they drank considerable quantities of intoxicating liquor; that when the brakeman ordered them out of the box car he, the defendant, offered him, the brakemen, one of the stolen knives to conciliate him; that Casey, on that account, became very angry and abusive to him, the defendant, saying, amongst other things, that, if he, defendant, ever made so bad a break as that again, he, Casey, would kill him; that it was in this way that the quarrel ending in the shooting began; that at the time he, defendant, shot Casey, the latter was,and had been, striking at him with a knife; that, in consequence, the shooting was in self defense. Counsel for the defendant thereupon offered to prove by him that, while on the freight train between Lima and Monroeville, Casey told him, the defendant, that he Casey, had shot one Fontaine, City Marshal, of Springfield, Illinois, while the latter was trying to arrest him for a robbery; that he had also stabbed a man at Paris, in the State of Illinois, for which he was sent to the State's prison at Joliet, and that he, Casey, had quit carrying a pistol, as he had ascertained that a knife did its work much more quietly and with better effect. But the prosecuting attorney objecting, the court refused to permit the defendant to make the proposed proof, upon the ground that evidence of particular acts of criminal misconduct, even by his own admissions, was not admissible to establish Casey's bad character as a violent and dangerous man, or in mitigation in any other respect; and that refusal has been made one of the principle questions upon this appeal. In the case of Dukes v. The State, 11 Ind. 557, this court said: "As a general rule it is the character of the living, the defendant on trial for the commission of crime, and not of the person on whom the crime was committed, that is in issue, and as to which, therefore, that evidence is admissible. But in a case like the present, where the question arises whether the accused acted, in the commission of a homicide, upon grounds that justify them in the deed, it would seem that the character of the deceased might be a circumstance to be taken into consideration. Especially might this be the case, where the accused knew that character, and also knew, at the time, the individual by whom the attack upon him or his property was made." In the later case of Fahnestock v. The State, 23 Ind. 231, this court further said: "If the deceased was in the habit of becoming intoxicated, and when in that condition was quarrelsome and violent, and that fact was known to the defendant, and if it is further claimed that the deceased was intoxicated at the time the defendant met him in the saloon, a short time before his death, and that the defendant's conduct on that occasion is claimed to have been influenced by a knowledge of the alleged violent habits of the deceased when so intoxicated, the question of such habits or disposition would seem to be one of fact rather than of general character." Wharton in his work on Criminal Law states the rule to be "that, whenever it is shown that a person is himself attacked, it is admissible for him to put in evidence whatever could show such attack to be felonious. He may thus prove that the person assailing him had with him burglar's instruments. He may prove him to be armed with deadly weapons. He may prove him to have been lurking in the neighborhood on other plans of violence. He is entitled to reason with himself in this way: This man comes to my house masked, or with his face blacked, he is the same who has been prowling about in the neighborhood, and is connected with other felonious plans; I have grounds to conclude that such is his object now.' And if so, he is entitled to say, 'This man now attacking me is a notorious ruffian; he has no peaceable business with me; his character and relations forbid any other conclusion, than that his present attack is felonious. And if such could be a legitimate reason for him to expect and defend himself against a desperate conflict, the facts are such as he is entitled to avail himself of on trial. He must first prove that he was attacked; and this ground being laid, it is legitimate for him to put in evidence whatever would show he had ground to believe such attack to be felonious." Vol. 1, § 641. The case of Horbach v. The State, 43 Tex. 242, is a well considered case, and gives an able exposition of the law of self-defense. The doctrine it announced is well supported by the authorities cited by it, as well as by the modern current of judicial opinion. It holds in brief that the habit of the deceased of carrying weapons, and his character for violent and passionate conduct, as well as other peculiarities constituting him a dangerous adversary, may, when the proper foundation is laid, be proven as distinct facts, and as part of the res gestæ, when such facts which might be reasonably supposed to have had an influence upon the defendant's mind in inducing the belief either that his life was in danger, or that some great bodily harm was likely to result to him. This case impresses us as being not only well supported by authority; but, as being also in accord with the principles of justice and of sound morality. It is cited and commented upon approvingly See in a late edition of Greenleaf on Evidence. vol. 3, 14th ed., §§ 27 and 28, and notes. As