6 Where, therefore, the will of H. directed his executors to convert the bulk of his estate into money, to invest the same, and to pay the income of different portions thereof to certain persons named during their lives respectively, and upon their deaths gave the principal sums to certain scientific and edu- cational corporations, held, that in determining whether the statutory limit had been exceeded, the value, at the time of the testator's death, of the portion of the estate so dis- posed of should be ascertained, from which should be deducted the values of the life estates, computed according to the proper annuity tables, and the balance would rep- resent the value of the remainders given to said corporations; and, it appearing that this was less than half the value of the testator's estate at the time of his death, that said bequests were valid. Id.
2. A statement in a promissory note that it was given for money loaned is not conclusive; it is open to either party to show the actual consideration. Miller v McKenzie.
7. S. married the plaintiff in 1854 and continued to live with her as his wife until his death in 1880; he became a member of defend- ant's association in 1870; its ob- ject, as stated in its constitution, is to provide for the relief of wid- ows, orphans and heirs of deceased 3. members," and it was provided in its by-laws that upon the death of ¦ a member a sum specified should be paid to his widow; if none, then to his children; if no children, then to persons therein provided for. In 1878 defendant issued to S. a cer- tificate certifying that in accord ance with the "by-laws and arti- cles of association," his wife (naming the plaintiff) was desig- nated as his beneficiary of all funds due him in case of his death. Plaintiff knew of this provision and paid herself most of the assess- ments against S. In an action to recover the sum so due, the defense was that plaintiff was not the law- ful wife of S. as he had when they married another wife living. Held, that this was immaterial; that the by-law did not limit the power of the company so as to
In proceedings by a creditor for the sale of the real estate of a deceased person it appeared that the real estate had been sold under a judg ment in a partition suit, but that at the time of the sale the pur- chaser was notified of the petition- er's claim. Held, that the provision
tinguished. Sanford v. Ellithorp.
Williams v. Sargeant (46 N. Y. 481), distinguished. Sanford v. Elli- thorp.
of the statute (§ 72, ch. 460, Laws of | Levin v. Russell (42 N. Y. 251), dis- 1837, as amended by chap. 211, Laws of 1873), prohibiting the sale in such proceedings of real estate, the title to which has passed out of any heir or devisee to a purchaser in good faith and for value, unless the application for the sale shall be made within three years after the granting of letters testament- ary or of administration, did not apply; that the purchaser having bought with full knowledge was not a purchaser in good faith. Mead v. Jenkins.
Quinby v. Strauss (90 N. Y. 664), dis- tinguished. Sanford v. Ellithorp,
Parsons v. Lyman (20 N. Y. 103), distinguished. In re Hughes.
60 Despard v. Churchill (53 N. Y. 192), distinguished. In re Hughes. 60 Nodine v. Greenfield (7 Paige, 544), distinguished. Lockman v. Reilly.
Parker v. Mayor, etc., of Macon (39 Ga. 725), distinguished. Cain v. City of Syracuse.
People v. Corporation of Albany (11 Wend. 539), distinguished. Cain v. City of Syracuse. 89 Jones v. New Haven (34 Conn. 1), distinguished. Cain v. City of Syracuse.
Norristown v. Moyer (67 Penn. St. 356), distinguished. 89 Sutherland v. Olcott (29 Hun, 16), reversed. Sutherland v. Olcott. 93 Vail v. Vail (4 Paige, 317), overruled. Cook v. Lowry.
Hull v. Hull (24 N. Y. 647), overruled. Cook v. Lowry. 109 Bissell v. M. S. & N. 1. R. R. Co. (22
Somerville v. Crook (9 Hun, 664), dis- tinguished. Sanford v. Ellithorp.
N. Y. 258), distinguished. Nassau | Rutherford v. Rutherford (1 Denio Bk. v. Jones. 33), distinguished. In re Cottrell Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow (63 N' Y. 62), distinguished. Nassau Bk. v. Jones. 123 Woodruff v. Erie R. Co. (93 N. Y. 618). distinguished. Nassau Bk. v. Jones.
Kerr v. Dougherty (79 N. Y. 327), dis- tinguished. Hollis v. Drew Theo- 176 logical Seminary. Lefevre v. Lefevre (59 N. Y. 434), dis- tinguished. Hollis v. Drew Theo- 177 logical Seminary. Duncan v. Pope (47 Ga, 445), distin- guished. Todd v. Weber. Nine v. Starr (8 Oreg. 49), guished. Todd v. Weber. Moncrief v. Ely (19 Wend. 405), dis- tinguished. Todd v. Weber. 190
Lewis v. Lewis (11 N. Y. 220), distin- 335 guished. In re Cottrell.
Woolley v. Woolley (95 N. Y. 231), dis- tinguished. In re Cottrell.
O'Donnell v. A. V. R. R. Co. (59 Penn. St. 239), disapproved. Vick v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. 273 Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (29 Hun, 35), reversed. Waldele v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. 274
Chaffee v. Baptist Mis. Con. (10 Paige,
85), distinguished. In re Cottrell.
