cured by the lodge system exclusively. Not all commercial travelers may become members entitled to the benefits of the insurance. An application is required, setting forth the willingness of each applicant to submit to a physical examination, and waiving all provisions of law now existing or that may hereafter exist preventing any examining or attending physician from disclosing any information acquired while acting in a professional capacity or otherwise, or rendering him incompetent to testify as a witness in any way whatever. The "benefits" are stated at a fixed amount in case of death, and certain specific sums for various injuries. It is evident that persons not answering these questions satisfactorily, though otherwise eligible, would be rejected as members. We do not discover in this association the features which characterize associations which the statute exempts from its provisions. We are strengthened in this conclusion by a letter from the superintendent of the insurance department of Missouri, which seems to have been admitted without objection, wherein it is declared:

"After an examination of the constitution and by-laws of the Travelers' Protective Association of America, forwarded by you to this department, I beg leave to inform you that the association not only fails to meet the requirements of the law governing this class of organizations, in reference to having a lodge system with ritualistic form of work," etc.

We concur in the view herein expressed that the association has no lodge system, with ritualistic form of work, and, we may add, no lodge system by means of which members are exclusively secured. In order to exempt it from the requirements of the Kentucky statute above quoted, it must secure its members through that system exclusively. We are, therefore, of opinion that this association was one coming within the purview of the Kentucky statute, and was transacting business when it obtained members and issued certificates to persons within that commonwealth. The provision of the constitution relied on was therefore required to be printed upon or attached to the certificate, and for failure to comply with the law in this respect the limitation is not a defense.

It is urged that this construction will prevent the plaintiff from recovery under this certificate, as the constitution must be looked to in order to make out a recovery of any amount, and no part of it is printed upon the certificate. But we find that the certificate undertakes that the "benefits," in case of death, shall be payable to the beneficiary. It does not introduce any new element of contract between the parties to ascertain the amount of this benefit from the constitution. The purpose of this statute is to require the company, in its policy or certificate, to bring all of the provisions of the contract to the attention of the insured, and definitely fix the conditions of the insurance beyond the power of others to change or enlarge the contract after his decease. To escape payment because the certificate did not comply with the statute, by failing to print the provisions fixing the amount to be recovered in case of death, would be permitting the company to avoid the contract by its own wrong in failing to comply with the statute.

It is urged further by defendant in error that it was correct to

instruct the jury for the defendant, because it appears that, Corley having been killed by a gunshot wound inflicted by another, his death was not accidental, and that the company was not liable for death by intentional injury. We think it is the true rule that if the deceased was killed by one incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or forming a rational intent to do the act, then the death would not be intentional, any more than it would be if it happened through some unforeseen accident. There is testimony in the record tending to show that the slayer of Corley was insane at the time of the act, sufficient to carry the question to the jury.

It is also urged that the beneficiary was not adopted in accordance with the laws of Kentucky, and therefore had no insurable interest in the life of the assured. The record of adoption, it is said, does not disclose that the wife of Corley, then living, joined in the application for adoption. We think, however, for the purposes of this case, the adoption is sufficiently shown, and against collateral attack it will be presumed that the statute of Kentucky was complied with; there being nothing in the record to exclude this conclusion.

We think, therefore, that the case should have been submitted to the jury upon the issue of intentional killing, and that the court erred in holding the case barred by the six-months limitation contained in the constitution. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

1. Validity.

NOTE.

What Law Governs Insurance Policies..

[a] Where the contract of insurance is made and the policies issued in another state, it cannot be objected that the company has not complied with the laws relating to foreign insurance companies doing business within the state where suit is brought.

—(U. S. C. C., Ark., 1890) Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 643:

(Mass. Sup. 1899)

Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Fairbanks Can

ning Co., 53 N. E. 373;

(N. J. Sup. 1874) Insurance Co. v. Kinyon, 37 N. J. Law, 33.

[b] (U. S. C. C., Or., 1880) A policy issued from the office of plaintiff in Milwaukee, Wis., upon the life of M. E. in Portland, Or., and afterwards sent to the local agent there for delivery, contained a clause to the effect that the policy was not binding upon the company until countersigned and delivered there and premium paid accordingly. Held, that the contract was completed in Oregon, that its validity must be determined by the laws of Oregon, and that, plaintiff being prohibited from doing business in Oregon, the contract was void.-Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 5 Fed. 225.