in personal conflicts, every man is permitted, within reasonable limits, to act upon appearances, and to determine for himself when he is in real danger, it would seem to follow, as an inevitable consequence, that whoever relies upon appearances, and a reasonable determination upon such appearances as a defense in a case of homicide, ought to be allowed to prove every fact and circumstance known to him, and connected with the deceased, which was fairly calculated to create an apprehension for his own safety. Any narrower rule than this would, we think, prove inadequate to full justice, in all cases of homicide, and would, in many cases, operate as a serious abridgement of the law of self-defense. When properly construed, the rule recognized by the case of Horback v The State, supra, simply permits all the facts and assumptions upon which a defendant acted, under a claim of self-defense, in taking the life of his adversary, to be proved at the trial, and, as thus construed, we know of no rule more in accordance with the principles of justice: In the light of the authorities cited, and of our deductions from the general principles enunciated by them, we can only come to one conclusion, and that is, that the court erred in excluding the proposed testimony of the appellant, as to the communications made to him by Casey concerning himself, during the night preceding the homicide, and that for that error the judgment will have to be reversed. One question remains which ought to be ruled upon at the present hearing, to relieve the embarrassment which might otherwise result when the cause shall be again tried. The dying declaration of Casey, which had been reduced to writing, was, after satisfactory preliminary proof, read in evidence by the prosecuting attorney,as follows: "Dying declaration of Daniel Casey, taken at Mooreville, Allen County, Indiana, on the 16th day of March, 1884. Q. What is your name and residence? A. Daniel Casey, Norwich, Connecticut. Q. Have you given up all hope of life? A. I have, of course. Q. Is this declaration which you now make, free from all malice? A. Yes, it is; I forgive him. Q. What is the name of the man who shot you? A. I don't know his name. Q. Where were you when he shot you? A. On the corner of Railroad and Empire streets, in the town of Monroeville, Allen county, Indiana. Q. Was the man whom you identified on the 15th of March in the presence of the marshal of Fort Wayne, J. B. Neezer, Dr. C. A. Seiter and others, the man who shot you? A. Yes, sir; that was the man who shot me. Q. What reason, if any, had the man you have so identified for shooting you? A. Not any that I know of. He said he would shoot my d-d heart out. Q. What were you doing at the time the shooting took place? his DANIEL X CASEY." mark. It was objected that this declaration was inadmissible in evidence, first, because it was in the form of a deposition; secondly, because the answer to the question, "What reason, if any, had the man for shooting you?" was a mere expression of an opinion by Casey, in disregard of the inhibition imposed by the case of Burns v. The State, 43 Ind. 311; Thirdly, because it was incomplete by reason of the failure of Casey to answer the last question addressed to him. In the first place, a dying declaration may be made in answer to questions addressed to the dying man, and reduced to writing. 1 Greenlf. Ev., § 159 and note; Commonwealth v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455; State v. Martin, 30 Wis. 216. In the next place, the words "what reason," referred to in the second objection, were, in the connection in which they were used, synonymous with the phrase "what cause," and plainly had reference to facts within Casey's knowledge, and not to opinions merely which he might have entertained. Casey's answer, "not any that I know of," was more in the nature of the denial of a fact than the expression of an opinion. In the case of Wroe v. The State, 20 Ohio St. 460, the court held that "there is no valid objection to the admission of the evidence of Smith Davison as to the dying declarations of the deceased. The declaration of the deceased, in speaking of the fatal wound, that "it was done without any provocation on his part." is objected to as mere matter of opinion. Whether there was provocation or not, is a fact, not stated, it is true, in the most elementary form of which susceptible, but sufficiently so to be admissible as evidence.' The conclusion reached in that case is sustained in principle by the cases of Rex v. Scaife, 1 Moody & Rob. 551, and Roberts v. The State, 5 Texas Appeals, 141; and the precedent it affords may, as we believe, be safely followed, in its fairly analogous application to the question now before us. See also Whart. Crim. Law, § 294. In the third place, the declaration was complete as to the answers to all questions which it purported to answer, and in that sense it was not fragmentary, within the meaning of the case of The State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308. Besides, the failure of Casey to answer the last question was sufficiently explained by his attending physician. In our opinion, therefore, the dying declarations of Casey were properly admitted in evidence. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. ZOLLARS, J., delivered a dissenting opinion on the point relating to dying declarations. NOTE.