to be regarded as a part of the description. This was latent ambiguity. In support of the plaintiff's contention that such extrinsic evidence should have been excluded, counsel cite and rely upon Curtis v. Sup'rs, 22 Wis. 167; Orton v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 102; Delorme v. Ferk, 24 Wis. 201; Johnson v. Ashland Lumber Co. 52 Wis. 458; s. c. 9 N. W. Rep. 464. In Curtis v. Sup'rs, supra, the lots, blocks, and addition appeared to be perfectly described on the face of the tax deed, but the recorded plat revealed the fact that there were no such lots and blocks in the addition named. It also appeared from the plat that there were such lots and blocks in a different addition, and it was held that parol evidence was not admissible to show that such different addition was the one intended, instead of the one named in the deed; in in other words, that parol evidence was inadmissible to strike from the deed one addition and insert a different addition. Orton v. Noonan, supra, was in principle the same. It may be questionable whether the case before us comes within the principle of those decisions. In Delorme v. Ferk, supra, it was held that the description was good under chapter 53, Laws 1866, notwithstanding it might have been invalid in the absence of that statute. That act provided that 'in all advertisements, certificates, papers, or proceedings relating * the assessment and collection of taxes, and proceedings founded thereon, as well heretofore as hereafter, any description of lands which shall indicate the land intended with ordinary and reasonable certainty, and which would be sufficient between grantor and grantee in an ordinary conveyance, shall be sufficient.' § 1047, Rev. St.; chapter 268, Laws 1881. Here one of the tax deeds was prior to the passage of the act, and the other after. The objections taken went merely to the mode of proving the land to be within the description, and not to the groundwork and essence of the transaction which resulted in the execution and delivery of the deeds. Assuming that, as the law stood prior to that enactment, parol evidence was inadmissible to aid the description, yet the act was obviously intended to be retroactive, and, if valid, clearly authorized the admission of such evidence. It merely provided, in effect, that in tax deeds theretofore issued, as well as those thereafter issued, if the description given indicated "the land intended with ordinary and reasonable certainty' it should be sufficient, if it would have been sufficient in an 'ordinary conveyance' between grantor and grantee. In other words, that extrinsic evidence should be admissible in the case of such tax deeds, the same as it would be in the case of an ordinary conveyance between grantor and grantee. That the legislature had power to so enact seems to be well established. Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556; Selsby v. Redlon, 19 Wis. 17; Ehle v. Brown, 31 Wis. 405. Such being the law, the question of uncertainty in the description in these tax deeds must be determined by the same rules as are applicable to ordinary conveyances between grantor and grantee. In Johnson v. Ashland Lumber Co. 52 Wis. 458, s. c. 9 N. W. Rep. 464, the description in the tax deed was, 'lot 3, and the north-east quarter of the north-west quarter, less seven acres, of § 5.' The difficulty with that description consisted in the impossibility of determining what portion of the 40 constituted the 7 acres, and as that could not be located with certainty, it was equally impossible to locate the remaining 33 acres. Had that exception been 'less seven acres,' as described in some other record document, plat, or description, capable of being proved by extrinsic evidence, then what would otherwise be uncertain would, by virtue of such extrinsic evidence, be made definite and certain. In For these reasons the case is distinguishable. Campbell v. Packard, 61 Wis. 88; s. c. 20 N. W. Rep. 672, no complete description was given in the deed, nor by reference to anything outside the deed, and hence the case is distinguishable. In the same volume (Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 689, s. c. 10 N. W. Rep. 6) it is said that 'deeds are to be construed with reference to the actual rightful state of the property at the time of their execution. * For this purpose extrinsic evidence is often admitted, in order to place the court in the position of the parties at the time of making the deed, and thus enable the court to intelligently interpret the language used. The law will not declare a deed void for uncertainty, when the light which contemporaneous facts and circumstances furnish renders the description definite and certain.' These positions are abundantly sustained by the authorities there cited. The opinion in that case cites a class of cases in which it was held, in effect, that where the language in the description of the land conveyed, or excepted from the conveyance, is otherwise doubtful, a practical location by the agreement, acts, conduct, or declarations of the parties concerned, followed by adverse and exclusive possession, was sufficient to remove the doubt, and give certainty to the description. 