made inquiries as to whether she could sustain her claim before they settled it, and that after those inquiries they came to the conclusion that if they paid the claim under the compromise it would cost the estate less than to stand a lawsuit. Mr. Hand, the other executor, says that after he had given the notice to Mrs. Adams to bring suit, he made fuller inquiry into the claim, and the relations between her and the testator. He also says that he found no evidence of any payment to her for her services as housekeeper for any part of the long period of time that she had lived with him, and that he had heard she had a claim, before it was presented to the executors. He further says that he was "under the impression that the executors had a right, in their discretion, to pay a just claim whether the heirs said so or not, and hence he did not particularly inquire of them about the claim or the other claims." The case of Ritter's Appeal, 23 Pa. St 95, was much relied upon by the appellant's counsel as holding that an executor who pays a claim against the estate, after notice from any person interested in the estate that such person desires that it be defended, and be not paid until after judgment, will not be allowed the claim in his account if he pays it without judgment. Of course that case is not authority here. It will be found, however, that it does not declare the doctrine imputed. It merely holds that where an executor or administrator pays a claim against an estate to which there may be a valid defence, and those interested, adversly, have stood by and permitted him to do so without notice to him of their wish that he should defend it, they cannot be heard to object to the allowance of the claim in his account. There the defence, which the appellants insisted that the administrator should have made, was the bar of the statute of limitations. As already remarked, there is no evidence that the claim in controversy here was not a just debt. On the contrary, the reasonable conclusion would be, from the admitted fact of the rendition of the services by the claimant and the want of any evidence of payment, that the claim was just and ought to have been paid. The decree will be affirmed with costs.

NOTE.-As to the validity of a contract based on an executor's forbearance to sue, or extension of time for payment, Yard v. Eland, 1 Ld. Raym. 368; Young v. Mackall, 4 Md. 362, 3 Md. Ch. 398; Clawson v. McCune, 20 Kan. 337; Martin v. Tarver, 43 Miss. 517; Smarr v. McMaster, 35 Mo. 349; Puckett v. James, 2 Humph. 565; see Heath v. Grinell, 61 Barb. 190; Kennedy's Appeal, 4, Pa. St. 149; Burnham v. Dalling, 3 C. E. Gr. 132; or receiving payment in depreciated currency, Bailey v. Dilworth, 10 Sm. & Marsh. 404; Smith v. Prothro, 2 S. C. 371; or in chattels, Gulledge v. Berry, 31 Miss. 346; Williams v. Maitland, 1 Ired. Eq. 92; or promissory notes, Anderson v. Gregg, 44 Miss. 170; Leland v. Manning, 4 Hun 7..

In Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583, a compromise with a del tor of the estate, made by two adminstrators against the consent of their co-administrator, and after notice by him of an application to remove them, one for insolvency and the other for incapacity, the

compromise being made contrary to the wishes of one-third of the persons entitled to distribution, was sustained.