-The above case is an important one in the law of self-defense; it goes beyond the line marked by the authorities, but we think the ruling of the court consistent with principle. It is now well settled in trials for homicide or assault to kill, where the defendant justifies on the ground of self-defense, that it is competent to show the character of the deceased or assailant for violence, quarrelsomeness, vindictiveness, treachery, his physical strength or habit of carrying weapons. State v. Nett, 50 Wis. 524; Abbott v. People, 86 N. Y. 470; Fitzhugh v. State, 77 Tenn. 258; Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. St. 1; State v. Graham, 61 Iowa, 608; DeArmen v. State, 71 Ala. 351; State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159; Commonwealth v. Barnacle, 134 Mass. 216, overruling previous authorities and re-establishing the rule in Selfridge's Case; Williams v. State, 14 Tex. App. 102: Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462; State v. Pearce. 15 Nev. 188; People v. Iams, 57 Cal. 115; Jones v. People, 6 Col. 452; State v. Smith, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 430; Roberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156. But the cases lay down the rule that it is not admissible to show specific acts of violence committed by the deceased upon third persons, in no wise connected with the defendant; on the ground that such matter is too remote, and, if the proof were admitted, so also would repelling evidence, and the side issues thus raised would be as numerous as the offenses imputed to the deceased. Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. St. 1; Dupsee v. State, 33 Ala. 380; McKinna v. People, 13 Hun, 580; Fitzhugh v. State, 77 Tenn. 258; State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 165; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218. Thus in Alexander's case the defense offered to prove a "series of five acts of violence" known to defendant at the time of the homicide; but it was held inadmissible. If the deceased's character, like that of a witness who is sought to be impeached, were the thing to be proved, then undoubtedly specific acts would not be admissible; but the thing to be proved is, did the defendant believe and have reasonable ground for believing in the imminence of danger from violence at the hands of the deceased. For this purpose the previous conduct of the deceased, known to the defendant, of a nature tending to indicate a violent, vindictive or quarrelsome disposition, would be admissible under the ruling in Boyle's Case, even though specific acts, and we think properly admissible. Previous threats made by deceased are specific acts, yet they are receivable upon two grounds: For the purpose of determining who was the aggressor, when doubtful, or to give color and meaning to the deceased's conduct; and also, when communicated to the defendant, to show that the threats, together with the other circumstances, operated to excite reasonable fears, in the mind of defendant of the violent purpose of the deceased. People v. Tomkin, 62 Cal. 468; State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159; Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194; Cases on Self-Defense, Harrigan & Thompson, 238, et seq; State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473. When a threat has been communicated to the defendant as having been made by deceased, its admissibility does not depend upon the truth of the communication, but on the effect it might produce on the mind of the defendant, and therefore such evidence is not hearsay. Carico v. Commonwealth, 7 Bush. 124; Logan v. State, 17 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 59; State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361; 1 Greenlf. Ev., §§ 100, 101. It would seem, therefore, that the question is not whether the deceased had actually threatened the defendant,nor whether he had acquired a character for violence, nor whether he was really guilty of violence in the specific instances, but the fact to be proved is this, did he from his knowledge of the deceased have reason to construe the overt act of the deceased as indicative of an intention then and there to do him violence? 1 Greenlf. Ev., §§ 100, 101; Russell v. State, 11 Tex. Crim. Cas. 288; Munday v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 239; State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361; State v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 592; Whart. Cr. Law, § 641. The occasion requires a speedy conclusion; that conclusion is materially influenced by his knowledge of the previous conduct of the deceased; doubtless the specific acts sought to be shown should be of a character calculated to indicate a disposition for violence. But it is illogical to hold that though such knowledge was calculated to and did materially influence the defendant in reaching his conclusion, yet they cannot be used by the jury in ascertaining whether the defendant's conclusion was justifiable. The law is now well settled that if, at the time of the killing, the conduct of the deceased was such as to create in the mind of the defendant a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, the defendant will not be responsible if those appearances should turn out to have been false. Smith v. State, 15 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 338. Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544. For the danger need not be real or actual; that it was apparent was sufficient. Munday v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 239; Holloway v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush. 344; State v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 592; Horr & Thomp. Cases on Self-Defense, p. 4, 18, et seq. The defendant is entitled to lay before the jury all the circumstances and grounds of fear on which he acted, and hence it is that previous affrays, difficul ties and threats made against him by deceased are admissible. Russell v. State, 11 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 288; Horr. & Thomp. Cases on Self-defense, p. 416. It is generally laid down that evidence of deceased's character for violenee is not admissible unless known to the defendant; Griscom v. State, 8 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 386; but it may be questioned whether this is true under all circumstances. It is held that uncommunicated threats may be given in evidence, for the purpose of determining the aggressor, and to illustrate the motives and conduct of the deceased. State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159. Evidence of character is used sometimes for the same purpose. State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473; Harback v. State, 43 Tex. 248; DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 352. The character of the deceased as a violent, dangerous, overbearing or turbulent man, "is always admissible" say the Supreme Court of Alabama, "where uncommunicated threats are received," and for the like purpose of illustrating the circumstances of the killing and of qualifying, explaining and giving point to the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing. Roberts v. State, 68 Ala. 165. But evidence of character, like previous threats, will not be admissible, unless there is some evidence to show that the defendant was acting in self-defense, State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473. The general rule is that some overt act on the part of the deceased must first be shown. State v. Jackson, 33 La. Ann. 1087; People v. Stock, 1 Idaho T. 218; State v. Pearce, 15 Nev. 188; Abbott v. People, 86 N. Y. 470; McNeone v. People, 6 Col. 346; Cresswell v. State, 14 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 1: DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351. Evidence of deceased's character for peace is not admissible until attacked, Graves v. State, 14 Tex. App. Crim. Cas. 113; but such evidence is admissible when the defendant seeks to to justify on the ground of threats. Russell v. State, 11 Tex. App. 288. Where the defendant introduces evidence respecting deceased's character, it will be proper for the State to produce evidence to sustain it. People v. Iains, 57 Cal. 115; but where the State thus attempts to rebut defendant's evidence, defendant may show the record of conviction of deceased for manslaughter. Brunt v. State, 12 Tex. App. 521; and the defendant may on cross-examination of State's witness as to deceased's character, enquire whether witness has not heard of certain enumerated acts of violence on the part of deceased. DeArmen v. State, 71 Ala. 351. GIDEON D. BANTZ. DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEYS. PEOPLE EX REL. WHITTEMORE v. RYALLS.* Supreme Court of Colorado, May 29, 1885. ATTORNEY—[Disbarment]—Wrongfully Retaining Client's Money.-An attorney stricken from the rolls for wrongfully retaining money belonging to client, although he had paid it over after proceedings commenced against him. Proceeding for disbarment. Theo. H. Thomas, Atty. Gen., and Horace G. Benson, for the people. PER CURIAM. This proceeding is instituted under section 74 of the General Statutes. The substance of this *S. C., 7 Pac. Rep. 290. statute, briefly stated, is that whenever an attorney shall receive, in his official capacity, any money or property belonging to his client, and shall, upon demand therefor and tender of fees, refuse or neglect to pay over the same, any person interested may apply to the supreme court for a rule requiring such attorney to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys; and if at the trial the truth of the charges made be sustained, the court shall cause the name of such attorney to be stricken accordingly. After service of the rule in this case, as required by law, respondent paid the money wrongfully withheld; also the costs of this proceeding. It seems to have been understood that the proceeding would then be dismissed by relator, as respondent made no answer, took no steps to defend against the charge, and departed from the State. We decline to discharge the rule, and have heard the evidence touching the matters averred in the petition. It seems to have been assumed in the present and several similar cases recently brought in this court that the statute mentioned was framed to aid clients in collecting moneys thus wrongfully withheld by their attorneys. Doubtless the proceeding will tend to accomplish this purpose for two reasons: First, an attorney must be lost to all sense of honor as well as professional pride, who would not thereby be stimulated to relieve