52 Wis. 691, supra; s. c. 10 N. W. Rep. 6. See, also, Whitney v. Robinson, 53 Wis. 314. 315; s. c. 10 N. W. Rep. 512; Parkinson v. McQuaid, 54 Wis. 484; s. c. 11 N. W. Rep. 682; McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 694, 695; s. c. 13 N. W. Rep. 694. In McMillan v Wehle, supra, the language above quoted was in substance applied to a tax deed executed and recorded August 6, 1856, and hence involved the same question as here presented."] Meade v. Gilfoyle, S. C. Wis. Sept. 22, 1885; 25 N. W. Repr. 413. 16. EVIDENCE. [Assault and Battery-Character for Violence.] Character of Plaintiff for Violence When admissible.-In an action for an assault and battery, evidence that the plaintiff was domineering, turbulent and quarrelsome, and that this was known to the defendant, is erroneously excluded. [In giving the opinion of the court, Royce, C. J., said: "The second exception was to the refusal of the court to allow the defendant to show, that the female plaintiff was a domineering, turbulent, and quarrelsome woman, and that when she had formed a purpose or determination, it was useless to oppose her or attempt to reason with her; and that this was known to the defendant prior to the affray. The testimony of the defendant previously given tended to show, that she commenced the affray, and that he used no violence towards her except what was necessary for his defense. There can be no doubt that evidence of that character is admissible. Harrison v. Harrison, 43 Vt. 417; State v. Meader, 47 Vt. 78; State v. Lull, 48 Vt. 581. The force that a party may use when assailed, in repelling the assault and protecting his person, is largely influenced by his knowledge of the character of the assailant."] Knight v. Smythe, 57 Vt. 529 (adv. sheets.) appeared after the affray; and the answer, "She seemed to be in great pain in her head and back," was also admissible. ["The question," said Royce, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court, "were not such that required the aid of professional skill to qualify the witness to answer. Evidence of the appearance of a party claiming to have been injured is admissible as explanatory of the nature and extent of the injury; and all that is required to qualify a witness to testify concerning the same is, that he should have so observed the party as to be able to determine what his appearance was. The weight to be given to the testimony of such a witness must depend largely upon his intelligence and the extent and character of the observations made by him. But such evidence, we understand, has always been held to be admissible. In Earl & Wife v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, which was an action of trespass for an assault and battery upon the wife, the plaintiff was allowed to show by an unprofessional witness, that she saw Mrs. Earl a few days after the affray and examined her person; and she described the injuries that she observed, and testified that Mrs. Earl complained of her right side troubling her. In City of Shawneetown v. Mason 82 Ill. 337, where the physical condition of a party was in dispute, the opinion of an ordinary witness as to his appearance was admitted; in Wilkinson v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562, the opinion of such a witness, that he appeared sick, was admitted; and in Railroad Co. v. McLeudon, 63 Ala. 266, testimony that the party was suffering and looked bad, was admitted. There was no error in permitting the question to be put and answered."] Knight v. Smythe, 57 Vt. 529 (advance sheets.) 18. INSURANCE. [Waiver.] Waiver of Proof of Loss. -A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Thus, when the company's special agent sent to adjust the loss, declared: "That the claim was worthless, and that the loss would not be paid, because he burned the property," but the referee found, that the agent did not intend to waive the proofs of loss, that the plaintiffs did not understand that they were waived, and were not misled as to furnishing such proofs, it was held that there was no waiver. But, where the property destroyed was owned by a married woman, and her husband signed and swore to the proof of loss .as her agent, and on objection by the company to such proof, he offered, if the company would return the proof received, to have it corrected and executed by his wife, and thereupon the defendant refused to return it for amendment, or to specify other defects, it was held that such conduct ought to be accounted a waiver, or an estoppel. [In the opinion