payment therefor in their individual names. In a claim by one of the parties, controlling eight-fifteenth interest in the property and in the firm, against the administrator of another to whom the money had been paid upon one of the notes: Held, that the money so paid was not partnership assets, and that the rights of the parties to the fund might be adjudicated by the Orphan's Court. [In the opinion of the court by Clark, J., it is said: "The title was not obtained with the firm's money, nor is it in the firm's name, it was to the partners individually; it contained upon its face no assertion that the land or quarry was to be treated as partnership property. If the question were one affecting purchasers or lien creditors, this fact would be conclusive. (Ridgeway, Budd & Co.'s Appeal, 3 Harris, 181; Lancaster Bank v. Myley, 1 Harris, 159; Lefevre's Appeal, 19 P. F. S. 122; Ebbert's Appeal, 20 P. F. S. 79; Holt's Appeal, 2 Out. 257; Nat. Bank's Appeal, 2 Norris, 204; Geddes' Appeal, 3 Norris, 482.) But as the case involves simply the relation of the partners to each other, in respect to the partnership property, it is evidential only as to their intent. (Abbott's Appeal, 14 Wr. 238; Erwin's Appeal, 3 Wr. 535.) As between partners themselves, real estate may in some instances be shown to be firm property, notwithstanding the title may be to one of them only, or to all, in form as tenants in common. As the slate quarry was not paid for with the firm's money and the deed is not in the firm name, whether it shall be considered partnership property depends largely upon the intention of the partners; that intention may be shown by parol; it may be manifested in the acts and declarations of the parties."] Shafer's Appeal, S. C. Pa., March 14, 1884; 15 Weekly Notes of Cases, 407.

22. RAILWAYS.

[Connecting Lines.] Company Selling Ticket over other Lines Acts as Agent.Through tickets in the form of coupons sold to a passenger by one railroad company entitling him to pass over successive connecting lines of road, in the absence of an express agreement, creates no contract with the company selling the same to carry him beyond the line of its own road, but they are distinct tickets for each road, sold by the first company, as agent for the others, so far as the passenger is concerned. The law is different in respect to the transportation of freights. A passenger bought of the W. St. L. & P. Ry. Company to Omaha, a coupon ticket from that place to the city of New York, calling for passage over the road of that company to St. Louis, and from thence to New York over the O. & M., the M. & C., the B. & O., the P. M. & B., and the Pennysylvania Railroad lines. The ticket on its face had printed: "In selling this ticket for passage over other roads, this company acts only as agent for them, and assumes no responsibility beyond its own line," and the coupons over the Pennsylvania declared, "issued by the W. St. L. & P. Ry., on account of Pennsylvania Railroad," which the company owning the latter road refused to accept, and on refusal to pay the regular fare demanded, ejected the passenger: Held, in a suit by the passenger against the latter company, that the first named company contracted with the passenger only as agent of the defendant company. When a coupon ticket has been sold, calling for passage over several distinct lines of railroad, the rights of the passenger, and the duty and responsibility of the several companies over which the passenger is entitled to a passage, are the same as if he had purchased a ticket at the office of each

company constituting the through line. Pa. R. Co. v. Connell, S. C. Ill. (Ottawa,) Oct. 31, 1884. 23. RECEIVERS.-[Inter State Law.]-Foreign Receiver cannot Intervene and Claim Attached Property. In a proceeding where a non-resident creditor has attached in Louisiana, property of a nonresident debtor fraudulently brought into this State, the rights thus acquired cannot be defeated by a receiver appointed under a creditor's bill by a court of another State by means of an intervention in which he claims the property as receiver, for the purpose of bringing the same within the jurisdiction of the court whence he holds his appointment. The general rule being that such a receiver is the mere creature of the court appointing him, and his powers cannot be exercised beyond the confines of that State. Lichtenstein v. Gillette, S. C. of La., New Orleans, May 18, 1885.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

RAILROADS AND THE COURTS.-The Railroads and the Courts. By Hiram T. Gilbert, of the Illinois Bar, Ottawa, Ill.; Published by the Author, 1885.

