Illinois statute are substantially the same. 2 Starr and Curtiss Anno. Stat., p. 2466. par. 2, and in Missouri, which is that the "will shall be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person by his direction and in his presence," 1 R. S. Mo., 1879, p. 680, § 3962. Under this clause it has been held that the instrument as written shall be subscribed by affixing the name of the testator in the usual way of "executing other instruments of writing." Here the will was not written by the testator, and not signed at the conclusion or "foot thereof," though his name appeared in the body of the will, and, it also appeared, that a further signing was contemplated; this was held not to be a sufficient signing, Catlett v. Catlett. 55 Mo. 330. The court said (p. 340): "It has been held in the cases on the subject, with a very few exceptions, that in order to the validity of the will where it is not subscribed at the conclusion or foot of the instrument, but only appears at the commencement or body of the instrument, the will must be in order to its validity, have been in the hand writing of the testator, and he must have intended the signature, wherever inserted, to be the authentication of the instrument and have contemplated no further signing."

In Jarman on Wills, it is said: "It was immaterial, under the statute of frauds, in what part of the will the testator's name was written, and where the whole will was in the testator's hand-writing, the name occurring in the body of the will, as the usual exordium, ‘I.,A.B., do make,' etc., was decided to be a sufficient signing. But the signature whatever its local position must have been made with the design of authenticating the instrument, for it would seem that if the testator contemplated a further signature which he never made, the will must be considered as unsigned.”

Where the statute of frauds merely requires that the will should be signed by the devisor, it has been frequently held that it is not important in what part of the instrument the name appears. Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; s. c. 1 Freem. 538; Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256, per Bennett, J.; s. c. Redfield's Am. Cases on Wills, 613.

But in such cases it is important that the name of the testator, in whatever part of the instrument it appears, should either have been written or adopted, by him, as the final act of execution. Griffin v. Griffin, 4 Ves. 197; Right v. Price, Doug. 241; Walker v. Walker, 1 Mer. 503; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 249; Martin v. Waltin, 1 Lee, 130. Thus, in Sarah Miles' Will, 4 Dana 1; s. c. Redfield's Am. Cases on Wills, 624, under the Kentucky statute of Wills, it was held to be a sufficient execution that the name of the testatrix appeared in the body of the will, although the will was written by another, at her request, and read over to her and approved by her, in the presence of the witnesses; she failing to sign it for want of strength. This case contains a full consideration of the question. See Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. (Mass.) 349: s. c. Redf. Am. Cases on Wills, 619 and note.

In Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538, the name of the testator was written in the beginning of the will by another, but in his presence and by his direction, and acknowledged to the attesting witnesses at the time of its execution. This was held to be as valid as if written by the testator. In Waller v. Waller, 1 Gratton (Va.) 454, the will was not signed at the end, but it was written by the testator, and his name appeared at the beginning. Under the Virginia statute, the signing, to be sufficient, must be as upon its face, and from the frame of the instrument, it appears to have been intended to give it authenticity-it must appear that the name written was regarded as a final signature, and that the instrument was complete withou further signing; and the paper itself must show this.

Papers or instruments properly referred to and identified may become part of the will, although not attached.

In Fickle v. Snepp, 97 Ind. 289; s. c., 49 Am. Rep. 449, it is held that notes made by a testator, payable at his death, folded up with his will, referred to and clearly identified therein and remaining in his possession at his death, are a part of the will. The court said (p. 451): "The notes which the testator signed at the time he executed the will are clearly and fully identified. There cannot be the slightest doubt as to their identity. They are therefore to be regarded as part of the will," see Fesler v. Simpson, 58 Ind. 83; Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. St. 159.

In Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91; s. C., 39 Am. Rep. 433; s. C., 2 Am. Prob. Cases, 18, (with exhaustive note), Gray, C. J., said: If a will executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself, by reference, any document or paper not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be in the form of a will or codicil, or of a deed or indenture, or of a mere list or memorandum, the paper so referred to, if it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by clear and satisfactory proof, as the paper referred to therein, takes effect as part of the will and should be admitted to probate as such"-see Church v. Brown, 21 N. Y. 315, 330; Tudlun v. Otis, 15 Hun, (N. Y.) 410; Wert v. Benedict, 1 Bradf. Sur. R. (N. Y.) 114, 119; Thompson v. Quinby, 2 Bradf. Sur. R. 449; In Goods of Tovey, 47 L. J. (N. S.) P. & D. 63; In Goods of Lake, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 397; In Goods of Brewis, 3 S. & T. 473; In Goods of Sutherland, L. R. 1 P. & D. 198; In Goods of Yockey, 29 L. T. (N. S.) 699; In Goods of Sims, 16 W. R. 407; Langdon v. Astor's Exec. 16 N. Y. 9; Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 305.

In the recent case of Gerrish v. Gerrish, 8 Oregon, 351; s. C., 34 Am. Rep. 585, it is held that where the will of a testatrix, otherwise properly executed, refers to will of her late husband, and so describes it as to leave no doubts of its identity, and adopts the provisions therein contained, it becomes a part of such will, and should be considered in construing its provisions. In Tounele v. Hall, 4 Com. 140, the will referred to another paper already written and so described it as to leave no doubt of its identity. The paper was held to be a part of the will, although it was not subscribed or even attached. EUGENE MCQUILLIN. St. Louis, Mo.

2.

3.

agreement under which it was declared that the bonds were sold by the city to the syndicate, and which provided that a commission should be allowed upon all bonds purchased or exchanged by them. It is held such contract is not authorized by the act of legislature, and is therefore void. Whelen's Appeal, S. C. Pa., Oct. 5, 1885; 1 Atl. Repr. 88.

[Street Improvements.]—Liability to Property-Owners for Damages to Property Incurred in Making Street Improvements.-1. If the owner of a lot near a town builds a dwellinghouse on his lot and improves it otherwise, and afterwards the limits of the town are extended, and the town opens a new street or extends the old one, which does not pass through this lot but passes along one of the boundaries of the lot, and in grading and improving the street the town damages permanently this lot and dwelling without acquiring a right to do so from the owner, and on demand paying him a just compensation therefor, the owner of the lot by virtue of § 9 of our bill of rights has a right to recover of the town in an action on the case the damages, which he has thus sustained. 2. If the owner of such lot outside of the limits of a town builds a residence upon it and otherwise improves it, and the lot fronts on the Northwestern turnpike, and subsequently the limits of the town are extended so as to include this lot, and the State cedes to the town all its interest in the Northwestern turnpike within the enlarged limits of the town, and the town subsequently improves the Northwestern turnpike making a street of it in front of this lot, and in so doing injures it permanently without acquiring a right to do so from its owner and without paying him on demand a just compensation for this injury, the owner of the lot by virtue of the 9th section of our bill of rights has a right to recover of the town in an action on the case the damages he has thus sustained, whether in improving the street in front of the lot the town has done this injury by simply filling up the whole width of the turnpike to the height of the eighteen feet of graded road, which the Northwestern pike under its charter had originally graded and made a road, or whether it increased or decreased the height of the grade of the original road-bed of the Northwestern turnpike. Hutchinson v. City of Parkersburg, S. C. W. Va., Nov. 29, 1884; 25 W. Va., 226 (adv. sheets).

4.

When Equitable Owner may Recover Full Compensation.-W. H. is the equitable owner of such a lot, and the legal title to only a moiety of it is in him, but the mere legal title to the other moiety is in his wife subject to his life-estate therein, and H. brings alone such action on the case against such town not joining his wife as coplaintiff in such action, and the town pleads to the declaration not guilty, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the whole amount of the damage, which has been thus done by the town to his lot and dwelling. Ibid.

