4. While the statutory amount must as a matter of fact be in controversy,
yet the fact that it is so need not appear in the bill, but may be shown
to the satisfaction of the court. Ib.
5. There was printed in the record, as filed in this court what purported
to be an extract from the closing brief of counsel presented to the
Supreme Court of the State, in which a Federal question was discussed,
and it was asserted orally at the bar here, that in the argument made
in the Supreme Court of the State a claim under the Federal Constitu-
tion was presented. Held, that such matters formed no part of the
record, and were not adequate to create a Federal question, when no
such question was decided below, and the record does not disclose that
such issues were set up or claimed in any proper manner in the courts
of the State. Zadig v. Baldwin, 485.
6. The verdict of a jury determines questions of fact at issue and this
court cannot review such determination, or examine the testimony
further than to see that there was sufficient to justify the conclusions
reached. Carter v. Ruddy, 493.
7. Under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, the power of this court
in certiorari extends to every case pending in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals and may be exercised at any time during such pendency, pro-
vided the case is one which, but for this provision of the statute, would
be finally determined in that court. Forsyth v. Hammond, 506.
8. While this power is coextensive with all possible necessities, and suffi-
cient to secure to this court a final control over the litigation in all the
courts of appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly exercised, and
only when the circumstances of the case satisfy this court that the im-
portance of the question involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict be-
tween two or more courts of appeal, or between courts of appeal and the
courts of a State, or some matter affecting the interests of the Nation,
in its internal or external relations, demands such exercise. Ib.
9. As, in the contests between the parties to this suit, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of the State of
Indiana had reached opposite conclusions as to their respective rights,
and as all the unfortunate possibilities of conflict and collision which
might arise from these adverse decisions were suggested when this ap-
plication for certiorari was made, it seemed to this court that, although
no final decree had been entered, it was its duty to bring the case and the
questions here for examination at the earliest possible moment. Ib.
10. This court cannot review the final judgment of the highest court of a
State even if it denied some title, right, privilege or immunity of the
unsuccessful party, unless it appear from the record that such title,
right, privilege or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" in the
state court as belonging to such party under the Constitution or some
treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States. Rev.
Stat. § 709. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 648.
11. The words "specially set up or claimed" in that section imply that if
a party in a suit in a state court intends to invoke for the protection
of his rights the Constitution of the United States or some treaty,
statute, commission or authority of the United States, he must so de-
clare; and unless he does so declare, "specially,” that is, unmistakably,
this court is without authority to reexamine the final judgment of the
state court. This statutory requirement is not met if such declaration
is so general in its character that the purpose of the party to assert a
Federal right is left to mere inference. Ib.
12. In cases brought here from state courts their decisions are final, in
matters of procedure, and on alleged conflicts between the statutes of
the State and its constitution. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook-
lyn, 685.
13. After the trial court and the Superior Court had disposed of this case
without any Federal question having been raised, the railroad com-
pany moved to set the judgment aside and transfer the case to the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the statutes, as construed by the
state court in its opinion, were invalid and in violation of the Consti-
tution. This motion being denied an appeal was granted to the Court
of Appeals where it was claimed in argument that the state statute as
construed impaired the obligation created by the charter of the com-
pany, and denied the equal protection of the laws, in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, that the record did not show that
a Federal question had been raised below in time and in a way to give
this court jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louis-
ville, 709.
See ADMIRALTY, 2;
CERTIORARI, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, C, 3;
PRACTICE;
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. When a decree of the Circuit Court, at a hearing upon pleadings and
proofs, dismissing a bill in equity for the infringement of a patent,
has been reversed by this court on appeal, upon the grounds that the
patent was valid and had been infringed by the defendant, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opin-
ion of this court, the Circuit Court has no authority to grant or enter-
tain a petition filed, without leave of this court, for a rehearing for
newly discovered evidence; and, if it does so, will be compelled by
writ of mandamus to set aside its orders, and to execute the mandate
of this court. In re Potts, 263.
2. A citizen of the District of Columbia cannot maintain an action against
a citizen of Wisconsin, on the ground of diverse citizenship, in a Circuit
Court of the United States in that State, even though a competent per-
son be joined with him as co-plaintiff. Hooe v. Jamieson, 395.
3. A writ of scire facias upon a recognizance to answer to a charge of
crime in a District Court of the United States is a 66
case arising under
the criminal laws of the United States," in which the judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final by the act of March 3,
1891, c. 517, § 6. Hunt v. United States, 424.
