hold, where there is no claim of an adverse title. Such finding amounts to no more than that there was a valid deed of trust made. [In the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Sheldon It is said: "We regard the scope of the whole litigation as in-. volving but the enforcement of liens on real estate, by mortgage or otherwise, the establishment of such liens, the release of and redemption from them, and the resistance of such redemption-all on the part of creditors, there being no adverse claims of title arrayed against each other. In the determination of such questions no freehold is involved, as this court has frequently decided. Carbine v. Fox, 98 Ill. 146; McIntyre v. Yates, 100 Id. 475; Conkey v. Knight, 104 Id. 337. We said in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Watson, 105 Ill. 222: 'A freehold is never involved, within the meaning of the statute, except where the primary object of the suit is a recovery of a freehold estate the title whereof is directly put in issue, and where the suit, if prosecuted to a final determination, will, by virtue of the judgment or decree rendered therein, as between the parties, result in one gaining and the other losing the estate.' No such result follows here by virtue of the decree, but the effect is to subject the property to be sold, for the satisfaction of the liens upon it."] Chicago, etc. Land Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408 (adv. sheets).

10. LANDS, PUBLIC. [Pre-Emption.]— Certificate of Pre-Emption not Subject to Cancellation by Commissioner.-A certificate of purchase issued in due form, in favor of a pre-emptor, for land subject to entry under the pre-emption law, cannot be canceled or set aside by the land department for alleged fraud in obtaining it; but, in such case, the government must seek redress in the courts where the matter may be heard and determined according to the law applicable to the rights of individuals in like circumstances. [Deady, J., in the opinion of the court, says: "Several of the State courts have decided that the certificate of purchase, when issued in due form, for land subject to entry, is beyond the power of the commissioner, otherwise than on a direct appeal from the register and receiver. In Perry v. O'Hanlon, 11 Mo. 585, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a cancellation of a pre-emption certificate by the commissioner was a nullity. To the same effect is the ruling in Prill v. Stiles, 35 Ill. 309; Cornelius v. Kissel, 58 Wis. 241."] Smith v. Ewing, U.S. Cir. Ct., Oregon, June 1, 1885, 6 West Coast Repr. 653.

11. LIBEL. [Jurisdiction.]— Local Jurisdiction of Action for.-Where a newspaper containing libelous matter is printed in G. county and mailed to subscribers in said county, and is also mailed to subscribers in T. county and sold by agents in the latter county, a suit for damages for such libel may be brought in T county. In the opinion of the court Willie, C. J., says: "The general rule is that every person against whom an action is brought must be sued in the county of his residence. Among other exceptions is the following: "Where the foundation of the suit is some crime, or offense, or trespass, for which a civil action in damages may lie, in which case the suit may be brought in the county where such crime, or offense, or trespass was committed, or in the county where the defendant has his domicile." Rev. Stats., art. 617. It may be committed by either making, writing, printing, publishing, selling or circulating the malicious statement with intent to injure another.

By reference to articles 619-620-621, it will be seen that three distinct methods by which the offense may be committed are pointed out. It will not be necessary for us to compare these definitions with those which are given by the common law. It is sufficient to say that within the meaning of publishing and circulating a libel are at least contained all acts going to make up the offense of publishing a libel known to the laws of England and of our sister States. No doubt can arise upon the proof or pleadings in this case but that the appellant sold and distributed the copy of their paper which contained the alleged malicious statement. Such sale and distribution constituted publication at common law; it constitutes circulation under our penal code. As under the former, publication of a libel was an offense indictable wherever it occurred, so under our law circulation of a libel is an offense committed in any place where the libel is sold or distributed. 1 Bish. Cr. Proc., secs. 53, 57, 61; Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; Rex v. Gridwood, Leach, 142; Rex v. Burdett, 4 Barn. & Ald. 95; Penal Code, arts. 616-621. The fact that the crime of libel may have been completed by a publication of the paper in Galveston county does not make it any less a crime to circulate the number containing the alleged libelous article in other places. By the common law the sale of each copy is a distinct publication (Odgers on Libel, 532), and hence a distinct offense, and the prosecutor may at least choose for which of the distinct offenses he will call the guilty party to account. A copy of the paper may be first sold to A, then one to B and another to C, but because the publication is completed by selling to A, the government is not bound to select that particular fact as the one upon which it will rely to prove the completion of the offense. It may indict for either of the sales, and as it makes no difference which was first in point of time; so for the same reason it is unimportant in what place the publication first took place. These principles are so well grounded in the law of libel that they would not have been noticed at such length but for the zeal and earnestness with which distinguished counsel have urged upon the court a contrary doctrine. Under our penal code each act of either making, publishing or circulating a libel, being a separate offense, we must hold that the circulation of the News containing the libelous statement in Travis county was such an offense, no matter what may have been done with reference to it in the county of Galveston. The offense having been committed in Travis county, and being indictable there, the present civil action for damages was properly brought in that county."] Belo v. Wren, S. C. Tex., 1884; 5 Tex. Law Rev. 149.

12. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. [Malice]-Want of Probable Cause not Conclusive Evidence of Malice. Whilst in an action for damages for malicious prosecution, want of probable cause on the part of the prosecutor is prima facie evidence of malice, it is not conclusive. [In the opinion of the court it is said by Gordon, J.: "As it is the duty of every citizen to aid in enforcing the criminal laws of the State against those by whom they are wilfully disobeyed, so is it the business of our courts of justice to see that the person thus undertaking to vindicate the law shall not suffer in consequence of such an attempt, even though it may have proved abortive. Hence it is, that it has ever been held that an action for malicious prosecution can be maintained only where the plaintiff can make it

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appear. 1. That the defendant in his attempted prosecution had no probable cause upon which to found it, and 2, That he was actuated by malice. If the defendant is able to show probable cause, that is sufficient for his protection, and, in that case, his motive for the prosecution is not to be considered. If there be no such case shown, then the question is one of malice, and if the proofs exhibit an absence of this essential element of the

plaintiff's case, the action cannot be legally sustained. Deitz v. Lanfitt, 13 P. F. Smith, 234; Bernar v. Dunlay, 13 Norris, 329. Whilst a want of probable cause is prima facie evidence of malice it is by no means conclusive, since, where it appears that there is a reasonable ground for the belief of guilt, without regard to what induced that belief, it ought to be regarded as a justification of the defendant's action, for as we held in Smith v. Ege, 2 P. F. Smith, 419, and Seibert v. Price, 5 W. & S. 438, the question turns not upon the actual state of the case, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party prosecuting. So where it appears that the defendant acted merely through mistake, or where the prosecution resulted from the mistake of the justice of the peace before whom the information was made, the action cannot be maintained:" 2 Esp. N. P. 122; Stark. Ev., Vol. 2, 688.] Gilliford v. Windel, S. C. Pa., Jan. 5, 1885; 15 Pittsb. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 262.

13. MARRIED WOMAN. [Community]-Not Responsible for Funds Received During Community by Her.-A married Husband, though Used by woman cannot be held responsible as a negotiorum gestor, by implied contract, during the existence of the community, even under a showing that she had made use of funds received by her husband for account of a minor. Glass v. Meredith, S. C. La., Monroe, June, 1885.

14.

[Separate Estate]-Liability of Wife's Separate Estate for Debts Contracted before Marriage. By an ante-nuptial settlement it was provided that any property to which the wife, or the husband in her right, should become entitled "at any time during the intended coverture," except jewels and articles of a like nature, which it was declared should be for the separate use of the wife, should vest in the trustees of the settlement. The wife was sued without her husband for a debt contracted before the marriage, and the creditor obtained judgment and issued execution against her separate estate, seizing a large quantity of jewelry, most of which had been given to her as wedding presents before her marriage. On an interpleader issue between the husband and the execution creditor: Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the articles seized were property to which the husband would have become entitled in right of his wife during the coverture but for the exception in the settlement, which made them the separate property of the wife, and therefore that they were rightly seized under the execution. Williams v. Mercier, House of Lords, Nov. 4, 1884; 52 Law Times Rep. (N. S.) 662.

16.