[Negotiable Paper.]- Power of School Commissioners to Issue Promissory Notes. -Under a statute which confers upon a board of school commissioners the power to purchase ground, erect school buildings, purchase supplies, employ and pay teachers, appoint superintendents, and disburse through the treasurer of the board of school commissioners, moneys for all school and library expenses, it is held that such a board might contract for the erection and comple

10.

tion of a school house, might agree to pay the contractor therefor partly in cash and partly on time,and for the deferred payments might lawfully make and deliver to him promissory notes, which would be valid obligations and binding upon the school corporation. [The court cite: Sheffield School Tp. v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; School Town of Monticello v. Kendall, 72 Ind. 91; Wallis v. Johnson School Tp., 75 Ind. 368; Johnson School Tp. v. Citizens Bank, etc., 81 Ind. 515.] Falout v. Board of School Commissioners, S. C. Ind., May 26, 1885; 1 N. E. Repr. 389.

[Powers of.]-Employing Counsel to Procure the Passage of a Legislative Act.A municipal corporation cannot compensate out of the public funds persons employed to procure the passage by the legislature of an unconstitutional act. [Citing Minot v. W. Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1; Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592.] Mead v. Inhabitants of Acton, S. C. Mass., 1885; 1 N. E. Repr. 413.

6. PENSIONS. [Exemptions.] Extent of Exemption of Pension Money from Legal Process under Rev. St.U.S. § 4747.-By § 4747 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it is provided: "No sum of money, due or to become due to any pensioner, shall be liable to attachment, levy or seizure, by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, whether the same remains with the pension office or any officer or agent thereof, or is in course of transmission to the pensioner entitled thereto, but shall enure wholly to the benefit of such pensioner." It is held that, by the force of this statute, the money due a pensioner is exempted from attachment or seizure upon legal process while it remains with the pension office or any officer or agent thereof, or is in course of transmission from such officer or agent to the pensioner, but not after the money has come to the pensioner's hands; when the money is actually in the possession of the pensioner the protection ceases. [In the opinion of the court by Peters, C. J., it is said: "Certainly, the money could not be protected in its transitions from property to property. The moment its identification is gone, the protection into

confessedly ceases. If the money goes attachable real estate such estate may may be taken for the pensioner's debt See Knapp v. Beattie, 70 Maine, 410. There would surely be some ground for saying that there might be an unfairness in extending the protection to the limit contended for. If the money be exempted against any debts, it would be against all attachments and all debts. And the pensioner may have obtained credit from the very fact of the possession of property acquired in this way. There are decisions favoring our view of the question. The Iowa court has twice affirmed the same view. Triplett v. Graham, 58 Iowa, 136. In Webb v. Holt, 57 Iowa, 712, it was said that 'the exemption applies only to money due the pensioner, while in course of transmission to him, and that there is no exemption after it comes into his possession.' In Jardain v. Fairton Saving Fund Ass'n, 44 N. J. (Law) 376, the same conclusion was reached, where it is said by the court: 'The fund is not placed in the hands of a pensioner as a trust, but it is to enure wholly to its benefit. When it comes to him in hand or personal control, it is his money as effectually and for all purposes as the proceeds of his work or labor would be, and whether he expends it in new contracts, or it be taken to pay the consideration due from him for

those of the past, it equally enures to his benefit.' In 126 Mass. 113 (Spelman v. Aldrich), it was held that 'even if, by the laws of the United States, the pension was exempt from attachment while it remained in the form of a pension check, the exemption ceased after the money was drawn upon the check. Cranz v. White, 27 Kan. 319, is to the same effect. See s. C., 41 Amer. Rep. 408 and note. In 50 Vt. 612, Hayward v. Clark, a case not directly calling for a decision of the question, a different view is intimated." Friend v. Garcelon, S. C. Maine, Jan. 5, 1885; 77 Me. 25 (adv. sheets); Crane v. Linnæus, S. C. Maine, Jan. 15, 1885; 77 Me. 60 (adv. sheets).