4. The statute of New Hampshire providing for proceedings against mill-
owners to recover damages resulting from overflows of land caused by
dams erected by them, contained, among other things, a provision
that "if either party shall so elect, said court shall direct an issue to
the jury to try the facts alleged in the said petition and assess the
damages; and judgment rendered on the verdict of such jury, with
fifty per cent added, shall be final, and said court may award costs
to either party at its discretion." In this case both parties elected
trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict for damages for the defend-
ant in error. Held, that the plaintiff in error, by availing itself of
the power conferred by the statute, and joining in the trial for the
assessment of damages, was precluded from denying the validity of
that provision which prescribes that fifty per cent shall be added to
the amount of the verdict, as the plaintiff in error was at liberty to
exercise the privilege or not, as it thought fit. Electric Company v.
Dow, 489.
5. A bill brought solely to enforce compliance with the Interstate Com-
merce Act, and to compel railroad companies to comply with such
act by offering proper and reasonable facilities for interchange of
traffic with the company, complainant, and enjoining them from re-
fusing to receive from complainant, for transportation over their
lines, any cars which might be tendered them, exhibits a case arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States of which a
Circuit Court has jurisdiction. In re Lennon, 548.
6. The plaintiff in his declaration described himself as a resident in
Texas, and the defendant as a railway company created and existing
under the laws of Texas. The railroad company was in fact a cor-
poration organized under and by virtue of acts of Congress, and in a
petition for the removal of the action from a state court of Texas to
the Federal court, set that forth as a ground for removal, and the
petition was granted, and the case was removed to the Circuit Court
of the United States, and tried and decided there. Held, that the
Circuit Court properly entertained jurisdiction. Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Cody, 606.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ADMIRALTY, 9.
E. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
The act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, providing for the bringing
of suits against the Government, known as the Tucker act, did not
repeal so much of section 1069 of the Revised Statutes as provides
"that the claims of married women first accrued during marriage, of
persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority,
and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons beyond the seas at
the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred
if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted, as aforesaid, within
three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability
than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor
shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively." United States
v. Greathouse, 601.
See INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES;
RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP.
F. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was duly authorized by
§ 6 of the act creating the court, as well as by § 6 as amended by the act
of July 30, 1894, to make rules limiting the time of taking appeals to
the court from the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents; and
there was no restriction on this power by reason of Rev. Stat. § 4894.
In re Hien, 432.
1. The direction of the municipal authorities of Baltimore to the street rail-
road company to maintain but one track through Lexington street
from and to the points named, instead of a double track as originally
granted to the company, did not substantially change the terms of the
contract (if there was one), between the city and the railroad as ex-
pressed in the original grant and was no more than the exercise by the
city of its acknowledged power to make a reasonable regulation con-
cerning the use of the street by the railroad company. Baltimore v.
Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co., 673.
2. An existing system of water supply in a municipality which is the prop-
erty of private individuals and is operated under a contract with the
municipal corporation for furnishing it with a portion of its needed
supply of water under rates fixed by the contract, is private property
which may be acquired by the public, in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, on the payment of a just compensation, including
compensation for the termination of the contract. Long Island Water
Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 685.
3. In condemnation proceedings for that purpose, the assessment of dam-
ages may be made by commissioners where the statutes so provide, and
there is no denial of due process of law in making their findings final
as to the facts, leaving open to the courts the inquiry whether there
was any erroneous basis adopted by the commissioners in their ap-
praisal, or other errors in their proceedings. 1b.
4. There was nothing in the statute under which the Long Island Water
Supply Company was organized, nor in its contract with the town of
New Lots for the supply of water, nor in the act of annexation to
Brooklyn, which gave to that company rights exclusive and beyond
the reach of such legislative action. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
See RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP.
1. Neutrality, strictly speaking, consists in abstinence from any participation
in a public, private or civil war, and in impartiality of conduct toward
both parties: but the maintenance unbroken of peaceful relations be-
tween two powers when the domestic peace of one of them is disturbed
is not neutrality in the sense in which the word is used when the dis-
turbance has acquired such head as to have demanded the recognition
of belligerency; and, as mere matter of municipal administration, no
nation can permit unauthorized acts of war within its territory in in-
fraction of its sovereignty, while good faith towards friendly nations
requires their prevention. The Three Friends, 1.
2. The word "people,” as used in Rev. Stat. § 5283, forbidding the fitting
out or arming of vessels with intent that they shall be employed in the
service of any foreign people, or to cruise or commit hostilities against
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