In this portion of the bill, the Administration undertakes what it considers to be a reform of the procedures and criteria which would enable the President to assist domestic industries and workers to adjust to injury from increased imports. The public statements of the President and his representatives on this topic indicate that from a policy point of view, the intent of the Administration to provide relief to domestic industries is very narrowly circumscribed.
It is said that relief would be extended to industries which suffer injury from sudden and massive increases in import volume such that it is difficult for the industry to adjust and to avoid the full impact of this sudden increase. The theory underlying the Administration's position is, evidently, that relief will not be granted to domestic industries that are injured by a steady increase in imports of like or directly competitive products; rather, such industries are expected to transfer their resources into other lines of production so as to
The focus of the Stewart paper's criticism is that the trade bill would provide only very narrowly circumscribed import relief. According to its analysis, relief will I not be granted to domestic industries that are injured by a steady increase in imports but only to those experiencing sudden and massive increases. While the paper acknowledges the fact that the availability of import relief will be greater through the trade bill's deletion of the "link" to previous tariff concessions, the paper nevertheless considers the shift from "major" to "primary" cause as a "distinction without a difference" since the petitioner still has the burden of establishing his case that imports caused the injury.
In fact, the provisions of the proposed Trade Reform Act represent a major liberalization of the import relief criteria. Of course the bill defines the parameters within which relief will be granted, otherwise it would
avoid such injury. The simple notion underlying this position is that the areas of systematic import injury are so limited and so narrowly defined that it will be a matter of comparative ease for any domestic manufacturing concern or group of concerns representing an industry to escape the injurious impact of steadily increasing imports by simply moving into some other line of production.
As a corollary to this notion, Administration spokesmen speak of the ability of technologically intensive industries to compete and the necessity for labor-intensive industries to increase their capital investment in technology so as to be able by shifting into technologically intensive fields to surmount the danger of destructive import injury. Thus, the Administration does not in fact intend to regulate import competi- tion through the selective adjustment of tariff levels in a manner that would enable efficiently conducted American industries, saddled with the costs inherent in the American standard of living, to continue to produce goods that are adversely impacted by steadily rising volumes of imports.
be extremely unfair in its operation and offer no standards for its administration. It is not accurate in any way to characterize the intent of the provisions as being to circum- scribe relief when they will accomplish the opposite. Relief has beer too restricted in the past operation of the escape clause provisions of the Trade Expansion Act. The import relief provisions of this bill remedy this defect and will make import relief more readily available; but still, of course, only where the facts justify its use.
The provisions will not deny relief to industries on the grounds that imports have increased steadily, not suddenly and massively. The Tariff Commission is to investigate whether imports are the primary cause of injury whether or not there is market disruption. In his message
accompanying the bill, the President described the need to provide relief for industries, seriously injured by sudden surges in imports. This description of a situation where relief would be necessary does not imply that relief would not be granted to industries injured by a steady increase in imports.
The true significance of the Administration's proposals concerning import relief is seen in the language used in Section 201; viz., Section 201(a)(1) refers to import relief "for the purpose of facilitating orderly adjustment to import competition" and requires a petition for relief to include a statement of "the specific purpose for which import relief is being sought, which may include such objectives as facilitating the orderly transfer of resources to alternative employment and other means of adjustment to new conditions of competition." This language is quite direct in transmitting the Administration's intention not to favor any form of relief for industries where existing conditions of competition created by trade agreement concessions in the past have stimulated imports to the extent that at present or in the foreseeable future serious injury will occur to the industry and its workers regard- less of their relative efficiency as judged by contemporary management and production technology applicable to their line of product.
With regard to the "primary" cause criterion, the
change from the current "major cause" requirement is signifi- cant. Major cause was not defined in the Trade Expansion Act but was interpreted by the Tariff Commission to mean greater than all other causes combined. The current trade
bill, on the other hand, defines "primary cause" to mean "the single largest cause." This is a much lesser burden
on the petitioner. Furthermore, where the market dis- ruption test is met, the bill provides that a prima facie showing of primary cause shall be considered to have been made. Thus, where the Tariff Commission finds serious injury, or the threat of serious injury, a finding of market disruption will constitute prima facie evidence that increased quantities of imports of the like or directly competitive articles are the primary cause of the injury or threat of injury.
Of course, for cases where market disruption is not
A further indication of the paucity of intention so far as
assisting domestic industries and workers in this context is concerned
is supplied in subsection (b)(1) of Section 201 of the Administration bill. There the key test which must be applied by the Tariff Commission in an investigation is stated as "whether an article is being imported into
the United States in such increased quantities as to be the primary cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing articles like or directly competitive with the imported article."
The key words here are "the primary cause. Evidently it is hoped by the draftsmen of the bill that some notion will be generated that the conditions for relief are being relaxed by changing the language from the requirements of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 301(b)(1) of that Act requires a determination by the Commission that as a result "in major part" of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being imported in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten
found, the domestic industry still must show a primary causal relationship between serious injury and increased imports. To do as the Stewart paper suggests, i.e., provide relief merely on the showing that increased imports "caused or contributed to" serious injury or threat thereof, would, in effect, establish a general relief program for domestic industry with an absolutely minimum relationship between imports and injury. Such is the case because, under this requirement, an industry experiencing a decline in profits, sales or employment during a period when imports of competitive articles are showing any increase could pro- bably demonstrate that such increased imports "contributed to" injury. The likely result of such a program would be the erection of innumerable trade barriers, with the inherent deleterious effects on U.S. exporters and consumers, when international trade is not necessarily the primary cause of an industry's difficulties. The costs to U.S.
serious injury to a domestic industry. As specified in paragraph (3)
of that subsection, increased imports shall be considered to cause or threaten serious injury when the Commission finds that they have been "the major factor" in causing or threatening such injury.
It is true that the omission of the preliminary requirement of showing that increased imports are due "in major part" to concessions granted under trade agreements will eliminate one of the bases upon which the Commission has frequently denied relief to domestic industries, firms, and workers seeking relief under the Tariff Adjustment and Other Adjustment Assistance Title of the 1962 Act. But a significant stumbling block in these cases has also been the necessity for the petitioner to prove that the increased imports have been "the major factor" in causing or threatening serious injury. Shifting from a conceptual test of "the major factor" to "the primary cause" is virtually a distinction without a difference.
consumers and to efficient U.S. producers would be severe and the benefits, if any, to protected domestic producers, would be unwarranted.
In this regard the Administration recognizes that it is in the national interest to ease the adjustment problems which can result from increases in imports. We feel that · the safeguard provisions of the trade bill fully meet this responsibility.
Furthermore, the "primary cause"
provision relaxes the admittedly stringent "major cause" test without making the connection between imports and injury so tenuous that the underlying rationale import relief is lost.
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