Valentine v. Valentine (2 Barb. Ch. 430), distinguished. Hancox v. Meeker. 539 Drake v. Price (5 N. Y. 430), distin- guished. Hancox v. Meeker. 539 Betts v. Betts (4 Abb. N. C. 317) dis- tinguished. Hancox v. Meeker
539 Morgan v. Hannas (13 Abb. [N. S.] 361), distinguished. Hancox v. Meeker, 539
335 Cram v. Cram (2 Redf. 246), ques.
plaintiffs, at the request of H. and for the purpose of increasing the depth of the lot, demised to him a piece of land in the rear of said lot, of the same width; this lease was for the same time as the first one, and ceased upon its termination; it contained the same covenants for renewals and for determining the rent to be paid thereon. The two leases being about to expire, arbi- trators were nominated by the par- ties pursuant to said covenants, the same persons being nominated under each lease. The arbitrators, not agreeing as to the method of ascertaining the value of the de- mised premises, were about to ap- point an umpire, as provided for in the lease, when this action was brought to restrain their action and to adjudge the rights of the parties in respect to the matter of disagree- Held, that the complaint was properly dismissed. Living- ston v. Sage. 289
Earlom v. Saunders (Amb. 241), dis- tinguished. Hobson v. Hale. 601 Cowley v. Hartstonge (1 Dow. 361), distinguished. ment. Hobson v. Hale. 601
Hereford v. Ravenhill (5 Beav. 55), distinguished. Hobson v. Hale. 602
Burrill v. Baskerfield (11 Beav. 525), distinguished. Hobson v. Hale. 602
Power v. Cassidy (79 N. Y. 602), dis- tinguished. Hobson v. Hale. 606
The firm of L. & Co. executed to plaintiff, who was a creditor, a gen- eral assignment of all its property for the benefit of creditors. the assignee after paying partner- ship debts, if a surplus remained, was directed to pay the individual debts of the copartners, and to re- turn to them any residue. At the time of the assignment the firm held a claim against the United States government, which was in the hands of a broker for collection. Thereafter, plaintiff, under an agreement with the members of the firm, returned to them a por- tion of the assigned property, and released his claim against the firm, upon receipt of a bond of indem- nity, conditioned for the payment by them of the other firm debts, and an assignment to himself of all their rights and interest in the assigned property, except that so returned to them. The government claim was allowed and paid by draft to the order of the firm, which was delivered to defendant L., one of the copartners: he trans- ferred it to the other defendants who had knowledge of the assign- ment; they collected the same. Plaintiff had not been discharged as assignee, some of the firm debts
remained unpaid, and it did not appear that the individual debts of the copartners had been paid. Held, that an action was properly brought by plaintiff, as assignee, to recover the proceeds of the col- lection; that title to the claim passed to him as such assignee by virtue of the assignment, and the 1. trust was not discharged, nor was the title affected by the subsequent agreement, as it did not transfer to him, individually, the assets held by him as trustee, but only the interest of the firm in any sur- plus. Stanford v. Lockwood. 582
3. S. being the owner of sixty-one shares of defendant's stock, which stood in his name upon its books, for a valid consideration sold the stock and assigned the certificates to H., who presented them, with the assignment, to defendant, and demanded a transfer to himself upon its books; this was refused. H. thereafter sold and assigned the certificates to plaintiff. In an action to recover dividends de- clared upon the stock, it appeared that, after notice of the transfer to H., defendant caused the stock to be seized and sold under an attach-
ment issued in an action brought by it against S. Held, that assum- ing the purchaser could be deemed a bona fide purchaser, as to which quære, it did not affect the rights of plaintiff as against defendant; that it could not set up its own wrongful act to defeat his title; and that he was entitled to recover. Robinson v. Nat. Bk. of New Berne. 637
4. Also held, that plaintiff's right to
maintain the action was not affected by the fact that he could bring an equitable action to compel a trans- fer or an action at law to recover damages for the wrongful acts of defendant.
When proceedings of State comptroller, on application to cancel tax sales, reviewable by certiorari. 477 See Clark v, Davenport.
See BENEVOLENT, ETC., ASSOCIA-
CIVIL DAMAGE ACT.
Under the provision of the "act to suppress intemperance, pauperism and crime" (Chap. 646, Laws of 1873), giving to certain persons specified, who shall be injured in means of support by an intoxi- cated person, a right of action against any person who, by selling intoxicating liquors, caused the in- toxication, to maintain the action, it is not essential to show that the act of the intoxicated person which caused the injury was the natural, reasonable or probable
quence of his intoxication; it is sufficient if it appears that the act was done while the person was in- toxicated, in whole or in part, by liquors sold by defendant. Neuv. McKechnie. 632
2. Such a cause of action is not taken away or mitigated by the fact that the act causing the injury con- stitutes a crime.
3. In such an action it appeared that the father of the plaintiff, while in a state of intoxication, produced in part by liquors sold to him by defendants, murdered his wife and then committed suicide. Plaintiff was fifteen years of age; he lived with and was dependent upon his father for support. Held, that the facts were sufficient to maintain the action. Id.
It appeared that defendants sold the liquor without a license, and that they had been so selling for a long time. Held, that submission to the jury of the question of ex- emplary damages, and an allow- ance thereof, was proper. ld.
1. A certificate, issued by the State comptroller upon sale of lands for taxes, illegally laid, is not a cloud on the title, as the record of the proceedings, which one claiming
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