"There is no certain and direct evidence that the mortgagor was indebted in any sum whatever to his wife at the time the mortgage was executed, but there is evidence showing that several years prior thereto she had let him have not exceeding $1,250. The mortgagor then being in failing circumstances, and actually insolvent, executed to his wife a mortgage for $3,000, and gave her selected notes and accounts of the supposed value of at least $2,000. It has been held that a mortgage given for a sum larger than the legitimate indebtedness, in the absence of explanatory evidence, is a badge of fraud, and may, in and of itself, be sufficient to establish a fraudulent purpose. Davenport v. Cummings, 15 Iowa, 219; Butts v. Peacock, 23 Wis., 359; Tripp v. Vincent, 8 Paige, 176; Beeler's Heirs v. Bullitt's Heirs, 3 A. K. Marsh, 280; Lynde v. McGregor, 95 Mass., 172; Wood v. Scott, 55 Iowa, 114; s. c. 7 N. W. Rep. 465." Taylor v. Wendling, S. C. Iowa, June 13, 1885; 24 N. W. Rep. 40.

[Description]-Variance Between Date of Notes Declared on and those Described in Mortgage, when Immaterial.-A discrepancy between notes sued on and notes described in the mortgage sought to be enforced, in the suit, on property described in the petition and mortgage, consisting merely in the date "July" instead of "June," is insufficient to defeat a claim for the enforcement of the mortgage; especially when there is no pretense that the mortgagor has issued other outstanding notes identical with those described in the mortgage. Thompson v. Lowry, S. C. La., Monroe, June, 1885.

[Ultra Vires]

17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Lease Made Without Specific Authority in Charter, Ultra Vires.-Municipal corporations can exercise only powers specially delegated or such as are incidental to those granted, or flow from them by necessary implication. The mayor and council of an incorporated town, therefore, cannot lease from a parish (county) a ferry, and bind the town to pay the rent fixed, unless the charter of the town specially authorizes such a contract. Millsaps v. Mayor & Council of Monroe, S. C. La., Monroe, June, 1885.

18.

[Negligence-Notice]-What Notice of Defect Sufficient to Charge City-Notice to Marshal not Notice to City.-When a sidewalk, which was originally constructed in a proper manner, afterwards becomes out of repair, and an injury is thereby occasioned, the municipal corporation, whose duty it is to keep it in repair, is liable therefor if it had actual notice of the defect in such time as that, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, it might have repaired it and thereby have prevented the injury; or, if the defect was of such a nature, and had existed for such a period of time as that, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of its duties, it would have learned of its existence in time to have prevented the injury. Notice of a defect in a sidewalk conimumcated to a city marshal is not such notice to the city as will render it liable for an injury resulting therefrom. Since the marshal is charged with no duty in respect of the streets and sidewalks. [The court cite: Rice v. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; Montgomery v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 101; s. c. 7 N. W. Repr. 421.] Cook v. Anamosa, S. C. Iowa, June 8, 1885; S. C. 23 N. W. Repr. 907.

19. NEGLIGENCE. [Presumption.]—Presumption of Care on the Part of Plaintiff Arising from Instinct

20.

21.

of Self Preservation when not Entitled to Weight. In an action against a railway company for a negligent injury, court instructed the jury in these words: "The jury may take into consideration in weighing the evidence, the hazardous nature of the work in which the brakeman was employed, and give due weight to the instincts and presumptions which naturally lead men to avoid injury and preserve their own lives." The giving of this instruction is held to be error, Adams, J., saying: "The instinct of self-preservation, planted in all persons may, in a proper case, be allowed some weight as raising an inference of care. Way v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 345. But where the party who has the burden of proving care can show by direct evidence what care was exercised, he should, we think, show it by such evidence; and if the direct evidence shows care, or a want of it, there is no room for a mere inference. The plaintiff was able to show by direct evidence what care he exercised. The case is different from Way v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., above cited. We think that the instruction is erroneous." Dunlavy v. Chicago etc. R. Co., S. C. Iowa, June 8, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 911.

Railway Station Platform High

er than Steps of Coaches.-It is negligence in a railway company to have a station platform higher than the steps of passenger coaches and to require in consequence that passengers should enter from the platform into a baggage car, and thence to proceed to the coaches assigned to passengers; and the company is liable in damages for injury to passenger received while seeking to board a train in that manner at request of conductor. Turner v. Vicksburg etc. R. Co., S. C. La., Monroe, June, 1885.