The above is the title page of one of the most remarkable law books which has been recently issued from the press. We take it for granted that no lawyer will have the hardihood to cite it to the Supreme Court of Illinois in any pending cause; because, from begining to end, it is little else than a bold arraignment of the course of decision in that court in favor of the railroad company against people who sue the railroad company for damages. The author commences his preface with the following remarkable statement:

"Out of a total of seventeen judgments rendered by the Circuit Courts against the four leading railroad companies of this State, in actions which came before the Supreme Court for review during a period of eleven years, (from June 1873, to June 1884), and which were brought for killing or injuring persons, or injuring property, at railroad crossings, sixteen were reversed and but one was affirmed, and that one was affirmed by a divided court, after two prior judgments in the same case had been reversed by the Supreme Court. Out of a total of twenty-seven judgments rendered by the Circuit Courts against the same companies, in actions which come before the Supreme Court for review during the same period, and which were brought for injuries resulting in death, twenty-four were reversed and but three affirmed, one of which was the judgment above mentioned, affirmed by a divided court after two prior reversals. Out of a total of sixty-three judgments rendered by the Circuit Courts against the same companies, in cases which involved the question of negligence, and were tried by jury, and which came before the Supreme Court for review during the same period, fifty-three were reversed and but ten affirmed, five of which were affirmed upon the first trials, and the other five upon the second or third trials. On the other hand, out of a total of fifty-three judgments of conviction in criminal cases, reviewed by the Supreme Court during the period covered by the last ten volumes (101-110) of the Illinois Reports, thirty-two were affirmed, and but twenty-one reversed."

This statement is well calculated to set judicious persons to thinking. We think it will be found that the

decisions of one or two other States present a similar concurrence of results in favor of railroad companies, and the people may well begin to reflect seriously whether their courts of

last resort, whose judges are put there by the elective system, are not mere putty in the hands of these corporations. It is a question which will bear examining and writing up, and when it is examined and written up, a shirt will be put on the backs of some of the the judges which will stick to them like the shirt of Nessus. It is certain that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in these actions for damages against railroad companies, are more favorable to popular right than are the decisions of some of the State courts of last resort.

The author of the present work gives a chapter on the subject of "Bribery by Railroad Passes." Concerning this chapter he says in his preface: "In expressing his own views upon the subject, the author has endeavored to avoid the use of any language which could be fairly construed as charging the judges of the Supreme Court with wilful wrong-doing. Such a charge would be not only unfounded in fact, but also inconsistent with the friendly feelings entertained towards them by the author. This should be borne in mind in construing as well what is said with reference to their decisions, as the views expressed in the chapter entitled 'Bribery by Railway Passes.' Having himself formerly indulged in the practices there condemned, the author has felt at liberty to discuss the subject with the utmost freedom. It is one of vast importance to judges, and in view of the extraordinary success of railway corporations in the higher courts, it cannot well be regarded as of no concern to the people."

It must not be supposed that this book is a mere tirade against the judges of a particular court. It seems to be a deliberate examination, embraced in some 600 pages, of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Illinois in actions for damages against railroad companies, by one who, we understand, has had experience as a nisi prius judge in that State. It contains a vast amount of valuable information for the practitioner on the subjects of the Illinois doctrine of comparative negligence; the burden of proof in these actions; questions of law and fact; excessive damages; trial by jury; instructing the jury, in which the author gives a number of valuable rules and illustrations; and the appellate courts. In all of these chapters the pages teem with practical expositions of the law and with hints and suggestions evidently drawn from the experience of one who is no novice in such litigation. The final chapter in called "Remedies." In this chapter the learned author suggests a number of remedies for the evils of judicial administration, which he claims to have pointed out. The first is, the abolishment of the free pass system. It is a great shame that legislation should be found necessary to prevent judges from taking such gratuities. But it is necessary, and we are ashamed to say that there is reason to think that where it exists, it is ineffectual. We have a constitutional ordinance against it in Missouri which has been in existence for nearly ten years, and yet, down to the present time, it has not been possible to get an act of the legislature passed enforcing it. The legislators are themselves corrupted by the railway pass, and a bill of this kind was either defeated or smothered in the Missouri legislature last winter. It is known that many of the most upright judges have been in the habit of travelling on annual, or other passes furnished them by railroad companies. At one time the practice had became so common and had so far escaped public criticism, that the most honorable judges took these gratuities without any thought that in doing so they were doing wrong. And yet when they took them, they were taking bribes from litigants in their courts. They were given as bribes, and with no other motive. If presents of the same value were accepted by a judge from the railroad damage lawyer, no one would de

bate about calling them bribes. It passes comprehension how an honest judge can carry these tokens of venality in his pockets and yet sit in judgment upon the controversies of the givers of them. Blind Belisarius begging his bread in the streets of Rome was a more worthy spectacle.