7. PLEADING. [Indiana Code.] Objection to a Bad Pleading must be seasonably made.-The ruling principle of the Indiana Code is, that parties must, with the single exception of an attack upon the complaint, raise their questions in the trial court and preserve timely exceptions. The sufficiency of an answer may be tested in the trial court by demurrer and by motion for judgment on the pleadings. The latter is, in effect, a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and if the answer is bad this motion, followed by a proper exception, will save the question on appeal. Notwithstanding a verdict may have been found for the defendant on the issue joined on a bad answer, the plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment on the pleadings, because his complaint would have stood confessed, and with no valid matter set up in bar of it. But where neither demurrer nor motion is interposed, the answer cannot be attacked on appeal. [The objection to the sufficiency of the answer as a defence was made for the first time in the Supreme Court. In giving the opinion of the court, Elliott, J., said: "The current of our decisions has been steadily in favor of the rule, that if a pleading is not challenged in some appropriate method in the trial court it cannot be successfully assailed on appeal. This general rule was applied to complaints and prevailed until changed by an express and positive statute. Johnson v. Stebbins, 5 Ind., 364; Menifee v. Clark, 35 Ind., 304; Newhouse v. Miller, 35 Ind., 463; Hannum v. State, 38 Ind., 32. The rule has been almost, if not quite, uniformily applied to answers, for the reason that there is no statute permitting such pleadings to be primarily and directly attacked in the assignment of errors. Roback v. Powell, 36 Ind., 515; Snyder v. Snyder, 50 Ind., 492; Campbell v. Coon, 61 Ind., 516; Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind., 1, vide p. 6; Shordan v. Kyler, 87 Ind.. 38. It is contended by the appellant's counsel that these decisions were made upon a former code, and are not applicable to the present code. The only difference in the two codes is that the present omits from § 346 the words "Unless the objection be taken by demurrer it shall be deemed waived," which were embodied in § 64 of our former code. We cannot concur with counsel in this view. The omission of these words worked no radical change, for, without them, the failure to test the answer in the trial court, in some appropriate method, precluded plaintiff from making the question of the insufficiency of the answer on appeal for the first time. The spirit of the code, rather than any mere form of words, supported the rule laid down by former decisions that the failure to attack the answer in the trial court precluded the appellant from assailing it for the first time in this court. In cases far too numerous for citation, extending from the earliest to the latest decisions upon the code practice, it has been held that exceptions to

the ruling of the trial court must appear in the record or this court cannot review and reverse the judgment. Time and again has this doctrine been affirmed and in no uncertain terms. The ruling principle of the code is that parties must, except in the single exception of an attack upon the complaint, make their questions in the trial court. and reserve timely exceptions. In almost every conceivable shape the question of what rulings can be reviewed where no exception is reserved has been presented and it has been invariably ruled that where there is no exception there can be no review, save only in the solitary exception made by the statute. Of the great number of cases illustrating and enforcing our proposition we cite but a few. Cupp v. Campbell, Oct. 8, 85 [post]; Wales v. Miner, 89 Ind., 118 see p. 122; Martindale v. Price, 14 Ind., 115: Davis v. Engler, 18 Ind., 312; Sutherland v. Venard, 32 Ind., 483; Shirts v. Irons, 28 Ind., 459; Train Ex. v. Gridley, 36 Ind., 241; Trentman v. Eldrdge, 98 Ind., 525, p. 527; Buchanan v. Berkshire Ins. Co.96 Ind., 510; Standley v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 95 Ind., 254; Scheille v. Slagle, 89 Ind., 323; Fisher v. Purdue, 48 Ind., 323; Roush v. Emerick, 80 Ind., 551; Houser v. Roth, 39 Ind., 89." Evansville v. Martin, S. C. Ind., 1885; Western Repr. 193.

8. POST MASTER. [Implied Assumpsit.] When Post Master cannot Recover of Railway Company for Handling Mails as upon an Implied Assumpsit.— The postal regulations, made, published and distributed by the post-office department for the instruction of all contractors, employees, and postmasters are, as to all such persons, matter of law and not of fact, and therefore a mistake by a postmaster as to his duty in receiving and delivering mail from the railway postal clerks at the cars, when the railway company should deliver it, will not be such a mistake of fact as to allow him to recover from the company pay for his services on an implied contract therefor. East Tenn. etc. R. Co. v. White, S. C. Tenn., Oct. 31, 1885; opinion by W. P. Washbun, Sp. J.

9.

