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Choate, which firm was indorser to the amount of $7,000 on paper of the Fair Lumber Company. Under these circumstances he orally agreed with the defendants in error that, if they would permit shipments of the lumber by the Fair Lumber Company, and waive their lien upon or possessory right to that lumber, he would, until such time as he should write the defendants of his final conclusion, "go good for what they are shipping." It will be observed that he did not promise to pay the debt of the Fair Lumber Company, amounting to $27,600; nor did he promise to pay only the amount of $6.50 per 1,000 feet for such lumber as should be shipped under the oral agreement. He did promise to "go good” for such lumber as should be shipped under that agreement, and that promise we understand to be an agreement to be responsible to and to pay the defendants in error the value of such lumber as they should pe it to be shipped under that agreement, and that irrespective of the debt of the Fair Lumber Company upon that quantum of lumber, and irrespective of the total indebtedness. It is at least doubtful whether this promise, if so properly construed, is not an original promise; whether it had relation to the debt of the Fair Lumber Company to the defendants in error; and whether it was not a promise for the payment of the value of the lumber shipped, without reference to any debt from another. Chandler v. Davidson, 6 Blackf. 367; Lessel v. Zillmer, 105 Wis. 334, 81 N. W. 403. Nor are we able to say, as matter of law, under the circumstances stated, and in view of Mr. Choate's evidence with regard to the receipt of the proceeds of the lumber by his company, that his promise was not made upon "a new consideration moving to the promisor, and beneficial to him," and that his "leading object” was not to benefit himself. These were questions proper to be submitted to the jury, and were so submitted under instructions most beneficial to the plaintiff in error, and we cannot disturb the verdict. The judgment is affirmed.
Sufficiency of Expression of Consideration in Memorandum within
Statute of Frauds. 1. "For Value Received."
[a] The words "for value received,” contained in a written guaranty, express the consideration sufficiently to satisfy the statute of frauds. -Ala. Sup. 1896) Flowers v. Steiner, 108 Ala. 440, 19 South. 321;
(Del. Super. 1832) Brooks v. Morgan, 1 Har. 123; (Md. App. 1888) Emerson v. 0. Aultman & Co., 69 Md. 125, 14 Atl. 671; (Minn. Sup. 1885) D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307, 25 N. W.
606, 57 Am. Rep. 55; (N. Y. Sup. 1838) Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557; (1840) Douglass v.
Howland, 24 Wend. 35; (1856) Cooper v. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 516; (1891) Smith v. Northrup, 29 N. Y. Supp. 851, 80 Hun, 65; (App. 1861) Miller v. Cook, 23 N. Y. 495, 22 How. Prac. 66; (1866) Mosher v. Hotchkiss, 3
Abb. Dec. 326; (S. C. Sup. 1820) Caldwell v. McKain, 2 Nott & McC. 555; (1830) McMor
ris v. Herndon, 2 Bailey, 56, 21 Am. Dec. 515; (1837) Woodward v.
Pickett, Dud. Law, 30; (Wis. Sup. 1855) Day v. Elmore, 4 Wis. 190; (1878) Dahlman v. Ham[b] The words "for value received,” in a contract, sufficiently express the consideration within the requirement of the statute of frauds. -(Md. App. 1847) Edelen v. Gough, 5 Gill, 103;
mel, 45 Wis. 466.
(N. Y. Super. 1862) Howard v. Holbrook, 22 N. Y. Super. Ct. 237;
(Wis. Sup. 1859) Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413. [c] (Ala. Sup. 1898) The words "for value received," in a note, express a consideration sutticient to satisfy the statute of frauds.-Booth v. Fire-Engine Co., 24 South. 405.
[d] (S. C. Sup. 1820) An unsealed instrument of writing in the form of a penal bond, whereby A. and B. acknowledge themselves held and firmly bound in a certain sum for value received, with a condition that the obligation should be void if the obligors should pay half of a debt due by B, and C., is not void, under the statute of frauds, as being a mere nude promise to pay the debt of a third person, but is founded on a sufficient consideration, which appears in the writing.–Aikin v. Duren, 2 Nott & McO. 370. 2. Effect of Seal.
[a] The presence of a seal is sufficient recital of consideration to satisfy the statute of frauds. —(Ind. Sup. 1844) Gregory v. Logan, 7 Blackf. 112;
(Or. Sup. 1893) Johnston v. Wadsworth, 24 Or. 494, 34 Pac. 13. [b] (N. Y.) Where an instrument of guaranty is under seal, this expresses sufficient consideration to be deemed a compliance with the statute requiring it to be expressed.—(Sup. 1840) Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35; (1894) Smith v. Northrup, 29 N. Y. Supp. 851, 80 Hun, 65; (Super. 1859) McKensie v. Farrell, 17 N. Y. Super. Ct. 192; (Com. Pl. 1854) Rosenbaum v. Gunter, 2 E. D. Smith, 415. 3. Agreements in Consideration of Marriage.