Another remedy suggested by the author is the amendment of the law respecting the mode of instructing juries; and under this head he advises, and with much propriety, we think, an abandonment of the practice of submitting written instructions to the jury and a return to the practice of instructing juries orally, as at common law. He also advocates the passage of a statute providing that "no judgment shall be reversed for errors in the charge, if the charge, when considered as whole, states the law applicable to the case with substantial accuracy, nor unless it appears probable to the Appellate or Supreme Court that the jury were misled thereby." Nothing is more ridiculous than the refinements and attenuated discussions upon the propriety of giving and refusing certain instructions, which are constantly met with in our judicial reports. When instructions are given to the jury in writing, there is reason to believe that in nine cases out of ten, they pay no more attention to them than if the judge had thrown them into the waste basket. In fact, they are not, in many cases, capable of understanding them, and the most trained lawyer is not. The system of jury trial, with hypothetical instructions given in writing, is the rankest farce in in judicial administration. In nearly every case which goes to the jury, they decide in favor of plaintiff and against the corporation, and the only question which they fairly consider is the amount of damages. It is believed that in Illinois where causes of this kind are more freely submitted to the jury than in Missouri, the railroad company does not get a verdict in one case out of a hundred. In Missouri, where the judges non-suit more freely, it rarely ever happens that the railroad company gets a verdict in a damage case. We do not know of a single instance. These facts will have to be carefully considered before the judges of the courts of last resort' are loosely arraigned for reversing judgments rendered against railway companies in damage suits.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

The American Law Journal has suspended. It takes a good deal of money now to found a law journal. There are too many poor law journals in the country and not enough good ones. Some of the poor ones ought to consolidate-and then suspend.

THE EVILS OF DRINKING.-The Swiss Federal Council recently instituted an inquiry as to the means to be employed for diminishing the consumption o spirits, in the course of which it was shown that the population of Switzerland, numbering 2,500,000 drink 27,000,000 litres of brandy yearly, the result being that every year the number of men unfit for military service increases; that 44 per cent of lunatics have lost their reason by the abuse of spirits; that of every 100 criminals 45 are given to drink; that a minimum of 254 deaths per annum are caused by alcohol; and that the great majority of the suicides-600 a year-are attributed to the same vice. St. Louis Globe Democrat.

ST. LOUIS, JULY 24, 1885.

CURRENT EVENTS.

RECENT VERDICTS. Short, the assassin who attempted to kill Phelan in cold blood, was recently acquitted by a New York jury, in the face of the plainest and most conclusive testimony. Cunningham and Burton, the two alleged dynamiters were recently convicted in England of "treason-felony" on circumstantial evidence so weak, that no fairminded judge would, on such testimony, send to a jury the case of a tramp indicted for stealing a shilling. A man named Cluverius was recently convicted of murder in the first degree at Richmond, Va., on the charge of killing his cousin, upon evidence so weak that an unprejudiced jury would not, on similar testimony, convict a negro of stealing chickens.

Mrs. Yseult Dudley, the crank

who attempted to kill O'Donavon Rossa, was recently acquitted by a New York jury, on the ground of insanity, after a farcical trial in which the prosecuting attorney zealously endeavored not to prosecute. She was just as sane, in the sense of being criminally responsible as any man on the jury, and the London Lancet, notwithstanding the popular applause which the news of the verdict created in England, had sufficient regard for truth and law to point out that no evidence of a want of criminal responsibility was developed in the case. A man in East Tennessee, deliberately killed another man to avenge some injury to a female relative-we do not remember the particulars, nor are they material, and a senator of the United States who defended him, so far forgot his duty as a member of the legal profession, as to tell the jury that it is a part of the unwritten law of this country, that a man who slays the seducer of his wife or daughter is guilty of no crime. There is no such law, unless it be among barbarians; no law which allows one man upon ex parte evidence, hearsay or rumor, to accuse another man, to judge him, and to convey to him the first notice of the accusation in the form of capital execution; and which tries his guilt or innocence before a jury for Vol. 21-No. 4.

