ment of the statute requiring such protection to be provided." Tracy v. T. & B. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433; Bradley v. B. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 427.

"Where stock is killed on a railroad switch at a point where it is unnecessary to keep the road open in order to transact business, the company will be liable without proof of negligence." Morris v. St. L., K. C. & N. R. Co., 58 Mo. 78; Comstock v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 32 Iowa, 376.

In the case of the P. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Laufman, 78 Ind. 320, it is said that "the statutory rule is that railroad companies shall be liable for injuries done by their locomotives or cars to animals at places where the roads might be, but are not, fenced; and it is not the province of the courts to create exceptions to the rule or to interfere with legislative policy. This meets with our approval. But whenever it appears from the general course of legislation that the public have a paramount interest in having particular portions of the railroads of the State unfenced, we shall hold that the statutes requiring railroads to be fenced has no application to such places. and that the railroad companies are not required to fence their roads at such places. This exception to the general rule requiring railroad companies to fence their roads, will apply to all public highways, including streets and alleys in cities, towns and villages; and, for the purposes of this case, we shall assume that it will also apply to all railroad depots and stations where the public generally do business with the railroad companies; and yet the roads themselves, or in other words, the railroad tracks might very well be fenced at the companies depots and stations. All the railroad tracks might be located on one side of the depots or stations, and the public have access to such depots or stations from the other side-the depots or stations forming a part of the inclosure. This would prevent stock from getting on the railroad tracks.

**

*

This brings us to the question whether the defendant's railroad should have been fenced where the animal in the present case was killed. The court below upon the evidence found that "at Crawford station, in Chase County, Kansas, the defendant owns a strip of land 250 feet wide and 2,400 feet long, which is used as its station grounds at that point; that the part of this land upon which the animal was killed was not necessary for the use of defendant as part of its station grounds." In th: present case, the plaintiff's animal passed from the public highway on to this tract or strip of land used for station purposes, and wandered along the strip until it passed upon the company's right of way and upon the railroad track, where it was killed, and neither the railroad track nor the right of way, nor the strip of land, was inclosed with a fence. A fence, however, extended along one end and a part of the two sides of this strip of land, but this made the wrong of the railroad company in the present case greater-if it committed any wrong-for by

reason thereof the animal could not escape from the passing train. Assuming, for the purposes of this case, that land necessarily used for stationgrounds need not be fenced, then the question arises, is it necessary for a railroad company to inclose a track not necessary for the use of the railroad company as a part of its station grounds but in fact so used? Under the circumstances of this case, we think we must answer this question in the affirmative. To say that railroad companies are not required to fence their roads in such cases would be to create an exception to an express statutory requirement, and to create such exception without any good reason therefor. This does not come within the province of the courts. Courts may say that where some other statute or some paramount duty or obligation absolves railroad companies from fencing their roads they need not do so, but where the statute expressly requires railroad companies to fence their roads in order to exempt the companies from liability, and no other statute or paramount obligation or duty, or any good reason exists to relieve them from so fencing, the courts cannot say that they need not fence. But if for any reason they are relieved from fencing their roads at some particular place or places, then they must construct fences or other barriers as near thereto as is reasonably practicable. Cleveland etc. R. Co. v. Newbrander, 40 O. St. 15; s. C., 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cases, 480; Morris v. St. L. K. C. & N. R. Co., 58 Mo. 78; Bradley v. B. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 427; Tracy v. T. & B. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433; Comstock v. D. M. V. R. Co., 32 Ia..376.

And if for any reason a railroad company is relieved from fencing its road at any particular place, it devolves upon the railroad company to show that it is so relieved. The burden of proof in all such cases rests upon the railroad company. U. P. R. Co. v. Dyche, 28 Kas. 200; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cases, 427; s. c., 1 Pac. Rep. 243; I. P. & C. R. Co. v. Lindley, 75 Ind. 426; s. C., 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cases, 495; R. R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lynch, 67 Ill. 149; Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 510.