of the court Royce, C. J., said: "It is established beyond question that such requirements are for the benefit of the company and may be waived by it; and also that, being conditions of forfeiture, they are not favored by the law, and a waiver of them is often found on slight evidence. Thus, it has been held that an unqualified refusal by the company to pay the loss upon other specified grounds, made before the expiration of the time within which it was the duty of the assured; by the terms of the policy, to file his proofs of loss, is an act from which the triers may find a waiver of such proofs. See authorities cited in Lyon v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 31 Alb. L. J. 59; 20 N. W. Rep. 829; and in Mosley v. Vt. M. F. I. Co., 55 Vt. 142. But it is equally well settled that a waiver is as remarked by Taft, J., in Donahue v. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt., on page 382, "an intentional relinquishment of a known right;" and that whether or not there has been a waiver is always a question of facts for the jury. Donahue v. Ins. Co., supra; Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 16 Am. Law Reg. 162; Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisot, 35 Ohio St. 35, and authorities supra."] Findeisen v. Metropole Fire Ins. Co., 57 Vt. 520 (Advance Sheets). 19 JUDICIAL SALES-Rights of Purchasers Pendente Lite.-Pendente lite purchasers are bound by the decrees entered affecting the property so purchased by them, although they may not be parties to the suit. If such purchaser has notice in fact of the litigation involving the title to the property so purchased, his purchase will be deemed fraudulent. [Citing on this point Harmon v. Byram, 11 W. Va. 511; White v. Perry, 14 Id. 66-76; Zane v. Fink, 18 Id. 693-734; Arnold v. Casner, 22 Id. 444; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 406.] The statute of limitations does not run in favor of a pendente lite purchaser. Such purchaser i possession of land so purchased will not be regarded as holding it adverse to the parties to the suit during the litigagation. Land is sold at a judicial sale, the sale confirmed and a conveyance made to the purchaser and he takes possession; the litigation continues, and after the purchaser has been in the actual possession of the land under such conveyance for more than ten years, the decrees ordering and confirming the sale are reversed and declared void, and the sale set aside for the want of jurisdiction in the court to order the sale; during all this time the taxes on the land are paid by the purchaser, and the same is not charged for taxes to the owner, and he pays no taxes on it, Held: I. The possession of such purchaser under such void sale is not adverse to the owner. II. The payment of the taxes by such purchaser inures to the benefit of the owner, and the State can have no claim against the owner for taxes on the land, and his title cannot become forfeited for not also paying taxes on the land. The vendee of such purchaser can occupy no higher position or acquire any better right to the land as against the owner during the litigation than that held and acquired by his vendor. Lynch v. Andrews, S. C. App., W. Va., Wheeling, April 22, 1885; 25 W. Va. Rep. 751 (Advance Sheets). 20. When Purchaser at Void Administrator's Sale Subrogated to Rights of Creditors. The purchasers at said void sale are entitled to credit for betterments,taxes and to be subrogated to the rights of creditors, whose debts were bona fide subsisting debts, against said estate, nd were a charge on said land, while the heir is entitled to the reasonable rents for the same period. The purchase money having been paid into court and ordered to be prorated by the court on the claims adjudicated as valid against the estate, was a satisfaction pro tanto, even though the creditor failed to receive it. Davis v. Reaves, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 10, 1885. Op. by Cooke, J. 21. LANDLORD AND TENANT. [Custom.] Custom for Farmers to Allow Tenants Hay Found on the Premises, a Bad Custom.-The tenant on leaving the premises refused to pay for the fodder and hay that he had found on the premises when he took possession, and which he used for his own cattle. Suit having been brought against him by his landlord, he set up a custom among farmers to allow this to their tenants. Held, that the evidence produced did not prove such a custom, and, even if proved, it was an unreasonable and bad custom, that the tenant could use the property of the landlord without making compensation. Anewalt v. Hummel, S. C. Pa, April 13, 1885; 16 Pittsb. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 92. 22. NEGLIGENCE. [Master and Servant-FellowServants.] Servants in Different Grades-Engineer on Passenger Train and Brakeman on Freight Train.