A person who is employed by a railroad company as station agent at a regular salary, and is also express agent, and as agent of the company, bound to attend it every mail train, and is moreover, postmaster and occupies, by permission of the company, a room in the depot, free of rent, for a post-office, is not entitled, as on an implied contract, to receive from the company whose duty it was to deliver the mail at the postoffice compensation for rendering such service himself, in the absence of express notice to the company that he will expect and demand such compensation in addition to his regular salary. East Tenn. etc. R. Co. v. McNight, S. C. Tenn., Oct. 31, 1885; opinion by W. P. Washbun, Sp. J.

10. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. [Evidence]. Quantum of Proof Required.-The certainty of proof in a suit for specific performance is greater than in an action for damages. [Wallbridge, C. J., delivered the judgment of the court (a). After an examination of the evidence he proceeded,-The answer by defendant Calloway asks for specific performance of this agreement. The certainty required in proceedings for specific performance is greater than in an action for damages. Marsh v. Milligan, 3 Jur. N. S. 979. Brealey v. Collins, Younge, 327, cited in Gough v. Bench, 6 Ont. R. 707, with approval. Specific performance is an appeal to the discretion of the court. and uncer

tainty itself is a good answer for relief. Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; 1 Ves. & Bea. 524, and when there are two differing contracts the court refuses specific performance to both. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 8 C. & F. 374; Howe v. Hall, Ir. R. 4 Eq. 252.] Tait v. Calloway, S. C. of Manitoba, 1885; 2 Man. Law Rep. 289.

11. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [Interest in Land.]Contracts for the Sale of Standing Timber not Within the Statute.-Parol or simple contracts for the sale of growing timber to be cut and severed from the land by the vendee do not convey any interest in lands, and are not therefore within the statute of frauds. [In giving the opinion of the court, Foster, J., said: "And the rule, as settled by modern decisions in reference to this question, is this-that parol or simple contracts for the sale of growing timber, to be cut and severed from the freehold by the vendee, with reference to the statute of frauds, and to give effect to them, have been construed as not intended by the parties to convey any interest in land, and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds. They are held to be executory contracts for the sale of chattels, as they may be afterwards severed from the real estate, with a cense to enter on the land for the purpose of removal. White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 378; Claflin v. Carpenter, 4 Met. 583; Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass. 316; Parsons v. Smith, 5 Allen, 578; Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Maine, 451; Davis v. Emery, 61 Maine, 141; Freeman v. Underwood, 66 Maine, 233; 1 Wash. R. P. 3* § 7; Benj. on Sales, § 126, note, and cases there cited; Marshall v. Greene, 1 L. R. C. P. Div. 44; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Met. 35; Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 391."] Banton v. Shorey, S. C. Me., Jan. 10, 1885; 77 Me. 48 (adv. sheets).

12. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [Promise to Pay Debt of Another.]-Parol Undertaking to Indemnify Constable for Levy.-The defendants were sureties on an undertaking on an appeal from a justice's court. After such appeal had been dismissed,they requested the plaintiff, a constable, to levy execution upon certain personal property, which they stated belonged to the judgment debtor. The plaintiff asked from the defendants a bond of indemnity to secure him against any damages he might sustain by reason of the levy and sale, should they prove to be wrongful. The defendants verbally promised to indemnify him, whereupon the plaintiff levied upon and sold the property under the execution, and thereby paid and satisfied the judgment in full. Such property did not belong to the judgment debtor, and the plaintiff, in an action against him by the owner, was compelled to pay for the conversion thereof. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendants upon their verbal promise of indemnity. Held, that such action could be maintained; that if the execution was issued at the request of the defendants, without the knowledge of the judgment creditor, he ratified and confirmed their act in ordering it, when he accepted the money under it in full payment and satisfaction of his judgment; that the interest the defendants had in having the execution satis fied out of the property of the judgment debtor, was a sufficient consideration for their promise of indemnity, and that such promise was not within the statute of frauds. Lerch v. Galup, S. C. Cal., Oct. 22, 1885; 7 W. C. Repr. 745.