In some States there are express exceptions by statute, as in Illinois, for instance, railroad companies are not required to fence their roads at the crossings of public roads and highways, or within the limits of cities and incorporated towns and villages; and in some States increased damages by the way of penalties are imposed for failures to fence, as in Iowa the party recovering because of a want of a sufficient fence is entitled to recover double damages. Of course decisions rendered upon such statutes have no application in this Sta.e, where no exceptions are found in the statutes, and no damages or penalties are imposed except the value of the animal killed or damages for the animals wounded, and an attorney fee.

The plaintiff in this case permitted his animal to run at large, but by so doing we do not think that he was guilty of such contributory negligence

Numerous cases

as will prevent his recovery. might be cited, but we think it is unnecessary to cite only a few of them, as follows: Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Lull, 28 Mich. 511; Ewing v. C. & A. R. Co., 72 Ill. 25; Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ind. 477; Cressly v. N. R. Co.. (Sup. Ct. of New Hampshire) 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cases, 540, and note, p. 544.

The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.

1. APPEAL. [Final Judgment.]-Lies Not from Refusal to Issue Warrant, etc.-Where a private citizen presents to the judge of the district court a complaint in writing, and under oath, charging the defendant with the commission of a misdemeanor, for which the punishment may be a fine not exceeding $500 and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, and the complainant demands of the judge that a warrant shall be issued for the arrest of the defendant, and that the judge shall take cognizance of the complaint, and hear and determine the case, and the judge refuses, no appeal lies to the Supreme Court from such refusal. State v. Forbiger, S. C. Kan., July 9, 1885; 7 Pac. Repr. 631.

2. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. [Connecting Railway Lines-Through Tickets.]-Through Tickets are the Separate Contract of Each Carrier.— Through tickets in the form of coupons, sold to a passenger by one railroad company, entitling him to pass over successive connecting lines of road, in the absence of an express agreement, create no contract with the company selling the same, to carry him beyond the line of its own road, but they are distinct tickets for each road, sold by the first company as agent for the others, so far as the passenger is concerned. Where a coupon ticket has been sold calling for passage over several distinct lines of railroad, the rights of the passenger, and the duty and responsibility of the several companies over whose roads the passenger is entitled to a passage, are the same as if he had purchased a ticket at the office of each company constituting the through line. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, S. C. Ill., Oct. 31, 1884, (112 Ill. 296, Adv. Sheets.)

the right of carriage from Omaha to New York, over the several lines intermediate and connecting between those two points, one of the connecting lines being the Pennsylvania railroad. There was printed on the face of the ticket: "In selling this ticket for passage over other roads, this company acts only as agent for them, and assumes no responsibility beyond its own line." The coupon over the Pennsylvania railroad declared, "Issued by the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific railway, on account of the Pennsylvanian railroad," which the company owning the latter road refused to accept, and on refusal to pay the regular fare demanded, ejected the passenger from the train: Held, in a suit by the passenger against the latter company, that the first named company contracted with the passenger only as agent of the defendant company. Ibid.

[Expulsion of Passenger Damages Measure of.]-When Passenger cannot Recover Damages for Force Used in Putting Him Off.— Where a conductor of a railway company, acting under instructions from his superior, refuses to accept a ticket issued by another company as agent of the former, and demands full fare, the passenger, if his ticket was issued by authority, may pay the fare again, and recover of the company requiring payment the sum paid, as for a breach of contract, or he may refuse to pay, and leave the train when so ordered by the conductor, and sue and recover of the company all damages sustained in consequence of his expulsion from the train; but if he refuses to leave, he cannot recover for the force used by the conductor in putting him off, when no more force is used than necessary, and the expulsion is not wanton or wilful. [Mr. Justice Craig, in giving the opinion of the court, cited Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499, and Hall v. Memphis, etc. R. Co., 9 Eng. & M. Ry. Cases, 349, and said: "We entertain no doubt that appellee was entitled to recover the amount of the cost of a ticket from the place he was ejected from the cars, to New York. He was also entitled to recover such damages as he sustained on account of the delay occasioned by the expulsion, and all additional expense necessarily occasioned thereby, as well as reasonable damages for the indignity in being expelled from the train; but we perceive no ground upon which he can recover for personal injuries received, unless the expulsion was malicious or wanton. When the conductor demanded that appellee should pay fare or leave the train, he would have been justified in refusing to pay fare, and in leaving the train on the command of the conductor, and had he done so he would have received no personal injuries, and might then have brought his action and recovered, as before stated; but when he refused to leave the train, and thus compelled the conductor to resort to force, he can not recover for an injury which he voluntarily brought upon himself. The conductor was ordered by his superior not to receive a ticket like the one presented. This order he was bound to obey, and so far as appears he acted in good faith, and when appellee was notified by the conductor that his ticket was not good, and would not be received, it was his duty to leave the train in a peaceable manner, and hold the company responsible for the consequences, rather than resist or undertake to retain his place on the train by force. A train crowded with passengers,-often women and children,-is no place for a quarrel or a fight between a conductor and a passenger, and it would be un