death. Public opinion justly sympathizes with one who avenges a wrong of that nature. But if he avenge it with death it is murder. Every lawyer knows that by the law of the land, it is murder. Every judge will instruct a jury that it is murder; and the jury who acquit, usurp the pardoning power and lay the moral guilt of perjury on their souls. In each of these cases, the verdict reflected popular fear, popular sympathy, or popular prejudice. The jury in the Short case either sympathized with the supposed political objects of the attempted assassination of Phelan, or else were afraid of the secret society to which Short was supposed to belong. In the Cunningham and Burton case, all England was in a state of terror and demanded a victim. In the Cluverius case, the evidence was wholly circumstantial, and left the question utterly in doubt whether the victim had drowned herself or had been drowned by him. woman had died and the accused had been criminally intimate with her; and the loose conscience of the jury, voicing public clamor, transformed seduction into murder. Such verdicts tend to produce a growing mistrust of the system of trial by jury. They show that that system is a barbarous system; that the outcome of it is generally a reflection of unreasoning sympathy, passion and prejudice; and that it is as inefficient to protect the innocent against unfounded charges, as to protect society against notorious crime.

But a

THREE TRIAL RULES. 1. Rely on Yourself. -The other side is not so weak as your client supposes. It will not be idle, but quite active. What you expect of breaking down witnesses may be measured by a heavy discount. Men are not caught napping. Witnesses are intelligent, brave, daring, determined. They are generally determined to outwit, out-talk, and out-general lawyers. If you think otherwise you will be willing to trade conclusions before very long in a lawsuit, so that the first rule is: Rely on the merits of your own evidence rather than the weakness of your adversary. 2. A short answer (if a bad one) is best. If a witness has commit

business, public or private; with operations of the war department, the navy, the treasury, the post-office, the interior; with commerce, manufactures, banking, transportation, mining, farming; with the venerable and conservative vocations of teaching and preaching; with anything, and what is its relative position? The main bulk of worldwork is ahead of it; several branches of that work, for instance, the postal service, general transportation, commerce and manufactures, are so far in advance, that the law seems to crawl whilst they go on wings. Is this relative backwardness a necessary condition, rooted in the nature of things, or is it attributable to deficient energy and enterprise on the part of the legal profession? Can it be possible the law is to become obsolete that the ages are to outgrow it; and that though sufficing for the past, it is not equal to the demands of the future? Will it be Bradstreeted as a failure? Surely this supposition cannot be entertained. And if not, the conclusion is imminent that either directly or indirectly, we lawyers are responsible for the wide chasm that separates the effective administration of the law from those industries, public and private, with which it ought to be abreast. Is it fit that a body of men so numerous, so cultivated, so capable, should suffer their quota of labor, their distinctive calling, to remain hopelessly behind? Let a noble, manly pride answer in the negative."

:

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [LEGISLATIVE BILLS] -ACTS TO CONTAIN BUT ONE TITLE AND THAT EXPRESSED IN THE CAPTION.-In People, ex rel., Thomas, Att'y Gen. v. Goddard, the Supreme Court of Colorado has recently had a close question before it. The title of an act of the legislature of that State,1 was, "An act regulating elections and repealing all territorial acts upon the subject." The fourth section of this act read: "Every qualified elector shall be eligible to hold any office for which he is an elector, except as otherwise provided by the constitution." The consti

Colo. Act of March 8, 1877.

tution of Colorado prohibits the passage of bills containing more than one subject, and makes void so much of any act as shall not be expressed in its title; and the question was whether the above section, which does not relate to elections, but to the qualification for public officers, was thereby rendered void. The court held that it was not. Beck, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court, said: "Provisions of this character are usually inserted in constitutions, the object being, as was stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa, to prevent the union in the same act of incongruous matters, and of objects having no connection or no relation.' ? But Mr. Cooley says the general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but one general object which is fairly indicated by its title. This learned author further says in the same connection: To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.' Courts and law writers have said that the generality of the title of a bill is no objection to it, and that it is not required that the body of a bill shall be a repetition of its title. The lamented Thatcher, when chief justice of this court, in commenting upon the constitutional provision referred to, used the following language, which has since been accepted as the true interpretation of the provision: "That under our constitution so much of any act as is not directly germane to the subject expressed in the title is without force that the provision, instead of being only a rule of the general assembly to regulate their procedure, is a mandatory declaration of an essential condition to the validity of legislative enactment.' 4 If subjects diverse in their natures, having no necessary connection with each other, be joined together in a bill, or subjects be inserted of which the title gives no intimation, it is an imposition upon the legislature and the public as well, and constitutes the very evil against which the constitution sought to guard. But as we said in Golden Canal Co. v. Bright:5 "This

2 State v. County Judge, 2 Iowa, 280.

3 Cooley, Const. Lim. 144.

4 Central & G. R. Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 41. 56 Pac. Rep. 142,