himself from the odium attaching to his breach of trust; and, second, payment of the money, even though under an influence akin to coercion, would probably have some bearing upon the decision of this court on the question of disbarment. But we do not conceive that the statute referred to was adopted for the purpose of affording an additional private remedy for the collection of the moneys mentioned. In our opinion the principal object of the legislature was to place in the hands of this court an additional means whereby the profession may be purged of unworthy members, and litigants generally be protected from impositions practiced by such persons. As supporting this view, it may be suggested that without the statute at common law the client possessed quite as effective a remedy for the wrong under consideration; he might obtain from the court a rule requiring the attorney to pay over the moneys kept back, and upon disobedience of the rule the proper practice was not to move for disbarment, but to procure an attachment for the contempt. Weeks, Attys. Law, § 97. Under this common-law proceeding, as declared by Hallett, C. J., the "attorney so attached might purge himself by satisfying the demand; but the statute is otherwise." learned judge further says: The "By section 7 it is provided that the judgment of the court shall stand until the court shall authorize the attorney again to subscribe the roll; and I do not perceive that he may obtain such permission by payment of the money merely." Concurring opinion In re Brown, 2 Colo., 558. The evidence taken in the case before us demonstrates that respondent is guilty of the offense referred to in the statute, and charged by the petition. We think that he improperly neglected and refused to pay over the money of his client, the relator herein. Interpreting the statute as we do, it therefore becomes our duty to pronounce the judgment of disbarment. In so far as the foregoing views may conflict with those of the majority of the court in the case mentioned, (2 Colo., 553,) that decision is modified. The rule to show cause heretofore issued herein is made absolute; and it is accordingly adjudged that the name of respondent, John V. Ryalls, be stricken from the roll of attorneys who are permitted to practice in the courts of this State. 1. APPEAL [Chancery Practice]-Effect of Appeal on Interlocutory Decrees.-1. An appeal from a final decree by a party entitled to appeal therefrom, brings with it for review all the preceding interlocutory decrees out of which any of the errors complained of in such final decree have arisen. An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order overruling a demurrer, by which the principles of the cause are adjudicated, but not until after a decree has been entered carrying those principles into effect. If, however, in such case, the appellant complains not only of the error committed in such interlocutory order, but also of errors in the subsequent decrees, independent of those resulting merely from giving effect to such erroneous order, he can not appeal from such order, unless he is also in a condition to appeal from such subsequent decree. Steenrod v. Railroad Co., S. C. W. Va., Nov. 22, 1884. 2. Appeal from Decree pro Confesso does not Lie.-Where a defendant in a chancery suit appears and demurs to the bill, and his demurrer is overruled, and a rule is given him to answer, which he fails to do,and thereafter a decree is entered in the cause granting the relief prayed for in the bill, and such defendant obtains an appeal to this court from said decree without having moved in the court, which rendered it, to have the errors complained of corrected, and assigns and complains of errors in said decree other than those resulting from the overruling of his demurrer. It was held that this is a decree on a bill taken for confessed; and this court will not entertain the appeal, but will dismiss the same as having been improvidently awarded. Ibid. 3. From Order Overruling Motion to Dissolve Injunction.-Under § 2, Ch. 178, Code 1873, an appeal lies from an order overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction, when that order is a practical adjudication of the principles of the cause. Kahn v. Kerngood, S. C. of App. Va., March 19, 1885; 9 Va. L. J. 369. 4. Value in Controversy, in Suit in Equity to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyance.Deed from H. to K., conveying property recited therein to be worth $1,500, is assailed as fraudulent by a creditor of H. whose debt is less than $500. Upon appeal by K., it is held, 1. As between K. and the assailing creditor, the matter in controversy is not the latter's debt, but the value of the property. 2. In absence of proof to the contrary, the recited value of the property must be treated as the real value. Ibid. Conveyances]-Withholding Part of the Debtor's Property Renders Deed Void.-The primary object of the statute of Colorado relative to assignments (§ 68, Gen. St.) is to secure a pro rata distribution of the insolvent debtor's entire estate among all the creditors; and the withholding of part of the property from the control of the assignee, and the subsequent conveyance or mortgage of the same to favored creditors, works a fraud as palpable as would a preference given and received on the eve of an assignment for the express purpose of evading the statute. Campbell v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., S. C. Colo., June 17, [1885; 7 Pac. Repr. 291. 