wise, and dangerous to the traveling public, to adopt any rule which might encourage a resort to violence on a train of cars. The conductor must have the supervision and control of his train, and a demand on his part for fare should be obeyed or the passenger should in a peaceable manner leave the train, and seek redress in the courts, where he will find a complete remedy for every indignity offered, and for all damages sustained."] Ibid.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. [Police Regulations— Common Carriers-Railway Tariffs.]-Power of States to Regulate Railway Charges.-Railroad companies are common carriers engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest, and are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight, just as any natural person, who is a common carrier, is subject to such legislative control. [The court cite: The Granger Cases, 94 U. S. 155-187; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.] Laurel Fork etc. R. Co. v. West Va. Trans. Co., West Va. Sup. Ct. App., Dec. 13, 1884; W. Va. 342 (Adv. Sheets).

6.

7.

Railroad corporations,

which devote their property to a use, in which the public has a direct interest, in effect grant to the public an interest in such use, and must to the extent of that interest submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, as long as they maintain the use; but they may withdraw the grant by discontinuing the use. Ibid, 340.

Difference in this Regard between Public and Private Corporations.-There is a marked difference between such corporations as those spoken of in the last point, and purely private corporations. The former may be called quasi public corporations; and the legislature of the State has over their employment of their property so devoted to a use, in which the public has an interest, a control, which it does not have over the employment of the property of a purely private corporation. The legislature can generally exercise no control, which is forbidden by the charter of a purely private corporation. Ibid, 141.

8. Grant to Railway Company of Exclusive Right to Fix Charges is Repealable.-Though a railroad corporation by its charter is given "the power to contract in reference to its business the same as private individuals," or is authorized "to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for the transportation of persons and property and for the storage of property, as it deems reasonable," or though it is authorized to "carry freight and passengers charging reasonable terms," or though by its charter it is authorized to charge a certain fixed rate, which is declared by its charter to be irreducible by the legislature, and though no right to repeal, alter or amend the charter is reserved to the legislature in the act granting such charter, still the legislature has a right subsequently to establish by a general act a maximum rate of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight, and to make it applicable to railroad companies, who were, when the act was passed, operating their railroads under such préviously granted charters. Ibid, 341.

10.

laws for the right government of the State, must be regarded as mere licenses and not as contracts, which bind future legislatures, for no legislature can give away or sell the discretion of subsequent legislatures in respect to matters, the government of which from the very nature of things, must vary in varying circumstances. Ibid, 362.

The right to regulate and fix at their pleasure the charges of railroad companies for transportation of freight and passengers is one of the powers of the State inherent in every sovereignty, to be exercised by the legislature from time to time at its pleasure, and therefore one legislature cannot by a charter granted to a railroad company, though it be for a valuable consideration, confer on such railroad company a right to charge certain fixed rates for the transportation of freight and passengers, and stipulate that this rate of charge shall not be changed by future legislatures. If that be done, it will not be regarded as a contract, but in legal effect as nothing more than a license to enjoy this privilege conferred on the corporation for the time subject to future legislative or constitutional control. Ibid, 364.

11.