If for the benefit of the estate, an executor may compound or release a debt, Blue v. Marshall, 3 P. Wms. 381; Larue v. White, 8 Dana 45; In re Scott, 1 Redf. 234; Gillespie v. Brooks, 2 Redf. 349; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 Serg. & R. 204; Bruner's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 46; Daniel v. Maclins, 6 Munf. 61; Kee v. Kee, 2 Gratt. 116; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151; see Legh v. Holloway, 8 Ves. 213; Hammond v. Hammond, L. R. (8 Irish Eq.) 322; Aikens v. Blain, 11 Grant's Ch. 212; Fridge v. Buhler, 6 La. Ann. 272; Verdier v. Simons, 2 McCord's Ch. 385; (but not his own debt, De Cordova v. De Cordova, 41 L. T. (N. S.) 43; Baughn v. Shackelford, 48 Miss. 255; Geigers v. Kaigler, 9 S. C. 401); and so may a trustee, Gorge v. Chansey, 1 Ch. Rep. 125; Atty.-Gen. v. Launderfield, 3 Swanst. 416; Shepard v. Saltus, 4 Redí. 232; Livingston's Case, 34 N. Y. 554; or an administrator, Pennington v. Healey, 1 Cr. & Mee. 402; Davenport v. First Cong. Soc., 33 Wis. 387: Boyd v. Oglesby, 23 Gratt. 674; Woolfork v. Sullivan, 23 Ala. 548; Henry County v. Taylor, 36 Iowa 259; Berry v. Parkes, 3 Sm. & Marsh 625; Long v. Shackelford, 25 Miss. 559; Wyman's Appeal, 13 N. H. 18; People v. Pleas, 2 Johns. Cas, 376; Berrien's Estate 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 23; Alexander v. Kelso, 3 Bax. 311; see Clark v. Davis, 32 Mich. 154; De Diemar v. Van Wagenen, 7 Johns. 404; Patten's Goods, 1 Tuck. 56; (but not as to the real estate, Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503; Hunt v. Thorn, 2 Mich. 213; Needham v. Belote, 39 Mich. 487; see Eagle v. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117; Ludlow v. Cooper, 4 Ohio St. 1); or the heirs, Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172; Ewing v. Handley, 4 Litt. 346; or legatees, Turner v. Campbell, 59 Ind. 279; Griffith v. Sheffield, 1 Eden, 73; or a creditor of the estate, Wood v. Westall, Younge 305; Portwood v. Outon, 3 B. Mon. 252; or a receiver, Henderson v. Myers, 11 Phila. 616; see Suydam v. Receivers, 2 Gr. Ch. 276; or the guardian of an infant, King v. King, 15 Ill. 187; Edsall v. Vandemark, 39 Barb. 589; Graham v. Hester, 15 La. Ann. 148; Lippiat v. Holley, 1 Beav. 423; Schee v. McQuilken, 59 Ind. 269, 276; see Brooke v. Lord Mostyn, 2 De G., J. & S. 373, 33 Beav. 457, 473; Wilson v. Birchall, L. R. (16 Ch. Div.) 41; Walker v. Ferrin, 4 Vt. 523; Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana 309; or its next friend, Drake v. Fortune, 1 Moll. 201; Walker v. Walker, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 265; but see Isaacs v. Boyd, 5 Port. 388; Miles v. Kaigler, 10 Yerg. 10; or assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, Leeming v. Lady Murray, L. R. (13 Ch. Div.) 123; ex parte Magnus, 3 M., D. & De G. 693; see Bousfield v. Bousfield, 31 Beav. 591, 3 Mont. & A. 41; ex parte Williams, 1 Mont. & A. 689; Burrill on Assignments (4th ed.) § 228; Watkins v. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57; or a municipal corporation, People v. Supervisors, 27 Cal. 656; or County commissioners, Shanklin v. Madison Co., 21 Ohio St. 575.

As to the powers of executors who are directed by the will to compound debts, &c., see Ratcliffe v. Winch, 17 Beav. 217; In re Alexander, 13 Irish Ch. 137.

An infant is not bound by a compromise, Tipton v. Tipton, 3 Jones 552; Britton v. Williams, 6 Munf. 453; but third persons cannot object, Horine v. Horine, 11 Mo. 649; see, however, Hargrave v. Hargrave, 12 Beav. 408.

A compromise by a trustee, &c., may be allowed to stand as between him and those beneficially interested, Forshaw v. Higginson, 8 De G., M. & G. 827; Bacot v. Heyward, 5 S. C. 441; Pool v. Dial, 10 S. C. 440; see Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 2; Alsager v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 217, 6 Ves. 748; especially after the lapse of considerable time, Yate v. Moseley, 5 Ves. 480; Manby V.

Benicke, 3 Kay & J. 342; Villines v. Norfleet, 2 Dev. Eq. 167; Washburn v. Washburn, 4 Ired Eq. 306. Whether creditors would also be bound by the lapse of time, see Noell v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 455.