[c] (U. S. D. C., Ind., 1876) Where an application for insurance on certain property, and a note and sum of money that constituted the premiums, were sent from Indiana by an agent of the company to the home office in Illinois, and were examined and accepted by the proper officer, held, that the contract was made in Illinois, and must be governed by its laws.-Lamb v. Bowser, Fed. Cas. No. 8,008 [7 Biss. 315].

[d] (Ill. Sup. 1895) An Illinois insurance company, which delivers in Illinois to a citizen of Wisconsin a policy insuring property in the latter state, is subject, in a suit on such policy, to the laws of Wisconsin as to service of summons on insurance companies.-Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 40 N. E. 488, 155 III. 204, 46 Am. St. Rep. 335, affirming (1894) 51 Ill. App. 339.

[e] (Ky. App. 1867) Where notes sued on were given for premiums for in

surance, and a contract was made through an agent in Indiana, the lex loci must determine their legal validity and effect, and therefore, if under the laws of Indiana the policy of insurance is void, the notes cannot be enforced. -Archer v. Insurance Co., 2 Bush, 226.

[f] (La. Sup. 1894) Where an open policy of insurance on shipment of goods contains all the conditions which govern the shipment, and the company reserves the right to accept or reject the risk on each shipment, the contract must be considered as made at the domicile of the company issuing the policy, within Acts 1890, No. 150, § 7, prohibiting foreign insurance companies from doing business in the state without a license.-State v. Williams, 15 South. 290, 46 La. Ann. 922.

[g] (Mich. Sup. 1892) The fact that an application for life insurance is made in Michigan does not render the contract a Michigan contract, where it appears in the by-laws indorsed upon the policy that the application was to be of no force until approved at the principal office situated in another state, and in the application furnished the assured that the contract should be considered as entered into in such other state and governed by the laws of such state.-Voorheis v. Society, 51 N. W. 1109, 91 Mich. 469.

[h] (Mo. Sup. 1899) Premiums on insurance policies in favor of a corporation in Missouri were paid in the first instance by the president of the corporation, in Chicago, to a company organized in the state of Illinois, but were ultimately paid by the corporation in Missouri. The insurance company had in no manner complied with the laws of Missouri authorizing foreign corporations to do business in the state. Held, that the contract of insurance was entered into in the state of Illinois, and was not affected by the laws of Missouri.-Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 50 S. W. 281, 149 Mo. 165.

[i] (N. H. Sup. 1892)

A resident of Massachusetts applied by mail, through a broker in Indiana, to the insurer in New Hampshire, for insurance on property situated in Massachusetts. Insurer issued in its business two forms of policies,―one, the standard policy required by the law of New Hampshire, on property situated in New Hampshire; the other, on property situated out of the state, which contained prov.sions prohibited by the laws of New Hampshire. The policy accepted by insured was of the latter kind. Held, that the intention of the parties was to contract in regard to the laws of Massachusetts, and therefore provisions in the policy prohibited by the laws of New Hampshire were not invalid.-Davis v. Insurance Co., 34 Atl. 464, 67 N. H. 218.

[j] (N. J. Sup. 1878) An application for insurance on property in New Jersey was made in that state to the agent in Pennsylvania, it being agreed that a policy should be issued when the application was approved. Upon receipt of the application at the company's office in Pennsylvania, it was approved, and a policy mailed to insured. Held, that the contract of insurance was a Pennsylvania contract, and enforceable in New Jersey, though the agent had not complied with the laws of the latter state relating to foreign insurance companies.-Insurance Co. v. Tuttle, 40 N. J. Law, 476.

[k] (N. Y. App. 1855) The agent in Canada of an insurance company incorporated in New York received and forwarded to the secretary of the company in New York a proposal for insurance on property in Canada, the proposal was accepted, and a premium note left with the secretary, who issued the policy and sent it to the agent in Canada, by whom it was delivered to the insured. Held, that the contract of insurance, was a New York contract. -Western v. Insurance Co., 12 N. Y. 258.