[Railway Companies.] - Accidents from Dissimilar Car Couplings, not Negligent. -A brakeman was killed while attempting to couple a freight car belonging to the road by which he was employed, and a car belonging to another road, by reason, as alleged, of a dissimilarity in the couplings of the two cars. It is held that the railroad company was not liable. [In the opinion of the court by Orton, J., it is said: The difference in the elevation of the coupling irons of this foreign car and the caboose or other cars of the defendant's road, would not have been very easily or readily observed when they were distant from each other, and yet the company is sought to be held liable for its want of ordinary care in not knowing this difference when consenting to take this foreign car into its train. When the car and the caboose were brought nearly together, this difference could have been at least much more readily seen and observed by comparison. The company is charged with negligently endangering the lives of its brakemen by not knowing of this difference, and, if presumed to know of it, in allowing this car to be attached to its train; and the intestate is alleged to have been in the use of proper care when he endangers his own life by not seeing, observing, or knowing of such difference in the elevation of the coupling irons. Did not the intestate have the same, if not superior, means of knowing this difference, as or to that of the company? If the negligence of the intestate and that of the company, in this respect, are equally balanced, ought the plaintiff to recover? The duty of the company to know of this difference is not absolute, and it is not presumed to know of it as a matter of law. In Ballou v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 54

Wis. 257; s. c. 11 N. W. Rep 559, the company was not held chargeable with knowledge of latent defects in the ladder of a foreign freight car by which the intestate in that case lost his life. Mr. Justice Cassoday said in the opinion: "Certainly, a railroad company is not required, under all circumstances, to make use only of the safest known appliances and instruments, and to be held responsible for any failure to discard what is not such, and supply its place with something better and safer. To hold in such a case that a railway is liable, and to apply such a rule to a company receiving a loaded car from another railroad, would, in many instances, operate as a prohibition upon interstate commerce." In Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258; s. c. 9 N. W. Rep. 273, a brakeman's arm was crushed by his attempting to couple two foreign cars in the night-time, the dead-wood of one of which had fallen down below that of the other, and they passed by each other. A verdict for the defendant was ordered and the judgment was affirmed. The case is very much in point. See, also, Railway Co. v. Flanigan, 77 Ill. 365; Baldwin v. Railway Co., 50 Iowa 680; Hathaway v. Railroad Co., 51 Mich. 253; s. c., 16 N. W. Rep. 634; Railroad Co. v.Smithson, 45 Mich.212; s.C., 7 N.W.Rep. 791. The liability of the railway company in such cases does not depend upon its general and absolute duty to furnish safe and proper machinery and other appliances with which its employees may work, but upon its knowledge, actual or presumed, that such coupling appliances will not properly fit and connect with each other. I have therefore briefly compared the means of knowing this unfitness of the coupling apparatus which the company and the intestate had, in order to see whether the greater negligence should be imputed to the company rather than to the intestate. It does not appear from the complaint that the company had not in their employ at the time suitable persons to make inspection of all such foreign cars and ascertain their fitness to go into its trains, and it is presumed that such persons were so employed, and that other employees of the company caused the foreign car in this case to be upon the side track ready to be coupled to the caboose. If, therefore, there was any negligence on the part of any one in not ascertaining before-hand that their couplings would not meet, it must have been the negligence of the co-employes and fellow-servants of the intestate, for which the company is not liable. This case seems to be ruled in principle by the recent case of Whitwam v. Railroad Co., 58 Wis. 408; s.c. 17 N. W. Rep. 124. In that case the drawbar of the car was too short to be safely coupled to or detached from the engine, and the plaintiff, who was a brakeman, in attempting to detach the car from the engine, was injured. Mr. Justice Lyon said in the opinion: 'It seems to us that the gravamen of this action was the coupling of the Green Bay car to the engine with the short draw-bar, and this is, really, the only negligence charged in the complaint. It does not appear when, where, or by whom this Green Bay car was attached to such engine, but the attaching of it, as well as the order detaching it therefrom, were manifestly the acts of the servants of the defendants, engaged in operating their railroads, and hence of the co-employes of the plaintiff, and therefore the defendants are not liable for the injury to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.' The case of Railway Co. v. Black, 88 Ill. 112, is perhaps more nearly in point both in facts and principle. In that case the complaint was that the coupling bars of a flat car, loaded