[a] (Minn. Sup. 1896) A writing as follows: "I, the undersigned, herewith promise to pay to the Widow M. G., on the wedding day, when she shall become my wife, the sum of $1,000,"— did not express the consideration for its execution with reasonable clearness, within Gen. St. 1894, § 4209.-Siemers v. Siemers, 65 Minn. 104, 67 N. W. 802, 60 Am. St. Rep. 430. 4. Agreements to Answer for Debt of Another.
[a] (Md. App. 1878) While the statute of frauds requires that the written contract of guaranty shall show the consideration on which it rests, it is not necessary that the consideration be stated in express terms. It is sufficient if it can be collected or implied with certainty from the instrument itself.Ordeman v. Lawson, 49 Md. 135;
(Minn. Sup. 1874) Sewing Machine Co. v. Schnell, 20 Minn. 40 (Gil. 33); (N. H. Sup. 1858) Simons v. Steele, 36 N. H, 73;
(N. J. Sup. 1815) Laing v. Lee, 20 N. J. Law, 337. [b] (Ala. Sup. 1881) A mortgage executed by one person to secure the debt of another, containing an obligation that the mortgagee will insure the mortgaged premises for two years, fulfills the requirements of Code 1876, $ 2121, that the consideration shall be expressed in writing.-Moog v. Strang, 69 Ala. 98.
[c] (Ala. Sup. 1898) A bond for the costs of an election contest is not void, under the statute of frauds, though it does not in terms express the consideration, when it shows that the consideration was the institution of the contest.- McDonald v. Wood, 24 South. 86.
[d] (Me. Sup. 1851) Where A. gave B. a writing in these words, “I will be responsible to B. to pay a note (describing it as being the note of C.), my responsibility to be the same as if I signed the note, and will not require notice of its nonpayment,” it was held that the writing did not, of itself, or in connection with the note, import a consideration for the agreement of A. -Cutler v. Everett, 33 Me. 201.
[e] (Md. App. 1867) A guaranty in these words: “I hereby hold myself responsible to A. and B. to the amount of $2,000 for any drafts they have accepted, or may hereafter accept, for L. Witness my hand this i6th of May, 1860. (Signed] H.,”-sets forth a sufficient consideration, as to subsequent acceptances, to satisfy the statute of frauds; the liability of the acceptors to suffer loss being a good consideration.-Hutton v. Padgett, 26 Md. 228.
[f] (Md. App. 1877) A written guaranty reading: “We, the undersigned, take pleasure in recommending S. to D. We also severally agree to become responsible for $350 to said D., to be forthcoming in thirty days after the final delivery of the work,”-does not sufficiently set forth the consideration thereof to satisfy the statute of frauds.—Deutsch v. Bond, 46 Md. 164.
[gl (Mass. Sup. 1813) A written promise by A. to B. that if B. will delay the service of an execution against C. until a certain date, A. will pay the amount of the execution, if cot paid on that date by C., sufficiently complies with the statute of frauds, without reciting a promise by B. to so delay service of the execution.—Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. 230, 6 Am. Dec. 119.
[h} (Minn. Sup. 1895) A letter by which defendant requested plaintiff to sell goods to a third person, and agreed that he would "see them paid for," sufficiently expresses the consideration for the guaranty to satisfy the statute of frauds.-Straight v. Wight, 60 Minn. 515, 63 N. W. 105.
[i] (Mont. Sup. 1879) An appellant's attorney by letter directed the clerk of the district court to complete the transcript by a specified time, so that it might be used for certain purposes by the client, and therein guarantied payment of the clerk's fees by him. Hcld, that the letter was a sufficient memorandum “expressing the consideration,” within Cod. St. p. 393, $ 12.—O'Bannon v. Chumasero, 3 Mont. 419.
[j] (N. J. Sup. 1845) Where one of the creditors of a merchant writes to another, informing him that he (the writer) has, to protect himself and the other creditors and to save the stock from going into the bankruptcy court, purchased the stock of the debtor, and intends to close it out as rapidly and with as little expense as possible "for the benefit of the creditors,” and says, "You may consider me as security or indorser" for the amount owing by the debtor, the consideration for the promise of security sufficiently appears.Laing v. Lee, 20 N. J. Law, 337.
 (N. Y. App. 1850) As a promise to do an act in consideration of some act to be done by the promisee implies a request, if an agreement of guaranty made in this manner be in writing, there is a sufficient setting forth of the consideration to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.-Bank v. Coster's Ex'rs, 3 X. Y. 203.
