and kindness of B, 548,714,718, 723. special sense not required for perception of moral or mathematical agreement, 549.-of one idea with another and of one thing with another = ideal truth, and truth of things, 550.-of things depends neither on percep- tion of man nor on will of creator, 550.-between actions, agents, and objects, 350.-between moral ideas and between arithmetical ideas, different, but both equally necessary, 715.-perception of moral, yields a proposition and an obligation, 716-17.-between gratitude and bounty self-evident, real, and objective, 718, 723.-moral, as evident to under- standing as differences of colour to our eyes, 719. 'fit' actions reason- able, conformable to truth and obligatory, 719-22, 730.-with truth, constitutes perfection in art and moral rectitude, 730. reasonableness of an act its agreement with the real relations of things or the under- standing of the agent, 735.
amiable, dist. respectable virtues, 276, 310.
animals,—have no virtue, 11.-have no conscience, 192-3.-have no reflex sense of actions, II, 244-5.-can a. have virtue? 531.-might have such a moral sense as Hutcheson describes, 538. to treat men as brutes, or brutes as stones, contrary to truth, 550.-possess true liberty, 703.- have no reflection and so no virtue, 711.
antecedent,-obligatoriness of laws of nature, 514, 516, 587 (v. compact). 'anticipations,'-of morality, 835.
appetite, dist. self-love (q. v.), 205. man endowed with appetites for means as well as for ends, 304. dist. passions and affections, 650. 'appetitus sensitivus' and 'rationalis,' 442, 450.
approbation, v. virtue, moral sense.
[Hutcheson.]—disinterested, 76-7.-always of benevolence (q. v.), 134 f.-a simple indefinable idea, 447.-and election excited by different qualities, 447.-is it excited by conformity to truth or reasonableness? 454. we do not choose to approve because appro- bation is pleasant, 460. pleasure and self-approbation as motives of action, 460 (cf. 806).-corrected by reasoning, but not therefore a function of reason (q. v.), 458.—of moral sense as superior to all other abilities, 473.
[Butler.] v. conscience.-immediate, of actions and dispositions apart from tendency to happiness, 242 n, cf. 293, 318-333.-or disapprobation of actions is perception of their good or ill-desert, i. e. of reward or punishment, 246.
[A. Smith.] v. sympathy.—of passions as proper, is same as sympathy with them, 262, and the same as adopting them, 263.-may proceed from consciousness of conditional sympathy under influence of general rules, 264, cf. 305.-of affections as proper, i. e. proportionate to their causes, dist. their approbation as meritorious, i. e. beneficial in tendency, 205-6.-of affection as proper, regulated by correspondent affection in ourselves as a standard, 267.-of taste and good judgment, where the
cause of the passion is indifferent to us, 268.-heightened into admiration, e. g. of intellectual virtues, 267-270, cf. 329. where the object closely concerns us or the agent, correspondence of feeling difficult to preserve, 272, and the agent to obtain approbation must lower his passion to the level of the spectator's, 273. nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the agent, and the agent to assume those of the spectators and look at his passion with their eyes, 274-5. only un- common degrees of sensibility and self-command approved as virtue, 276-8, which thus differs from mere propriety, 279.-two standards of, perfection and ordinary degree of proximity to perfection, 280-1.-of so- cial passions, rests on redoubled sympathy, 283.—of actions, as meritorious or the reverse, which are the proper objects of gratitude or resentment, 285. proper gratitude and resentment are those which the impartial spectator approves of, i. e. sympathies with, 290.—of retaliation, im- mediate and antecedent to all reflections on utility, 293, cf. 270, 326 f. we do not approve of gratitude unless motives of benefactor are proper, 294-7.-of resentment, when lowered to the level of the sympathetic spectator, 303. the inquiry is about a matter of fact not a matter of right-i. e. about the principles upon which a man actually does approve, 304.-of proper punishment, immediate, 304.—of propriety requires actual concord of sentiments, of merit does not require this, 305, cf. 264.-of our own conduct based on sympathy with approbation of a supposed impartial spectator, 306.-of ourselves, can only arise in society and in relation to the opinion of others, 307-8, our first moral criticisms being passed on others, 309. virtue not approved because it is the object of its own love or gratitude, but because it excites those sentiments in others, 310.-partiality of, shows that it does not proceed from a peculiar faculty or moral sense, 311-313. self-deceit remedied by general rules founded on experience of what in particular instances we approve or disapprove, 314.