all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have a right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man and have the essence of a man, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for: nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species;

the turn to MAKE things of one kind and not of another (which, as I have showed, signifies no more but ranking of them under different specific names) but their real unknown constitutions, which are the real essences we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we should have really different kinds of substances, or distinct names for them, unless we could distinguish them by these differences, of which we have no distinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily answered me, if I should demand, wherein lies the real difference in the internal constitution of a stag from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and nobody questions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different.

Your lordship farther says, And this difference doth not depend upou the complex ideas of substances, whereby men arbitrarily join ' modes together in their minds.' I confess, my lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex ideas of substances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are these: For let them mistake in ⚫ their complication of ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what 'doth not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree, are just what they were.'

The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, that things are here taken to be distinguished by their real essences; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your lordship, does your lordship mean, when you say, The real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree,' but that there are such kinds already set out by the signification of these names, man, horse, tree? And what, I beseech your lordship, is the significa tion of each of these specific names, but the complex idea it stands for? And that complex idea is the nominal essence, and nothing else. So that taking man, as your lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of individuals, all which agree in that common complex idea, which that specific name stands for, it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals comprehended under the specific name man, your use of it, would be just the same; let others leave out or into their complex idea of man what they please; because the real es sence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties de pend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

in

put

For I take it for granted, that in using the name man, in this place, your lordship uses it for that complex idea which is in your lordship's

it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the workmanship of the understanding, that abstracts and makes those general ideas.

mind of that species. So that your lordship, by putting it for, or substituting it in the place of that complex idea where you say the real essence of it is just as it was, or the very same as it was, does suppose the idea it stands for to be steadily the same. For if I change the signification of the word man, whereby it may not comprehend just the same individuals which in your lordship's sense it does, but shut out some of those that to your lordship are men in your signification of the word man, or take in others to which your lordship does not allow the name man; I do not think you will say, that the real essence of man in both these senses is the same. And yet your lordship seems to say so, when you say, 'Let men mistake in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them;' and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of the individuals comprehended under the names annexed to these ideas, will be the same: for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your lordship aims at. For as your lordship puts it by the name of man, or any other specific name, your lordship seems to me to suppose, that that name stands for, and not for the same idea, at the same time.

For example, my lord, let your lordship's idea, to which you annex the sign man, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of such a shape, let a third man's idea be of an animal such a size and shape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth's be an animal with a body of such a shape, and an immaterial substance, with a power of reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial substance. It is plain every one of these will call his a man, as well as your lordship; and yet it is as plain that men, as standing for all these distinct complex ideas, cannot be supposed to have the same internal constitution, i. e. the same real essence. The truth is, every distinct abstract idea with a name to it, makes a real distinct kind, whatever the real essence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true what your lordship says in the next words, And let the nominal essences differ never so much, the real common essence or nature of the several kinds, are not at all altered by them,' i e. That our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real con stitutions that are in things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which we annex them, ean and does alter the signification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by these names we rank and sort them into. Your lordship farther adds, And these real essences are unchangeable,' i. e. the internal constitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beseech your lordship, are the internal constitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal constituVOL. 1. 3 K

§. 13. They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.

I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, I think, we may say the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them as patterns or forms (for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say, this is a man, that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exist and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but these precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed

tion, or real essence of a species; which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific name, v. g of man, horse, or tree, is annexed to, or made the sign of the same abstract complex idea, under which I rank several individuals; it is impossible but the real constitution on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal essence depends, must be the same, i. e. in other words, where we find all the same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal constitution from which those properties flow.

But your lordship proves the real essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in these following words: For, however 'there may happen some variety in individuals by particular accidents, yet the essences of men, and horses, and trees, remain always the same; because they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of beings.'

It is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular things existing do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator: but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does depend, and wholly depend, on the ideas of men,

real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a horse or lead, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse or lead.

§. 14. Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence.

Nor will any one wonder, that I say these essences, or abstract ideas, (which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas: and therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the foetus born of a woman were a man; even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding put together, and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence: and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval, as a sheep from a goat: and rain is as essentially different from snow, as water from earth; that abstract idea which is the essence of one being impossible to be com municated to the other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, you please, species, as essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite in the world.

which

f. 15. Real and nominal essence.

But since the essences of things are thought, by some, (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word essence.

First, essence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally, in substances, unknown constitution of things, wheron their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence. This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; essentia, in its primary notation, signifying properly being. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of particular things without giving them any name.

Secondly, the learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary signification: and instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collec tion of simple ideas co-existing must depend. But it be ing evident, that things are ranked under naines into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names: the essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word es sence imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other nominal essence.

§. 16. Constant connexion between the name and nominal

essence.

Between the nominal essence and the name, there is so near a connexion, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea, whereof that name is the sign.

§. 17. Supposition, that species are distinguished by their real essences, useless.

Concerning the real essences of corporeal substances,