-Several employes of a railroad company, although of different grades, when employed in a common service, are fellow-servants within the rule that servants undertakes to run the risk of injuries from negligence of his fellowservants. An engineer on a moving passenger train and a brakeman on a freight train of the same company at a depot, who is ordered by the conductor of his train to go along the line of the road to display danger signals to the passenger train, are fellow servants for the purpose of bringing the train safely into the depot. Railroad Co. v. Rush, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885. Op. by Cooper, J. 23. PARTITION. [Dower]. Widows' Allotment in Voluntary Partition when Presumed to be Dower. -Under a voluntary partition between a widow and her two children, of land descended from her, the husband and father in which the widow receives one-third, including the dwelling house and improvements. The presumption of the law would be that the widow's allotment was in dower, and the execution by the parties at the time of a penal bond to abide the division would only strengthen the presumption. Cloyd v. Cloyd, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885. Op. by Cooper, J. 24. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS. [Infringement— Accounting.] Principles and Evidence Applicable in a suit in equity for an accounting against an infringer considered at length. Graham v. Geneva Lake Crawford Man. Co., U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Wis., May 10, 1881; 24 Fed. Repr. 642. 25. RIVERS. [Navigable.] Title to Soil of Bed of.The soil below low water mark of the rivers of this State navigable in a legal sense, as well as the use of the stream for purposes of navigation, belongs to the public, and the title is vested in the State for the use of the public. Goodwin v. Thompson, S. C. Tenn., Knoxville, Oct. 3, 1885. Op. by Cooper, J. 26. 27. Grant of Land Including the Bed of the River Void.-The title to the soil under the waters of such navigable streams cannot be acquired by individuals under our general land laws, and a grant thus obtained, which undertakes to include the bed of such a navigable stream and to give the grantee the exclusive privilege of taking from the bed of the stream so included, sand, gravel and other deposits found therein is to this extent void. Ibid. Legislature, Power of, over Navigable Rivers.-Question, whether the legislature, under our constitution or upon general principles, can by express grant, confer upon an individual the exclusive title to the soil under a navigable stream, especially after the Congress of the general government has undertaken to improve the navigability of the stream. Ibid. 28. SALES OF PERSONALTY. [Conditional Replevin.] Sale of Chattel on Condition that it prove satisfactory and subsequent Insolvency and Assignment of Vendee.-A. sold to B. in 1879 an engine and boiler, B. to pay for it in one year if it proved satisfactory. B. subsequently made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and his assignees sold the engine and boiler to C., from whom the the defendants purchased them. In 1882 A. brought an action of replevin against defendants for the engine and boiler. Held, that he could not recover. This was a conditional contract, but as over one year had elapsed it would be presumed that the engine and boiler were satisfactory to B., and that the title to them passed to him or his assignee. [In the opinion of the court by Clark, J., it is said: "The case of Dewey v. Erie Borough, 2 Harris, 211, is very similar in all respects. The defendant in that case gave a note for the price of a town clock, payable in one year, 'conditioned, however, that the said clock perform to the satisfaction,' etc. The suit was upon the note, and it was shown that the clock was not satisfactory. Chief Justice Gibson, delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The defendant promised to pay the price at the expiration of a year, on condition that the clock should perform to the satisfaction of the burgess and town council, or their successors. The corporation, consequently, had a year to signify its determination. The burgess and town council were ultimately dissatisfied with it, and, after two years, took it down, but did not offer to return it, or attempt to give notice of their dissatisfaction. ** It is clear and indisputable law, that the burgess and council were bound to give notice of their dissatisfaction, with an offer to return the clock, or attempt to do it. * * But there was not a spark of evidence to prove that any effort had been made whatever, and the contract had become absolute.'"] Hickman v. Shimp, S. C. Pa., March 30, 1885; 16 Pitts. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 82. 29. TAXATION. [Stock in Trade.] Sewing Machine kept for hire.