with iron, of one company, and of a caboose of another company, were of different heights, and the plaintiff, in stooping down between the cars to do the coupling, had his hand crushed between the bars. It is said in the opinion by Mr. Justice Sheldon that it was the plaintiff's own fault 'in not ascertaining the condition of the cross-bars before attempting the coupling;' and that 'from his experience as a switchman in the yard, and the frequent coming in of cars thus constructed from other roads, he had reason to suppose that the car in question was liable to have a draw-bar in the situation it was here, and it was his plain duty to examine and ascertain, as he safely might have done, what was the condition of the car in this respect before venturing upon the coupling." It seems to us plain enough that if there was any fault or negligence anywhere in this case, it was that of the intestate or his fellow-servants and coemployes, and the defendants are not liable. It is very sad and pitiful that so many deaths and severe personal injuries result from coupling cars; but this part of the employment of brakeman is extremely dangerous and hazardous, and especially when it becomes necessary to couple together cars coming from different roads with dissimilar coupling appliances; and the care necessary to be used increases in proportion to such danger, and the law exacts its exercise, or it will refuse redress."] Kelly v. Wisconsin Central R. Co., S. C. Wis., June 1, 1885; 23 N. W. Repr. 890.

(4) The rights and privileges conferred by the Constitution upon citizens do not apply to the negro race. (5) A slave is not made free by residence in a free State or territory.

(6) The Constitution should have the same meaning intended when it was adopted.

(7) The Constitution expressly affirms the right of property in slaves.

(8) The Missouri compromise was unconstitutional and void.

As I see no occasion for rebuking the court for laying the law as above, I hope you will not fail to throw some light on the subject; for if Mr. Hedricks had no better ground than that to denounce the court, it seems to me your expression of disappointment at his recent address is not well founded. St. Louis.

JULIUS ROBERTSON.

REMARKS.-We are not going into the Dred Scott Decision. That decision is as weary, stale, flat and unprofitable as a last year's bird's nest. The discussion might prove especially unprofitable to us, because an old subscriber of ours in East Tennessee threatens to discontinue his subscription if we do not avoid these irrelevant matters. We are, however, much obliged to our learned friend for telling us exactly what the Dred Scott Decision did decide, for we never knew before, except that it decided something unpleasant to a majority of the American people. The decision was discreditable to the court by reason of its length, if for no other. If we had commenced reading the several opinions at the time they were delivered, we might possibly have completed the task by this time.-[ED. C. L. J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A LAST YEAR'S BIRD'S NEST.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

Probably you will receive other inquiries besides this, concerning your remarkable denunciation of the United States Supreme Court for its decision in the Dred Scott case. It will, I am sure, interest many awyers to know in what points the American people have reversed that decision on a hundred battle fields. And it will be not less interesting to learn just on what points of law the court in that case went wrong. It is well enough to allow the newspapers to display their ignorance by repeating the unjust charge that Chief Justice Taney there decided that "the negro had no rights which the white man was bound to respect," but I take it for granted you, as well as every lawyer, knows better; and of course every observer of political events remembers that even in many Northern States the negro was not made a citizen for two and three years after the close of the war. In 1867 Ohio, by an immense majority, denied him the right of voting.

It is true the American people have changed the law since that decision was rendered, but I do not suppose you were serious in intimating that thecourt should have decided, not according to the law as it then stood, but as it was going to be at some indefinite time in the future. I cannot believe that you would have had the court override the law, because it did not happen to suit the views of one of the great political parties of the country.

The case is reported in 19th Howard, 691, Scott v. Sanford, and the chief points decided are:

The word "citizen," in the Constitution does not include one of the negro race.

(2) A negro cannot become a citizen of Missouri. (3) The Declaration of Independence does not include slaves as a part of the people.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