Validity and Effect of West Virginia Statute Regulating Railway Charges.-Chapter 227 of the Acts of 1872-3, passed December 27, 1873, entitled "an act to establish a reasonable maximum rate of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight, and to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates to be charged by different railroads in this State for the transportation of passengers and freight on said railroads" is applicable to all railroads in this State, whether their charters were granted before or since the passage of this act; and it is binding on all railroad companies doing business in this State without regard to any provisions, which may have been inserted in their charters. The legislature had a constitutional right to pass this act; and no previous legislature had a right to so restrain or limit this legislature as to take from it the right to fix the maximum rates of charges of, all railroads in the State, as it pleased. And any provision in the charter of lroad com pany purporting to restrain the legislature in this respect, cannot be regarded as a contract, but must be regarded as a mere license revocable at the pleasure of the legislature. Ibid, 373.

12.

.

Statutes-Repeal by Implication-Effect on Special Charter of Subsesequent General Law.-If in a special act of the legislature of this State, chartering a company and conferring on it specified privileges exceeding those granted to other like corporations by the general law of the State there be reserved a right to amend this act by a future legislature, and and the legislature subsequently passes a general act applicable to all corporations of this character, whereby the specified privilege, while not withdrawn, is so modified as to render it far less valuable to the corporation, which had been chartered by this special act, this cannot be regarded as an exercise by the legislature of the reserved right to amend any act, as it cannot properly be called an amendment of this special act; for by our Constitution, art. 6, § 30, it is provided, that no law shall be amended by reference to its title only; but the section amended shall be inserted at large in the new act." But such general act is not necessarily inoperative on such corporation, as may or not be subjected to such law; this de

pending upon whether or not the legislature has the constitutional power by a general act to control the corporation in this respect. Ibid, 371.

13. DIVORCE. [Marriage.]- Marriage in Violation of Decree of Divorce Voidable Only.-Where a divorce is obtained on notice by publication merely. and the decree, as required by § 1030, R. S. 1881, forbids the party obtaining such divorce to marry within two years, but such party, in violation thereof, does marry within that time, the marriage is unlawful and voidable, but, under the statute o this State, not absolutely void. It will 'become void, however, if, within the period inhibited, the decree is opened by the party against whom it was obtained. Mason v. Mason, S. C. of Ind., March 21, 1885.

14. EVIDENCE. [Husband and Wife Privileged Communications.]—Communication as to Adultery by a Wife mude After her Return to her Husband are Privileged.-In an action by a husband to recover damages for enticing away, debauching and alienating the affections of his wife, the fact as to whether adultery had been committed by the defendant and the plaintiff's wife can neither be proved nor disproved by any communications had between the plaintiff and his wife after her return. Higham v. Vanosdol, S. C. of Ind., March 31, 1885.

15.

[Declarations-Res Gesta.]- Declarations of Wife to a Third Person on the Day of Elopement and not of the Res Gesta Inadmissible. Declarations made by the wife to a third person, on the day she eloped with the defendant, or within the time when she was presumably under his influence, as to the causes of her leaving, which are not part of the res gesta accompanying the act of leaving, and which do not impute to her husband any violence or cruel treatment, are not admissible in mitigation of damages. Ibid.

16. GARNISHEE. [Liability.] If Securities are Converted after Summons the Garnishee must Account to the Plaintif that he Properly Discharged his Duty as Custodian thereof.-Where a bank summoned a garnishee, after the service of summons, converts and disposes of collateral securities held by it, the burden is upon it to account to the plaintiff, and to show that it has properly discharged its duty as custodian of such securities. First Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, S. C. of Ind., April. 8, 1885.

17. HUSBAND AND WIFE. [Enticing away WifeAdultery.]-No Proof of Adultery Necessary for the Husband to Maintain an Action for Damages. -Where a stranger, knowing a woman to be the wife of another, and having no reason to suspect mistreatment of her by her husband, entices, persuades and takes her away to another State, and keeps her in different places for ten days, all without the consent of her husband, such husband can maintain an action for damages without proof of adultery. Higham v. Vanosdol, S. C. of Ind., March 31, 1885.

