Opinion of the Court.

Manson, should or might, from time to time, by any deed or instrument of writing, or by her last will and testament, under her hand and seal (which will she was authorized to make), limit, direct or appoint, give or devise the same; and in default of any such limitation, direction and appointment, gift or devise, in trust for such child or children as she should leave surviving her and the issue of any deceased child, such issue taking his, her or their parent's or parents' share; and for default of all such children or issue, then in trust for the right heirs of the said Sarah J. Manson forever; and that all money which should or might be raised by sale or mortgage of the said premises or any part thereof should be paid to the said Sarah J. Manson and be disposed of as she should or might think best, her receipt being a valid discharge therefor, the party paying the same not being bound to see to the application or disposition thereof.

The record does not inform us upon what view of the legal import of these provisions the district court proceeded in awarding the decree of sale. It may have been thought that such a trust did not protect the real estate described from the creditors of Sarah J. Manson, either during her life or at her death. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716. Or the court may have regarded the will of Sarah J. Manson, though not so executed as to permit it to be proven in the District of Columbia, as a sufficient exercise of the power of appointment, in which case, according to a rule well established in England and in this country, where a person has a general power of appointment, either by deed or will, and executes this power, the property appointed is deemed, in equity, part of his assets, and subject to the demands of his creditors in preference to the claims of his voluntary appointees or legatees. Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200; Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344.

We do not wish to be understood as intimating that either of such views would have been a sound construction of the trust deed; but we do say that these were questions before the district court for decision, and if any error was committed by that court the remedy was by appeal or by a bill of review if duly filed.

Opinion of the Court.

We adopt the language and reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case:

"It is certainly the policy of the law to maintain judicial sales, and every reasonable inducement should be indulged to uphold them, otherwise the public would become distrustful, and fair prices for property sold under judicial authority would seldom be obtained. Purchasers, while they are required to take notice of the existence and terms of the decrees or judgments under which they purchase, and as to the parties bound thereby, cannot be required to become judicial critics, and to pass in review, at their peril, upon the correctness of the proceedings upon which the judgments or decrees may be founded. As was pertinently said by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 168: After a lapse of years, presumptions must be made in favor of what does not appear. If the purchaser was responsible for the mistakes of the court, in point of fact, after they had adjudicated upon the facts, and acted upon them, these sales would be snares for honest men. The purchaser is not bound to see whether the court was mistaken in the facts of debts and children. The decree of the orphans' court in a case within its jurisdiction is reversible only on appeal, and not collaterally in another suit. When a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question that may arise in the cause; and whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court.'

"These principles apply in all respects and with special force in this case. It was for the court whose decree is attempted to be impeached, not only to decide on the facts before it, but upon the construction and legal effect of all deeds and muniments of title upon which the proceeding was based. The court having general jurisdiction over the subject-matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor for the payment of debts, it had the right and was required to determine the question as to the liability of the property for the debts, and whether the case was within its jurisdiction; and though its decision may have been erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal."

Syllabus.

"It is of no avail," said this court in Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, "to show that there are errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment rendered was beyond its power. This principle has been often held by this court and by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of the law."

And in Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226, it was declared that "the settled rule of law is that jurisdiction having attached in the original case everything done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud."

Having concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, and that its decree cannot be successfully impeached in this collateral proceeding, it is unnecessary to consider other questions suggested in the record and discussed in the briefs of the counsel. The decree of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

In re LENNON.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 254. Submitted March 30, 1897.- Decided April 19, 1897.

Parties to collateral proceedings are bound by the jurisdictional averments in the record, and will not be permitted to dispute them except so far as they may have contained a false recital with respect to such parties. Where the requisite citizenship appears on the face of a bill, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be attacked by evidence dehors the record, in a collateral proceeding by one who was not a party to the bill.

A bill brought solely to enforce compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act, and to compel railroad companies to comply with such act by offer ing proper and reasonable facilities for interchange of traffic with the company, complainant, and enjoining them from refusing to receive from complainant, for transportation over their lines, any cars which might be tendered them, exhibits a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States of which a Circuit Court has jurisdiction.

Statement of the Case.

To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual notice.

THIS was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus originally filed in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The petitioner alleged that he was a citizen of the State of Ohio, and was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the marshal, under an order of the Circuit Court of the United States, made in a case pending in that court, wherein the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Michigan, was complainant, and several railway companies, citizens of Ohio, as well as the Michigan Central Railroad Company, a citizen of Michigan, were defendants.

The bill in that case, which was annexed to the petition as an exhibit, averred the complainant to be the owner of a line of railroad from Toledo, Ohio, northwesterly through the State of Michigan; that a large part of its business consisted in the transportation of freight cars from points in the States of Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin to points in Ohio and other States east thereof, and that it was engaged as a common carrier in a large amount of interstate commerce, which was regulated and controlled by the Interstate Commerce Act of Congress. The bill further averred that the defendants' lines of railroad connected with those of complainant at or near Toledo, and that a large and important part of its business consisted in the interchange of freight cars between the defendant and complainant companies, and was subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act; that it was the duty of the defendant companies to afford reasonable and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and to receive, forward and deliver freight cars in the ordinary transaction of business, without any discrimination; that the defendant companies, and their employés, had given out and threatened that they would refuse to receive from complainant cars billed over its road for transportation by complainant to their destination, for the reason that the complainant had employed

Statement of the Case.

as locomotive engineers in its service men who were not members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, "an irresponsible voluntary association," and that the locomotive engineers in the employ of the defendant companies had refused to handle cars to be interchanged with the complainant's road; notwithstanding that they continued to afford the other railroad companies full and free facilities for the interchange of traffic, while refusing to transact such business with the complainant, thereby illegally discriminating against it.

Upon the filing of this bill, and upon the application of the complainant, the Circuit Court issued an injunction against the defendants, their officers, agents, servants and employés, enjoining them from refusing to afford and extend to the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railway Company the same facilities for an interchange of interstate business between the companies as were enjoyed by other railway companies, and from refusing to receive from the complainant company cars billed from points in one State to points. in another State, which might be offered to the defendant companies by the complainant.

The injunction was served upon the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, one of the defendants, one of whose employés was the appellant, James Lennon, a locomotive engineer, who had received notice of the injunction, and, still continuing in the service of the company, had refused to obey it.

Thereupon the Lake Shore company applied to the court for an attachment against Lennon, and certain others of its engineers and firemen, setting forth that, with full knowledge of the injunction theretofore made, they had refused to obey the order of the court, and deserted their locomotives and engines in the yard of the company, for the reason that Ann Arbor cars of freight were in the trains of such company, and that they had refused to haul such cars and perform their service for that reason.

The persons named, including the petitioner Lennon, being served with an order to show cause, appeared in pursuance of