-A party letting sewing machine for hire, under an agreement that after a certain time, the rent being paid up, the machine shall become the property of the lessee in consideration of one cent, is liable to taxation on all machines so let until the title has completely passed. [The following is the opinion in full as delivered by Allen, J.: "The only question is whether the sewing machines in question were "stock in trade" within the meaning of Pub. St. c. 11, § 20, cl. 1. It cannot be questioned that the machines kept by the petitioner in its store in Lynn for the purpose of sale or letting belonged to its stock in trade. We see no ground for the contention that a machine ceased to be stock in trade when a contract was made for its sale, or when it was let for hire, and the possession delivered to the lessee. By the contract under which possesion was delivered, the general and taxable property in the machine remained in the petitioners, and was held for the purposes of the business carried on at its store as fully as if the machines remained in the store. See Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 332. The fact the petitioner had an office in Boston, under directions from which its agents in charge of the Lynn store acted, does not affect the questions." Singer Manf'g Co. v. County Com. of Essex, S. J. C. Mass., May, 1885; 1 N. E. Repr. 419. 30. TROVER. [Landlord and Tenant-Trade Fixtures.] When Tenant may Maintain Trover against Landlord for Trade Fixtures.-Where a landlord takes possession before the end of the term without the tenants' consent, and prevents the tenants from removing their personal proper ty, the tenant can bring an action of trover and conversion against the landlord for the personal property, even if it is attached to the realty. [In the opinion of the court by Trunkey, J., it is said: "A fixture erected by a tenant on demised premises for the purpose of trade is personal property, and may be removed by him within the term; and it does not alter the case that by agreement between the landlord and tenant the fixture in a certain event was to become the property of the landlord, unless the event had actually occurred: Lehman v. Miles, 4 Watts, 330. By law and also by agreement of the parties, the property claimed by the plaintiffs was personalty until the end of the term, or until the end of thirty days from the notice of the default. The judge of the Common Pleas, citing Darrah, Moore & Co. v. Baird, 101 Pa. St. 275, as authority, ruled that trover would not lie because the landlord was in exclusive possession of the land before the tenant undertook to remove the fixtures. But the facts in that case materially differ from the facts in this. A glance at the opinion of the present Chief Justice reveals that the ruling was based on the fact that the landlord had actual and legal possession by consent of all interested parties, before those who had been tenants demanded the fixtures; it was the case of demand and refusal after the end of the term. The point and scope of the case are stated in the syllabus thus: A refusal by the owner of the freehold, after he has taken possession upon the expiration and surrender of the term, to permit the former tenants to remove fixtures which they had attached to the premises during the term, will not enable the latter to maintain trover for them against him.' In this case the landlord took possession before the end of the term, without the tenants' consent, and with strong hand prevented the tenants from removing their personal property. Possession was not voluntarily surrendered by the tenants-it was wrongfully taken by the landlord. Before the end of the term, whether the property in controvery was attached to the realty or not, it was personalty and belonged to the tenants. They had agreed not to remove it until payment of all royalties. Upon such payment within the term, the right of removal was complete. The instant the defendant took and appropriated the plaintiffs' property they became entitled to redress by proper action at law. His wrongful possession is not a bar to the action of trover. If he entered in violation of his contract and unjustly converted the chattels, he is liable as a stranger would be for entering and taking the plaintiffs' goods. The title to real property cannot be directly tried in trover, but may be incidentally brought in question: Green v. Ashland Iron Co., 62 Pa. St. 97. This issue involves only the ownership of personal property and the right to remove it. No title to land is in question, and the right of possession is determined by the contract. Whether the defendant had the right of possession under the contract is incident to the issue, as would be the claim of a third party who had intruded into possession and appropriated the plaintiffs' personal property."] Watts v. Lehman, S. C. Pa., Oct. 6, 1884; 16 Pittsb. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 78. 