18. MARRIAGE. [Ratification Estoppel.]—Ratification of Unlawful Marriage Estops one Party from Denying its Validity.-In violation of such decree, a woman married within two years, and, after living with her husband four years brought an action for divorce, to which a defense was interposed that the marriage was unlawful because of such violation. It is held, that as it did not appear that the defendant was ignorant of the inhib

ition at the time of his marriage with the plaintiff, and as he ratified the marriage by living with her two years after the inhibited period had expired, he was estopped from denying the validity of the marriage as a defense to the complaint. Mason v. Mason, S. C. of Ind., March 21, 1885.

19.. [Solemnization] - Failure to Comply with Statute Requiring a License will not Invalidate a Marriage.-No ceremony or solemnization is necessary to a valid marriage, and a marriage is not rendered void by a failure to comply with a statute requiring the parties to obtain a license, though such failure may subject them to a criminal prosecution. When there is an agreement to form a present matrimonial connection, followed by cohabitation as husband and wife, no particular form of words is essential, provided it appears that the engagement was entered into from pure motives, and that the connection was not entered into from bad motives, or for the mere purpose of sexual commerce. Tater v. Tater, S. C. Ind., March 21, 1885.

20.

Illustration.-C and T were married by license. Chad been married, but believed that a divorce had been granted. However, the suit by his former wife had been dismissed for failure to pay costs. The parties cohabited as husband and wife for six years and were so regarded by the community. A mortgage was executed by them in that capacity. Five months after the marriage the former wife got a decree. T died in the belief that there was a lawful marriage between her and C. It is held that there was a presumption of marriage which was not overthrown because there was no formal celebration after the impediment was removed. Ibid.

21. NEGLIGENCE [Municipal Corporations-County Bridges]-Duty of County under a Statute to Repair Bridges over which it has Control Extends to Bridges Built by Township.-Under $ 2892 Ind. R. S. 1881, it is the duty of the board of commissioners of a county, in this State, to cause all bridges, over which it has control, to be kept in repair, and if it negligently suffers such a bridge to remain out of repair and a person is thereby injured without contributory fault, he can recover; and when a bridge, located upon and constituting part of a public highway, has been built and maintained by township authorities, it is still the duty of the board to see that it is kept in repair, and for failing in this duty is liable, although it has never accepted, recognized or in anyway adopted the same as a county bridge. Vaught v. Commissioners of Johnson County, S. C. Ind. March 20, 1885.

22. PRACTICE [Removal of Causes to Federal Court]-Opposing Parties Citizens of Different States. etc.-A, a citizen of New York, and B, a citizen of New Jersey, sued C, a citizen of Maryland, and D, a subject of Prussia, in the State court. Held, that the suit was removable to the United States Circuit Court. [Citing Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457.] Ballin v. Lehr, U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y., April 1885; 24 Fed. Rep. 193.

24.

25.

which it could have been tried, and therefore too late under the act of 1875, is sought to be sustained by the act of 1866, (subdivision 2 of § 639, Rev. St. U.S.) But that clause is held to be repealed by the act of 1875, (Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407,) although it had been held otherwise previously, by various State and circuit courts."] Mairer v. Olmstead, U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y., April 1885: 24 Fed. Rep. 193.

Time of Removal, under Particular Circumstances, where Time of Filing Complaint was Extended.-A receiver of an insolvent bank commenced an action against the receiver of a national bank in the State court by summons' without any complaint setting out his cause of action, at a time early enough to make it triable at the April term of the court, if the pleading had been promptly put in; but the time of filing the complaint was extended to the April term, when plaintiff moved for an order for the examination of the officers of the national bank, to enable him to make complaint; and, in support of the motion, filed an affidavit stating that his cause of action arose out of the fact that the bank, of which plaintiff was receiver, had paid to defendant's bank illegal interest, and that by the statutes of the United States defendant became indebted to his bank for twice the amount so paid. If the examination had been had instantly, and a complaint been framed at once, the cause would not have been triable in due course until the May term, and at that term it was removed to the United States court. Held, that the cause was removable, and that the application for removal was made in time. Davies v. Marine Nat. Bank, U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. N. Y., April, 1885; 24 Fed. Repr. 194.

