Opinion of the Court.

Reinstein's estate, but was held in trust by Reinstein for Collins or his assigns, and after his death by the defendants, his devisees and successors. The defendants asserted that no such trust existed, but that Reinstein, their devisor, held the lands as his own estate, and that they had succeeded to his right. The very question to be determined here was whether the interest sought to be recovered was a part of Reinstein's estate or not. If it was a part of his estate, then no trust existed; he held it in trust in his lifetime, and the interest passed to his successors to the legal title, clothed with the trust. To hold that the claim or demand here attempted to be enforced was a part of the estate, and thus render the witness incompetent, would be to determine in advance the very question to be determined on the trial of the action. By so holding we would assume the very question to be tried and settled by the contestation between the parties. This we are not allowed to do."

The Supreme Court of Utah evidently entertained a different view of the Utah statute; for the claim asserted by Whitney in this case was, in the judgment of that court, "not only a claim against an estate, but one for many thousands." The relief sought was a decree declaring Whitney to be the equitable owner of one eighth of the Mansion House in Detroit, and entitled to the rents, issues and profits thereof, as well as to part of the 3000 shares of the stock of the Eureka Hill Mining Company, and the dividends that had theretofore been declared thereon; and that the executors of Lawrence be required, not only to account to the plaintiff for all of the said rents, issues, profits and dividends, but to convey to him an undivided one eighth interest in the real property, and assign to him a like proportion of such stock. It was also asked that a receiver be appointed to receive the dividends on the stock, and the rents, issues and profits of the realty. We cannot doubt that the claims asserted in this suit by Whitney are, within the meaning of the Utah statute, claims or demands against the estate of a deceased person, and, consequently, Lawrence being dead, Whitney was incompetent to testify to any fact touching said claims or demands that occurred be

Opinion of the Court.

fore Lawrence's death, and were equally within the knowledge of both Whitney and Lawrence. The Supreme Court of Utah properly rejected the suggestion that such claim or demand was not against the estate of Lawrence. To say that the only issue here was whether the real property and stock described in the petition constituted a part of Lawrence's estate, and that no claim or demand was asserted against the estate, would be to defeat what, it seems to us, was the manifest object of the statute. While, as said by this court in Coulam v. Doull, 133 U. S. 216, 233, it is the ordinary rule to accept the interpretation given to a statute by the courts of the country by which it was originally adopted, the rule is not an absolute one, to be followed under all circumstances. We concur in the interpretation placed upon the Utah statute by the Supreme Court of Utah, as one required by the obvious meaning of its provisions, and we do not feel obliged, by the above rule, to reject that interpretation because apparently the highest court of the State from which the statute was taken has, in a single decision, taken a different view. We, therefore, hold that to the extent indicated by the court below Whitney was an incompetent witness as to any fact occurring before the death of Lawrence and equally within the knowledge of both.

It remains to inquire whether the judgment was right upon the merits. The Supreme Court of the Territory held that the suit was barred upon the grounds both of laches and of the statute of limitations of Utah. The undisputed facts make a case of such gross laches upon the part of Whitney as to forfeit all right to the aid of a court of equity. Equity will sometimes refuse relief where a shorter time than that prescribed by the statute of limitations has elapsed without suit. It ought always to do so where, as in this case, the delay in the assertion of rights is not adequately explained, and such circumstances have intervened in the condition of the adverse party as render it unjust to him or to his estate that a court of equity should assist the plaintiff. It is impossible to doubt that Whitney knew, for many years, while Lawrence was in proper mental condition, that the latter did not admit,

Syllabus.

but denied, that the former had any just demand against him. But Whitney forbore to assert the rights which he now asserts, and although having abundant opportunity to do so, and having, if his present claims are just, every reason for promptness and diligence, he nevertheless slept upon his rights and made no demand upon Lawrence until disease had so far deprived the latter of his reason and faculties that he could not sufficiently comprehend any matter of business submitted to him. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the court below rightly held that the plaintiff's laches cut him off from any relief in equity. Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 95; Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611, 617; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377; Richards v. Mackall, 124 U. S. 183, 188; Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U. S. 556, 566; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, 250, 274. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff's causes of action were barred by the statute of limitation.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

The case of Wood v. Fox, Surviving Executor of Lawrence, No. 56, on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, was argued with No. 68 by the same counsel, and depends upon the same facts as appear in the above case, and for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case the judgment is

Affirmed.

OXLEY STAVE COMPANY v. BUTLER COUNTY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

This court cannot review the final judgment of the highest court of a State even if it denied some title, right, privilege or immunity of the unsuccessful party, unless it appear from the record that such title, right, privilege or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" in the state court as be

Opinion of the Court.

longing to such party under the Constitution or some treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 709. The words "specially set up or claimed" in that section imply that if a party in a suit in a state court intends to invoke for the protection of his rights the Constitution of the United States or some treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States, he must so declare; and unless he does so declare, "specially," that is, unmistakably, this court is without authority to reëxamine the final judgment of the state court. This statutory requirement is not met if such declaration is so general in its character that the purpose of the party to assert a Federal right is left to mere inference.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Isaac II. Lionberger for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. John F. Dillon and Mr. Frank M. Estes for defendant in error. Mr. Winslow S. Pierce, Mr. Harry Hubbard and Mr. Henry N. Phillips were on their briefs.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error brings up for review a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, setting aside and declaring to be null and void certain conveyances of lands in Butler County, Missouri, and quieting the title thereto of the present plaintiffs in error.

It is contended on behalf of the defendants in error, who were defendants below, that, under the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of this court, we have no authority to reexamine that judgment.

It appears from the petition that the lands in controversy were part of the lands granted to Missouri by the swamp-land act of September 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 84, and were subsequently, in 1857, patented by the State to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, a Missouri corporation, in payment of a subscription to the capital stock of that company by the county of Butler, Missouri, which subscription was made under the authority of the State; that in payment of certain bonds

Opinion of the Court.

issued by it, the railroad company, on the 23d of May, 1857, conveyed the lands in question, with other lands, to John Moore, John Wilson and A. G. Waterman, as trustees; that in 1871 Chouteau, having become the owner of the greater portion of such bonds, brought suit in the Circuit Court of Mississippi County, Missouri, for the foreclosure of the above deed of trust, in which suit there was a decree for the defendants; that such decree was reversed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and a decree of foreclosure directed to be entered; that the lands were accordingly sold by a commissioner, Chouteau becoming the purchaser; and that afterwards, on the 19th day of November, 1886, Chouteau conveyed the same, with other lands, to the plaintiffs in error.

The petition also alleged that the county of Butler, November 7, 1866, filed in the Circuit Court of Butler County its petition against the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company and Moore, Wilson and Waterman, trustees as aforesaid, for the purpose of cancelling and setting aside the patent from the State to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, as well as the deed of trust from the railroad company to Moore, Wilson and Waterman, trustees; that in that suit "service was attempted to be had by publication, the plaintiffs in said cause alleging that the said Moore, Waterman and Wilson were nonresidents of the State of Missouri; that in the said proceeding the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company were brought in, as was pretended, by personal service; but your complainants herein here aver, charge and show the fact to be that the service in said cause, the pretended appearance of the defendants by their attorney and in their own proper persons, was, in fact, a fraud and deception imposed upon the Circuit Court trying said cause; that in truth and in fact the said Waterman, previous to the bringing of said action in said Circuit Court, and said Moore, soon after the bringing of said action and before service upon him therein had been obtained, had departed this life, and their successors in said trust and as trustees had been appointed in pursuance to the provisions of the said deed of trust; that in consequence of their said deaths and the appointment of their successors as such trustees, as aforesaid, no service