31. WILL. [After-Acquired Property.] Devise of, After-Acquired Property, Valid in Illinois.-The devise of after-acquired property is valid in Illinois. [In giving the opinion of the court to this effect, Craig, J., said: "In England, and in some of the States, property will not pass under a will which was acquired after the execution of the will, unless the will has been republished. But such is not the law in this State. Here the power to devise after-acquired property exists, and it is only a question of intention, to be determined from the language used in the will. As said in Peters v. Spillmann, 18 Ill. 373: 'It is a mere question of intention in the testator to pass such lands, and not a question of power, when the intention is clear.'" Williams v. Johnson, S. C. Ill., Nov. 17, 1884; 1 N. E. Repr. 274. 32. WORDS AND PHRASES. [Execution Sale-Publication of Notice.] When "for" means "during."— The provisions of the code which require public notice of the time and place of the sale of real estate upon execution to be given "for at least thirty days before the day of sale, by advertisement in some newspaper, etc., are not satisfied by one publication of the notice at least thirty days before the day of sale. The word "for" as used in this statute, means "during,” and the notice must be published for or during thirty days before the day of sale. [Whitaker v. Beach, 12 Kan. 493, approved: Craig v. Fox, 16 Ohio, 563, distinguished.] Lawson v. Gibson. S. C. Neb., Sept. 15, 1885; 24 N. W. Repr. 447. RECENT PUBLICATIONS. AMERICAN REPORTS, VOLUME FIFTY.-The American Reports: Containing all Decisions of General Interest Decided in the Courts of Last Resort of the Several States, with Notes and References. By Irving Browne. Vol. L., containing all Cases of General Authority in the following Reports: 51 Connecticut: 109 Illinois; 99 Indiana: 100 Indiana; 63 Iowa; 81 Kentucky: 62 Maryland, 137 Massachusetts; 52 Michigan: 32 Minnesota: 80 Missouri; 46 New Jersey Law: 98 New York: 11 Oregon: 62 Texas; 17 Texas Court Appeals; 60 Wisconsin; 61 Wisconsin. Albany: John D. Parsons, Jr. Publisher, 1885. The selection of cases in this volume is excellent; the syllabus of the editor is terse and pointed; extrinsic matter, not conneted with the main question, is eliminated; many useful notes appear; and, on the whole, the volume is much to be commended. QUERIES AND ANSWERS. [Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.] QUERIES. 25. Under the laws of Alabama, stock in an incorporated company is liable to levy and sale under execution. The execution is a lien from the levy. A, having recovered judgment against B, caused an execution to be levied on certain stock owned by B in an incorporated company, pursuant to the statute, on the day of February, 1885. On the day of 1885, the company declared a dividend on the stock On the day of May, 1885, the sheriff sold the stock, and the same was duly transferred on the books of the company to the purchaser. Who is entitled to the dividend declared after the execution became a lien, and before the sale--the defendant or the purchaser? A reply with the authorities will greatly oblige the PURCHASER. Montgomery, Ala. 26. LETTING PUBLIC CONTRACT TO OTHER THAN LOWEST BIDDER.-The town of advertise for sealed proposals for building a school-house "according to plans and specifications which may be seen at town hall upon application to janitor. All proposals to be addressed to H, chairman of Committee on Buildings, etc." This committee were elected at a town meeting, and authority conferred on them to make a contract for the erection of a school-house. This committee in their advertisement did not reserve the right to reject any and all bids. Three bids were made in conformity to the advertisement. The contract was awarded to the highest bidder, who also was a member of the committee, but resigned for the purpose of bidding on the contract. The lowest bidder is responsible and capable. Can the lowest bidder maintain an action for damage against the town? Cite authorities. Boston, Mass. **** Query 14. [21 Cent. L. J. 259]. In 1867 Shelton borrowed $400 of Willoughby and gave his promissory note, and Irish signed the note with Shelton apparently as co-principal, but in reality as surety. The note has never been paid, but Shelton has made payments from time to time, so that as to him the statute of limitations has not run. The payments were made without the knowledge or consent of Irish. Action against both Shelton and Irish; Irish was allowed to show by parol that he signed as surety, and then the court gave judgment in his favor, on the ground that payment by Shelton did not bar the statute of limitations as to him. Is that good law? RUSSETT. St. Paul, Minn. Answer. The cases are conflicting and may be divided into three classes: 1. Those which, on the strength of Whitcomb v. Whiting, 1 Smith's L. C. (7th ed.) 941988, hold that, as payment by one of several co-contractors enures to the benefit of all, so part payment or other admission by one binds all. So where the party making the admission is a principal, and the party sought to be bound by it a mere surety. Frye v. Barker, 4 Pick. 382, 14 id. 387; 17 Conn. 511; 6 R. I. 505, 2. By statute in Eng. Me. and Mass., and by the decisions of a number of States, including N. Y. and Penn., a more logical rule prevails, under which the part payment or other admission by one of several cocontractors will bind the others only when there is shown a power to make such admission other than that arising out of the joint nature of the contract. 