In some states, express authority to compromise claims is given by statute to executors, &c., Pouce v. Wiley, 62 Ga. 118; although such statutes have been held not to include claims against the estate, Reitzell v. Miller, 25 Ill. 67; Clarke v. Hogle, 52 Ill. 427. They do not interfere with the parties' common law right to compromise, Chadbourn v. Chadbourn, 9 Allen 173; Chouteau v. Suydam, 21 N. Y. 179; Childs v. Updyke, 9 Ohio St. 333. JOHN H. STEWART.

Trenton, N. J.

SPECIAL JUDGMENTS IN VIEW OF INSOLVENCY OR BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.

GAY V. RAYMOND.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, Sept., 1885.

If the defendant, in an action at law wherein his property has been attached more than four months prior to the institution by him of insolvency proceedings, be defaulted pending the insolvency proceedings, the plaintiff has his election to take either a general judg ment or a special judgment enforcible only against the property attached; and if he elect the latter, and such property prove insufficient to satisfy his claim in full, no further judgment can be entered or process issued in the action to enforce the balance.

Contract on promissory notes. Property of the defendant was attached on the writ, and more than four months thereafter, the Massachusetts Insolvent law, Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 46, like the recent U. S. Bankrupt Act, saves to an attaching creditor the lien acquired by his attachment if made more than four months prior to the institution of insolvency proceedings by the defendant. The defendant instituted insolvency proceedings. The action was thereafter placed upon the trial list, and, upon being reached for trial, the defendant was defaulted. The plaintiff, a few days later, moved "that judgment be entered on said default against the property so attached,” reciting in his motion the attachment and insolvency proceedings. The motion was allowed, and the clerk docketed an entry of "Special judgment vs property attached on the writ on mo." Execution thereon was issued, in which the direction to the officer to levy was limited to the property attached, and said property was levied upon by force thereof, but proved insufficient to satisfy the claim in full Upon the return of the execution, the plaintiff moved for an additional judgment or further process to enforce such balance, which the court below refused.

Plaintiff excepted. Boardman & Tyng, for the plaintiff; Gray & Cogswell, for the defendant.

ALLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The proceedings in insolvency of themselves

had no effect upon the plaintiff's attachment or upon the action; they did not dissolve the attachment, and the defendant could have no benefit of them in the action, except by pleading a discharge obtained during its pendency, and, in aid of that, by obtaining a continuance of the action before a discharge was granted, on a representation of the pendency of the proceedings. The defendant, after having answered in the action by a general denial, and having made no representation of insolvency, was defaulted. The action and the attachment then stood as if there had been no proceedings in insolvency, and if nothing more had been done, judgment against the defendant would have been entered at the close of the term under the general order, and the property attached might have been taken on the execution without regard to the insolvency. But, after the defendant had been defaulted the plaintiff himself suggested the pendency of the insolvent proceedings, and moved "that judgment be entered on said default against the property so attached," which motion was allowed, and the entry on the docket made, "Special judgment es. the property attached on mo.' The property having proved insufficient to satisfy the full amount of the debt, the plaintiff now seeks for a judgment or an execution against the defendant for the unsatisfied balance, contending that the judgment may be taken as a general judgment against the defendant, upon which the plaintiff is entitled to an alias execution; or that the judgment against the property was an interlocutory judgment, leaving the action of the defendant pending for further proceedings, and that the entry of the judgment should be amended in conformity therewith. We think that the judgment was in effect against the property only, and that it was final.

An attachment on mesne process is a proceeding in a suit by which property is held, that it may be taken on an execution to be issued on a judgment which may be recovered in the action. It constitutes a lien on the property, which can be enforced only by judgment and execution in the suit. Insolvent proceedings commenced more than four months after an attachment do not dissolve it, but they may result in a discharge of the .defendant from the debt, which will prevent the plaintiff from recovering judgment against the defendant, and so obtaining an execution upon which the property may be taken. To prevent this result the special judgment against the property attached was devised, so that when a defendant pleaded a discharge in insolvency and showed a defence to the suit, so that no judgment could be had against him, the plaintiff was enabled to enforce his lien under the form of a judgment against the defendant enforceable only against the property attached. The precise form of the proceeding is not material: the substance of it is a judgment for the amount of the debt, to be executed only in preserving and enforcing the lien on the property.