[Trials.]-Discretion of Court in Organizing the Jury.-A wide discretion is allowed the court in organizing the jury; and its rulings will not be revised unless the excepting party show that he has been prejudiced, or the statute infringed. Thus, when the court adjourned the first day eleven jurors had been accepted, but five of these were talesmen; on the next day, another panel being present, the court discharged the eleven, commenced de novo, and formed a panel from those regularly in attendance. It was held, that there was no error; that the discretion of the court was reasonably exercised. [In the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Taft, it is said: "It is a settled rule of practice, that some prejudice to the excepting party resulting from the rulings of the court below in organizing the jury, or, at least, some infringement of the statutory provisions relating thereto, must be shown before this court will revise the proceedings of the trial court. It is within the discretion of the court to direct the clerk in calling a panel to omit the names of such jurors as are presumably disqualified or unable to serve; for example, such as have been present and listened to a former trial of the same cause, or a trial involving the same questions; those ill or whose family are; and many other instances that might be named. A wide discretion is allowed the court in such cases; and until a panel is complete, we think a party has no vested right in any particular juror that may not be taken from him should the exigencies of the case in the discretion of the court require it. Thompson and Merriam on Juries, § 271, say: 'So far as the formation of the jury is concerned the litigant parties have a constitutional right to demand that it shall be impartial;

but this right is not impaired by the exclusion of jurors, though never so impartial, so long as impartial ones remain and try the case. And, it has been pertinently asked, what advantage would accrue to a party, should a new trial be awarded, because of the exclusion of competent jurors in his case? Obviously the only effect of granting the motion would be to take the verdict of another impartial jury. Upon the new trial he could not demand that the jurors of whose, exclusion he complains should sit in the case. He has therefore suffered no injury, nor, in the eye of the law, could he be possibly benefited by another trial. This view of the law does not permit a trial judge to exclude competent jurors arbitrarily and unreasonably from participating in the trial of a cause, civil or criminal. Whenever it shall appear that the court has thus abused its discretion, a new trial will doubtless be granted.' In Phelps v. Hall, 2 Tyler, 401, the court say that: No occasion can occur to render it necessary for one juror to sit on the panel in preference to another.' We think the discretion of the court below, in the case at bar, reasonably exercised. An unusual number of talesmen were upon the panel, the regular jurors were in attendance, the trial was to occupy several days; and it was much better that the regular jurors should try the case and the expense of talesmen avoided, than to retain the latter upon the panel; and as some question might arise as to the challenges, and in fact did, it was not unwise to discharge the six regular jurors and begin de novo. It does not appear but that the six, who were so discharged, were subsequently drawn. It is likely some of them were; and, as the defendant has already had all he is now seeking-a trial by an impartial jury-his exception upon this question should not be sustained." Quinn v. Halbert, S. C. Vt., Oct. Term, 1884; 57 Vt. 178 (adv. sheets).

26. TAXATION. [Telephone Companies.]- Assessed as an Entire System, and not in Respect of Particular Attachments.-A telephone company were the owners of certain overhead wires, which were supported by poles fixed in the ground, and by attachments to the roofs and chimneys of buildings. The consent of the owners and occupiers of the land and buildings was in every case first obtained in written agreements, by which the company undertook to pay an annual sum as an acknowledgment, to make good any damage that might be done to the property, and to remove the wires, attachments, and poles, upon notice to that effect. The only access to the wires and attachments on the buildings was through the interior of the buildings by the permission of the owners or occupiers, and then only during business hours, the company having no key or other way of obtaining admittance thereto. Similarly the only access to the poles was by the permission of the owners or occupiers of the land. Held (affirming the judgment of Mathew and Day, J.J.), that the telephone company had such an "exclusive occupation" of those parts of the buildings to which the wires were attached, and of the land in which their poles were fixed, as would render them liable to be rated, and that consequently they were rateable in respect of their wires, attachments, and poles taken as one entire system. Lancashire, etc. Telephonic Exchange Co. v. Overseers of Manchester, Eng. Ct. of App., 'Dec. 2, 1884; 52 L. T. (N. S.) 793.

27. VENDOR'S LIEN. [Waiver.] Waived by Taking Independent Security.-Where the vendor of land