-originally exercised antecedently to moral rules, but appeals to them when formed as standards, 315-316.-how far based on utility (q. v.)? 325 f.-enlivened but not originated by percep- tion of utility, 326, cf. 270, 293.—of virtue cannot be same kind of feeling as approbation of a building, 327, cf. 561.—of intellectual virtues, not based on their utility, 329, so with self-command, 330, generosity, 331, heroism, 333.-what is the faculty of? self-love, reason, or immediate sentiment? 334 f. this question has only speculative no practical im- portance, 335.-ascribed to political advantage of virtue because it is so striking, 337.-based on sympathy by writers of selfish school, but sympathy is not a selfish principle, 338-9.-not based on positive law, 340 f. do we approve acts for conformity to reason? 344 f.-regulated by reason, so far as rules of morals are formed by induction, 344, but the first perceptions of right and wrong are objects of immediate sense and feeling, 345.-does not proceed from a special moral sense (q. v.) analogous to external senses, 348 f., because we approve our moral faculty itself as good, 349-50 (cf. 457, 473). is it an ultimate peculiar sentiment, not analogous to external senses, but like gratitude or resent- ment? 352 f.-but feelings of, not all of same kind, 353, and on this theory we could not approve of approbation itself, 354.-if a peculiar sentiment would have been recognized and named long ago, 355.- proceeds from four sources, sympathy with motives of agent, sympathy
with gratitude of persons benefited, perception that the act conforms to the general rules regulating our sympathies, perception of utility, 356. -reduced to level of approbation of a machine by theory which bases it on sympathy with the happiness of the person benefited, 357 (Hume, Treatise, p. 576 f.).-name of, only recently confined to moral qualities, 355.
[Bentham.] to treat approbation as a sufficient reason for itself is the negation of all principle in morals, which require an external standard, 369-371.
[Balguy.]-does not constitute merit but is produced by it, 536, cf. 685.-commanded by the reasons of things, as assent by evidence, though the will can rebel and the understanding cannot, 547.—of virtue, necessary, 559. the same necessity which compels men to assent to what is true, forces them to approve what is right and fit, 559.
[Price.]-- of certain acts, irresistible, 585, 608.-of some acts, must be ultimate, 605.-of making the virtuous happy, immediate and regardless of public utility, 655.-of an act, is discerning it to be right, as assenting to a proposition is discerning it to be true, 670.-dist. obligation, 685.
[Gay.]-often can give no reason for, 852, 880. to explain it not necessary to assume moral sense or public sense, 854, as the fact can be explained by association of ideas, Hutcheson's theory being based on an argument ad ignorantiam,' 855.-may properly be called a habit, 855. -deduction of, from self-love, 871-9.—not innate but acquired, 879.— immediate, without regard to private happiness, 880. this comes from treating means as ends and using them as resting-places, relying on habitual knowledge, 881-3, and on association of acts with pleasure, which remain after the connexion has ceased, 884-7.
[Kames.]-not bestowed on material objects unless designed for an end, 916.-increased when the end is good, 918.-of voluntary action, peculiar, 920-1.-moral, dist. approbation of works of art, 922, and proceeds from a peculiar sense, 923.-sense of, dist. sense of duty, 930.- mere, does not yield the authority of a law, 934, cf. 922. Aristotle,-cited by Hutcheson, 454, 478.
art,-two standards of judgment in, 281.-perfection of, conformity to truth, 730. taste in art and taste in morals compared, 768.
asceticism, v. pleasure, utility.-principle of, incapable of consistent pursuit, 368.-influence of, on moral vocabulary, 425 n.
[Butler.]-of ideas of natural and moral evil, fundamental, 246. [Gay.]-of ideas, explains our approval of certain acts without being able to give a reason, 855.-of ideas, causes us to treat means as ends, after they have ceased to promote the real end, viz. pleasure, 884; e. g. money, 884; fame and knowledge, 885; envy, 886.—arises from educa- tion or imitation, 887.
atheism, absolute, impossible, 20.
authority, v. conscience, obligation, will, law.—of moral sense immediately perceived, 472. dist. power, of superior, 219, 481, 816-821.—of con- science, 190 f.-of the reflective principle, 194, 196, 223, 657, 931.—of the greatest happiness principle, 746.-of reason, 677.-compounded of natural obligation of sanctions and moral obligation of laws, 721.
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