3. In a few States, as Md., Ga., Ark., and the Carolinas, an intermediate doctrine prevails, under which part payment by one of several co-contractors will suspend, the running of the statute, but will not revive their liability after it has once been extinguished. See Parker v. Butterworth, (S. C. N. J.) in 31 Alb. Law Jour. 48. The authorities are too numerous to be cited, but will be found collected in 1 Sm. L. C. supra, and in 1 Greenl. Ev. § 112, note 3; Angell on Limitaions, § 260, note 5, and chapter XXIII, passim. Arkadelphia, Ark. T. D. C. JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. DID NOT MEAN TO INSULT THE COURT.-Mr. Rogers at the Dinner of the American Bar Association told this story: The judges were holding court in some Western county-town, (of course it was many yearss ago,) and Mr. Brown's case was cailed. Mr. Brown wa at the tavern and the court sent for him and told him that his case had been called and that since he had not answered it must go over. The case was an appeal. Brown said, "Your Honors, I don't care which way you decide that case. If you decide to affirm, I will get my money, and if you decide to reverse, I will have a new trial and get another verdict with ten per cent. interest added, so I don't care which way you decide it, but I want you to decide it now. I hope you will not put it off. I'll tell you what I'll do, I'll give you five dollars to hear it now." The court answered indignantly, "Do you mean to insult us, Mr. Brown?" "Why no, your Honors," said Mr. Brown, "I did not mean to insult you. I had no intention of insulting your Honors. Why, your Honors misunderstood me, I did not means to say that I would give the court five dollars altogether. I meant to say that I would give your Honors five dollars apiece." Ex. A LOW FEE.-A gentleman, Mr. X., who is now a prominent member of the Louisville bar, tells a good story about the times when he was a young man and practiced law in the same county with Judge- ,now a member of one of the appellate courts at Frankfort. They were once employed on the same side in a case where they had to do an unusual amount of work,there were depositions taken both in and out of the county, an argument on demurrer and perhaps a hung jury and a new trial, in all events a great amount of work was done, but finally the case was finished, and the client, who was a rich man but very close, came to settle the fee. He saw Mr. X. and offered $200, but X thought that was scarcely fair but referred the matter to his co-counsel, JudgeThe client according went off to see the Judge and asked him what he thought would be a fair fee. "Well," the Judge said, 'we have done a great deal of work in that case and you must pay us a good fee. Think we ought to have $50, $25 apiece." The client paid the money and went out without a word.-Ky. Law Reporter. A DUKE ON LAWYERS.-The Duke of Marlborough writes as follows to the London Times: "No country in the civilized or uncivilized world possesses so barbarous and extravagant a system of land transfer as this country. A brokerage of 10 to 15 per cent. and a delay of three to six months weigh like a tombstone on every transfer operation in the land market. The House of Commons' Committee of 1878 examined exhaustively the character of these abuses. It was shown that both Lord Westbury's Act of 1862, as well as Lord Cairns's far more intel.ligent measure of 1875 had been succesysfull burked and scotched by the profession, who were also unanimous before the commission in their opposition to any real reform of their conveyancing system. A fertile expedient with the legal profession is to enter heartily into the consideration of a measure of reform, but at the same time to lead the inquiry so that the reform when carried shall-first, either leave an undefended spot for hamstringing the measure afterwards, or else, secondly, to insure that the complication of the new system shall be assured by the safeguards and involutions which it is caused to contain. I venture to believe this is true of every Act of Parliament which affects the interest of this class, and I give as an instance of the ingenuity of the |