The same judgment may be entered while the question of discharge is pending on a suggestion of insolvency and on motion of either party.

In this case, after the defendant had been defaulted, upon a suggestion of the insolvency of the defendant by the plaintiff and upon his motion, judgment was entered against the defendant for the amount of the debt and costs to be enforced only against the property attached, and execution was issued reciting the judgment against the defendant for said sums to be levied only on the property attached. We think that the judgment was a final disposition of the case. It was a final judgment, and it authorized an execution only against the property attached, and cannot be treated as a general judgment against the defendant. After the default, the plaintiff had his election to take a general judgment against the defendant, or the special judgment to hold the property, which would be the only judgment he could have in case the defendant had pleaded a discharge in insolvency. One would be, equally with the other, a final judgment, and the plaintiff having elected to take the special judgment, and, judgment having been entered, there was no opportunity or occasion for the defendant to plead his discharge, and no authority in the court at a subsequent term to change the judgment into a general judgment, or to issue execution on it as such. Stat. 1885, c. 59, having been enacted after the judgment was entered, can have no effect upon it.

Exceptions overruled.

NOTE. A judgment is the conclusion of law from certain premises judicially established. It is the authoritative ascertainment and expression of the existence, nature and extent of a legal duty or obligation, or of the non-existence of the same. But, since a judgment is merely declaratory, performance of the duty or obligation must, when not voluntarily rendered, if justice is to be effected, be enforced by process. The form of the judgment ought to express the whole extent of the duty or obligation, and the form of the process ought to be sufficient for its complete enforcement. The common law, from the inflexibility of its forms, does not always admit of this; yet, within certain limits, courts of common law have from time to time asserted the right to vary such forms, when necessary to the attainment of justice. Among such instances, is the special judgment against the property of bankrupt or insolvent defendants. The U. S. bankruptcy act (Rev. Sts. § 5044) and the Massachusetts insolvency law (Pub. Sts. c. 157, § 46) both reserved to an attaching creditor the lien acquired by his attachment when made more than four months prior to the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, but provided no remedy for the enforcement of the lien. The courts, upon plea of discharge in such cases, asserted the right to vary the usual form of judgment, by adding the proviso "to be enfored only against the property attached, and not against the person of the defendant or his other property." Bump Bkey., 10 Ed. 514, and cased cited. Davenport v. Tilton, 10 Met. 320. This accomplished the double purpose of enforcing the lien, and making the discharge operative. It ascertained and declared the nature, existence and extent of the defendant's duty

to the plaintiff, and further asserted that, if the whole duty or obligation could not be enforced by a resort to the attached property, the discharge of the defendant relieved him of the remainder. The same courts held that special judgment could be entered while the bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings were still pending. Bosworth v. Pomeroy, 112 Mass. 293; Sullings Guin, 131 Mass. 479. And it was assumed that the same form was appropriate as when the discharge had been granted. But one of the premises viz.: the existence of a discharge, was absent in the latter, as in the principal case, and instead we find another premise, viz.: the contingency of a refusal of, or neglect to plead, the discharge. Is the conclusion of law the same in both cases? If so, the pendency of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings is equivalent to a discharge. But this is obviously absurd. If the judgment had, in such cases, been entered "to be enforced, in the first instance, only against the property attached, and not to be enforced against his person or other property if, within a reasonable time, he secure and plead his discharge," this and a proper continuance of the action, would have secured to the defendant all the rights to which he was entitled, and would not have deprived the plaintiff of the right to enforce any balance of his claim. In the principal case the common law court, by the form of its judgment, discharged the defendant from a portion of his indebtedness, which the attached property failed to satisfy and which had not been, and might never be, discharged by the decree (discharge) of the bankruptcy or insolvency court. An examination of the statutes will show that the lien was given, not as a substitute for, but in addition to, the other rights and remedies of the creditor. If the form above suggested be the proper one, and the court below, in the principal case, erred in entering the judgment in the manner appropriate where the discharge has been granted and pleaded, it would seem that, under the familiar principles relating to the amendment of judgments, the error should have been corrected by the higher tribunal on the plaintiff's exceptions. Capen v. Stoughton, 16 Gray, 364.