[1] (N. Y. Super. 1853) A wager policy of life insurance made by a company incorporated in another state, being valid at common law, will be presumed to be valid in that state, though it is invalid by the laws of the state where it is in suit.-St. John v. Insurance Co., 9 N. Y. Super. Ct. 419.

[m] (Pa. Com. Pl. 1894) A wagering life policy cannot be enforced in Pennsylvania, though valid in the insurer's state, nor can the premiums paid thereon be recovered.-McDermott v. Insurance Co., 7 Kulp, 246.

[n] (Vt. Sup. 1899) A fire insurance agent representing several companies informed an applicant that he could only place his insurance in a company which was not authorized to do business in the state, and in procuring the

policy he would have to act as the agent of the applicant. The applicant signed an application, which the agent forwarded to the home office in Massachusetts, where it was accepted, and a policy issued, and mailed to the agent, with a request that he collect the premium. Held, that the policy was a Massachusetts contract, governed by the laws of that state, and was valid under V. S. §§ 4181, 4182, prohibiting foreign insurance companies from doing business in Vermont unless authorized by the insurance commissioners, except that residents of Vermont may procure insurance at the home office of foreign companies not authorized to do business in the state.-Baker v. Spaulding, 42 Atl. 982.

[o] (Wis. Sup. 1895) Brokers domiciled in Illinois solicited fire insurance from defendant, a Wisconsin corporation, which consented to take insurance on certain Iowa property in acceptable companies, whereupon the brokers requested plaintiff, by letter addressed to its home office in Wisconsin, to write a portion of the insurance. Plaintiff sent to the brokers a blank application and a blank premium note and a policy dated in Wisconsin, which recited that the application was a part of the policy, and was on file at its office, and the brokers sent the papers to defendant's office in Missouri. Defendant filled out the application and note and returned them to the brokers, who sent them to plaintiff. Held, that the contract of insurance was executed in Wisconsin.-Seamans v. Knapp, Stout & Co. Company, 61 N. W. 757, 89 Wis. 171, 27 L. R. A. 362, 46 Am. St. Rep. 825.

[p] (Wis. Sup. 1895) An insurance company may, within the state of its domicile, make valid contracts of insurance against fire on property situated in a sister state, without regard to the laws of the latter state.--Seamans v. Knapp, Stout & Co. Company, 61 N. W. 757, 89 Wis. 171, 27 L. R. A. 362, 46 Am. St. Rep. 825.

2. Construction.

[a] (Wash. Sup. 1894) A life insurance policy, issued in Pennsylvania, which contains a stipulation that it "is a contract made and to be executed in the state of New York, and shall be construed only according to the laws" of that state, will be construed as though actually executed and delivered in New York.-Griesemer v. Insurance Co., 38 Pac. 1031, 10 Wash. 202; Id., 38 Pac. 1034, 10 Wash. 211.

[b] (U. S. Sup., Pa., 1897) A contract of marine insurance made by an English company, in this country, upon a cargo to be exported to Portugal, which specially provides that in case of loss the amount of damages are to be paid at the office of the company in London, the adjustment to be made according to the usages of Lloyds, being a contract to be performed in England, is governed by the English law.-London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, 17 Sup. Ct. 785, 167 U. S. 149, 42 L. Ed. 113.

[e] (U. S. C. C. A., Cal., 1898) Where a policy issued by an English corporation provides that all claims under it are to be established according to the customs of the English Lloyds, the words of an average clause contained therein are to be understood in the sense given to them by the English law. -Canton Ins. Office v. Woodside, 33 C. C. A. 63, 90 Fed. 301, modifying (D. C. 1897) 84 Fed. 283.

[d] (U. S. C. C. A., Tenn., 1896) A life insurance policy, issued upon an application which is made part thereof, and which expressly provides that the place of the contract shall be the city of Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, is to be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania, though the insured was a resident of Tennessee at the time of making the application.-Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 19 C. C. A. 286, 72 Fed. 413, 37 U. S. App. 692, 38 L. R. A. 33, 70.