13. TRIALS. [Instructions.] Error to Authorize Jury to Find on their Personal Knowledge.-An instruction which authorizes a jury, in determin

ing an issue presented to them, to infer what was the fact from the evidence, "or from such personal knowledge as you may have in relation to matters of this kind," is erroneous. [In giving the opinion of the court, Libby, J., said: "This instruction authorized the jury to find the nature, cause, and time of development of a curb from such personal knowledge as they might have in relation to matters of that kind. We think this was error. The judge may have intended to tell the jury that, in considering the evidence, they might bring to its consideration, in determining the weight to be given to it, such general practical knowledge as they might have upon the subject, which would not transgress the rule of law applicable to the case, but he failed to do so. The subject under consideration was not one of general knowledge and observation, but one of science, upon which no witness, not specially qualified as an expert, could testify. It does not appear that any juror upon the panel was qualified as an expert to testify or give his opinion upon the subject under consideration; and still each juror may have thought he was, and under the instruction given, may have based his conclusion solely upon what he thought his personal knowledge was, disregarding the evidence submitted by the parties. The verdict thus given would not be 'according to the evidence given them, but according to their own personal knowledge of the subject-matter. under consideration. We think the case is clearly within the authority of State v. Bartlett, 47 Maine, 388, and Schmidt v. N. Y. U. M. F. Ins. Co.. 1 Gray, 529."] Douglass v. Trask, S. C. Maine, Jan. 6, 1885; 77 Me. 35 (adv. sheets.)

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.-Ed.]

QUERIES ANSWERED.

Query 32. [21 Cent. L. J. 417.] T., aged nineteen, was married by a justice while under arrest for seduction and bastardy, to one aged seventeen, and has never lived with his alleged wife nor recognized the marriage. The statute permits marriages of males at eighteen and females at sixteen. Defendant files a bill to set aside marriage for duress, minority, want of ratification, etc. Meanwhile wife applies for arrest of T. for failure to support, etc., and defense claims he owns nothing, never intended the marriage to any more than clear him of arrest, and his father owns his time. Is marriage valid? Or can he be held to support her?

Answer. 1. "If a man, arrested under bastardy process as the putative father of a child of which the woman procuring the arrest is pregnant, marries her, even though, being unable to procure bail, he does it purely to avoid being imprisoned and compelled to contest the charges she has made oath to; he cannot afterward, on learning he could have made a successful defense, have the marriage set aside as procured by duress." Aliter, perhaps, if arrested under a void process. 1 Bish. M. & D. (4th ed.) § 212. 2. If the separation was by mutual consent, still the husband must support his wife the same as when they are living in cohabitation. 1 Bish. M. & D., § 578. So if the separation was by his fault. Id., § 568. But not

if by her fault. Id., § 573. See Manby v. Scott, 2 Smith's L. C., 419. 3. "Necessaries for an infant's wife are necessaries for him." Comyn's Dig. Tit. Enfant (5); Schouler's Dom. Rel. 87, 558. And he is liable therefor the same as if he were of full age. 1 Bish. M. & D., § 553. 4. It is said that where an infant lives with or under the control of his parents or guardian, no credit is ever implied as given to him, but it must be proved to have been given to him. 1 Minor's Inst., 524. But it is evident from the nature of the contract of marriage that the above rule does not apply to this case. The legal status of marriage being proved, the law imposes the duty upon the husband to support the wife. 1 Bish. M. & D., § 557. 5. The marriage of an infant, with his parent's consent, emancipates him (so far as his wages are concerned) from parental control. So Mr. Schouler thinks it would if the infant marries without their consent. Schouler's Dom. Rel. 370. But it is held otherwise in Maine. White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531. See Burr v. Wilson, 18 Tex. 367; 1 Minor's Inst., 438. T. D. C.

Arkadelphia, Ark.

Query 39. [21 Cent. L. J. 444 ] A. makes a note to B., reading, "On or before January 1st, A. D., 1886, I promise to pay," etc., note bearing ten per cent. interest. Can A. tender to B. the principal and amount of interest up to date of tender before maturity of said note and be discharged?