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. [Fees.] Attorney having no License may Recover.-Although by practicing without a license attorney violates the law, client cannot on that account refuse to pay him his fees. Yates v. Robertson, Va. Ct. of App., May 7, 1885; 9 Va. L. J. 522.

2. CARRIERS OF GOODS. [Replevin.] When consignee may maintain Replevin.-A consignee of a car load of freight, who has tendered to the carrier, the charges due on the freight, may, on the refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods, maintain replevin or trover for them, there being no other legal

3.

claim upon them, and he is not bound to tender the amount of the freight into court. East Tenn., &c., Co. v. Hunt, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885, op. by Turney, J.

[Demurrage.]

When Railway Carriers not entitled to Demurrage.-A bill of lading which provides the goods shall be received by the owner or consignee at the ultimate point of delivery and if not taken away within twenty-four hours after their arrival, may, at the option of the delivering company, be sent to a warehouse, or be permitted to lie where landed, all at the expense and risk of the shipper, owner or assignee, does not entitle the carrier to a lien for demurrage, nor where the consignee has complied with the rules of the company, and it has failed to place the car in a position to be unloaded, can the carrier company charge demurrage.-Ibid.

4. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. [Negligenee.] Injury to Passenger while Alighting.—It is the duty of carriers of passengers, to provide safe and suitable places for passengers to get on and off it trains, at the regular stations, and to stop at such places, and give passengers a reasonable time to alight; and when the conductor of the train had announced the station and ordered a passenger to get off, it being so dark that she could not see the station, the train stopped, but was started before she could do so; she had a right to presume that she was at the usual place of getting off, and that there was at that place a safe and suitable place for her to alight from the train, and to rely on the conductors directions for her to get off. East Tenn., &c., R. Co. v. Conner, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885, op. by Cooke, J.

5.

Injury to Passenger through Train failing to stop at Station.-If the carrier of passengers accepts fare and agrees to stop at a station not designated as a stopping place on the schedule of that train, it is bound by its contract and must stop at the regular depot or place fixed for that purpose; but the fact that the agent has agreed to stop the car at the depot would furnish no basis on which a passenger could assume necessarily or as a matter of fact that the train had stopped, when in fact it was in motion and had been seen to be in motion only a few seconds before as it passed the depot, only about five steps from where the plaintiff claims was the stopping place. Nor is the company liable because the passenger bona fide believed it had stopped and stepped off. Before the company could be made liable under these facts, the conductor or agent of the company must have, by specific acts or conduct, directed to the fact that the train has stopped, misled the plaintiff, whereby he was injured. East Tenn., &c., R. Co. v. Massengill, S. C. Term, Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885, op. by Freeman, J.

When

6. CIVIL PROCEDURE. [Administration.] Claims allowed by County Court have force of Judgment.-An insolvent bill filed by an administrator against the heirs and creditors of his intestate to have the administration of the estate transferred from the county to the chancery court, and and then to have the necessary accounts taken to ascertain the indebtedness against an estate the personal assets and to sell the realty to pay said debts, and said insolvent estate fully wound up and settled: in subsequent proceedings, proceedings by the heirs to set aside the sale of the realty for irregularities in said insolvent proceedings; all

7.

8.

9.

10.

claims regularly presented and passed upon by the court in said insolvent proceedings have the force of a judgment as between the creditor and the administrator, and are prima facie valid and subsisting liabilities of said estate, and will be so re cognized in the subsequent proceedings. Davis v. Reaves, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 10, 1885, op. by Cooke, J.

[Lost Deed.] Quantum of Proof to set up.-Under a bill filed to set up a lost deed, if the evidence clearly establishes the proximate date of the deed, the names of the grantor and grantee, the signing of the deed by the grantor and its delivery to the grantee, and that the conveyance was of forty acres of a designated end of a seventy-five acre grant, the complainant would be entitled to have the deed set up and title divested and vested accordingly, even if the precise metes and bounds set out in the original deed could not be ascertained. Anderson v. Akard, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885, op. by Cooper, J.