 (N. Y. App. 1855) A letter saying, “I will be responsible for what stock M. has had or may want hereafter, to the amount of $500," sufficiently expresses the consideration, within the statute of frauds.—Gates v. McKee, 13 N. Y. 232, 64 Am. Dec. 545.
(m) (N. Y. Sup. 1833) Where a party by a written instrument acknowledges to have received the deed conveying to a third person land to be paid for in a specified manner, and at the foot of the instrument promises to see the contract fulfilled, the consideration for such promise sufficiently appears to take the agreement without the statute; and where the deed is executed to enable the grantee to compromise with persons in possession, and the grantee conveys a portion of the land and receives the consideration money, the guarantor of the contract is liable for the money thus received.–Stymets v. Brooks, 10 Wend, 206.
[n] (N. Y. Sup. 1813) A general letter of credit, whereby the writer engages to guaranty the payment of such debts as the bearer may contract on the usual credit to a specified amount, sufficiently expresses its consideration.Benedict v. Sherill, Hill & D. Supp 219.
(0) (N. Y. Sup. 1851) Where a person, by an instrument in writing, under seal, expressing a consideration of one dollar to him in hand paid, guaranties the payment of a debt owing by another, the consideration thus expressed is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, and to support an action upon the guaranty, notwithstanding the defendants prove on the trial that the one dollar was not in fact paid.—Childs v. Barnum, 11 Barb. 14, affirming Barnum v. Childs (Super. 1847) 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 58.
[p] (N. Y. Sup. 1877) Since the passage of Laws 1863, c. 464, a promise to pay the debt of another need not expressly state a consideration. It is enough if the consideration appears by necessary implication, in construing the memorandum.—Castle v. Beardsley, 10 Hun, 343.
[q, r) (N. Y. Sup. 1894) A guaranty of the payment of an overdue bond "within one year from the date of this instrument" shows that the guaranty was in consideration of extending the time of payment of the bond for one year, and sufficiently states the consideration, within the requirements of the statute of frauds.-Smith v. Northrup, 80 Hun, 65, 29 N. Y. Supp. 851, affirmed (App. 1895) 145 N. Y. 627, 40 N. E. 165.
[s] (N. Y. Super. 1850) A letter written to G., stating that, if the owner of a specified house would let it to G. at a rent named, the writer would become security for G., and directing G. to state the same and to send the papers to the writer for execution, expresses on its face a sufficient considertion to sustain the promise, within the statute of frauds.—Waterbury v. Graham, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 215.
[t] (Vt. Sup. 1863) A letter to an attorney in which defendant assures the attorney that his (defendant's) brother is “perfectly good," and binds himself to be accountable that plaintiff shall be paid for services rendered and to be rendered in a certain suit, sufficiently expresses a consideration.—Roberts v. Griswold, 35 Vt. 496, 84 Am. Dec. 641.
[u] (Wis. Sup. 1857) A letter of guaranty informing the persons to whom it is addressed that “Mr. C. [the bearer of the letter] will purchase a small stock of clothing of you, which I hope you will sell him cheap," sufficiently expresses the consideration.—Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis. 232.
[v] (Wis. Sup. 1863) If an undertaking on appeal could be held to be an agreement to answer for the debt of another, the recital of the rendition of judgment that the party against whom it is rendered feels aggrieved thereby, and intends to appeal therefrom, and wishes to stay the execution of the same, expresses a sufficient consideration, under the statute of frauds.Johnson v. Noonan, 16 Wis. 687.
[w] (Wis. Sup. 1865) A memorandum in the following form: "I will be responsible for the purchase of goods from W. S. & Co., for H. C. D., or by his order, until I give them notice to the contrary,"-dated and signed by defendant, expresses a consideration, and is a valid agreement within the statute of frauds.— Williams v. Ketchum, 19 Wis. 231.
[x] (Wis. Sup. 1897) A written warranty of an "account" of a certain person, where the word "account” refers to an indebtedness about to be incurred, sufficiently expresses the consideration to satisfy the statute of frauds.Waldheim v. Miller, 72 N. W. 869, 95 Wis. 300. 5. Past Consideration.
[a] (N. Y. Sup. 1862) A dispatch: "I will be responsible for P.'s bill of goods ordered yesterday. R.,"-aided by proof that P. had ordered goods, and that the seller bad written to R. declining to deliver them on P.'s order, sufficiently expresses on its face a present consideration.—Dunning v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 463.
