24(D)

MR. STEWART

Furthermore, section 252(c) gives the President the power to

act against countries that maintain unreasonable import restrictions which
either directly or indirectly substantially burden United States commerce,
by withdrawing or suspending the benefit of trade agreement concessions
to the products of such countries.

While one of the subsections of Secton 252

namely, subsec-
tion (a)(3) also provides similar authority directed specifically
against countries that maintain import restrictions against United States
agricultural products, the sections already referred to contain sufficient
authority for the President to proceed against nonagricultural product

discriminations.

The United States has absolutely no experience by which to
judge whether or not the provisions of section 252 are effective or
ineffective in removing restrictions against U. S. exports. It has been
suggested by an Administration spokesman that withdrawing the benefit

GOVERNMENT

against the commerce of the United States. The Trade Reform
Act of 1973 as proposed would not repeal section 338 of
the 1930 Tariff Act.

The proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 provides an
opportunity to review provisions of current law and improve
them where improvements are called for. The purpose of
section 301 is to improve upon existing section 252 of the
Trade Expansion Act and make it a more credible bargaining
Its purpose is not for wholesale use against
practices that the United States disapproves of.
mere fact of its existence will be of great benefit.
Existing law was too complex and rigid and did not fit the
needs of trade policy management. Section 301 represents

tool.

The

a reasonable and useful revision of the trade laws of the

United States.

The Stewart paper is incorrect in its statement that section 252 has never been used. When the European Communitics established its common external tariff, it withdrew its tariff rents on poultry and placed a

24(E)

MR. STEWART

of past tariff concessions from an offending country might not be
effective because some of the statutory rates are comparatively low
and, therefore, would not be as effective as if the President were
empowered to impose even higher rates of duty against offending countries.
This is a specious argument and comes with little credibility from
foreign trade policy spokesmen who oftentimes refer to the statutory
rates (the so-called "Smoot-Hawley" tariff) as being so high as to
virtually constitute an embargo against imports.

The Trade Relations Council is opposed to the enactment

of Chapter 1 of Title III because such action would seem to accept as
valid the notion advanced by Administration spokesmen that the President
has lacked the authority effectively to deal with unreasonable burdens
imposed against U. S. exports in violation of U. S. trade agreement rights.

GOVERNMENT

variable levy on this product, injuring United States
exports. The United States reacted by increasing duties
to the statutory level on imports of potato starch,
certain brandy, dextrine, and certain automobile trucks
(Proc. No. 3564, December 19, 1963).

In terms of the Stewart paper's analysis this was
an example of a vigorous pursuit of United States rights.
But ten years have passed and the result has been reduced
trade in the products covered by the EC's action and
the U.S. reaction. Some products in the United States
perhaps received unlooked for protection. Our exports

did not improve. The conclusion to be drawn is that the
success of our trade policy should not be gauged by the
number of retaliatory actions taken against others.
successes occur when settlements are reached at the

The

bargaining table. The progress made at such negotiations

24(F)

MR. STEWART

Since the opposite is in fact the case, there is no necessity for the
enactment of still additional authority, when that already on the books,
adequate to the job at hand, has never been invoked.

Chapter 1 of Title III should be deleted from the bill.

GOVERNMENT

depends in part on the ability of the United States to
respond in the event of a failure to reach a solution.
The existence of retaliatory authority, not its use is
the important factor. Nothing can be deduced from a list
of the times it has been used. Section 301 of the proposed
trade bill strengthens the hand of the U.S. negotiator
and should be adopted.

96-006 73 - pt. 7 - 26

In this section of the Administration bill an effort is made,
in part procedural and in part substantive, to make improvements in the
operation of the Antidumping Act. Some of the revisions proposed by the
Administration bill are ill-advised and ought not to be adopted. This
description applies to the attempt by the Administration to require the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff Commission in their respective
jurisdictions in administering the Act to make their determinations
pursuant to a hearing on the record in which the contents of the record
available for use by the Secretary and the Commission are specifically
limited to the transcript of the hearing and papers filed in connection
with the investigation. This feature of the bill evidently is presented
in an attempt to create a specific record which would be subject to
judicial review, though the hearings themselves are declared by the
bill to be exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act.

GOVERNMENT

Mr. Stewart stated that section 310 (b) of the bill,
in exempting the hearings which would be required by that
section from specified provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, indicates an attempt to create a specific
record which would be subject to judicial review since there
is no exemption from the judicial review provision,

5 U.S.C. 702. The omission of 5 U.S.C. 702 from the list
of sections of the Administrative Procedure Act which
would not apply to the hearing procedures was inadvertent.
The Administration recommends amendment of the bill to

specifically list that section.

Mr. Stewart also objected to the provision of section

310 (b) which would make the transcript of the hearing and all
papers filed in connection with an investigation the exclusive
record for determinations by the Treasury or the Tariff
Commission. He felt that the proposed language would limit
improperly the record for decision by excluding information

MR STEWART

GOVERNMENT

25(B)

The fact that the bill at Section 310(b)(4) exempts the

hearings specified from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act indicates that it is the intention of the draftsmen to subject the
determinations of the Secretary and the Tariff Commission to judicial
review pursuant to the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.

The provisions of the bill in attempting to describe the nature
of the hearing to be conducted by the Secretary and the Tariff Commission
prior to making a determination are not objectionable, but the further
provision in subsection (b)(2) in undertaking to limit the determination
of the Secretary or the Commission to a record composed of specified
elements including the transcript of the hearing and papers filed in
connection with the investigation is objectionable because it fails to
understand the nature of the administrative procedure which has developed
for determinations which must be made under the Antidumping Act.

developed independently by either agency. Again, there was
no intent to so limit the agencies concerned or in any way
restrict their present scope of inquiry.
Clarification of

this language would be useful. The Administration
recommends amendment of section 310 (b) by substituting
"information developed" for "papers filed" on line 2 of page 51
of the bill.