Proof of Boundaries Embraced in Such a Deed.-And if the proof shows in addition that the boundaries of the land were pointed out by the grantor by the calls of the grant, beginning at a particular tree on one side of the tract and running around to a particular tree on the other side, closing the boundaries by a straight line from one of these trees to the other, and that these boundaries were included in the deed, the boundaries of the grant by actual survey between the designated trees and a straight line from one to the other, may properly be embodied in the deed, although the witnesses present at the making of the deed cannot recollect the poles and bearings actually called for in the lost deed.-Ibid.

Legal or equitable owner may set up his title-Any person having a legal or equitable interest in land, however small, whose possession is endangered by suit, and even without suit, may come into equity to set up a deed lost before registration, by bringing before the court all persons having an interest in the land, and the title of the complainant in such a bill may be confirmed by deed of confirmation, made after the filing of the bill or by acquiescence in his claims.-Ibid.

[Laches - Limitation.] Neither Lapse of time nor Statutes of Limitations Apply. -Neither the statutes of limitations nor lapse of time have any application to a bill filed to set up a lost deed by a person in possession of the land conveyed therein.—Ibid.

11. COPYRIGHT ["Charts."] Sheets of Paper Containing Tabulated Information. - The word "chart," as used in the copyright law, does not include sheets of paper exhibiting tabulated or methodically arranged information. It refers to marine maps and is classed with "maps" and other words of artistic import. [In the course of his opinion Mr. District Judge Wheeler says: "When books and charts were first protected by the copyright laws this works would not have been protected as as a chart; nor for many years afterwards. No change has been made in the use of that term in the statute to indicate that congress intended that it should take to itself there any new definition. On the contrary, it has been separated from the word 'book,' and kept with the word 'map,' and other words of artistic import, thus showing an in tention to continue its use in the same sense of a

chart of the class with maps, and other works of art. Mallan v. May, 13 Mees. & W. 511; Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704. When it is doubtful in what sense a word is used, it is proper to look at the purpose for which it is used. While this statute is remedial in so far as it furnishes a remedy to the party aggrieved, it is penal as to so much of the recovery as goes to the United States. The United States is not aggrieved in a civil sense; but the law is violated when the copyright is infringed, and punishment is inflicted to the extent of one-half the sum imposed. Johnson v. Donaldson, 18. Blatchf. 297; s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 22; Schreiber v Sharpless, 17 Fed. Rep. 589; Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76; s. c. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. As a penal statute, it must be construed strictly, and not be held to include what it does not clearly cover to make any one guilty by construction. Taney, C. J., U. S. v. Morris, 14 Pet. 475. Although it was ruled at the trial, for the purpose of taking the evidence as to the whole case, that this might be found to be a chart, on full consideration now it appears that the word 'chart,' as used in the statute, will not include it."] Taylor v. Gilman, U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. New York, Aug. 13, 1885; 24 Fed. Rep. 632.

12.-.[Penalty-Agency.]-The penalty or forfeiture given to a party aggrieved by the infringement of his copyright cannot be recoverd from a principle whose agents have, without his knowledge, been guilty of such infringment. [In his opinion Mr. District Judge Wheeler says: "There are many cases where property is forfeited on account of some situation in which it is placed without the knowledge or consent of the owner, but in such cases the property only is proceeded against, and there is no conviction of the owner to affect his person or other property. U. S. v. Brig Malek Adel, 2 How. 210; Dobbins' Distillery v. U. S. 96 U. S. 395. And there are cases where it is held that the act of the agent in the course of his empoyment is evidence against the principal in a criminal proceeding, but evidence which may be rebutted by showing want of knowledge, consent, or encouragement. Com. v. Nichols, 10 Metc. 259; Attorney General v. Sidden, 1 Cromp. & J. 219; Rex v. Gutch, 1 Moody & M. 433: Rex v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2686. Here this want appeared. Cases of sales of intoxicating liquor are instanced, but in such cases the statute frequently prohibits and punishes sales by agents and servants expressly. Where a penalty or forfeiture is given to a party aggrieved, so that the recovery is a remedy for the injury, the right to recover may be founded upon the doings of agents, the same as other rights of action. Stockwell v. U. S. 13 Wall. 531; Attorney General v. Sidden, 1 Cromp. & J. 219. That the recovery is for more than single damages, or of a fixed sum, is not material, if it is for compensation. Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt. 80; Newman v. Waite, 43 Vt. 587. But when the penalty, or a part of it, is inflicted for punishment only, the guilt of the party to be punished should be established. Schreiber v. Sharpless, 6 Fed. Rep. 175 As the case is now considered, a verdict for the plaintiff would fail upon each of these grounds."] Ibid.