6. CONTRACT—[Privity]—Right of Third Person to Sue upon.-Where A sells land to B in consideration that he will pay A's debts, A cannot, after the creditors have accepted, release B from liability on the promise. The creditors have a lien on the land, and one may sue on the promise without joining the other creditors. Dodge's Adm'r v. Moss, Ky. Ct. App., Oct. 25, 1884; 6 Ky. Law . Repr. 707. 7. CRIMINAL LAW - Concealed Weapon What Amounts to a Concealment.-A partial concealment of a dangerous weapon, is a violation of the statute prohibiting carrying concealed weapons. It should be fully exposed. A pistol half sunk in the pocket or about the clothes, even though a part of it may be visible, is a concealed weapon within the meaning and intent of the statute. The word "concealed" has a statutory sense contradistinguished from its ordinary meaning, and must be construed so as to give potential effect to the law. State v. Bias, S. C. La., March 16, 1885. 8. [Forgery]-Description of Statutory Of. fense in Indictment.-1. Any fraudulent making or alteration of any writing mentioned in the statute, or writing included in the terms therein used, constitutes the crime of forgery. 2. It is not necessary to set out in the indictment, the particular acts that constitute the crime, but is sufficient to charge that the defendant did feloniously forge a certain cheque. 3. The charge that the defendant forged a cheque, or bill of exchange, is not vicious for duplicity. A cheque may be described in an indictment for forgery as a cheque or bill of exchange. The object of the statute in permitting the forged instrument to be described by its ordinary designation was to exclude the need of designating it by its exact legal name. State v. Maas, S. C. La., New Orleans, March 30, 1885. 9. DAMAGES-[Wealth of Defendant.]—Evidence of Pecuniary Circumstances of Defendant, when Admissible.-On the trial of an action of trespass for an assault and battery, the plaintiff may give in evidence the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant, to enhance his damages, and in such case the defendant may give counter evidence on the subject; but unless such evidence is given by the plaintiff, the defendant has no right to introduce proof on that subject, even in mitigation of damages. [In the opinion of the court, Mulkey, J., said: The only point made by plaintiffs in error, which we deem of sufficient importance to notice, is one relating to the admissibility of evidence. On the trial, the plaintiffs in error offered to show, by way of mitigation of damages, the pecuniary circumstances of McHugh, no evidence of that character having been offered by the plaintiff. On objection by the plaintiff, the court held the evidence improper, and excluded it from the jury, and the defendants excepted. Counsel for plaintiffs in error maintain that the ruling of the court upon the admissibility of the evidence offered is erroneous, and in support of the position cite McNamara v. King, 2 Gilm. 432, and 1 Sutherland on Damages, page 745. The citation from Sutherland seems to be in point, but none of the authorities cited in support of the text sustain it, except the case of Johnson v. Smith, 64 Maine, 553. In all the other cases cited the evidence was offered by the plaintiff, and not by the defendant, except in one or two cases, where the record fails to show how the question arose; and the case just cited, which does sustain the text, seems not to have been concurred in by a full bench. Evidence of this character, even when offered by the plaintiff for the purpose of enhancing the damages, is held inadmissible by many courts and text writers of high standing, but, nevertheless, we have recognized the contrary rule, and have no disposition to depart from it; but under the present state of authorities we are not inclined to extend the rule beyond its present limits. Where a plaintiff entitled to vindictive damages offers no evidence of the defendant's wealth with a view of enhancing them, he in effect says, "I ask no damages against the defendant except as a mere individual, without any regard to his property or estate, whether it be much or little,"-and in that kind of a case the jury have no right to give any more damages than they would if it had affirmatively appeared the defendant was without pecuniary resources. But where the testimony is offered by the plaintiff, he does it for the purpose of enhancing the damages. By offering it, he in effect says, "I ask in the way of damages something more than I would be entitled to recover from the defendant as a mere individual, without regard to his pecuniary circumstances." In doing this, the plaintiff tenders a new issue of fact, which opens up the question to both sides. The McNamara case, supra, like many others that might be cited, simply supports the proposition that in an action like this the plaintiff may, if he sees proper to do so, offer such testimony, and that case was cited by this court with approval in Chicago v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, Peters v. Lake, 66 id. 206, White v. Murtland, 71 id. 250, and Drohn v. Brewer, 77 id. 280; but in none of those cases, nor in others we have been able to |