[e] (U. S. C. C., Iowa, 1893) Where an application for insurance is made in one state by a citizen thereof, through agents located therein, to a company of another state, and the policy, though actually issued in such other state, took effect on payment of the first premium, and the policy is delivered and premium paid in the state where the application is made, the law of that state governs, and interprets the force of the contract.-Insurance Co. v. Robinson, 54 Fed. 580.

46 C.C.A.-19

[f] (U. S. C. C., Mo., 1891) A life insurance company chartered in the state of Illinois carried on its business in the state of Missouri through agents. The agent in Missouri would solicit applications for insurance, which he would forward to the company at Chicago. When an application was approved, a policy was filled up, dated, and signed by the officers of the company at Chicago. and transmitted by mail to the agent of the company in Missouri, who, upon the payment to him by the applicant of the first premium, called in this case an "entrance fee," delivered the policy to the assured. Held, that the company was "doing business" in the state of Missouri within the meaning of Rev. St. Mo. § 5982, and the policy was a Missouri, and not an Illinois, contract, and that the validity and legal effect of its stipulations must be determined by the laws of Missouri.-Berry v. Indem- nity Co., 46 Fed. 439.

[g] (Ala. Sup. 1875) A covenant in a life policy issued by a New York corporation, and to take effect on being countersigned by the agent in Alabama, to pay a certain sum to the children of insured in conformity to the statutes in such case made, is governed by the law of Alabama as to what persons come within the designation of "children."-Insurance Co. v. Webb, 54 Ala. 688.

[h] (Ark. Sup. 1895) Where the soliciting agent for a foreign insurance company has no authority to pass upon applications nor to issue policies, and the policies, when issued, are not sent to him for delivery, and the premiums paid are forwarded directly to the home office, the contracts of insurance are contracts of the state in which the home office is located.--State Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Brinkley Stave & Heading Co., 31 S. W. 157, 61 Ark. 1, 29 L. R. A. 712.

[i] (Iowa Sup. 1892) The secretary of defendant, an Iowa insurance company, not authorized to do business in Nebraska, while there solicited the insurance of plaintiff, a resident thereof, whereupon an application and premium notes were signed, payable at C., Iowa, the home office, from which place a policy was thereafter issued, payable in Iowa. Held, that the contract of insurance was made and completed in Iowa, and must be construed by its laws.-Marden v. Insurance Co., 52 N. W. 509, 85 Iowa, 584, 39 Am. St. Rep. 316.

[j] (Md. App. 1889) The fact that a policy given in Maryland is made by its terms a New York contract does not require the court of Maryland, when called upon for construction, to look to New York for authority.—Supreme Council v. Green, 17 Atl. 1048, 71 Md. 263, distinguished in Robinson v. Hurst (1893) 26 Atl. 956, 78 Md. 59, 44 Am. St. Rep. 266.

[k] (Mass. Sup. 1853) An insurance contract made with a New York company, dated and signed by the president and secretary in New York, and before taking effect as a contract from its countersignature delivered by the agent in Massachusetts, is to be interpreted by the Massachusetts law.-Daniels v. Insurance Co., 12 Cush. 416, 59 Am. Dec. 192.

[1] (Mass. Sup. 1857) A policy of insurance from a company established in another state, signed by their president and secretary there, but not to be valid until countersigned by their agent here, and issued by such agent, is to be interpreted by the laws of Massachusetts.-Heebner v. Insurance Co., 10 Gray, 131, 69 Am. Dec. 308.

[m] (Mass. Sup. 1895) A contract of fire insurance is to be construed with reference to the laws of the state in which the property is situated and the policy is issued.-King Brick-Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. E. 277, 164 Mass. 291.

[n] (Neb. Sup. 1900) A fire policy, providing that it should not be effective until countersigned by the appellant's agent in Nebraska, and actually delivered to the insured by the agent in Nebraska, is a Nebraska contract, and hence subject to construction under the laws of that state.-Antes v. Insurance Co., 84 N. W. 412.

[o] (N. Y. App. 1861) Plaintiff and defendant's agent negotiated a contract for life insurance in Georgia. Defendant was a New Jersey corporation, and the policy was dated at its principal office in New Jersey; and the court, in a suit in New York, presumed that the contract was to be performed