BATTLE IN A COURT ROOM.-A press dispatch from Fort Worth, Texas, June 20, says: "A lively scene occurred in the district court yesterday during the Stevens' trial for the murder of Dr. Wallace. H. M. Furman, of counsel for the defense, objected to a question put by County Attorney Bowlin, who took offense at an after-remark of Furman's. Further exchange of warm words led to Furman striking the county attor ney a heavy blow on the head, and a fight ensued. The Judge left the bench to separate the two men, when Robert D. Wear, of counsel for the prosecution, took a hand in the fight, and, in reaching for Furman, struck the judge on the face by mistake. The jurors jumped to their feet and the utmost confusion and excitement prevailed for a few minutes. The sheriff at length enforced order and heavy fines were imposed by the court. The jury yesterday in the trial of Chas. Herrin for the murder of C. W. Barradall in Chase's drug store, June, 1884, announced that they were unable to agree and the Judge discharged them. They stood three for murder in the first degree, eight for second degree with five years' imprisonment.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AN ENGLISH COURT.-On Saturday last, says the London Times, Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Mathew came upon the bench accompanied by a gentleman whom Lord Coleridge introduced to the bar-all standing up as the Chief Justice of the United States, who was assigned a seat by the side of the Lord Chief Justice, and was treated throughout with the highest marks of respect, their lordships handing to him the ancient documents which were cited in the interesting case appointed to be heard, and explaining to him the proceedings. The Chief Justice appeared to be very much amused and interested in the quaint ceremony which took place of the introduction and reception of the new queen's counsel.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 18, 1885.

CURRENT EVENTS.

LEGAL OBITUARIES.-The Cincinnati Law Bulletin mentions the death of Col. Oscar Fitzallen Moore, of Portsmouth, Ohio, which took place on June 23d, while attending court at Waverly, in that State. He is described as one of the foremost members of the bar of Ohio. He was born at Steubenville, Ohio, in 1817; had been a practitioner for forty-seven years, and literally "died in the harness." The Washington Law Reporter mentions the death of Richard T. Merrick, Esq., which took place in that city on the 23d of June. Mr. Merrick was, at the time of his death, a member of the special committee of the American Bar Association, of which David Dudley Field is chairman, on the subject of delays and uncertainties in judicial administration. The Washington Law Reporter says of him: "Every bar has its leader, and every community its most eminent lawyer; but the remarkable feature of his career lies in the fact that, residing here in the District of Columbia, without the advantages of official position, political prominence or a constituency, by his sheer innate wealth of intellectual and personal qualities, he attained not merely a local but a national reputation as a lawyer of the highest order, and made his name a familiar one, cherished as well as respected, not only in the profession, but among the people of every part of the Union."

THE FORREN'S SYSTEM OF LAND TRANSFER. We call the attention of law reformers to what is known as Forren's System of Land Transfer, which was explained at some length in a late issue of the American Law Review. The leading principle of the system is that the recorder of deeds grants a certificate of title, which serves as the symbolical representative of the land and passes by a written transfer, very much as a warehouse receipt passes. Of course, to make every new transfer effective, it would be necessary that the transferee should bring the certificate in and Vol. 21-No. 12.

cording consists of a few words it would consume but a few minutes time and be very inexpensive, while at the same time it would impart effective notice to the world, under the operation of our recording acts. The system, of course, can be varied to suit various views and exigencies. Suppose, for instance, a man owns a house and lot on Olive street, in St. Louis. A plat or description of it is recorded in a book, the owner shows to the recorder his muniments of title, which show that title is prima facie in him. He gets a recorder's certificate, refering to the book and page in which his title with a plat is registered. On the opposite page are blank spaces for the entry of transfers. The next day he sells the property to Brown; he does this by writing on the back of the certificate: "For value received I hereby assign the within named tract of land to John Brown with warranty." John Brown would take the certificate and present it to the recorder and the recorder, who would make an entry like this opposite the plat and description of the land: "Assigned to John Brown with warranty," giving the date of the assignment. The statute could be so framed as to attach the proper legal significance to the words "with warranty," so as to give such an assignment the effect of an ordinary warranty deed conveying all the estate which the grantor has. A mortgage or deed of trust to secure a loan could in like manner be made by endorsement upon the certificate of a few simple words prescribed by statute, and the statute should define the legal incidents of such a mortgage or deed of trust and the manner of its enforcement. Our readers see the principle. Of course it requires development. Some inconvenience might attend the introduction of it at first. But our present system of land transfer is entirely behind the mercantile spirit of the age.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

WORDS AND PHRASES [CHILD]-DEFINITION OF THE WORD "CHILD" IN A PENAL STATUTE. -A statute of Texas, relating to aggravated assault, declares an assault to be aggravated, "when committed by an adult male upon the