Answer. The principal sum may be paid either at the time specified or at any earlier time that the maker may elect, and the interest is to be computed only until the note is paid. Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137. But a note containing a provision that it shall be payable "in one and one half years or sooner," was held not negotiable, as the time for payment was uncertain, depending on the election of the maker. Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137, opinion by Gray, C. J. In Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421, C. J. Cooley held that a note payable on or before a certain day might be paid before that day, and also that such a note was negotiable. Also in Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St. 586, the court held the negotiable character of a promissory note is not affected by the fact that it is made payable on or before a future day therein named. Though the maker has a right to pay such note at any time after its date, yet for all purposes of negotiation it is to be regarded as a note payable solely on the day therein named. Cincinnati, Ohio.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

S. G. M.

San

CRIMINAL DEFENCES, VOL. 3. [DISABILITY-NONLIABILITY.]-Adjudges cases on Defences to Crime, vol. 3. Including disabilities of parties (as corporations, coverture and infancy); criminal irresponsibility of principal and agent; non-liability for accidents, ignorance and mistake of law and fact; duress; consent as an answer to a criminal charge; and non-liability for acts of omission and for attempts. With notes by John D. Lawson. Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co., 1885. We must remind the reader that the plan of this work is not to give all the cases upon a particular topic in the law of crimes, nor the leading cases, nor even the best cases, but those cases only in which a particular defence has been adjudged sufficient and has been successful. We do not approve of the plan of the work. We think that it will be open to mistrust, growing out of the fact that it gives only those cases which, having regard to their results, rest upon one side of the discussion, and that it does not present as a

whole a correct view of the body of the adjudged law upon any subject. Such being its scope, it will fail of its purpose even as a tool or machine to enable advocates of a certain class to defend crimes; because they will constantly find themselves falling into a trap in relying upon a series of cases which array themselves only upon one side of the question. When the strong cases from the unknown mass upon the other side are brought to bear against them, they may find that a book constructed on this one-sided plan does not always defend. Indeed, it looks like a mere effort to make money without any regard to its effect upon the administration of justice.

BRADWELL'S REPORTS, VOL. 16.-Reports of Decisions in the Appellate Courts of the State of Illinois. By James B. Bradwell. Vol. 16. Containing all the remaining opinions of the First, Second and Fourth District up to the 1st of September, 1885, and all the remaining opinions of the third District up to and including a portion of those filed August 20th, 1885. Chicago Legal News Co., 1885.

These decisions are not elsewhere reported. The appellate courts of Illinois occupy a position between the circuit courts and the Supreme Court. They were organized to relieve the Supreme Court of its burden of work, and they proceed by substantially the same methods as that court. The bench in each appellate district is, we understand, selected by the judges of the Supreme Court, by appointing certain of the circuit court judges to do appellate duty. We understand that the system works well. These decisions cover a variety of subjects and, for the most part, bear intrinsic evidence of being carefully considered. Judge Bradwell is an experienced reporter and does his work well. These reports are not "annotated" according to the craze that has taken hold of the publishers of the so-called "reporters," except by a skillful condensation of the briefs of counsel; and this is, on the whole, the best and most acceptable annotation.

THE FEDERAL REPORTER, VOLUME 23.-Cases argued and determined in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, March-June, 1885. Robert Desty, Editor. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1885.

It is well known that this is the only series of reports extant which undertakes to give all the decisions of all the Circuit and District Courts of the United States upon all the subjects upon which those courts exercise their jurisdiction. Whether the enterprising publishers are able to give them all or not we have no means of knowing. They have large resources at their command, and no doubt they glean the field thoroughly. Many of the cases are annotated by competent writers.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

A MOCKERY OF THE LAW.-A Richmond. Va,, press despatch dated Nov. 20 says: "L. B. Jones, a young and prominent man here, was to-day fined one cent and given one hour in jail by a jury in the Hustings Court for sending a challenge to fight a duel. The trouble out of which this hostile correspondence grew occurred between Jones and C. P. Bradley, another young man, in August last. No meeting took place between them, and the difficulty was amicably adjusted. The officers, however, arrested Jones, and he was tried to-day. It is the second time in the history of the dueling laws of Virginia since the war that any punishment has ever been inflicted for their violation."