13.———. [Accounting.] The principles and evidence on which an account in equity will be stated in an action for an infringment of copyright considered at length. Myers v. Callaghan, U. S. Cır. Ct. N. D. Ill., July 6, 1885; 24 Fed. Rep. 636.

14. DEED. [Interpretation.] Covenant against Nui

not

sances, when held not to include Livery Stable.A livery stable would nor be offensive to a neighborhood within the meaning of a covenant not to erect any building for or to carry on upon certain premises certain enumerated trades, cow stable or hogpens, "or any other dangerous, noxious unwholesome or offensive establishment, trade or calling, or business whatsoever." The word "cow" before "stables" limited the establishments prohibited of the same class, and the words "other," &c., do not include stables where domestic animals are to be kept. [In giving his opinion Clement, J., commented on some authorities as follows: "In Baker v. Ludlow (2 Johnson's Cases, 289) the words used in a policy of marine insurance were as follows; 'It is agreed that salt, grain of all kinds, Indian meal, fruits, cheese, dried fish, vegetables, and roots and all other articles perishable in their own nature, are warranted by the assured free from average unless general.' A question arose as to pickled fish which formed part of the cargo. The Court say: 'By the terms of the memorandum fish in general were intended to be included, and the expression driedfish implies that other fish were not intended.' It was also held that the subsequent words 'all other articles perishable in their own nature' were not applicable to the articles previously enumerated nor could they repel the implication arising from the enumeration of them. In the case of Hare v. Horton (5 Barnewall & Adolphus, 715), A granted by mortgage to B an iron foundry and two dwelling houses and the appurtenances 'together with all grates, boilers, bells and other fixtures in and about the said two dwelling houses.' The Court decided that the conveyance of the foundry, if nothing else had been expressed, would have passed the title to the fixtures, but the mention of the articles in the two dwelling houses showed that it was the intention of the parties that the fixtures in the foundry were not conveyed. Lord Mansfield, in construing the act of 43 Elizabeth, c. 3, section 1, which required the overseers of the poor to tax every occupier of lands, coal mines and saleable underwoods, in a case where it was sought to tax the occupier of lead mines, observed (The Smelting Company v. Richardson, 3 Burrows, 134), that the words of the act 'are coal mines, not mentioning any other kind of mines, and that is equal to an express exception or exclusion of all other mines.' See also The King against The Inhabitants of Sedgley (2 Barnewall & Adolphus, 65). In Parsons on Contracts (Volume 2, 516) the rule as to construction of contracts is stated as follows: 'If however there be many things of the same class or kind, the expression of one or more of them implies exclusion of all not expressed; and this, even if the law would have implied all if none had been enumerated."] Flanagan v. Hollingsworth, Brooklyn (N. Y.) City Court; Daily Register (N. Y.) Vol. 28, No. 89.

15. DEED. [Latent Ambiguity.] When Reference may be made to other Deeds and to Extrinsic Evi dence. When the description of land conveyed in a tax deed is uncertain, and reference is made therein to the record of other deeds in the chain of title, such records and other extrinsic evidence, are admissible in evidence to give certainty to the description. [In the opinion of the court by Cassoday, J., the point is thus learnedly discussed: "The ambiguity in the description here consists in reference to records, documents, and descriptions outside the deeds, and which were necessarily to