[b] (N. Y. Super. 1850) Upon a purchase of goods of the plaintiffs by A. & Co., the defendant guarantied the payment of the price by an instrument in these words: "Bill, October 20, 1844, $1,306.29. I hereby agree to guaranty the payment of A. & Co.'s note for the above amount, in favor of Mess's. Weed, Masters & Weed, payable nine months after rite thereof, viz. from 20 October, 1844.” Held, that the guaranty by its terms plainly expressed a past consideration, and therefore, for want of a valid consideration, would not support an action, within the statute of frauds.-Weed v. Clarke, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 31.
[c] (N. Y. Com. Pl. 1892) A recital in an alleged contract of guaranty, as a consideration therefor, that the guarantor had entered into various contracts with a certain other person, shows a past consideration, and is insufficient to support the guaranty.-Marston v. French, 17 N. Y. Supp. 509. 6. Indorsement of Notes.
[a] (Ala. Sup. 1893) A blank indorsement of a note by one not a party thereto is, so long as the note remains in the hands of the payee, void under
the statute of frauds, as an undertaking to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, for which no consideration was expressed.--Hood v. Robbins, 98 Ala. 481, 13 South. 574.
[b] (Md. App. 1879) A. wrote her name across the back of a single bill nine months after its delivery. The payee sued A. as upon a guaranty, and at the trial wrote over her signature matter purporting to be a contract of guaranty, and offered testimony tending to show the contract between himself and the maker of the bill to have been incomplete before the indorsement, and that until then the bill had been delivered provisionally only, and that he parted with his money in consideration of the above. Held, that the statute of frauds was a bar to the suit, since the mere blank indorsement is not a sufficient writing, not showing the consideration, and the subsequent writing was not signed by the defendant.-Culbertson v. Smith, 52 Md. 628, 36 Am. Rep. 384.
(c) (Minn. Sup. 1869) A mere signature on the back of a note is not sufficient to evidence a contract of guaranty. There must, under the statute of frauds, be a memorandum expressing a consideration.—Moor v. Folsom, 14 Minn. 340 (Gil. 260), 100 Am. Dec. 227. 7. Reference to Original Contract.
(a) (Cal. Sup. 1859) The order for an injunction is to be taken in connection with the injunction bond, and, when so taken, sufficiently expresses the consideration, within our statute of frauds.—Prader v. Purkett, 13 Cal. 588.
[b] (Cal. Sup. 186-1) By indorsement of a contract at the time at which it is made, the indorsee makes the language of the contract his own, and it is not necessary that the consideration should be expressed in any set phrase.Otis v. Haseltine, 27 Cal. 80.
[c] (N. Y. App. 1850) Where A. by a general letter of credit undertook to accept and pay drafts to be drawn by B. to a given amount, and C., at the foot of the letter, at the same time wrote and signed these words: “I hereby agree to guaranty the due acceptance and payment of any draft or drafts issued in virtue of the above credit,"—the letter and guaranty should be read together; and hence the consideration of the guaranty was sufficiently expressed to satisfy the statute of frauds.-Bank v. Coster, 3 N. Y. 203, 53 Am. Dec. 280, affirming (Super. 1848) 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. 563.
(d) (N. Y. App. 1860) A. and B. contracted in writing for the sale of goods. C. indorsed on the writing, at the time of the agreement, “I will be responsible for all such goods as B. shall buy of A. and shall not pay for according to the within agreement.” Held, that the undertaking sufficiently expressed the consideration thereof to be the delivery of goods at the guarantor's request, without any reference to the writing it was indorsed upon.—Church v. Brown, 21 N. Y. 315, reversing judgment (Sup. 1859) 29 Barb. 486.
[e] (N. Y. Sup. 1814) Plaintiffs having issued a fi. fa. against their debtor, he executed an agreement to deliver them at a future date goods at specified prices to pay the same, in consideration that plaintiffs would, the costs being paid, return the execution unsatisfied. Defendant signed a guaranty at the bottom thereof. Held, that this was an original, and not a collateral, undertaking on defendant's part, in which no consideration need be expressed; but, if necessary, the consideration was sufficiently expressed by reference to the debtor's undertaking.–Bailey v. Freeman, 11 Johns. 221, 6 Am. Dec. 371.
(f) (N. Y. Sup. 1833) A factor, being sued for a breach of warranty as to the quality of goods sold, refused to pay over to his principals balance of the proceeds of the sale until he was indemnified against the suit, in which issue had been joined. His principals thereupon addressed a note to third persons, stating the existence of the suit, that the sale was on their account, and that they wished to indemnify the factor, and requested them to pay to their factor, as he might require, all such sums as he might be required to pay by way of damages and costs, and to charge them to the principals. The persons to whom the note was addressed indorsed and signed an engagement thereon as follows: "We will promptly comply with the request of Messrs. L. M. & Sons, as contained in the within order." Upon the receipt of such engagement, the factor paid over to his principals the balance. Held,